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One of the most important emitters of CO2 is the building stock, in particular the residential one. Although 
technical potential to increase buildings’ energy efficiency is available, a gap between actual and potential 
implementation persists and policymakers worldwide continuously try to explore new tools to support the 
retrofit uptake. Within this context, the UK committed itself to ambitious carbon emission reductions by 2050 
and there the housing stock is believed responsible for about 29% of total emissions. The main instruments 
used by British policymakers were energy obligations schemes and despite these policies performed 
relatively well, they were not able to substantially support the deep retrofit uptake necessary to reach 2050 
targets. In late 2012, a new market-based policy, called the Green Deal, was launched with the goal to 
substitute all the previous mechanisms and support the uptake of millions of retrofit measures, but it was a 
huge failure. The causes were partially identified in the lack of knowledge available on the dynamics involved. 
Moreover, British policymakers began to explore two new financial policies, stamp duty rebate and green 
mortgages, which systemic impact was never assessed. Hence, the objectives of the present dissertation 
were to uncover these dynamics related to British homeowners retrofit uptake, to evaluate the impacts of 
the two new policies, and, since the study was conducted a participatory system dynamics approach, to test 
if an adaptation of the traditional Devil’s Advocate script, in which the facilitators left their neutral role and 
act as the missing stakeholders, would be a successful way to tackle homogeneity in participatory workshops. 
This last was formulated since the research context posed this methodological challenge. The study was 
conducted in a joint project between University College London and the Department for Business, Energy 
and Industrial Strategy in which only policymakers could attend the workshops because of the confidentiality 
and time constraints, creating a situation of homogeneity that could had undermined outcomes’ quality. In 
the literature there were not techniques available to overtake the problem, therefore the new setting was 
developed and used. Although playing the Devil’s Advocate appeared to be challenging to facilitators, it 
proved to be successful and increased the heterogeneity in the room. The research resulted in a quantified 
model that depicted the dynamics related to British homeowner retrofit uptake. The study highlighted 
affordability as a necessary condition but not enough to raise retrofit: popularity and non-financial 
attractiveness are two factors that deeply drive measures uptake. The two tested policies showed low direct 
impacts on the system since they target a small segment of population. Nonetheless, indirect effects related 
to additional financial benefits may increase policies’ impact, although these effects are strongly dependent 
on the time markets need to perceived policy changes. No silver bullets are available in policymakers’ toolbox 
and a combination of policy instruments is necessary. Specifically, financial policies need to be integrated 
with interventions aimed to increase popularity and non-financial attractiveness of retrofit measures. 
Key words: housing stock, energy efficiency, retrofit, United Kingdom policymaking, system dynamics, 
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“… We need to really shake this up, to get it moving and we get this feedback! […] what you 
need to do is give the system a serious shock, not just play around with a few incentives; 
you need to change this really quickly …” 











1.1. Background and relevance 
Having a roof over the head is a primordial human need. For this reason, human beings have always built 
edifices, shelters and especially dwellings. This necessity is so widely recognized that providing all the citizens 
a decent place to live became in the last century one of the principal objectives of national governments (e.g. 
social housing) (Malpass, 2014). Until the pre-industrial era the whole building stock was not a source of any 
major threat to the environment, but, unfortunately, this has changed with the advent of the industrial 
revolution (IPCC, 2014). Modern factories took place and started to massively consume energy and pollute. 
Then, this condition extended to all the type of edifices. Among all the types of pollutants emitted by the 
building stock over time, greenhouse gasses (GHG), such as carbon dioxide (CO2), became one of the most 
menacing. Anthropogenic GHG emissions are the main responsible for one of the major threats to human 
society today: Climate Change (IPCC, 2014). While at the beginning the housing stock wasn’t playing a big 
role, as time went on its share of GHG emissions increased. Wealth diffusion, development of technologies 
(appliances), decrease in the household average size combined with an increasing population are all factors 
that made the housing stock consuming energy and become an crucial GHG emitter (Ürge-Vorsatz et al., 
2012). At the moment, there are plenty of functional and cost-effective technologies available, and new 
options are likely to come from the developments of research (Ürge-Vorsatz, Harvey, Mirasgedis, & Levine, 
2007). Nevertheless, achieving future with lower carbon emission from the housing stock will require very 
significant efforts to build up programs and policies aiming to do so, far beyond what it is happening today.  
Therefore, nowadays, policymakers all around the world are faced with this difficult contraposition in which 
a basic human need, such as having a dwelling, is causing a major threat to whole humanity. One of the main 
strategies they identified in order to tackle the issue is to decrease the energy efficiency of the housing stock 
(Kelly, 2009). On top of that, increasing the dwellings retrofit extent, the improving of existing buildings 
structure with energy efficiency equipment, has become a desirable goal also because achieving this 
objective could lead to additional co-benefits (e.g. green growth, poverty alleviation, energy security, etc.) 
that are really appreciated by citizens and politicians (Ryan & Campbell, 2012).  
United Kingdom (UK) is no exception to this situation. The country committed itself to the very ambitious 
pledges of carbon emission reduction of the 80% below 1990 levels by 2050 (Parliament of the United 
Kingdom, 2008) in order to do its part to ‘fight’ climate change.  However, although the UK has done fairly 
well so far, with current trends the CO2 abatement targets will be missed (Committee for Climate Change, 
2015; Kelly, 2009). Within this context, the housing sector represents a big share of UK energy consumption 
(Waters, 2016) and therefore it is getting British policymakers’ special attention. Owing the low replacement 
rate, the majority of the UK dwellings will be still in existence in 2050; therefore, retrofit has been identified 
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as one of the principal ways to tackle dwelling emissions. In the country, many technical measures for energy 
efficiency are potentially available. Nevertheless, the upgrading rate for energy efficiency installments is still 
limited and insufficient to meet national objectives (BEIS, 2017b; DECC, 2016b). Moreover, pursuing these 
goals has become important not only from an environmental perspective but also for other reasons. First, 
these improvements will help the government to tackle the widespread social problem of fuel poverty 
(households that can not afford to maintain properly warm their home at a fair cost; DECC, 2015). But also it 
has been observed that retrofitting housing stock would lead to greater energy security (Kelly, 2009), avoid 
energy grid structural enhancements (Erbach, 2015; Poudineh & Jamasb, 2014), foster green growth (Ryan 
& Campbell, 2012). Considering the importance of achieving efficiency in UK dwellings, policymakers started 
almost 20 years ago to implement policies aiming to support retrofit uptake rate among households 
(Rosenow, 2012). Since the first governmental interventions, almost all the policies had been based on a logic 
of subsidy (e.g. CERT, ECC1 and 2, ECO) for the households on the retrofit measure (Rosenow, 2012). Over 
time the schemes targets have progressively raised and these interventions delivered the promised carbon 
reduction in a relatively satisfactory way. However, the subsidies’ mechanism worked well for the UK short 
term pledges (Committee for Climate Change, 2015) until these types of policy structures became 
‘unsustainable’ for two reasons. First, these schemes were not able to support a retrofit uptake high enough 
to meet the long-term national targets. Second, in a difficult economic situation in which the country is going 
through, it was becoming more and more challenging to defend this system of subsidies to the retrofit 
market. Energy efficiency was not necessarily perceived as a priority and therefore maintaining these 
financial aids was getting expensive in terms of political capital. Therefore, in 2013, the Green Deal scheme 
was launched in grand style and it became the Government’s flagship green policy. It was based on innovative 
economic incentives on bills and it was intended to deliver energy efficiency retrofits at scale. It was expected 
to support millions of retrofit installations, but instead the scheme was undertake only by few thousands of 
households (Morse, 2016; Rosenow & Eyre, 2016) resulting in a resounding policy failure (Bishoff, 2013; 
Gosden, 2016; Syal, 2016; Vaughan, 2015). There are multiple reasons for this failure (Bonfield, 2016; Morse, 
2016; Rosenow & Eyre, 2016). However, one of the main causes was the poor design of the policy 
(complicated and not economically attractive) that forgot to take into account the complex dynamics 
involved in the homeowners retrofit uptake (Eker & Zimmermann, 2016; Macmillan et al., 2016) and ended 
up misjudging households behaviour and overlooking to many policy resistances and unintended 
consequences (Collins & Dempsey, 2017; Shrubsole, Macmillan, Davies, & May, 2014). Now, new policies are 
under examination by policymakers in order to fill the gap left by the Green Deal fiasco. The main direction 
is towards the creation of financial and fiscal instruments and two policies are being considered. First, a green 
mortgage policy, in which it is assumed that lenders starting to offer preferential mortgages for improving 
fabric energy efficiency or providing better conditions to home buyers that purchase houses with high 
efficiency standards, will stimulate the retrofit uptake. Second, it is a direct stamp duty rebate, namely a 
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discount on the fees to pay when a house is acquired if the dwelling under transaction is energetic efficient 
or if the buyer is committed to retrofit the property.   
Unfortunately, scientific sounded knowledge on this issue is lacking. There have been multiple studies on the 
homeowner decision-making process for the retrofit uptake (Wilson, Crane, & Chryssochoidis, 2015) but they 
are very specific and narrow focused on small sectors or portions of the retrofit system. Conversely, there 
are no studies that capture and explain the dynamics involved in the homeowners retrofit uptake rate in UK.  
In other words, there is not a robust knowledge from a more holistic perspective understanding loops, 
barriers, drivers and interaction between different actors and their decision-making processes related to the 
homeowner retrofit demand are still unknown. Moreover, the possible impacts of the two policies under 
investigation by policymakers have not been assessed and their effects on the retrofit market explored in 
scientific literature. 
1.2. Research context and setup 
To conduct this study System Dynamics (SD) methodology (Forrester, 1961; Sterman, 2000) was considered 
an optimal tool to improve our understanding over the issue through the use of causal maps and quantified 
models. Moreover, it was decided to use this method in its participatory form (Stave, 2010; Vennix, 1996). 
This approach is usually called Participatory System Dynamics Modelling (PSDM) and it directly involves 
stakeholders and experts in the process of map or model construction. This choice was made for two main 
reasons. First because including stakeholders and experts in the conceptualization and modelling phase may 
dramatically improve the quality of the outcomes and support possible implementation (Scott, Cavana, & 
Cameron, 2016). Second with respect of the relation between housing stock and energy efficiency, there 
have been many calls by scientist to use more PSDM to understand what are the dynamics involved (Eker & 
Zimmermann, 2016; Shrubsole et al., 2014) and to use this approach to concretely support policymakers in 
the decision process (Macmillan et al., 2016; Xing, Lannon, & Malcolm, 2014) with quantified SD models. 
A joint project between the Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), the former 
Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC), and the University College London (UCL) Institute for 
Environmental Design and Engineering (IEDE) offered the right context to conduct this investigation. Between 
March and April 2017, in London, a PSDM project was performed with policymakers from BEIS with the 
support of UCL researchers and in collaboration with Valerio Cappuccio, a fellow Erasmus Master in System 
Dynamics (EMSD) student. The project aimed to improve the departmental understanding of the dynamics 
involved in the homeowners retrofit uptake and to preliminary assess the likely outcomes of the green 
mortgage policy and of the stamp duty rebate. Unfortunately, the project took place in ‘pressure-cooker’ 
situation (Gerrits & Vaandrager, 2017). The time span for the research on the field was very short compared 
to usual PSDM approaches because the Department needed to have some preliminary insights very quickly. 
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In addition, due to the short time to arrange the participatory sessions and to the confidentiality of the issues 
discussed (the two policies were not publicly disclosed yet), only policymakers attended the sessions while 
all the other stakeholders were excluded. As a result, this condition of homogeneity in the participants’ 
group, not so uncommon in PSDM projects, could have decreased the quality of the outcomes (Gerrits & 
Vaandrager, 2017). Therefore, the study posed interesting methodological challenges. In response to this 
situation a new facilitation approach was prepared upfront, in line with the objectives of the dissertation, 
and developed as a possible way to overcome the problem. It consisted an adaptation of the traditional 
Devil’s Advocate in a new setting, in which facilitators leave their neutral roles and try to act like the missing 
stakeholder would do in the attempt to bring their mental models into the room.  
1.3. Research objectives and contribution 
Consequently to the gaps in literature identified above, the questions this dissertation tries to answer are 
the following:  
1) What are the dynamics involved in the homeowners retrofit uptake rate in UK? Specifically, what are 
the loops, barriers, drivers and interactions between different actors and their decision-making 
processes related to the homeowner retrofit demand? 
2) What will the impact on the uptake rate of financial policies, such as a green mortgage policy or a 
stamp duty rebate, be? Would they be effective from a dynamic perspective, namely would they be 
able to trigger virtuous feedback loops? 
In addition to these objectives, this thesis aims also to explore the effectiveness of the adapted and new 
Devil’s Advocate script as a tool to overcome homogeneity in a PSDM group of participant. Therefore, it tries 
to give a response to the following demand: 
3) In a PSDM case in which relevant stakeholders cannot be involved in the participatory process and 
homogeneity is present in the group of participants, how can missing stakeholders’ point of view be 
brought inside the PSDM sessions? What is the effectiveness of the adaptation of the Devil’s 
Advocate script presented in this thesis? 
The pursuit of these research objectives and the resulting insights are expected to improve our understanding 
of the retrofit system in the UK and to preliminary evaluate the impacts of financial policies under 
consideration in BEIS. Providing an answer to the last question could contribute to enrich the set of 
instruments in the toolbox of SD practitioners, since homogeneity issues are not uncommon in PSDM and 




1.4. Dissertation structure 
This dissertation is structured as follows. In the second chapter, a review is conducted on the literature 
discussing the environmental issues posed by the buildings’ stock (with an eye to the housing one) and the 
different methods and policies for their mitigation. In the third chapter, the specifics and peculiarities of the 
UK case are presented, such as: the challenges to policymakers, the knowledge gaps undermining previous 
policy efforts, an overview on the methods used before on this topic and on the related SD researches. Then 
in the fourth chapter, it is outlined the PSDM method developed and used to perform the study. Here it is 
also explained why a new approach to tackle homogeneity in groups in PSDM project is needed and how the 
new Devil’s advocate (DA) setting is structured. Subsequently, the fifth chapter describes and discusses the 
results of the research: first, the process and outcome products are shown, then the results of the new DA 
are analyzed, and later the simulations runs and policy tests performed through the model are shown and 
policy implications are discussed. Here there will not be a very detailed description of the model since this 
will be deeply disclosed in the dissertation of Valerio Cappuccio, the EMSD colleague the model has been 
built with. The last chapter, the sixth one, reports the main insights gained regarding the three research 
questions introduced before and indicates possible future pathways for additional studies on the subjects. 
Fig 1-1 illustrates the thesis chapters unfolding and the different level of analysis. 
  
Figure 1-1: Dissertation structure 
Source: conceived by the author 
 
Figure 2-1: Global anthropogenic CO2 emissions sources 
(2006).Figure 1-1: Dissertation structure 
Source: conceived by the author 
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2. Buildings’ stock and sustainability 
2.1. Buildings stock: a source of sustainability concerns 
Starting from the ground-breaking message of the book Limits to Growth (Meadows, Meadows, & Randers, 
1972), mankind has began to consider environmental sustainability as a potential obstruction to human 
prosperity. Sustainably is a complex and wide concept that offers an umbrella for a wide array of issues 
(ocean acidification, natural resources management, land use, etc.) and due to this variety and complexity it 
has been discussed for long time (Hopwood, Mellor, & O’Brien, 2005). Nevertheless, nowadays, despite some 
few skeptical niche-groups that remain, anthropogenic climate change has been almost definitely 
acknowledged as one of the major future sustainability threats to humanity. Greenhouse gasses (GHG) 
emissions, mostly in form of carbon-dioxide (CO2), can be pointed as the most important cause of this threat 
(IPCC, 2014). That has pushed human community (scientists, policy makers, etc.) to look at the sources of 
GHG in order to try to decrease their emission. What emerged is that the existing building stock is one of the 
most important responsible CO2 releaser worldwide (Allwood, Cullen, & Milford, 2010; Ürge-Vorsatz et al., 
2012; Ürge-Vorsatz, Harvey, Mirasgedis, & Levine, 2007) as it is possible to see in Figure 2-1.  
 
 
Ürge-Vorsatz et al. (2007) estimated that, in 2002, the building sector was ‘blameworthy’ of 7.85 Gt of carbon 
emission, accounting for 33% of the total. Since then, the situation hasn’t changed much at a global level as 
a later appraisal made by Ürge-Vorsatz et al. (2012) reports that the building stock is still responsible of a 
third of energy related carbon emissions. In addition to that, it contributes with roughly 1.5 Gt CO2 (Ürge-
Figure 2-1: Global anthropogenic CO2 emissions sources (2006) 
Source: Source: Allwood et al., 2010 p.1 
 
Figure 2-2: Impact of energy policy on world energy 
consumption (2000–2030)Figure 2-1: Global anthropogenic CO2 
emissions sources (2006). 
Source: Source: Allwood et al., 2010 p.1 
 
Figure 2-2: Impact of energy policy on world energy 
consumption (2000–2030) 




Vorsatz et al., 2007) equivalent emissions of halocarbons (type of gasses responsible not only of increasing 
global greenhouse effect but also of decreasing the thickness of the ozone layer), approximately two thirds 
of the total emission (Ürge-Vorsatz et al., 2012), as well as around 25-33% of black carbon emissions (Ürge-
Vorsatz et al., 2012). It has also projected that by 2030 there will be a growth in building  absolute emissions 
reaching a range between 11 and 15.6 Gt/year, with the share of the sector remaining around one third of 
the total (Ürge-Vorsatz et al., 2007). However, other studies state that the building energy use and related 
CO2 emissions may even double or possibly triple by 2050 because of many tendencies (Lucon et al., 2014). 
These trends are connected to the fact that an increasingly number of people in developing countries will 
access to adequate housing, electricity, and improved cooking facilities from today to mid-century (Lucon et 
al., 2014). Moreover, households size changes (decreasing number of people per households) and variations 
in wealth level and lifestyle habits (e.g., rise in the average number of appliances per household) all around 
the world will contribute to increase building energy use (Lucon et al., 2014). In this context, residential 
buildings play a key role since they are responsible for the nearly 18% of direct CO2 emissions (World Health 
Organization, 2011). This generates a very challenging contrast, where on one side housing is a basic human 
necessity and right (United Nations, 1948) and on the other one housing is a major contributor to Climate 
Change, one of the most important threats to humanity. However, the residential stock can become also part 
of the solution to the problem. Housing have been described by the IPPC (2014) to have one of the greatest 
potential compared to other sectors (i.e., industry, transport, , waste generation, energy supply, forestry) for 
reducing GHG emissions in a cost-effectively way, in short time and using mature available technologies 
(World Health Organization, 2011) compared to other sectors. Providing some numbers can help to 
understand the magnitude of the phenomena: for example, reductions in heating energy requirements of 50 
to 75 % in single-family housing that can even increase up reaching peaks close to 90 % in multi-family housing 
for average costs of approximately 100-400 US$(2010)/m2  (Harvey, 2013).  
Kelly (2009), in line with Lucon et al. (2014) and Ürge-Vorsatz et al. (2007), has identified mainly four ways 
by which carbon emission can be cut down from the existing buildings and housing stock:  
- re-engineering the fabric of the buildings 
- improving the energy efficiency of appliances used in houses and offices 
- decarbonizing the sources of energy to the home  
- and changes in personal behaviour  
The last point involves social and psychological aspects and regards population educational processes more 
than edifices themselves. Also the decarbonisation of the energy sources (through the decarbonized grid and 
use of local or distant renewable sources of energy) is more related to the way energy consumed by edifices 
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than directly to how the building consumes energy. Whilst the first two ways, re-engineering the fabric of 
the edifices and improving the performance of appliances at parity of energy consumption, directly regard 
the action to close the buildings and housing energy efficiency gap and this will be the focus from now on.  
2.2. Energy efficiency gap: a complex system 
The energy efficiency gap has been defined as the “discrepancy between optimal and actual implementation 
of energy efficient technologies” (Backlund, Thollander, Palm, & Ottosson, 2012). At the moment, there is a 
wide set of relatively accessible and cost-effective technologies that could decrease buildings energy 
consumption by a notable extent that have not been broadly adopted (Ürge-Vorsatz et al., 2007). In this 
respect, Yang (2012) reports that the International Energy Agency (IEA) calculated the potential for energy 
efficiency improvements to range approximately between 20% and 50% of the total energy consumption. 
Other estimations show that closing the general energy efficiency gap would help to save around the 20% of 
the total final energy consumption from 2010 to 2030 in OECD countries and of that increased energy 
efficiency in buildings will account for around 34% (Jollands et al., 2010) (Fig 2-2). This seems to be in line 
with the IEA estimations (Yang, 2012). Moreover, in developing countries the potential can be considered 
even larger since there are more low-cost energy efficiency opportunities in these nations that have not been 
tackled yet and because of the diffused use of inefficient technologies  (Yang, 2012).   
 
Another useful way to look at the energy efficiency gap is as the “difference between the actual level of energy 
efficiency and the higher level that would be cost-effective from an individual’s or firm’s point of view” (Yang, 
Figure 2-2: Impact of energy policy on world energy consumption (2000–2030) 
Source: Yang, 2012 p.11 
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2012). From the economical point of view this implies it is possible to produce greater economic output using 
less energy and from a societal one that people do a highly inefficient use of energy (Lovins, 1976 cited in 
Yang, 2012, p. 11). Despite the clear benefits energy efficiency leads to, as it was shown, this gap is far to be 
close even though it seems potentially to be cost-effective. The causes of this situation have been identified 
in the presence of multiple barriers (financial, informational, behavioural, geographical, technological etc.) 
that inhibit the uptake rate of energy efficiency measures (Blok et al., 2007; Dowson, Poole, Harrison, & 
Susman, 2012; Lucon et al., 2014; Santangelo & Tondelli, 2017; Tuominen, Klobut, Tolman, Adjei, & De Best-
Waldhober, 2012; Ürge-Vorsatz, Koeppel, & Mirasgedis, 2007; Wilson et al., 2015; Yang, 2012). These 
obstacles, act also as market barriers since hinder the growth of the energy efficiency businesses, act on 
several levels of society, such as on households, on firms, on regional governments, on nations (Lucon et al., 
2014; Yang, 2012), pushing government and international bodies (e.g. United Nations Framework for Climate 
Change, IEA, etc.) for policy interventions (Yang, 2012). Due to this multiplicity, the understanding of these 
obstacles comes from several disciplines, including economics, engineering, sociology, anthropology, and 
psychology. Nonetheless the many forces employed, there is still no consensus about the nature, origin and 
interrelations of these barriers and there are different opinions about which policy interventions are 
indispensable and effective (Yang, 2012). The effort needed to close the gap is massive, if we consider that 
IEA has projected that the world will require around 96 billion US$/year to address the energy efficiency gap 
between 2012 and 2030, in all sectors of society (Yang, 2012). To make things even more complex, increasing 
energy efficiency is not always a straightforward process because it can generate unintended consequences. 
This is especially true with respect of increasing the efficiency level of dwellings (Collins & Dempsey, 2017; 
Shrubsole et al., 2014) that can impact negatively households living there.  
Therefore, energy efficiency appears to be a very complex system, affecting several domains (economic, 
social, and environmental), with high stakes involved (e.g. high investments required, increasing need to 
mitigate climate change), in which multiple actors are present (people, firms, policymakers, etc.) at a 
different levels (local, national, regional, global), with barriers and unintended consequence. 
2.3. Energy efficiency co-benefits: multiple interests 
In addition to mitigate climate change, improving buildings and housing retrofit extent can lead to important 
direct and indirect co-benefits other than energy savings. Co-benefits are defined as “the positive effects that 
a policy or measure aimed at one objective might have on other objectives, without yet evaluating the net 
effect on overall social welfare. Co-benefits are often subject to uncertainty and depend on, among others, 
local circumstances and implementation practices” (Clifford & Prasad, 2016). In the case of energy efficiency, 
it is possible to consider as co-benefits all the socioeconomic outcomes that may arise aside to climate change 
mitigation (Ryan & Campbell, 2012). These co-benefits seem to be many (Fig 1-2) and they have been listed 
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by a multitude of researchers (Blok et al., 2007; Kelly, 2009; Lucon et al., 2014; Ryan & Campbell, 2012; Ürge-
Vorsatz, Danny Harvey, et al., 2007).  
 
 
Understanding the co-benefits related to energy efficiency is crucial in order to comprehend the relevance 
that closing the energy efficiency gap is gaining among policymakers around the world. In this respect, Ryan 
& Campbell (2012) provide an interesting framework to understand these co-benefits. They assume that 
society is a multilayer entity and state that energy efficiency related benefits impact on many of them. The 
authors identify four main levels that can potentially be affected: individual, sectoral, national and 
international. 
At individual level (people, households, enterprises, etc.) several co-benefits have been highlighted. First, 
health and wellbeing improvements were observed in public health as result of improved heating, cooling 
and air quality. Then, augmenting energy efficiency can lead to increased energy affordability and access, 
alleviating poverty. If energy efficiency raises energy demand is reduced at parity of consumption (namely 
there is not rebound effect). This translates in reduced bills and it might make the difference especially for 
the low-income classes, making them able to acquire all the energy services they need without renouncing 
to other primary needs as well as free up income to spend to satisfy other needs. However, the last concept 
is valid not just for the poor but for all income level classes.  
Figure 2-3: The multiple benefits of energy efficiency 
Source: Ryan & Campbell, 2012 p.8 
 
 
Table 2-1: Energy-efficiency related co-benefits level and domain of impactFigure 2-3: The multiple benefits of energy efficiency 
Source: Ryan & Campbell, 2012 p.8 
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At a sectoral level, namely on the economic sectors of the society (industrial, transport, residential and 
commercial) improved energy efficiency can increase industrial productivity and competitiveness. This 
because it reduces the consumption of resources and pollution (lowering the costs of buying resources, 
depleting waste or compensating for externalities), and it improves firms capacity utilization leading to 
smaller operational and maintenance costs. Moreover, increased energy efficiency may help energy 
providers to supply better energy services to their customers, to decrease operating costs and to increase 
their profit margins. In addition, it alleviates the pressure on the energy grid, reducing the peak demand and 
providing an alternative solution to grid capacity enhancements (Erbach, 2015; Poudineh & Jamasb, 2014) 
that are at the moment very costly and technically difficult to make. Lastly, evidences start to show an 
increase in the number of investors willing to pay a premium for properties with higher energy performance 
(Fuerst, McAllister, Nanda, & Wyatt, 2013). Therefore, energy efficiency may also increase asset values. 
At a national level there might be multiple co-benefits related to energy efficiency. First, investments in 
energy efficiency can lead to new jobs in energetic and other sectors. This could be in line with governments’ 
green growth strategies and macroeconomics objectives of GDP increase. Then, it reduces the energy-related 
public expenditures, for example, it lowers energy consumption in government agencies and public utilities 
due to the decreased fuel purchase costs. For countries with energy consumption subsidies (usually in 
attempt to fight fuel poverty), improving energy efficiency means decreasing the public disbursements to 
‘feed’ these subsidies (Ryan & Campbell, 2012). In countries where fuels are imported, energy efficiency can 
lower the pressure on currency reserves (better trade balance) and in energy-exporting ones it can free up 
even more fuel to export (Ryan & Campbell, 2012). Another very important co-benefit for policymakers in 
governments is that a reduced energy demand can improve the security of national energy systems crosswise 
the four dimensions of risks (Kruyt, van Vuuren, de Vries, & Groenenberg, 2009): “fuel availability 
(geological), accessibility (geopolitical), affordability (economic) and acceptability (environmental and 
social)”. 
Lastly, at international level there may be several positive additional impacts too. If energy demand decreases 
in multiple markets it may lead to a reduced energy price on a regional scale (Ryan & Campbell, 2012) and 
consequently this can increase energy affordability help to raise the disposable income of individuals and 
enterprises. In addition, lower demand can reduce pressure on natural resources (e.g. oil, coal, gas) with 
potential benefits for the environment and ecosystems. Improved energy efficiency can be significant in 
achieving economic and social goals in developing countries such as better access to energy services, poverty 
eradications, improved environmental sustainability and economic progress (Ryan & Campbell, 2012).  
However, as mentioned above, this is only one of the framework that can be used to understand the 
multiplicity of the energy efficiency related co-benefits. Usually, other authors tend to categorize these co-
benefits based on the domain they impact or challenge they tackle, for an example look at what Kelly (2009) 
12 
 
propose. Integrating these two different ways of interpreting energy efficiency co-benefits may help to 
understand better how wide the range of these co-benefits is. This is done in in Table 1-1. Here, in vertical 
the co-benefits levels of impact proposed by Ryan & Campbell (2012) are combine horizontally with an 
adaptation of the three domain of impact used by Kelly (2009). 
 
 
        Domain 
Level 
Energy security Long-term sustainability Welfare  
Individual 
improving energy affordability 
and access 
None 
ameliorating health and 
wellbeing; increasing disposable 
income 
Sectoral None 
reducing costs for energy 
providers and energy peak 
 
higher industrial productivity 
and competiveness; 










moderating energy prices 
regionally; 
reducing the extraction of 
natural resources; meeting 
development goals; 
moderating energy prices 
regionally; meeting development 
goals 
The world is facing challenges on multiple levels and domains. Improving energy efficiency for attacking one 
of these challenges means to attack all the others. It follows that someone may be skeptical on some of the 
challenges but not on all of them. This is why energy efficiency is widely recognized as a desired and appealing 
goal. Although these co-benefits are often not all quantified or identified by policymakers, the impacts listed 
above can still have a key role in making energy efficiency a priority for policymakers and then prompt them 
to implement policies that also mitigate GHG emissions (Blok et al., 2007).  This is particularly true in countries 
where environmentalism does not have a strong tradition or a priority role in political agenda or occupies 
daily concerns of citizens. (Blok et al., 2007). In conclusion, in the light of what has been discussed so far, the 
buildings’ stock seems to be a major player in “both causes and solutions of these challenges” (Kelly 2009).  
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2.4. Closing the energy efficiency gap: retrofit 
As it was shown, there are mainly two ways to reduce the energy efficiency in buildings:  re-engineering the 
fabric of the buildings and improving the energy efficiency of appliances used in offices and, in particularly, 
houses. 
For what concerns buildings’ appliances, evidence suggests that in a wide number of countries devices and 
machines energy efficiency has increased in the last years (IPCC, 2014), even three times more than 
underlying rate of technological improvement (Lane, 2015). This substantial improvement has translated into 
energy saving and therefore in carbon emissions reduction. For example, in the countries in which robust 
actions have been taken to improve appliances performance at a lower energy cost, it has been estimated  it 
saved between 10% and 15% of national or sectoral energy utilization (Lane, 2015). Moreover, the issues 
related to the expensiveness of efficient appliances acting as barrier for the low income households uptake, 
i.e. Faberi, Mebane, & Presutto (2001), it has been resolved by a ‘natural’ decrease in purchase prices (see 
economy of scale and learning curves effects). This means that policies that have been undertaken (e.g. 
labelling1) worked relatively well. Even if there still room for improvements in the appliances’ efficiency, 
where it seems that much needs to be done regards the building fabric (Ürge-Vorsatz et al., 2007). To increase 
the energy efficiency of the building stock means to diminish the quantity of energy consumed during their 
life-long (in particularly the energy required for indoor heating). There are principally two ways. The first one 
is to construct new buildings in a more efficient way and support the depletion rate of high inefficient 
buildings. The second is to retrofit the existing stock (the operation of improving the energetic performance 
of a building). Acting on the new constructions is easier for policymakers than increasing the retrofit uptake 
rate, since setting efficient standards for new edifices is relatively straightforward process (although, 
implementation may raise several issues), while operating on existing building, especially on the houses 
people live in, is considered a very sensitive subject due to the high sentiment people project in their home 
(Soo, 2015).  
Unfortunately, due to the low replacing rate, most of the existing building stock will still be present in 2050 
in most countries (IPCC, 2014), especially in the developed ones, e.g. in Europe it has been predicted that 
80% of the actual stock will still be there (Serghides, Dimitriou, & Katafygiotou, 2016). The replacement time 
is a key concept that needs to be understood in order to comprehend the necessity of retrofit. The 
replacement time of appliances is relatively much shorter than the buildings’ one. This means that it is not 
necessary to act on the appliances in use in order to meet the reduction goals in that sector, but producing 
and commercializing efficient ones and wait for the natural replacement of old and broken devices can be 
                                                          




enough in order to meet the targets on time (Blok et al., 2007). Conversely, this is not true for the building 
stock. That is why retrofit is necessary at this stage.  
At the moment there is a plethora of ways thorough which is possible to retrofit an existing building (Blok et 
al., 2007; IPCC, 2014). Table 2-2 offers a summary of the measures that will discussed below.   
 
Direction of action Examples of retrofit measures 
Thermal envelop 
Walls insulation, ceiling insulation, basement insulation, 
doors and windows frames, ventilation system 
Building heating system 
Solar passive technologies (airflow windows, preheating or 
pre-cooling buried pipes, solar air collectors, sun-facing 
glazing) 
Space heating system 
Condensing boiler, heat pump, passive ventilation 
mechanisms, customize ventilation 
Heating, ventilation and air-conditioning systems (HVAC)  Demand-controlled airflows systems, displaced ventilation 
Building energy management  
Smart buildings, smart meters, centralized electronic 
energy management systems 
Lighting Daylight sensors, efficient lightning devices 
Solar energy 
Devices for capturing solar-thermal energy to heat up water 
and indoor air 
 
One of the principal retrofit interventions is to act on the thermal envelop of the building. Thermal envelop 
refers to the building shell as a barrier to unwanted heat transfer between inside and outside the edifice. The 
effectiveness of this envelop depends on (Blok et al., 2007): the insulation levels in the walls, ceiling, loft, 
basement; the thermic features of doors and windows; and the stream of inside/outside air exchange which 
depends on the edifice air-tightness, on ventilation (mechanical and non-mechanical) and on external driving 
forces (e.g. wind, inside-outside temperature or air pressure differences). Improvements in inefficient 
thermal envelops can have big impacts in reducing energy consumption for heating by a factor from two up 
to four compare to standard practices at a relatively low cost-effectiveness for both residential and 
commercial buildings (Hamada, Nakamura, Ochifuji, Yokoyama, & Nagano, 2003; Hastings, 2004 cited in Blok 
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et al., 2007, p. 395). Moreover, it does not just help to keep the edifice warm in winter, but it also 
considerably reduce indoor summer temperature thus it lowers the energy used to cool down the fabric.  
Another option for retrofit is to act on the building heating system. It can consist, for example, in implanting 
solar passive heating technologies (Blok et al., 2007) such as: airflow windows, preheating or pre-cooling air 
ventilation through buried pipes, solar air collectors (mounted on walls or roofs), extensive sun-facing glazing, 
etc. Or alternatively, the effort may be towards increasing the efficiency of the space heating system: new 
condensing boilers (in which additional heat is recovered as part of the water vapour in the outlet valve is 
condensed and reused, see Palmer & Cooper, 2013), heat pumps (a device that uses energy inputs to transfer 
heat from the outside air or ground in the winter to medium used to distribute heat in a building), etc. Also 
the cooling effort can be reduced, thorough the use of passive techniques (e.g. fans or pumps that do not 
require mechanical energy) to meet part of the cooling load, via the increase of cooling equipment 
performance at parity of energy consumption, and combination of efficient auxiliary systems (e.g. customized 
and proper ventilation). These have proven to generate significant energy consumption reduction (Blok et 
al., 2007). This has become a more salient issue considering the recent trends in which the penetration of air 
conditioning in developing countries is quickly rising and reaching even higher peaks in developed ones (Blok 
et al., 2007). In line to what has been said, the heating, ventilation and air-conditioning systems (HVAC) 
(namely filtration, humidification, dehumidification, heating and cooling) need to be adjusted and tailored to 
the fabric of the building and to the situation. This provides massive savings according to Blok et al. (2007). 
For example installing demand-controlled airflows in which ventilation systems adapts to the change building 
occupancy can alone save 20-30% of total HVAC energy consumption (Brandemuehl & Braun, 1999 cited in 
Ürge-Vorsatz et al., 2012, p. 683). Or new systems like displacement ventilation have been reported to reduce 
HVAC energy use by 30 to 75% (Blok et al., 2007). Another type of retrofit listed by Block et al. (2007) is the 
improvement of building energy management (BEM). BEMSs are control systems for buildings that use 
computers for monitoring and managing the use of energy. Nowadays, the edifices that implement this type 
of technology are also known as smart buildings. These systems to help avoid energy waste because they 
support building occupiers to efficiently manage the consumption and also make faults easy to be detected 
(through smart meters). Estimates of the potential savings vary much in literature ranging from 5 to 40% 
(Blok et al., 2007). Moreover, smart buildings can be easily combined with daylight sensors to dim or switch 
off lighting, diminishing energy waste. This if integrated with the most efficient lightning devices can reduce 
by 75% up to 90% lightning energy consumption (Blok et al., 2007). Other retrofit opportunities come from 
the use of solar energy. For example, solar-thermal energy can be utilized for heating water and indoor air 
offering savings on the energy used for warming water and air that range from 10 to 60%, depending on the 
fabric (Blok et al., 2007). 
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The measures listed above are not all the measures available. There is a vast literature on that. The idea of 
this last paragraph was to show the high number of potential measures that are available. Moreover, many 
of these can be combined when it is time to retrofit a property, offering even a wider range of options and 
increasing the CO2 savings. Nevertheless, as it was shown, the uptake rate of energy efficiency gap for 
buildings and housing is far to be at an optimal level.  
2.5. Policies to support retrofit uptake rate 
Although improvements in energy efficiency evidently reduce buildings and housing energy consumption, as 
well as providing a broad range of co-benefits, its uptake rate is lower than desired ad the energy efficiency 
gap discussed above still persists all around the world. The causes of this unfavourable situation have been 
identified in the presence of decision-making, informational and economical barriers (Wilson et al., 2015) 
that interfere and hinder people to install retrofit measures in their property (all these obstacles vary from 
case to case, therefore the ones related to UK will be presented  and discussed in detail in chapter 3.4).  
Therefore, market forces alone will not lead to the indispensable conversion towards low carbon buildings 
without external policy intercession (Lucon et al., 2014). However, there is no consensus among policymakers 
about which strategies are necessary and most effective to overcome the barriers (Yang, 2012). Hence, from 
this perspective, the greatest challenge is the development of effective intervention for improving the energy 
efficiency of existing buildings and houses (Ürge-Vorsatz, Koeppel, et al., 2007). The International Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) through the 3rd Working Group (Lucon et al., 2014) to the Fifth Assessment Report 
(IPCC, 2014) grouped the broad portfolio of policy instruments in six categories. The detailed policies are 
reported and described in Table 2-3 at the end of this chapter. First, regulatory measures seem to be some 
of the most effective and cost-effective tools. Examples are building codes and appliance standards. 
However, standards need to be carefully set at proper level and periodically raised in order to avoid to be 
locked in suboptimal performances. Moreover, enforcement has not always been easy.  Second, information 
instruments (e.g. equipment energy labels, building labels and certificates, and mandatory energy audits) are 
usually implemented as support of other policy interventions, in particular standards. However, they proved 
to be relatively effective also on their own. Third, direct market intervention instruments include public 
procurement or the development of energy service companies (ESCOs). These interventions in some cases 
had a real impact in transforming the market. Fourth, economic instruments comprehend several options, 
including tradable permits (tradable white certificates and broader carbon markets), energy carbon taxes, 
tax rebates (e.g. tax deductions building retrofits, value-added tax exemption, various tax reliefs), and more 
focussed incentives (low interest loans and incentives). The fifth category are the voluntary agreements, for 
example with industries. However, the effectiveness of these policies is extremely context-dependent and in 
many cases they need to be accompanied with other policy measures. The sixth and last type includes advice 
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and leadership programmes, such as information campaigns, advice services, and public leadership 
programmes. The objective of these interventions is to build public awareness and capacity. Although 
virtually any of these tools can perform very effectively (environmentally and costwise) if adjusted to the 
context and if implemented and enforced properly, there is a remarkable spread in the policies’ 
performances and results when it comes to reality (Blok et al., 2007; Lucon et al., 2014).  What can be safely 
stated is that one policy alone in most cases appears not to be enough to achieve significant results but 
combinations of them (policy packages) seem to be the most sounded approach (Lucon et al., 2014). For 
example, appliances market transformation has been realized through a combination of energy labels, 
minimum standards, incentives for efficient equipment and communication campaigns (Lucon et al., 2014). 
Integration with other policy domains (see co-benefits) is particularly effective and energy-efficiency can be 
pursued more forcefully through other policy goals that occupy higher positions in the political agendas. Thus 
retrofit may benefit of more resources and of stronger political support than just climate change mitigation 
(Ryan & Campbell, 2012). Moreover, IPCC state that to obtain the broadest impact possible policymakers 
should adopt and holistic approach considering the whole life span of the building and to not neglect the fact 
that a skilled workforce is needed to fulfill the instalments (Lucon et al., 2014). Lastly, policies should be 
dynamic, namely with periodic revisions to adapt to technical and market changes (especially regulations 
may need to be strengthened over time).  
Up to know, policymakers have mainly focused on technological improvements in energy efficiency (Geller, 
Harrington, Rosenfeld, Tanishima, & Unander, 2006). However, especially in developed countries, they began 
to direct their action towards the existing building stock. This because it is extremely large and renewed very 
slowly, therefore it has been targeted through policies aiming at accelerating rates of energy refurbishment 
and regulatory building codes (Lucon et al., 2014). Concerning these lasts, in the last years a large number of 
executives have set or are considering important strengthening of the requirements in these regulations. 
Moreover, several emerging policy instruments are starting to gain the attention of policymakers. Some of 
them, started to act on consumer behaviour in order to reduce energy demand.  For instance, they recently 
started to direct their action on the need to change society behaviours towards more sustainable ones (Lucon 
et al, 2014). Policy tools for capping or discouraging increasing energy use include: personal carbon trading 
with personal carbon allocations (but this action still have not been introduced yet), property taxation related 
to CO2 emission and energy saving feed-in tariff (incentive to reduce energy consumption. In addition, energy 
efficiency obligation schemes are being diffused in several countries (e.g. some UE states, Brazil, India and 
Australia). These certificates are also known as suppliers’ obligations and their main application has been in 
regulated markets directed by obligations upon energy companies to save energy (Lucon et al, 2014). This 
policy instrument was first applied in Europe and it proved to be very effective (Bertoldi, 2012 cited in Lucon 
et al, 2014, p. 720). However, these certificates have a downside: they are incline to incentivize cheap and 
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mass market measures rather than massive, expensive and more effective in terms of savings retrofit. This 
fact has instilled some concerns on the ability of these policies not to be the best suited for high saving targets 
(Eyre et al., 2009 cited in Lucon et al, 2014, p. 720). Policymakers are also looking at financial tools that could 
stimulate and support energy efficiency uptake. Several retrofit technologies have shown to be economically 
convenient and if properly financed the costs are paid back in a relative short time frame by the energy 
savings. Unfortunately still many potentially attractive investments in energy efficiency are not undertaken 
because there are not financial products available, because they do not meet short-term financial return 
criteria or because customers are very initial-cost sensitive. The major causes of this gap have been identified 
in the lack of relevant finance and of bankable energy efficiency offers. Germany made an innovative attempt 
to overcome these issues. Through the KfW (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau) development bank, loans for 
energy efficiency with very low interest rate (compare to the market) making them very attractive for 
households. Up to now, the scheme has been successful in supporting many building refurbishments 
(Rosenow, Eyre, Bürger, & Rohde, 2013). Also, UK tried a market-based approach with another innovative 
policy called ‘Green Deal’ that unfortunately did not delivered the expected results (it will be discussed in 
detail in the next chapter). Another financial solution to overcome economic constraints is to involve external 
investors (e.g. commercial banks, venture capital firms, equity funds, etc.) in contributing to the retrofit and 
repay their investments through the energy savings. It works best for huge projects (e.g. social housing), since 
the profits for individual cases are not high enough for the investors (Lucon et al, 2014). Moreover, there is 
need to guarantee that energy savings are able to repay the investments in order to tempt investors. Lastly, 
opportunities in financing for green buildings are slowly gathering interests. Japanese financial institutions 
started to offer products that provide a discount greater than 1% on mortgages and loans for constructing or 
buying a house, depending on the grade of efficiency received by a public assessment done by the 
municipality (Murakami et al., 2004 cited in Lucon et al, 2014, p.720). From first evaluations it appears to 










Sets of standards for buildings or building systems determining minimum requirements 
of energy performance 
Traditionally typical low enforcement has resulted 
in lower than projected savings. Building codes 
need to be regularly strengthened to be effective 
Appliance standards (MEPS) 
Rules or guidelines for a particular product class that set a minimum efficiency level, 
and usually prohibit the sale of underperforming products 
Most OECD countries have adopted MEPS. 
Voluntary agreements with manufacturers are 




The mandatory (or voluntary) provision of information about the energy / other 
resource use of end-use products at the point of sale. 
MEPS and labels are usually co-ordinated policy 
measures with common technical analysis 
Building labels and certificates  
Rating buildings based on their energy performance and provide credible information 
about it to users/buyers 
Building labels could be mandatory (for example in 
the EU) or voluntary. Labels are beginning to 
influence market prices  
Mandatory energy audits  
Measurements of the energy performance of existing buildings and identify cost-
effective improvement potentials 
Audits should be mandatory and subsidized and 
reinforced by incentives or regulations that require 




Sustainable public procurement 
The organized purchase by public bodies following pre-set procurement regulations 
incorporating energy performance / sustainability requirements. Setting a high level of 
efficiency requirement for products purchased by public sector as well as requiring 
energy efficient buildings when renting or constructing them. 
It can achieve a significant market transformation, 
because the public sector is responsible for a large 
share of these purchases and investments 
Promotion of energy services 
(ESCOs)  
It aims to increase the market and quality of energy service offers, in which savings are 
guaranteed and investment needs are covered from cost savings. 
Energy performance contracting (EPC) schemes 
enable ESCOs or similar 
Economic 
Instruments 
Energy Efficiency Obligations and 
White Certificates  
The set, record and prove that a certain amount of energy has been saved at the point 
of end-use. Schemes may incorporate trading. 
In all the White Certificates schemes the targets 
imposed by governments have been so far 
exceeded 
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Carbon markets  
The limit to the total amount of allowed emissions. Carbon emission allowances are 
then distributed and traded 
Carbon cap and trade for the building sector is an 
emerging policy instrument  
Energy and carbon tax  
Taxation levied on fossil fuels or on energy using products, based on their energy 
demand and/or their carbon content respectively 
These fiscal tools can be powerful are expected to 
cause a decrease in consumption. However, 
depending on price electricity, the tax typically 
should be quite substantial to have an effect on 
behaviour and energy efficiency investments. 
Use of taxation 
It can be considered as a type of subsidy, representing a transfer of funds to investors in 
energy efficiency. 
Examples include reduced VAT, accelerated 
depreciation, tax deductions, feebates etc. 
Grants and subsidies Economic incentives, in the form of funds transfer. 
Incentives (e. g., grants and subsidies) for 
investments in energy efficiency and building 
renovation 
Soft loans (including preferential 
mortgages) 
Loans and mortgages given for carbon-reduction measures with low interest rates. 
Governmental a fiscal incentive to banks, which 
offer preferential interest rates to customers and 
incentives based on the performances achieved, 
e.g., in Germany (CO2-Rehabilitation Program) 
Voluntary 
agreements  
Voluntary and negotiated 
agreements 
Tailored contracts between an authority and another entity, aimed at meeting a 
predefined level of energy savings. 
Voluntary programmes can be also applied in the 
built environment where housing association and 
public property owners agree on energy efficiency 
targets with the government  
Awareness raising and information 
campaigns 
Programs transmitting general messages to the whole population. 
Information campaigns to stimulate behavioural 
changes and investments in energy efficiency 
technologies 
 Individual feedback  Provision of tailored information 
New developments for information campaigns are 





Public Leadership Programmes 
Public practices going beyond the minimum requirements in order to lead by example 
and demonstrate good examples. 
 
Source: adapted by Lucon et al., 2014, p. 717 
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3. Retrofit policy: the United Kingdom housing efficiency 
3.1. UK emissions and targets 
Within this global context and following the CO2 reduction targets set by the EU of a 40% GHG cut by 2030 
compare to 1990 levels (Erbach, 2015; European Commission, 2014), the UK thorough the Climate Change 
Act (Parliament of the United Kingdom, 2008) has committed itself to ambitiously reduce its carbon emission 
in 2050 80% below 1990 levels. In the UK, around 45% of all CO2 emissions come from the use of appliances, 
heating systems, the water and air movement in buildings (Kelly, 2009). The remaining 55% is divided among 
transport 33%, industrial processes 22% and agriculture with an irrelevant percentage. Therefore, 
incrementing the building stock efficiency performance is essential in order to reduce consumption and thus 
emissions, especially because evidence shows that 2050 targets with the current improvement rates will be 
missed (Climate Change Commitee, 2015; Kelly, 2009). In this regards, Kelly (2009) explicitly says that “unless 
there is a deep retrofit of existing buildings to reduce carbon emissions by 60% and probably by 80%, the 
targets […] will certainly be missed”.  
3.2. The UK housing stock: a source of concerns and potential solutions 
Of the buildings’ stock, dwellings represent a big share of total UK carbon emissions. In 2015 they have been 
accounted for approximately the 29% of the total CO2 (Waters, 2016) and it has even increased its weight if 
we look at the past, considering that Kelly (2009) estimated it to be 27%. Fig 3-1 below, shows how prevalent 
is the energy consumption made by the housing stock compare with other sectors in British society.  
 
Figure 3-1: Final energy consumption by sector 2012 (UK, TWh, Total 1,724 TWh) 
Source: Palmer & Cooper, 2013, p.5 
 
 
Figure 3-2: Housing stock distribution by age 1970-2006 (millions)Figure 3-1: Final 
energy consumption by sector 2012 (UK, TWh, Total 1,724 TWh) 
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Thus, dwellings have a key part to play in achieving the targeted reductions. It needs to be noted that the UK 
domestic residential stock is relatively dated compare to most European countries, with many edifices built 
during the Victorian era (19th century) (Waters, 2016). In consequence, many houses have been built with 
poor insulation standards and then these properties require additional energy to maintain a basic level of 
thermal comfort. However, as older houses are progressively substituted with newer and more efficient ones, 
this will bring to a lower stock energy consumption. But, given the actual low replacement rate, the majority 
of these dwellings will be in existence in 2050 (Shrubsole et al., 2014) when UK is expected to have met its 
GHG reduction targets. In 2050, 70-80% of the existing housing are likely to still be there according to Palmer 
& Cooper (2013), whilst Kelly (2009) calculated this percentage to be even higher, 87%. Therefore, in UK the 
replacement rate is a long-term trend; houses constructed antecedently 1918 were the 25% of the dwelling 
stock in 1970, and 44 years later in 2014, they were still a 16% of the total stock, yet a remarkable percentage 
(Palmer & Cooper, 2013). In this respect, Fig 3-2 offers a clear idea of how the UK housing stock has developed 
over time and how low the replacement rate of dwellings is. The absolute number of old houses has been 
fairly constant and the ‘real’ reason why it decreased in percentage is that the size of the stock increased, 
making it relatively smaller than before.  
 
For that reason, rising the retrofit rate, namely the adoption of domestic energy efficiency measures, is 
essential in helping the government to stay on track in achieving its pledges. 
Moreover, an improvement in the energy efficiency of the housing stock has been intended (Heffner & 
Campbell, 2011) and expressly indicated as a crucial strategy by the Department of Energy & Climate Change 
Figure 3-2: Housing stock distribution by age 1970-2006 (millions) 
Source: Palmer & Cooper, 2013, p. 24 
 
 
Figure 3-3: Fuel poverty in England (%) and average fuel poverty gapFigure 3-2: 
Housing stock distribution by age 1970-2006 (millions) 
Source: Palmer & Cooper, 2013, p. 24 
 
 
Figure 3-3: Fuel poverty in England (%) and average fuel poverty gap 
Source: Palmer & Cooper, 2013, p.16 
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(DECC, 2015) to tackle fuel poverty, a condition faced by a household when its members, given their income, 
can’t afford to maintain properly warm their home at a fair cost. More specifically, households are officially 
considered to live in fuel poverty when confronted with “higher than average required fuel costs” (not just 
for heating but also for hot water, lights, cooking and appliances) and “if spending this amount on fuel would 
push the residual income below the official poverty line” (Hills, 2012). This definition allows to capture the 
extent (the number of households in fuel poverty condition) and the depth (namely the fuel poverty gap, 
defined as the difference between energy bills and what is estimated to a reasonable expenditure threshold 
for each dweller) of the problem. Figure 3-3 below shows the trends of fuel poor size (grey bars) and the fuel 
poverty gap (red line). The diffusion of this phenomena slightly reduced overtime from 11.8% of the dweller 
(around 2.44 million households) in 2003 to the 10.9% (2.39 million households) (Palmer & Cooper, 2013). 
More recent detections, calculated the households affected by this condition to be 2.38 million, roughly the 
10.6% of all total (DECC, 2016a). On the contrary, the fuel poverty gap line highlights that the depth of the 
problem has raised significantly for these households (especially because in this period the price of energy 
increased remarkably). This may be due also to the fact that a disproportionate number of low income live 
in the least energy efficiency dwellings (DECC, 2015). Although it may appear there are little improvements, 
fuel poverty is still a severe issue in the UK society and much need to be done to solve it. 
 
Furthermore, increasing the energy efficiency of the existing housing stock is expected to generate other 
important co-benefits by the British Government. First, it will help to reduce the household’s bills, not just 
for the fuel poor (Ryan & Campbell, 2012).  Then it will also alleviate the pressure on the energy grid, reducing 
the peak demand and providing an alternative solution to grid capacity enhancements (Erbach, 2015; 
Poudineh & Jamasb, 2014). This is very important because enlarging the grid capacity is an expensive and 
Figure 3-3: Fuel poverty in England (%) and average fuel poverty gap 
Source: Palmer & Cooper, 2013, p.16 
 
 
Figure 3-4: Total number of electrical appliances owned by UK households and total 
domestic electricity consumptionFigure 3-3: Fuel poverty in England (%) and 
average fuel poverty gap 
Source: Palmer & Cooper, 2013, p.16 
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24 
 
technically challenging task. In addition, it is expected to contribute promoting renewable energy and ‘green’ 
attitude among the population (Ryan & Campbell, 2012). Energy efficiency also helps to decrease 
vulnerabilities and external (foreign) dependence in energy sector, concerns that are rising of importance 
during these uncertain times (Kelly, 2009; Linares & Labandeira, 2010). Especially because, in the last years, 
the flow of gas between Zeebrugge (the Netherlands) and Harwich (UK) has changed direction. After more 
than 30 years of exporting gas extracted in the North Sea, the UK became an importer from the Russia. 
Therefore,  significant reduction in energy consumption in the buildings stock could decrease the energy 
security threat arising from receiving fuel from potentially unreliable sources (Kelly, 2009). This has become 
even more salient now after the uncertainties related to Brexit and the instabilities in the European – Russian 
relationship since the war in Crimea (Correljé & van der Linde, 2006; Nelsen, 2014). Last but not the least, 
expanding the retrofit measure uptake rate is supposed to foster green growth and create new jobs (Ryan & 
Campbell, 2012), co-benefits that are highly evaluated by British policymakers.   
3.3. The state of the stock  
The two main ways the UK households can adopt to decrease their dwelling energy consumption are to use 
highly energy efficiency appliances and to retrofit the fabric of the building. Concerning the appliances, the 
average number of appliances per household has raised for all kind of devices. It stands out the dramatic 
increase of electronic devices which has boosted from an average of 2 appliances in 1970 to 13 in 2015 
(Waters, 2016). Fig 3-4 illustrates the total number of appliances in by typology per household (vertical bars 
– left hand axis) and the total domestic electricity consumption (diamonds – right hand axis). 
 
Figure 3-4: Total number of electrical appliances owned by UK households and total domestic electricity consumption 
Source: Waters, 2016, p.26 
 
 
Figure 3-5: Average energy consumption of new cold appliances 1990 to 2015 (index 1990)Figure 3-4: Total number of 
electrical appliances owned by UK households and total domestic electricity consumption 
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It is clear that over time there has been a notable growth in consumer appliances especially from mid 90s in 
electronics and lightning. Nevertheless, despite the increasing number of devices, it is also visible a recent 
drop in electricity consumption. To some extents, it can be explained by an increased efficiency in appliances. 
Looking at the cold appliances can be emblematic and help to understand the magnitude of the phenomena. 
The average energy use for new cold appliances has dropped constantly and significantly since 1990 for all 
devices types (Fig 3-5). During the period 1990-2015, all cold appliances improved by between 58% (fridge-
freezers) and 69 per cent (chest freezers) (Waters, 2016).  
 
However, improvements on average consumption for other appliance types were remarkable too but less 
dramatic compared to cold ones.  For example, concerning wet appliances, between 1990 and 2015 there 
was an energy efficiency increase of 11% for tumble dryers, while dishwashers’ energy utilization fell by 41%, 
washing machines by 33%, and washer dryers by 20% (Waters, 2016). Moreover, if these outstanding positive 
trends are combined with the short appliances’ replacement time (relatively to housing one), it is reasonable 
to be optimistic and expect a drop in housing devices electricity consumption.  
On the other hand, with respect on the interventions directed to renew the dwelling fabric, it is worth to look 
closely first at the state of the 27.7 million homes in the UK and the retrofit measures installed. However, at 
the moment there is a plethora of technologically available measures to retrofit buildings (double-glazing, 
condensing boiler, cavity wall insulation, solid wall insulation, loft insulation, heat pump, etc.) as it was shown 
in chapter two and therefore a choice needs to be done in order to focus enough the analysis. With this in 
Figure 3-5: Average energy consumption of new cold appliances 1990 to 2015 (index 1990) 
Source: Waters, 2016, p.27 
 
 
Figure 3-6: housing stock distribution by tenure (millions) up to 2011Figure 3-5: Average 
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Source: Waters, 2016, p.27 
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mind, the author has chosen to concentrate on the retrofit measure that are most frequently monitored in 
the ministerial reports (BEIS, 2017a; DECC, 2016b; Waters, 2016).  
The instalment of double-glazing is believed to provide a reduction in consumption around 4% (DECC, 2016b). 
The number of houses in which double-glazing has been installed has considerably raised overtime: in 1983 
it was just 9.5% and it became 80% by 2013 (Waters, 2016).   
Part of UK dwellings’ external walls, 19.2 million (BEIS, 2017a), have been built with external cavity walls. A 
cavity wall is formed by two thicknesses of brickwork with a hollow space in between them (‘cavity’) and it 
was a typical method of construction during 1920s. Cavity wall insulation consist in filling this cavity in 
between with particular material that decreases the exchange of heat among house indoor and outdoor. This 
type of retrofit has been estimated to reduce consumption by 8.4% (DECC, 2016b) and up to 2015 it was 
installed by 73% of households against the 3.8% of 1976, with an estimation uncertainty of 2% (Waters, 
2016). Other estimates account that 13.3 million homes undergone cavity wall insulation, namely the 69% of 
potential dwellings (BEIS, 2017a). The two sources slightly differ, however, what is clear is that it has 
considerably increased overtime, although it still far away reach its full potential (Waters, 2016). 
Homes without cavity wall have solid walls. This type of construction has no gap in between and let more 
heath passing through than walls with cavity (in which the air inside provide a first sort of insulation). In this 
case, it is possible ‘to add’ additional external (external wall insulation) or internal (internal wall insulation) 
layers to decrease the amount of heat exchange with the outdoor environment. These measures can reduce 
energy consumption by 16% (DECC, 2016b). Despite the high energy savings, only 4% (334,000) dwellings of 
the potential homes with solid wall, 8.5 million (BEIS, 2017a), have a solid wall insulation (Waters, 2016).   
Loft insulation (namely adding an additional layer of insulating material, such as rock wool, on the loft, attic 
or flat roof to the loft space) in 1976 was adopted by half of potential UK homes, 23.9 million (BEIS, 2017a), 
and it reached 90% by 2002 (Palmer & Cooper, 2013) and it is estimated to save 2.1% of energy consumption 
(DECC, 2016b).  However, the majority of these houses have what today is seen to be as an inadequate level 
of insulation, from 25mm to 100mm (Palmer & Cooper, 2013). Regulations on the matter have changed in 
2002 and again in 2006 towards thicker layers of loft insulation. At the moment, according to the new 
standards, 15.8 million dwellings have a proper loft insulation of at least 125mm (66% of the potential) while 
8.1 million houses have an insufficient insulation (lower than 125mm) and only an irrelevant number of  
properties is estimated to have no loft insulation at all (BEIS, 2017a).   
Another retrofit uptake rate that is monitored by policymakers is the condensing boiler. As said in the first 
chapter, condensing boilers recover additional heat from its exhaust gasses that otherwise would be lost 
(Palmer & Cooper, 2013). Installing a condensing boiler can diminish energy consumption by 8.3% (DECC, 
2016b).  In 2005 they were only 7% of the total boilers installed but their number dramatically boosted and 
they have been estimated to be around 50% (Palmer & Cooper, 2013), and it hasn’t stop growing. 
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Unfortunately, although some comforting trends are already in place (e.g. double-glazing, boilers), what 
alarms British policymakers and experts is that at the current paces UK might fall short to meet the desired 
national targets on time (Kelly, 2009). This because, despite the availability of options, there is still a 
remarkable energy efficiency gap that can be close through retrofit (BEIS, 2017a), especially for what 
concerns solid wall insulation. What is needed to be explored now is the reason why people remain reluctant 
to introduce retrofit energy saving measures into their properties and lives even though they have been 
demonstrated to be cost-effective and thus their uptake to be economically convenient (Backlund et al., 
2012; Booth & Choudhary, 2013; Frederiks, Stenner, & Hobman, 2015; C Wilson et al., 2015; Yang, 2012).  
3.4. Barriers to homeowners uptake and unintended consequences 
Before to dig into the different barries obstacolating energy efficiency uptake, it is worth and necessary to 
look at the housing stock distrubution by tenure. Fig 3-6 shows the historical trend in UK housing ownership. 
In the 1970s homeowership was around 40%, then it steadly increased and in 2011 more than two thirds of 
the housings stock belonged to the households living there (Palmer & Cooper, 2013) and, although there has 
been minor oscillations, this share has been relatively constant up to now over the total 27 million UK 
dwellings (DCLG, 2016; Office for National Statistics, 2016). On the contrary, the share of social and affordable 
rented dwellings by Local Authority and Registerd Social Landlords (RSL) had fallen overtime from more than 
a third in 70s to slightly less than the 20% of now. After strong osclillations, the private rental sector stabilized 
at similar proportion as the social housing (DCLG, 2016; Palmer & Cooper, 2013).   
 
 
Figure 3-6: housing stock distribution by tenure (millions) up to 2011 
Source: Palmer & Cooper, 2013 p.25 
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This is why to homeowners it has been given a special consideration. It is due to their biggest share of the UK 
housing stock. Moreover and beacuse historically housings owned by social renters have been more likely to 
get energy efficiency improvements while conversely private rented and owned houses tended to be less 
well insulated (DCLG, 2013 cited in Palmer & Cooper, 2013, p. 25). For all these reasons homeowners will be 
the focus of this study from now on.  
Although energy efficiency improvements clearly appear to reduce household energy consumption (DECC, 
2016b) as well as provide a wide range of individual benefits, such as thermal comfort and weak increase in 
assets’ values (Fuerst et al., 2013), the retrofit measures uptake rates are stubbornly lower than the 
projections would suggest (Wilson et al., 2015). Moreover, while studies commonly observe UK households 
having a positive attitude towards energy efficiency (Skelton, Fernandez, & Fitzgibbons, 2009 cited in Wilson 
et. al., p.13), it is clear that the energy efficiency gap between the techincal and economic potential and the 
real adoption is far to be closed. At this point an obvious question arises: “if there are profits to be made, 
why do markets not capture these potentials?” (Blok et al., 2007 cited in Wilson et al., 2015, p. 13). The 
explanations invoked by researchers and policymakers suggest the presence of several barriers that inhibit 
cost-effective technology adoption decisions (Backlund et al., 2012; Booth & Choudhary, 2013; Erbach, 2015; 
Frederiks et al., 2015; Hamilton et al., 2014; Lucon et al., 2014; Rosenow & Eyre, 2016; Ürge-Vorsatz et al., 
2012; Ürge-Vorsatz, Danny Harvey, et al., 2007; Weiss, Dunkelberg, & Vogelpohl, 2012; Wilson et al., 2015; 
Yang, 2012). These obstacles have been identified and describe by many authors. Consequently there are 
many frameworks used in literature to categorized them from the homeowner perspective. For example 
Wilson et al. (2015) identify three main barriers’ domains to retrofit renovations in owner-occupied houses: 
decision making, information and finances. However, here an original and broader approach is adopted, that 
takes into account the aspects considered during the decision-making process for energy efficiency 
renovation. The reason for that is that it is believe to help the reader to grasp all the nuances and issues 
related to homeowners’ decision making. Therefore, the levels identified and used to frame are following: 
financial, informational, behavioural, social, trustworthiness and technological.  
Financial barriers are mostly related to the initial upfront costs of a measure (Blok et al., 2007; Wilson et al., 
2015). The upfront costs vary a lot depending on the measure. For example, a loft insulation usually costs 
around 400£, while a solid wall insulation can range between 12000 and 18000£2 depending on the property. 
These costs require to the homeowners personal available capital (e.g. savings) or access to additional capital 
(e.g. loans and mortgages). With this respect it needs to be taken into account that at the moment there are 
not many available financial products tailored on offering credit to homeowners willing to retrofit their 
property (Bonfield, 2016). On top of that, the majority of UK homeowners are not prone to borrow money 
                                                          
2 All the prices are retrieve from the Energy Saving Trust http://www.energysavingtrust.org.uk/ . Founded in 1992, it is a 
governmental organization devoted to promote energy saving in UK  
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to pay for their renovations. A study performed by the governmental organization Energy Saving Trust (2011) 
estimated that only 10% of the households undertaking a renovation use any sort of financial product, and 
this is in line with some research done by private companies (Houzz UK, 2016). However, energy efficiency 
instalments are usually considered by homeowners as an addition to a renovation for amenity reasons that 
they are planning to do (Wilson et al., 2015). It has been found that, on average, households are willing to 
top up their initial budget by 10% for covering an additional retrofit measure (Energy Saving Trust, 2011). 
Another financial barrier arises from the fact that in several cases it might be more convenient to look for a 
better deal with the energy supplier than to install a retrofit measure. On the newspaper ‘The Guardian’, 
Brignall (2015) reports that it is possible to save on average between 158 and 234£ by only switching energy 
supplier. Then, governmental fuel subsidies tend to make less salient the need to decrease home energy 
consumption to households (Alberini, Banfi, & Ramseier, 2013; Blok et al., 20073). Lastly, the presence of 
subsidies supporting retrofit in previous policies may generate in the households a feeling of subsidies 
expectations, making them waiting for the moment in which the retrofit measure they want is subsidized at 
the most and therefore delaying the installation (Alberini et al., 2013; Blok et al., 20074).  Behavioural barriers 
relate to the household’s inner perception and personal evaluation of energy efficiency. The economic gains 
provided by the savings on the bill due to reduced energy consumption take time to repay back the initial 
costs and research has shown that there is a strong aversion in UK homeowners to delayed gains (Behavioural 
Insights Team, 2011). The reason why has been identified in the fact that homeowners are prone to look for 
quick and tangible returns from their investments (Wilson et al., 2015). In addition, among households it has 
been observed that energy costs have a low salience and they are usually misperceived (Sanstad & Howarth, 
1994 cited in Wilson et al., 2015, p. 13). This aspect has also been found and verified in other countries, like 
the Netherlands  (Brounen, Kok, & Quigley, 2013). With respect of salience, it is very important to note that 
dwellers renovate their properties mostly because they want to improve the aesthetics or increase the value 
of the house and very few of them renovate with the specific purpose of improving the energy efficiency 
(Wilson, Chryssochoidis, & Crane, 2013). Consequently, the majority of households appraises a lot aesthetic 
attributes and how much their property can improve when they need to decide whether to retrofit or not. 
Furthermore, homeowners tend to evaluate a lot the possible hassle factor involved when retrofitting 
(Wilson et al., 2015; Wilson et al., 2013) . For example, the disruption necessary during the installation 
processes may be an obstacle for many households. While the disruption, and therefore the hassle generated 
by that, for a loft or cavity insulation are very low, for a solid wall insulation is very high and it may block 
people from retrofit. Lastly, there are other behavioural barriers related to the “cognitive burden (or 
transaction costs) of making complex and irreversible decisions” (Phillips, 2012 cited in Wilson et al., 2015 p. 
13). Deciding to improve the energy efficiency of your own can be a complex decision, and this complexity 
                                                          
3 Blok et al. (2007) refer to that as a generic market failure 
4 Blok et al. (2007) refer to that as a generic market failure 
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can be perceived as overwhelming by some households and prevent them to consider the retrofit option. 
This type of inhibitory burdens have been repeatedly found in applied behavioural research on energy 
efficiency in the UK (Wilson et al., 2015), in Europe (Emmert, Van De Lindt, & Luiten, (2010) cited in Wilson 
et al., 2015 p. 14), and globally (Ürge-Vorsatz et al., 2012). To this, it needs to be added that homeowners 
have a bounded rationality when they make decisions on energy efficiency (Backlund et al., 2012; Frederiks 
et al., 2015;  Wilson et al., 2015).  Informational obstacles are related to the knowledge homeowners have 
on the subject. In detail, information barriers include a perceived absence of credible and available 
information on energy efficiency (Energy Saving Trust, 2011; Wilson et al., 2015) generating a lack of 
awareness and familiarity on the subject among the populations (Brounen et al., 2013; Papachristos, 2015). 
This lack of information is quite wide and regards the measures available, their features, what the benefits 
are, etc. It makes people less familiar with retrofit processes and thus less prone to undertake them. 
Moreover, energy efficiency is not perceived yet as an added value to property (Wilson et al., 2015). 
However, there is discordance in the literature on the topic: in other researches it seems energy efficiency 
has a low impact on the house value (Fuerst et al., 2013). Social barriers refer on how social bonds may affect 
homeowners’ retrofit decisions. Environmental benefits appear to be more for society than for the individual 
that retrofit (Energy Saving Trust, 2011; Papachristos, 2015). Moreover, due to energy efficiency lack of 
salience, to energy consumption misperceptions and to the jeopardized and not very high retrofit uptake, 
there is still not a social pressure to undertake retrofit renovations (Behavioural Insights Team, 2011). 
Trustworthiness barriers can be consider as a special sort of informational obstacles. In this case households 
do not have enough trust in order to overcome uncertainties about contractor reliability and cost-saving 
outcomes (Weiss, Dunkelberg, & Vogelpohl, 2012 cited in Wilson et al., 2015, p. 13; Bonfield, 2016). 
Specifically, homeowners have been reported to not trust the installers and the potential retrofit energy 
savings declare. In addition, the poor advices provided in the past have increased the magnitude of the 
problem (Bonfield, 2016; Guertler, Robson, & Royston, 2013; Rosenow & Eyre, 2016). Lastly, the instability 
coming from the lack of longevity and clarity from the government policies to support retrofit negatively 
influences the energy efficiency uptake rate of households (Guertler et al., 2013).  Technological level barriers 
refer to the physical limitation some measures have. This means that not all the measures can be installed in 
every home because not all of them are suitable for that property or because there are technical issues that 
impede to install that measure (Blok et al., 2007). Moreover, due to the installation process and material 
used, some retrofit measures in particular cases tend to impact negatively the aesthetic value of a property 
(solid wall insulation done in a Victorian house lowers the beauty of the external part of the edifice) (Roberts, 






Aspects Types Sources 
Financial 
Measure upfront cost 
(Blok et al., 2007; Lucon et al., 2014; Wilson 
et al., 2015) 
Access to finance (Blok et al., 2007; Bonfield, 2016) 
Reluctance to borrow 
(Energy Saving Trust, 2011; Wilson et al., 
2015) 
Easier to save by switching supplier (Brignall, 2015) 
Subsidies expectations (Alberini et al., 2013; Blok et al., 2007) 
Fuel subsidies (Alberini et al., 2013; Blok et al., 2007) 
Behavioural 
Hassle factor (Blok et al., 2007; Wilson et al., 2015) 
Delayed gains (Behavioural Insights Team, 2011) 
Lack of tangibility (Wilson et al., 2015) 
Not salient 
(Brounen et al., 2013; Sanstad & Howarth, 
1994 cited in Wilson et al., 2015, p. 13) 
Aesthetics 
(Wilson et al., 2015; Wilson, Chryssochoidis, 
& Crane, 2013) 
Cognitive burden 
(Phillips, 2012; Wilson et al., 2015; Emmert 
et al., 2010; Ürge-Vorsatz et al., 2012) 
Bounded rationality 
(Backlund et al., 2012; Frederiks et al., 2015; 
Wilson et al., 2015) 
Informational 
Lack of knowledge  
(Blok et al., 2007; Energy Saving Trust, 2011; 
Wilson et al., 2015) 
Awareness/ familiarity 
(Blok et al., 2007; Brounen et al., 2013; 
Papachristos, 2015) 
Perceived value of energy efficiency (Wilson et al., 2015) 
Social 
Social norms (Behavioural Insights Team, 2011) 
Benefits appear more to society than 
individual 




(Weiss, Dunkelberg, & Vogelpohl, 2012 cited 
in Wilson et al., 2015, p. 13; Bonfield, 2016) 
Declared savings reliability 
(Weiss, Dunkelberg, & Vogelpohl, 2012 cited 
in Wilson et al., 2015, p. 13; Bonfield, 2016) 
Lack/poor of tailored advices 
(Bonfield, 2016; Guertler et al., 2013; 
Rosenow & Eyre, 2016) 
Perceived lack of longevity and clarity from 
government policy influencing investment 
decisions 
(Guertler et al., 2013) 
Technological 
Lack of potential to apply retrofit measures 
to some properties 
(Blok et al., 2007) 
Some measures impact aesthetic  (Roberts, 2008) 
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In addition to all the barriers presented above, installing retrofit measures have proven to be not a 
completely ‘safe’ process because once a multitude of undesired unintended consequences cause by them 
have been detected. Detailed descriptions are provided by Collins & Dempsey (2017) and by Shrubsole et al. 
(2014), especially the last focus on the British housing stock. Energy efficiency measures tend to increase the 
building airtightness and the building envelope insulation (decreasing the indoor-outdoor exchange of heat). 
If the measures are not properly installed or do not consider the house ‘holistically’ (e.g. they take into 
account the climate condition of the area or the presence of other retrofit measures already installed), these 
may lead to increase indoor pollutants, radon levels, dust, mites and humidity. If this last is too high it can 
generate mould on the walls. Usually energy efficiency measures at insulation level of the fabric tend to 
increase the building permeability, but if not installed properly they may lead to leakages and infiltrations 
generating mould (this is especially true in the England, since it is a very rainy geographical area). 
Nevertheless, there are also positive side-effects related to retrofit such as decreasing noise, quieter indoor 
environment (although even these may have negative impacts on some individuals as increasing anxiety 
because they feel more disconnected with the external environment). Moreover, retrofit leads to increasing 
thermal comfort, especially during winter, and with a potential reduction in winter mortality. However, it is 
even possible that this downturns in summer overheating if the proper ventilation is not installed. In addition, 
radio signal might result attenuated and it can generate issues with some telecommunication devices. 
In conclusion, what appears to be is that there are many drivers and obstacles leading and hindering 
households retrofit uptake that create a very complex system.  
3.5. Past policies: successes, failures and resistances 
Starting from 1994, several British government have tried to close the discrepancy between potential and 
actual implementation of energy efficiency measures in dwellings mainly using financial leverages, such as 
energy saving obligations, and mandatory regulations (Grimshaw, 2016; Mallaburn & Eyre, 2014; Palmer & 
Cooper, 2013; Rosenow, 2012; Shrubsole et al., 2014).  
Mandatory minimum requirements have demonstrated to work effectively. Two examples can show it: the 
condensing boiler uptake rate and the 125mm or more loft insulations. Since 2005, all new boilers in UK must 
be high-efficiency condensing one. Before the regulation the share of this type of boilers made up only 7% of 
the total. In 2011, six years later they were already almost half of them (Palmer & Cooper, 2013). In 2002 and 
in 2006 the standards for loft insulation have increased up to 125mm. In 2002, most of the houses with a loft 
had an insufficient insulation. Over time, with the support of subsidies mechanism EEC and CERT, the number 
remarkably increased and now it is around two thirds of the total potential (BEIS, 2017a; Palmer & Cooper, 
2013).   
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As for the financial policies, the UK has used a lot this type of policy-tools in the last years in order to support 
retrofit uptake as many other countries did (Weiss et al., 2012). The key policies schemes have been 
composed of subsidy mechanisms (Rosenow, 2012). From 1994 to 2002, the Energy Efficiency Standard of 
Performance (EESoP), the first governmental scheme, was put in place. Then there was the Energy Efficiency 
Commitment (EEC) from 2002 up to 2005 and next it was substituted with the Community Energy Saving 
Programme (CERT) until 2011. In 2011, the Energy Company Obligation (ECO) replaced the previous scheme. 
However, in 2013, the Government tried to integrate ECO with a new market-based financial mechanism 
without the presence of subsidies. The name of this policy was Green Deal and unfortunately, it did not 
deliver the energy savings desired and it was rapidly dismissed in 2015 (Guertler et al., 2013). At the moment, 
only ECO is in place with a reduced funding capacity (Grimshaw, 2016). Fig 3-7 illustrates the main financial 
instruments introduced in the UK from 2000 up to now.  
 
Except the Green Deal, that will be explored in detail later, all the subsidies mechanisms have been working 
in a similar way. The government sets some targets of energy saving through retrofit for the energy suppliers 
and they have to economically support the uptake rate of retrofit measures in the UK housing stock in order 
to meet that targets (Fig 3-8).  
Figure 3-7: UK financial policies from 2000 up to now 
Source: adapted from Grimshaw, 2016 p.4 
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Although the key structure of these policy-tools has been almost the same for all of them, what have changed 
are the energy saving targets set by the government to the energy suppliers (Rosenow, 2012). Fig 3-9 below 
shows how these targets increased over time.  
 
Over time policymakers have constantly tried to raise the targets, and therefore the final subsidies to the 
households, in order to influence even further the retrofit uptake. This subsidies worked so well that the UK 
Figure 3-8: UK subsidies policy structure 
Source: Rosenow, 2012, p.377 
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is on track to meet its short term pledges (Committee for Climate Change, 2015). However, as it has been 
reported above, it is not enough to achieve emission reduction for 2050 (Kelly, 2009). This is the case because 
energy suppliers are incline to incentivize and support the uptake of light retrofits (isolated upgrades that 
are  generally simple, economic and fast but that tend to not capture high energy savings) rather than deep 
ones (more expensive and intrusive retrofits that achieve greater energy efficiency and that tend to have a 
more holistic approach). These are well-known side effects for this type of policy instruments because this 
policy approach might not be best suited for ambitious future targets (Lucon et al., 2014). With this in mind, 
it is interesting to look at the solid wall insulation uptake rate (due to its high costs and savings can be to 
some extends consider a sort of deep retrofit). In 2008 the homes with solid wall insulation were only 67,000 
compared to 334,000 homes with that in 2015 and most of these installations are due to the subsidies 
mechanism, especially ECO (Waters, 2016). Although the uptake has sensibly increased, the policies had a 
major impact: only the 4% (Waters, 2016) of the potential houses have a solid wall insulation and it clearly is 
not enough to help the UK to reach its targets. 
Thus, policymakers started to look for new approaches than just subsidizing the market for two main reasons. 
First, because a change in pace was needed to reach the long-term targets. Second because for the political 
point of view subsidies on energy efficiency were not appealing and not seen as a sustainable way to support 
retrofit, especially in such a period of economic crisis and constraints. A more market-based policy was 
indicated as the preferable solution since it could have lead the retrofit market to be self-sustainable and not 
attached and dependant on governmental help. Based on these principles the Green Deal was developed 
(Guertler et al., 2013). Unfortunately, the Green Deal was a resounding failing (Bishoff, 2013; Gosden, 2016; 
Syal, 2016; Vaughan, 2015). Launched in 2013 in grand style, it was the government flagship environmental 
policy and it was supposed to complement ECO subsidies. It was defined by the conservative minister Barkers 
as the “Europe’s most innovative and transformational energy efficiency programme” (Rosenow & Eyre, 
2016). Green deal was based on innovative economic incentives on bills and it was intended to deliver energy 
efficiency retrofits at scale. Specifically, households could have asked for property assessments from a 
specialized assessor and then, if considered eligible, to enter in the scheme. To be eligible the retrofit 
measures under consideration have to abide to the Golden Rule. The Golder rule requires that projected 
saving generated by the measure installed to exceed the loan repayments. The candidates could have 
retrofitted their property through affiliated installers and paid it with a loan at a fixed and conventional 
interests rate without facing the upfront costs. The pay back process would have been thorough a ‘pay-as-
you-save’ mechanism in their energy bills. Basically, households could have their house retrofitted and they 
would have paid it back with the saving generated in their bills. Another original aspect was that the payback 
payment was attached to the house not to the household: therefore, in case the household had moved away, 
the new dweller would have continued paying the retrofit measure with the saving in the bills (Rosenow & 
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Eyre, 2016; Rosenow et al., 2013). Green deal was expected to support millions of retrofit installations, 
precisely it was estimated by the Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC) that by 2020 it would 
have facilitate the retrofit of 14 million homes with a rate of about 2 million per year (Rosenow & Eyre, 2016). 
Instead the scheme was dramatically undertake only by few thousands (Guertler et al., 2013; Morse, 2016; 
Rosenow & Eyre, 2016): around 6000 homes per year for a total of 14,000 by March 2016. Due to the 
extremely low impact (it delivered the 0.003% of what was expected to), the new Conservative Government 
stopped to fund it in July 2015 de facto scrapping it (only the houses that have already started the Green Deal 
process could have used the dedicated funds) (Rosenow & Eyre, 2016). The House of Commons’ Energy and 
Climate Change Committee said “Green Deal has widely been recognized as be a failure” (House of Commons 
Energy and Climate Change Committee, (2016), cited in Rosenow & Eyre, 2016, p. 141) while some scholars 
went even further defining it as “the biggest failure in the history of UK energy efficiency policy” (Rosenow & 
Eyre, 2016, p. 141). Media did not go easy and condone the mistake (Bishoff, 2013; Gosden, 2016; Syal, 2016; 
Vaughan, 2015). Not only the Green Deal failed to deliver what was expected but it also slowed down the 
retrofit uptake rate in British houses (BEIS, 2017b). Rosenow & Eyre (2016) report that by mid-2015 the loft 
insulation delivery rate dropped by 90%, cavity wall by 62% and solid wall by 57% compared to 2012. And 
what was done under the government schemes was mostly under ECO (BEIS, 2017b). Therefore, it seems 
Green Deal even increased the magnitude of the problem instead than solving it.  
It is important to look in detail at what has not worked. The interests rates were not competitive since they 
were higher than other products findable in the market (Guertler et al., 2013; Rosenow & Eyre, 2016). The 
Green Deal suffered since its born of bad publicity issues (Guertler et al., 2013) and many UK citizens were 
already skeptical and when the media diffused data and information on the low uptake (Jones, 2013) the 
situation got even worse. Moreover, given the high interests rates only retrofit measures with high return 
rates were eligible for the scheme. Thus, usually only relatively cheap and with discrete return, like cavity 
wall insulation, were fitting the golden rule while major energy efficiency improvements, that were more 
expensive than simple measures, were excluded. This was a perverse result since more expensive measures 
appear to be better suited for pay-as-you-save financing mechanisms (Rosenow & Eyre, 2016). Another huge 
mistake made by policy makers was that they did not engaged enough homeowners. They adopted a top-
down marketing approach since they were thinking that solely financial savings would have prompted 
homeowners to renovate their property (Rosenow & Eyre, 2016). As it was presented previously the reasons 
why people renovate and retrofit their property are much more complex than that (Wilson et al., 2013). 
Especially they ignored the fact that people have great aspiration for themselves and their houses than just 
have savings in their bills and when homeowners undertake renovations look for improvements in their 
health, wellbeing, house aesthetic, etc. (Macmillan et al., 2016; Rosenow & Eyre, 2016; Wilson et al., 2013). 
Therefore, policymakers completely failed to take into account this complex narrative and all the other 
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barriers involved in the retrofit uptake rate. Using a nice metaphor from Rosenow & Eyre (2016), they tried 
to sell the loan instead the car. If a broader perspective is taken, it is possible to realize that the root causes 
of this failure were many (Bonfield, 2016; Morse, 2016; Rosenow & Eyre, 2016): the design of the policy itself 
was poor (complicated and not economically attractive), the behaviour and attitude of households was 
misjudged and many complexities and policy resistances were overlooked, etc. The main reasons for this 
poor policy-making process has been identified in underestimation of the complexity of the housing system 
and in “a lack of appropriate modelling and decision support tools to aid long term planning for sustainable 
urban retrofitting” (Xing et al., 2014). Consequently, these may have led to overlook at the high 
fragmentation of the policy environment (Eker & Zimmermann, 2016), at huge amount of dynamics involved 
in the system (Macmillan et al., 2016) and at presence of multiple possible unintended consequences (Collins 
& Dempsey, 2017; Shrubsole et al., 2014).  
3.6. Policy under exploration 
Nonetheless, the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), the former DECC, still has 
the task to fill the gap left by the Green Deal and to develop other financial policies to support energy 
efficiency improvements in the housing stock. Furthermore, BEIS wants to foster the energy efficiency sector 
up to the point in which it is self-sustainable without government subsidies. However, at the moment ECO 
subsidies are still in place and it has been assessed that without them the market would drop drastically 
(Morse, 2016). To achieve these goals policymakers in BEIS consider important to make energy efficiency 
more valuable in the eyes of consumers in order to avoid previous mistakes (especially the ones related to 
household engagement). At the moment, BEIS is exploring a policy consisting in pushing mortgage lenders to 
value more energy efficiency (green mortgage policy). The logic underlying this policy is that if energy 
efficiency was weighted more during the lending process, it would be more appreciated also by public and it 
will prompt homeowners selling or buying a property to consider retrofit because of these financial benefits. 
This mechanism will be in place through the concession of bigger mortgages depending on the energy 
efficiency level of the property purchased or through special conditional loans for retrofit an inefficient house 
that is going to be bought. The goal of BEIS is also to increase the general households’ consideration of retrofit 
and energy efficiency desirability; in order to stimulate demand, support growth and the development of the 
supply chain (generating new jobs). In addition, policymakers in BEIS are examining another possible policy 
option: a stamp duty5 rebate (stamp duty is a tax in UK that you have to pay when you buy a residential 
property for more than £125.000, and its amount is oscillating between 2% of property value, for the less 
expensive houses, to 12% for the most expensive ones). The effects that it is expected to trigger in consumers 
and in the market are similar to the green mortgage policy. If buyers wanted to buy an efficient property they 
                                                          
5 More info at the following link  https://www.gov.uk/stamp-duty-land-tax/overview  
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would have a discount on the stamp duty, but also who acquires a non-retrofitted house could benefit of this 
rebate in case they guaranteed to improve the efficiency of the dwelling. In this last case, the amount of 
money free up by the discount would support the buyers to pay for the retrofit. Moreover, these changes 
could send some signals to the market and trigger an increase in the value assigned to the energy efficiency 
by homeowners. 
3.7. Challenges and open questions  
After all this overview, it should be clear the complexity of the energy efficiency retrofit system in the UK. 
High stakes and multiple actors are involved, plenty of barriers decrease the policies’ impacts and unintended 
consequences are behind the corner. Whereas technologies significantly improved during the last years, our 
understanding of the interrelations between homeowner values, measures’ costs, decision making 
behaviours, policies, installation quality, installers, etc. is still very limited (Ürge-Vorsatz et al., 2007). 
Moreover, the impact of changes in the energy efficiency system is very complex “with some changes pushing 
in one direction and others pushing in another” (Palmer & Cooper, 2013, p. 26). For instance, the historical 
rise in home ownership should have meant that homeowners have more stake in their property, so they are 
more likely to invest in it. However, retrofit improvements have not gained much attention from 
homeowners: they are more likely to invest in amenity renovations (e.g. new kitchens, better bathrooms) 
than in insulation (Palmer & Cooper, 2013). It follows that since there is not an understanding of these 
relations, no quantification of them has been done (Ürge-Vorsatz et al., 2007). Therefore, a holistic 
understanding of the homeowners’ retrofit uptake system is lacking and acquiring it becomes crucial and 
needed. In the scientific literature, studies on the whole dynamics related to UK homeowners deciding to 
retrofit their property are completely lacking. Moreover, also the impacts of the financial policies under 
investigation in BEIS (mortgage policy and stamp duty rebate) have not been explored yet in this context. 
Knowing them can be noteworthy in order to help policymakers to improve policies design and to assess their 
effects.  
3.8. Previous studies 
The homeowner decision process to renovate and retrofit has already been investigated. Wilson et al. (2015) 
provides a very interesting overview on many studies on this issue. They report that discrete choice models 
have been widely used to capture household’s preferences in energy efficient renovations. In the vast 
majority of these studies, financial attribute appears to be dominant when homeowners consider to retrofit. 
Microeconomic research has been also employed to estimate the effect of policy incentives and consumers’ 
willingness-to-pay for retrofit and to calculate discount rates for future energy cost savings. The use of these 
models stresses a lot the importance of financial influences on energy efficiency decisions. In addition to that, 
also diffusion models are applied. Wilson et al. (2015) point out that from these models analisys appear that 
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cost-savings, thermal comfort, compatibiliy, simplicity, visibility and trialability are the most important 
drivers of a retrofit measure diffusion. Moreover, surveys and statistical analysis are broadely used to 
investigate homeowners preferenes, specifically if socioeconomic explanatory variables, such as household 
green attitude or type of property owned, have any correlation with the uptake rate. What is intersting of 
these modelling efforts is the fact that the type of factors and variables at which researchers are looking at 
is incresing in getting more diverse respect the traditional financial aspects that are usually considered.  
However, these types of models only briefly touch the dynamics involved in the homeowners’ decision-
making process and in how they are interrelated with the whole system. Moreover, most of these studies 
have static approach (Meadows, 1980), while what seems to be needed is knowledge of how these relations 
in a complex system unfold over time. Hence, another method needs to be chosen. Therefore, in order to 
study the dynamics related to homeowner retrofit uptake rate and the impact of mortgage and stamp duty 
rebate policies a Participatory System Dynamics Modelling approach is adopted. A short description of 
System Dynamics (SD) and Participatory System Dynamics (PSDM), of the reason why this method was 
selected and of its applications to similar contexts will be provided in the following sections. 
3.9. System Dynamics and Participatory System Dynamics Modelling 
applications to retrofit systems 
System Dynamics (Sterman, 2000) is a methodology invented by J. Forrester in late 50s and early 60s 
(Forrester, 1961) to study interactions in complex systems. It uses informal maps and formal models 
combined with computer simulations to understand and alleviate dynamic problems in complex systems such 
as social, technical and environmental ones. Dynamic problems can be defined as undesired situation 
changing overtime, in which the problem owners find troubles to solve them despite their effort. SD 
practitioners believe that a problematic behaviour depends on the structure of the system and that its 
complexity makes it difficult for people to understand the causes of the problem. SD provides a peculiar, high 
level and holistic approach to analyze these issues. Through the conceptualization of system as a structure 
based on accumulating stocks and flows, it tries to uncover the endogenous feedback loops that  generate 
the system behaviour (Sterman, 2000). This holistic perspective of SD allows to see how mental models and 
decision-making processes influence the system behaviour. Once the underlying structure is understood, SD 
gives the possibility to test policies and their impact on the system. Therefore, it helps to develop policies for 
triggering systemic change in complex environments. Initially and usually, it has been employed in an expert 
mode, namely a system dynamicists collecting information, building a model and then sharing the results. 
Although interactions with experts on the subject generally take place, in the traditional SD setting they are 
not directly involved in model or mapping development process. However, from the late 80s and more 
consistently in the 90s a new mode of modelling emerged in which stakeholders, policymakers and subject 
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experts were directly involved in the model building process (Vennix, 1996; Vennix, Andersen, Richardson, & 
Rohrbaugh, 1992). In this case, SD practitioners engage with subject experts, academics, policy-makers, 
communities and people affected by the problem in a so-called ‘group model building’ (GMB) (Vennix, 1996) 
or ‘participatory system dynamics modelling’ (Stave, 2010) process. Therefore, in GMB or PSDM, the 
stakeholders’ expertise is directly used for building a causal model, e.g. in a (series of) joint workshop(s). 
Alternatively, stakeholders are involved more broadly in different participatory system dynamics activities, 
which include not only group model building, but also additional participatory elements such as problem 
formulation, model validation, etc. (Cappuccio, Cunico, & Zimmermann, 2017). For this reason when SD is 
utilized with any form of stakeholder participation in addition to during the modelling process, it is usually 
called PSDM (Stave, 2010; Videira et al., 2003). The attempt to integrate a broader participation into the 
modelling process has the goal to overcome some limitations related to the traditional expert mode 
approach. The principal reasons are mainly four. First, stakeholders hold the necessary knowledge on the 
system to build the model and improve its quality (Vennix, 1996). Thus, a broader participation in the 
modelling process can tend to improve model quality, since more sources of knowledge are integrated 
together. Second, participants can improve their understanding of the problem by joining the modelling 
process (Scott et al., 2016). Attending to workshops tend to generate a learning process among the 
participants, since they follow step by step the development of the model. Third, PSDM can support the 
alignment of participants mental models and create shared knowledge among the group (Scott et al., 2016). 
Discussion during the workshops is facilitated and this helps to create the right context to generate shared 
learning. Fourth, “if [stakeholders] are involved in the process, they are likely to engage more fully with the 
results” (Xing et al., 2014). Traditional approaches has proven to be likely to fail to trigger a sustainable, long 
term and systemic change (Vennix, 1990). Instead, PSDM supports the implementation phase, since the 
participants’ sense of ownership towards the model is greater than it would be with an expert approach and 
this make more likely the intervention to have an impact (Rouwette, et al., 2002; et al., 2016; Vennix, 1996). 
All of this is especially true when models have tried to tackle ‘messy problems’ (Vennix, 1996), namely issues 
that have high degree of complexity, a multitude of stakeholders involved and in which uncertainty is high. 
Moreover, experts and stakeholders involvement and supervision over the model provide a first validation 
of the quality of the structure of the model. For all these reasons, PSDM has been recognized to have a great 
potential to contribute to complexity understanding and policy-making. Therefore, PSDM has been chosen 
as method for this study for the reasons listed above. In the context under study, it can provide great 
knowledge enhancements. However, the reason why PSDM has been chosen are not just from a scientific 
purpose of gaining new understanding. It has been selected also because the engagement of stakeholders in 
the modelling phase can increase the likelihood of the model to trigger a social and sustainable change. That’s 
exactly why Eker & Zimmermann (2016), Shrubsole et al. (2014), Macmillan et al. (2016), Xing et al. (2014) 
explicitly have called for the use of PSDM in this environment. Said so, it is necessary to look at previous SD 
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experiences in the retrofit domain looking if there are studies that already covered, at least partially, the 
dynamics of UK homeowners retrofit uptake and the systemic impact of the two policies under exploration 
in BEIS and looking for lessons to learn from similar projects.  
SD has a long tradition of being applied housing problems. Jay Forrester, the founder of SD, first investigated 
the dynamics involved in the urban development, discovering how policies in force at that time were 
contributing to cause undesired behaviours experienced in many major cities in USA (Forrester, 1969). 
Therefore, it not surprising that SD has already dealt with issues related to housing stock and its energy 
consumption.  There are existing focusing on the housing market dynamics and scenario exploration 
(Eskinasi, Rouwette, & Vennix, 2011). There are also researches on the diffusion of energy-efficiency 
measures in the dwelling stock. For example Blumberga et al., (2011), Müller & Ulli-Beer (2010) and Pruyt & 
Yücel (2011) developed models in an expert mode approach respectively for the Latvian, Swiss and Dutch 
housing stock. These models explore the main trends in housing stocks, the sensitive system sectors and the 
main drivers of energy efficiency. However, despite the differences due to the diverse case studies, they all 
adopt a very aggregate point of view: energy efficiency is not differentiated in different type of measures but 
they are integrated all together; households decision processes are stylized since they do not take into 
account most of the barriers and drivers discussed in the literature; and other important sectors of the 
retrofit system appear to be left outside their analysis boundaries (e.g. supply chain) and consequently their 
impacts on the homeowner decision are not explored, etc. However, there are also SD studies on the 
occupants’ consumption behaviour conducted in a traditional setting. Papachristos (2015) studies and 
quantifies the effects of smart meter introduction, increased appliances efficiency and households trends 
and behaviours (with respect of appliances use) in the Netherlands, finding that the benefits carried by the 
smart meters diffusions are ‘rebounded’ by the increase in the number of households and in the average 
number of appliances per person. Armenia et al. (2009) investigated how households behaviour in terms of 
comfort and cost can influence the adoption of energy efficiency measures. Although this study is very 
narrowed in its scope (it accounts only household’s comfort and costs and it lack of any connection to the 
broader system, such as housing stock, supply chain, etc.), it shows that the ‘taboo topic’ of homeowner 
behaviour (Armenia et al., 2009, p. 29)  can be modelled in a dynamic way and not only with static models as 
it has been mainly done so far. According to them, this may open to system dynamicists new areas of research 
in the housing efficiency domain. However, they warn on the difficulty to formalize it. There were also 
application of PSDM in the housing sustainability system domain. De Gooyert et al. (2016) used it to 
understand better the persistence of policy resistance in the context of sustainability transition. Their project 
with 96 participants was considered successful since it showed that the PSDM approach can help overcoming 
policy resistance by mapping out the structure of the system responsible for such resistances and because it 
helped to identify leverage points to trigger systemic changes. Elias (2008) conducted a systemic analysis of 
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the residential sector energy efficiency in New Zealand’s residential sector. He gathered 10 stakeholders for 
a workshop session and the outcomes of that were a qualitative map of the housing stock and a general 
understanding of how retrofit uptake can be improved from an aggregated perspective. Although the map is 
not quantified and it lacks of details on the homeowners decision-making process for retrofit uptake and of 
connections with other important sector of the housing domain (e.g. supply chain), it illustrates how PSDM 
can be successfully used in the domain of residential energy efficiency.  
The UK housing system is not new to be explored with SD. Hong-Minh & Strohhecker (2002), in a traditional 
expert mode, investigated the British private house building supply chain and built a model able to explore 
different scenarios for different supply chain performances. However, what can be specifically relevant to 
the scope of this project is the study Eker & Zimmermann (2016) in which the authors highlighted the high 
fragmentation degree of the UK housing construction and retrofit environment. After conducting a large set 
of interviews with stakeholders, they were able to capture and identify the high degree of fragmentation 
within the housing system. This state of fragmentation seems to arise from the lack of competences and 
monitoring activities in the actions of designers, constructors and policy-makers, thus generating 
performance gaps. Therefore, they suggest systems thinking approaches for research and decision-making in 
order to avoid policy resistances and unintended consequences. Also PSDM was recently applied to 
specifically study the UK case when participatory group modelling sessions were done with stakeholders and 
experts with the goal of increasing the understanding of the long-term dynamics of urban retrofit at a city-
regional scale (Xing et al., 2014). The result was a causal map that was used to facilitate the discussion among 
the participating stakeholders at the end of the process. The outcome, although maybe a step behind in 
terms of refinements, it is very close to what Elias (2008) obtained in New Zealand. In line with this is the 
work of Macmillan et al., (2016). They involved in over 50 stakeholders from the UK, representing 37 
organizations (among which six national government departments), in a series of workshops with the scope 
of improving the understanding about housing, energy and wellbeing and their complex interconnections. It 
resulted in a series of Causal Loop Diagrams (CLDs) that helped participant to create a shared understanding 
of how wellbeing relates to housing and a set of common criteria to assess future policies. The researchers 
conclude calling for further participatory studies focused on deepening the dynamics involved in the system. 
Hence, the works of Xing et al (2014) and Macmillan et al. (2016) shows how PSDM can be successfully applied 
to create system maps in a participatory way with British stakeholders in order to improve the general 
understanding. Moreover, both of them identify in the policy-makers lack of appropriate modelling and 
decision support tools for long term sustainable retrofitting one of the key barriers to the energy efficiency 
uptake.  
An overview of the SD relevant studies on the subject has been presented. Although some researches are 
available, no one have explored so far in a dynamic way and in detail how the homeowners’ decision-process 
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for retrofit and the broader housing system are interrelated in the UK (it wasn’t either precisely studied in 
other countries). On top of that, nobody quantified these dynamics. There are also no study on the dynamics 
triggered by financial policies such as the mortgage policy and the stamp duty rebate. Therefore, noted the 
knowledge gaps and the relevance of the challenges arising from these gaps, the scope of this thesis is to 
study through a PSDM approach the dynamics related to homeowners deciding to retrofit their property and 





4. Methods and Research Process 
The method adopted to conduct this research was PSDM based on participatory workshops. Figure 4-1 below 
outlines how the approach was developed for this research  by detailing the activities related to each research 
step.  
 
In the next paragraphs, an explanation of each step is provided. 
Figure 4-1: The Participatory System Dynamics Modelling process 
Source: conceived by the author 
 
 
Table 4-1: Prototype table with the information provided to the 
Devil’s AFigure 4-1: The Participatory System Dynamics 
Modelling process 
Source: conceived by the author 
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4.1. Research steps 
4.1.1. Research set up and gatekeepers’ preliminary interviews 
Since the approach needs the contribution of several participants-stakeholders, it is important to organize 
some preliminary interviews with the gatekeepers of the organizations involved. There are three main 
practical reasons for this. First, it serves to familiarise the client with the method and to define clearly the 
scope, focuses and outcomes. Second, it is important to plan and set-up the whole research process (e.g. 
workshops, interviews, etc.). Third, it is compelling because it allowed the researchers to get to know what 
the pressures and constraints that project will face are and to tailor the PSDM approach consequently. The 
optimal expected results for this step are to obtain primarily a shared process schedule, and then an 
agreement on the desired outcomes.  
4.1.2. Workshop and workshop preparation 
Once the process is set up and the workshops planned, these last need to be prepared. First, a literature 
review on the subject was performed in order to familiarize the researchers with the subject. Then time by 
time, before each workshop, a detailed plan for the session needed to be developed. To perform this work 
the traditional guidelines (Vennix, 1996) for participatory SD are followed. Moreover, the workshops are 
structured in ‘chunks’, based on scripts, in order to make the session more flexible and increase participants’ 
performance, as  literature recommends (Andersen & Richardson, 1997). The outcomes of the sessions are 
expected to be system maps in form of causal loop diagrams (CLD). The workshop recording is done in order 
to save on digital format all the discussions that take place. Moreover, at the end of each sessions, 
participants’ feedback are collected. In between the workshops, a workbook with the outcomes of the 
session is delivered to the group, as Vennix (1996). The purpose of this is to show them what they have done, 
to make the whole process completely transparent (via letting them know what the research team has been 
doing behind the scenes) and to try to keep their interest high on the project. Moreover, it served as 
validation step. The participants are asked to refer back if any inconsistency is found or to bring their concerns 
directly to the next session. Then the outcomes of a workshop will be used for the preparation of the next 
one as a starting point. The idea is to continuously build up the new map structure based on the previous 
one produced. The procedure described is an iterative process that is repeated all the time that a workshop 
is performed (for this reason in Fig 4-1 there is an arrow going back from stage 3 to stage 2).   
4.1.3. Model building 
Once the workshops terminate, the quantification phase starts. A stock and flow model (SFD) is constructed 
based on the resulting system map produced in the last workshop. To build up the structure the lessons 
provided by Sterman (2000) are followed. The needed data will be firstly retrieved from literature and official 
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sources (e.g. BEIS, UK Office for National Statistics, etc.). In case the necessary data are not found among 
these, grey literature will be analyzed.  
4.1.4. Experts interviews and model refinement 
Near the conclusion of model building process, interviews with experts are done. These serve many scopes. 
First, meeting the experts can be crucial to clarify some possible uncertain structures of the model. Second, 
they can provide information and data that might still be needed since not found in literature. These aspects 
are crucial to refine the model towards a better quality. Third, having the model and the assumption 
discussed with experts can be considered a form of validation (Barlas, 1996). At the end of this step a more 
formal model validation will take place based on the examples provided by Barlas (1996) and Sterman (2000). 
4.1.5.  Follow up 
Lastly, once the model is built and validated, the results are presented to the workshop participants. The 
scope of that is to share with them the insights gained on the system. A possible related outcome for this 
final step could be that the new insights may cause or support participants mental model changes and/or 
create commitment towards group solutions. Feedback on the whole process are going to be collected.  
4.2. Research context 
As already said in the introduction, the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) is the 
governmental department responsible for energy efficiency policy. In the direction to avoid the repeat the 
same mistakes made in past policy-making processes, BEIS began to explore more holistic approaches in 
order to take into account the complexities involved within the housing system. After the Green Deal failure, 
to BEIS appeared clear that financial affordability is not the only barrier limiting the retrofit uptake rate in UK 
dwellings, despite its importance. Accordingly, BEIS decided to improve its understanding of this system, 
especially with respect of homeowners. Therefore, it started a fruitful collaboration with University College 
London (UCL) Institute for Environmental Design and Engineering (IEDE) in which PSDM was the adopted 
approach to conduct research. This has brought to the Housing, Energy and Wellbeing (HEW) project6, 
described in Macmillan et al. (2016) and reported in the previous chapter. Since, the final maps and the 
participatory process proved to have an impact in shifting the mental model of a wide number of stakeholder 
and policymakers in the direction of a more holistic view, BEIS and UCL decided to extend their collaboration 
further. Therefore, this new project between the two institutions is at the base of the research developed in 
this thesis. The scope of the project was to explore the dynamics behind the homeowners retrofit uptake and 
how the policies under investigation in BEIS, namely the mortgage policy and the stamp duty rebate, would 
trigger systemic change. The scope of the project is in line with the research gap previously identified and 




with the objects of this study. Moreover, this project allows us to answer to the many calls that have been 
made in the scientific literature to use PSDM in the domain of housing energy efficiency in the UK (Eker & 
Zimmermann, 2016; Shrubsole et al., 2014) and to support policy-makers, with this method (Macmillan et 
al., 2016; Xing et al., 2014). The project took place between the end of February and April 2017 in London. 
There was an agreement to conduct the project through interviews and participatory workshops. 
Unfortunately, only members from different areas of BEIS policymaking team could attend the sessions due 
to the confidentiality of the subject and because of the high time pressure to conclude the project in a short 
time making that it was not possible to invite other stakeholders or experts and that there was no room to 
arrange extra and separate events with them. Therefore, only policymakers could attend the workshops. 
4.3. Participatory system dynamics in a ‘pressure-cooker’ 
These setting specifics impose to diverge from the traditional and complete group model building approach 
exposed by Vennix (1996).  However, it is also true that this case is not uncommon in PSDM. Many (if not all) 
participatory projects needs to deviate from the original prototypes and be adapted to the context in which 
they take place because sometimes they can not access all the stakeholders or have a reasonable amount of 
time to follow all the indicated steps. This is exactly one of the reasons why sessions tend to be divided into 
chunks based on scripts (Andersen & Richardson, 1997): this make them flexible and adaptable to a wide 
range of situations. Examples of successful projects conducted in short time frame or unorthodox settings 
already exist. For instance, Videira et al. (2012) were able to achieve satisfactory outcomes thorough only a 
workshop with twenty-two participants. Nevertheless, the possibility to have only policymakers attending 
the workshops creates an absolute homogeneity in the mental models brought into the session, and such 
homogeneity in the participants poses a great methodological challenge. The traditional setting for PSDM 
requires to include a different variety of stakeholders affecting and affected by the system under analysis 
into the workshops’ participants (Vennix, 1996). The reasons are that this allows to incorporate diverse 
sources of information into the model, to improve its quality, to avoid group-thinking and ideas redundancy 
among the participants, to have their assumptions challenged by other stakeholders and thus develop further 
their understanding, to create shared knowledge among different stakeholders and, lastly, to get 
commitment on the project results from different actors and consequently to increase the chance of success 
during the implementation phase. Actually, there are very few script that tries to overcome part of the issues 
posed by homogeneity. One of them is the ‘Devil’s Advocate’ (Vennix, 1996). It suggests dividing the 
participants in two groups, one with the goal of attacking the assumptions made in the model so far and the 
other with the aim of defending them. However, this strategy has a major limitation: it does not introduce 
new source of information ‘into the workshop room’, it just uses the knowledge that is already there. Thus, 
it is expected to work well only in projects where the participants are heterogeneous. For instance, it may be 
the case of a workshop group in which heterogeneous participants are facing groupthink or they do not 
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challenge each other assumptions and the first ideas that pops up is always the one the group opts for. Then, 
using the Devil’s Advocate suggested by Vennix (1996) may stimulate participants to go behind what already 
discussed. 
Therefore, finding a solution to the homogeneity issue that brings ‘into the room’ new mental models 
(namely bringing heterogeneity) is a remarkable methodological challenge. However, based on the actual 
state of the art, a proper methodological solution has not been found. Gerrits & Vaandrager (2017) found 
themselves in a very similar situation and they report an unsuccessful methodological adaptation they tried 
in a PSDM process in order to increase the heterogeneity among the group. Policymakers of Rotterdam, a 
Dutch municipality, asked Gerrits and Vaandrager their help to gain system thinking skills and develop a 
model “in oder to assess the extent to which budget cuts could be done whilst keeping the urban system 
stable” (Gerrits & Vaandrager, 2017, p. 4). To achieve this scope a particpatory group model building setting 
was chosen. However, there were two major issues:first, the project needed to be concluded in a time span 
of two months and second, due to time and external constraints, only a small group of civil servants of 
Rotterdam municipality attended the project. Therefore, they found themselves working under high time 
pressure and with a homogenous group of policy-makers as this research did. In reaction to that, they 
planned “to negate the homogeneity of the group by instructing the participants to collect data from a wide 
range of sources and to safeguard the diversity of the data” (Gerrits & Vaandrager, 2017, p. 5), expecting that 
these instruction could increase the heterogeneity present in the group. Nevertheless, the adaptation was 
no successful and therefore it is worth to look closely at what happened. Gerrits and Vaandrager had an 
initial meeting with the gatekeeper in the organization in which they framed the focus of the project and 
selected the methodology (PSDM). Then, they hold a presentation to the potential participants in which they 
presented SD and PSDM features and the scope and plan of the study. During the presentation they noticed 
that the trust on the use and attainability of the methodolody was not very high, since among the group 
several people were skeptical towards the methodology. Nevertheless, the project was approved because 
the municipal chief executive (the gatekeeper) was a supporter of the approach. However, due to time and 
external constraints mentioned earlier, it was communicated that only people from the same municipality 
department would attend  the project and that it needed to be done in a two month period, and therefore 
there was room for only two worskshops and a final follow-up meeting. Therefore, with this information, 
Gerrits and Vaandrager started to design a participatory process and decided to ‘compress’ the usual GMB 
approach in order to meet the necessities of the case. The first session began with an introduction of GMB 
to participants and then they were taught on how to reconstruct mental models from interviews. After that, 
municipality officials practiced this type data of collection. The participants were requested to perform the 
role of either the responded or interviewer (and in this last case to try to be as much naïve as possible). Once 
the problem of the interview was clarified, the interviewers had to repeatedly ask about the causes of the 
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problem, and then the causes of the causes and so on. Some of the preliminary results after this exercise had 
recognizable feedback loops even though the concept was not touched by the facilitators yet. So modellers 
gave to the audience the task of performing these interviews with people outside the organization and the 
relative model construction in between the two session and to send the results to the research team as soon 
as possible. Then the modellers would have gathered all the data together and constructed a preliminary 
model to be discussed and further developed in the second session. The idea was that as the officials got into 
the ‘field’, they would confront with many diverse points of view on common themes as waste and cleaning 
policies. Gerrits and Vaandrager also report that their general impression at the end of the session was that 
the participants accepted the ideas and the task provided. However, the results started to arrive to the 
facilitators only very few days before the second workshop. Moreover, the majority of the maps were of a 
very disappointing quality. Here the words used by Gerrit and Vaandrager are reported in order to fully 
comprehend the extend of the disappointing outcomes: “few officials had even taken the effort to actually 
construct a model. Those who had made an attempt had usually done it incorrectly and, it appeared, in a 
great hurry. The models were also based on very little but homogeneous information. An important reason 
for this homogeneity was that, contrary to the instructions, most of the civilservantshad only interviewed 
direct colleagues at approximately the same hierarchical level. Even if they did interview outside of their own 
organization, as two did, they were unable to translate those results into anything other than what they 
themselves understood to be true. In other words, they only recorded and emphasized those views that 
confirmed their own. In addition to this, normative and factual statements were mixed” (Gerrits & 
Vaandrager, 2017, p. 7). Consequentely it was impossible for the modellers to unify the information collected 
in a preliminary model to be used as a starting point in the next session. Therefore, a change in plan was 
decided: the modellers built a preliminary model by themselves, presented it to the audience and then used 
the second session to ask for additional information to the participant in order to compensate the lack of 
quality. During the second workshop, the participants were divided into subgroups with a topic assigned to 
each one and, after the group discussion, they were asked to report back to the bigger audience their 
conclusions. The modellers used these ideas to develop the model further. Their findings were presended in 
the last meeting. Contrary to the first two workshops, which deeply relied on participants’ inputs, this session 
was more a follow-up in which researchers presented the insights gained. Unfortunately, the meeting was 
unsatisfactory. The authors report that “the participants either found it difficult to follow the many loops in 
the model or, conversely, thought that the model was too generic to reveal anything surprising. Of the latter 
group, some remained silent out of politeness but were still deeply sceptical. The details of the model and our 
observations mentioned in the previous section seemed to fall upon deaf ears” (Gerrits & Vaandrager, 2017, 
p. 8). The participants claimed they were expecting something far different from the actual outcomes and 
because of this diffused unsatisfaction among the participants the possibility for further projects and 
collaborations was cancelled.  
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Gerrits and Vaandrager tested to what extent they could compress GMB and PSDM more in general. They 
accepted the challenges posed by a homogeneous group of participants and they thought it would be feasible 
to train participants to collect mental models and make them do the task and that this would introduce more 
heterogeneity in the group discussion and subsequently improved the model. Unfortunately, the results were 
very dissatisfactory. At a group level (increased quality of communication, creation of a shared language, 
consensus about problem and solution definitions) no improvements were seen. At individual level (positive 
response to the process, mental model refinement, commitment and behavioural change) only a small 
portion of participants stated that they appreciated the usefulness of SD while the majority did not respond 
positively. These last “were negative about the method mentioned the following weaknesses: the amount of 
time and other resources required, the skills demanded from the participants, the resulting model that was 
either self-evident or not clear enough and lack of a clear goal for using the method” (Gerrits & Vaandrager, 
2017, p. 9). Gerrits and Vaandrager got to the conclusion that the adaptations tried need to be rejected as 
good or promising practice because they could not achieve the client goal, no change in the organization was 
observed and the organization rejected the method deciding to not continue the collaboration after the 
sessions. The researchers identified the possible causes of the failure in a combination of factors as the lack 
of time, no effort from the participants’ side, contextual issues (political environment). It is very unusual to 
see scientific articles reporting on a failed PSDM, but the work of Gerrits and Vaandrager is definitely very 
instructive to illustrate what may not work in a GMB project. Therefore, a new strategy to try to overcome 
the homogeneity during a GMB and PSDM in general is still needed. The project at the base of this research 
provided the right setting to test a new approach. What has been developed is an adaptation of the 
traditional Devil’s Advocate and it makes the facilitators leave their neutral role, becoming participants in 
order to raise new issue and new mental model into the workshop. It will be fully explained in the following 
subchapter.  
4.4. The ‘new’ Devil’s Advocate setting: a possible way to overcome the 
homogeneity barrier 
The new Devil’s Advocate script (DA) is a deep revisitation of the Vennix (1996) script and it takes inspiration 
from other facilitation techniques, such as the ‘Stakeholder role plays’ proposed by Bryson (2004), the role 
play gaming (blue team vs red team) used in cybersecurity (for example: Hannes, 2012; Mirkovic et al., 2008) 
and the widespread approach of the ‘Six thinking hats’ (De Bono, 1999). From these approaches, it is possible 
to note that people in other fields of study already tried to increase heterogeneous thinking among working 
group. From all these experiences and approaches, one main idea comes out: role-playing games are a 
successful way to deal with this. For instance, Bryson (2004) makes people impersonate different stakeholder 
in order to explore how they would behave. It is similar to what is done in cybersecurity: groups responsible 
of cybersecurity of companies or governments are divided in two teams, the defenders (blue) and the 
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attackers (red) and they have to play these roles and try to take each other down. This is a way to stress out 
how effective are the defence mechanisms and to explore how hackers might think. However, to ensure 
these strategies are effective a reliable knowledge among the game participants on the role they are going 
to play is needed, otherwise the usefulness of the technique can decline drastically, for instance if the actions 
of the fictional stakeholder/hackers are not realistic and credible the learning experience suffers. For these 
reasons, these techniques were evaluated as not the best way to deal with complete homogeneity in a PSDM 
session. In our project, only policymakers from BEIS were attending the workshops and they were the part 
of the organization that contributed to develop the failed Green Deal policy. As it was illustrated before, one 
of the reasons why the policy design was poor, was because policymakers failed to take into account other 
actors perspective (e.g. homeowners, supply chain). Therefore, from a practical point of view it did not make 
much sense to ask someone who had proven not to understand the mental model of some specific actors to 
perform a role play game in which they have to impersonate exactly those actors. Based on all of this the 
new DA script was developed.  
The substantial difference of the new approach suggested here is that who plays the role-play game is not a 
participant but a facilitator among the research team. One or more members of the team leave their neutral 
role of facilitators for the entire duration of a session and then impersonate and bring in to the PSDM ‘room’ 
the mental models of the missing stakeholders/experts. It may be intended as a sort of new GMB script but 
actually it is not. With script, it is usually meant a group exercises that is performed for chunk of workshop 
sessions. Moreover, they are interchangeable and usually practitioners put in series in order to create a 
session (Andersen & Richardson, 1997). This is not the case for the DA adaptation, since it is not a group task 
lasting for a certain amount of time and then changed. It is more a setting for a session because it does not 
involve the actively participants and it does not just last for part of the workshop but for the whole meeting. 
What are the information that the DA brings into the room? The preparation of the role requires a 
considerable amount of time. First, the missing stakeholders need to be identified. This can be done based 
on the group inputs and on the literature on the subject. Once they have been discovered, behind the scenes, 
scientific and ‘grey’ literature is read on their point of view, interviews with subject experts are done (paying 
high attention to not disclose any confidential information on the case) and reports analyzed. Then all the 
relevant information obtained are organized in tables in which there are indicated: the theme of issue to be 
raised by the DA, who the related stakeholder is, how to frame the issue during the workshop, a suggestion 
on how to represent these concepts in form of variable and causal relations and the source of all the 
information. Table 4-1 shows how the tables provided to the DA look like. The DA is provided with these 




Once all the information have been collected the whole preparation needed for the setting is completed. The 
setting can be now used during a workshop. For that session, at least two facilitators are required: one will 
facilitate the workshop while the other plays the DA. The facilitator needs to introduce the figure of the DA 
to the workshop participants. It is a very delicate phase since it is the moment in which a member of the 
facilitation team, that before was neutral, abandons his impartiality and starts to act as a participant. If this 
setting is not properly explained to the group, it may raise misunderstanding, tension and even conflicts and 
thus undermine the whole project. It is also a good practice to ask the participants whether they agree with 
this approach and leave them room to refuse it in case they do not feel comfortable with it, because there is 
no point in creating pressure on group members. Figure 4-2 provides a guideline on how to introduce the DA 
to the group. 
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Lastly, how does the DA carry out his role during the session? Although he acts as one of the participants, he 
has to follow some guidelines in order to make his role as smooth as possible. The ideas behind this choice 
come from the work on human interactions, help and consultation of Schein (1990). Therefore, the 
behavioural guidelines provided to the DA are the following: 
- Sit and stand among the participants and not among the facilitators. 
- Suggest links and variable as any participant. Therefore, participate to the nominal group techniques 
and the modelling phase (suggesting variables, links, arising questions, etc.). 
- Do not interfere in the group activity that requires reaching a consensus among participants. You have 
‘less power’. This because reaching consensus is an internal group process through which the 
commitment on the model is built and so nobody of the facilitation team should interfere with it. In 
practice, after every discussion in the modelling phase, in which also the DA can take part, the facilitator 
usually asks to the participants if they all agree on the suggested item. In this moment the DA should 
not interact (if something appears to be extremely wrong he can ask clarifications but he cannot put a 
veto or start a conflict) 
- The goal of the DA is to add more perspective to the group and then improve the model quality. 
Remember that with this adjustment we are exploring to what extent a facilitator can leave his role and 
intervene on the content and what contribution they can give to the model. To do so, the DA can share 
his reasoning as a normal participant and the data source these ideas come from. Try to set yourself in 
an inquiry mode when suggesting variables, etc. An example of bad practice is: “this is wrong, the 
literature says this, this and this” because obviously their reaction would be quite negative towards the 
workshop setting. Instead an example of good practice could be: “I see. But, have you ever considered 
this option described in this source?” or “I read some articles. This might be placed here and connected 
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to this. Is it useful? Why don’t you think so?”. In this case, the DA just challenges their ideas and do not 
impose anything. The burden of thinking about the stimulus from the DA is shifted to the participants 
since they need to think about it in order to answer the question. Moreover, questions are less ‘harmful’ 
in a discussion than statements. 
- Ultimately the role of the DA is just posing ideas (backed by sources), explaining the reasoning why 
these ideas could be relevant and then support the participants to accept them or not. They are the 
ones who make a decision. The DA should never forget this while conducting his role.  
- The issue that DA should pose are studied and analyzed earlier with the research team in order to check 
and assess their robustness and relevance. All the issues are related to a stakeholder, have a source 
backing that claim (literature, interview with experts, etc.), have a sentence as guideline on how to 
present the issue to the other participants and a list of possible variables related to it.  
Ultimately, the DA needs to be warned that this is a methodological attempt to adapt PSDM to an undesirable 
situation. It has never been tried and there could be some aspects that have not been taken into account and 
something not expected can arise in the workshop. Therefore, to the DA it is requested a high degree of 
flexibility and adaptation. In conclusion, the DA becomes an ‘asynchronous knowledge broker’ between the 
missing stakeholders and the policymakers at BEIS. Although the DA sticks to the scripted role, he still has 
some personal bias that cannot be erased. Therefore, it is impossible to distinguish completely to what extent 
the DA also represents himself. However, with this approach it is expected that the DA gets an additional and 
different knowledge about the missing stakeholders than the workshop participants have about them and 
thus be able to (at least partially) represent them indirectly. 
4.5. SWOT analysis 
Due to the originality of the approach, a preliminary assessment of its strengths and weaknesses is required. 
In order to do so, a SWOT analysis of the setting is undertaken (Osita, Onyebuchi, & Nzekwe, 2014). SWOT is 
an acronym for strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats and it is a framework for evaluating these 
factors in projects and organizations. It allows to identify external and internal factors that are unfavourable 
and favourable to achieve the objectives of the adapted setting. Therefore the elements analyzed are: 
-  Strengths (internal and favourable) stand for the attributes of the approach that give benefits over the 
others 
- Weaknesses (internal and unfavourable) refer to the features (e.g. distractions, competition) of the 
approach that place it in a disadvantage compared to others 
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- Opportunities (external and favourable) external aspects that the approach could exploit to its 
advantage 
- Threats (external and unfavourable) elements in the environment that could harm the approach and 
impede to achieve its goals. 
Therefore, performing a SWOT analysis is crucial because it can help to explicit the key factors that can 
support or undermine the new DA approach. However, SWOT method has its own weaknesses that it is 
necessary to highlight. The principal one is that it does not provide a prioritization so, for instance, weak 
opportunities may seem to counterbalance strong threats. In the next paragraphs, the four elements will be 
discussed in detail for the new DA, while Fig 4-3 at the end of section summarizes al the main points of the 
analysis.   
4.5.1. Strengths 
Several strengths have been identified. In general, confidentiality and time constraints posed by BEIS are 
respected: no external person is needed and no modifications to the participants schedule are needed. All 
the effort to prepare the setting is on the facilitators. Benefits compare to the ‘Stakeholder role play’ 
suggested by Bryson (2004) are that, in this new setting, the DA can prepare himself on the missing 
stakeholders before the workshop and explore the issues and concerns (e.g. reading literature, interviews) 
while a participant might not have the knowledge to bring their interests or mental model. In other words, 
the new DA somehow guarantees a ‘minimum’ standard over the missing stakeholders’ representation that 
there is not with other approaches while the benefits over the traditional Devil’s Advocate proposed by 
Vennix (1996) are multiple. First, it is not just a script for part of a workshop but, as said, it is something 
continuously present. In all the modelling phases of the workshop the DA shares information that a missing 
stakeholder might have and so have an impact on the group and on the model. Second, participants that are 
locked-in in their mental models and assumptions might not even see them when playing the Vennix (1996) 
script while an external input from a DA could highlight those ones. 
4.5.2. Weaknesses 
The new DA setting has four major weaknesses. First, it requires to the facilitator to play the DA to have 
enough knowledge to represent the missing stakeholders otherwise it may raise unrealistic issues during the 
workshop, ending up to lower the quality of the model and also the relationship with the group of 
participants. This risk is not there in any of the similar approaches mentioned earlier since the facilitators do 
not get involved in the group dynamics at all. Related to that, another weakness is the time required to 
prepare the scripts for the setting. In order to collect the information to ‘feed’ the DA with a lot of preparation 
is due: reading of scientific literature, exploration of grey literature, interviews with the stakeholder and 
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subject experts, etc. Compared to the other approaches where the preparation time is almost null, the one 
required by this new setting in considerably higher. Thirdly, the facilitation team loses ‘capacity’ since at least 
one of them plays the DA during the whole workshop. This increases the workload for the remaining 
facilitators. Lastly, this new approach is encompassed of uncertainty. Since it is an original setting, there are 
no previous experiences on using it, therefore, although careful analysis ca ben conducted in advance for 
assessing the entire situation, no one can anticipate all the factors that will interplay a role during the session.  
4.5.3. Opportunities 
An external benefit that might arise from the new DA setting is that it may help to structure better the 
process. The idea is that having an expert in modelling/facilitation as a participant can help the facilitators to 
structure the work of the group. For example, DA may show other group members how to suggest variables 
and express concepts in form of causal relations and thus end up leading by example the other participants 
on how to behave and interact during a workshop. 
4.5.4. Threats  
Numerous possible threats have been established. First, the acceptance of the participants of this original 
setting is unknown and unpredictable. What may harm more the group dynamics is the reaction of 
participants to the facilitator playing the DA loss of neutrality. Specifically, the fact of being challenged by a 
‘new’ participant that comes from outside the group and that was before perceived as neutral can generate 
adverse reactions in some participants. Moreover, as already mentioned in the weaknesses part, the 
credibility of the DA depends on the participants perceived quality of the issues and comments raised. In 
addition, the DA could struggle to step in the discussion. This because there could already be some group 
dynamics formed and getting in for an outsider may be challenging. Alternatively, the DA could steer the 
process. Due to his deeper experience in PSDM and SD than other participants, he could more or less 
voluntarily impose the point of view he represents. There is also the risk that during the session the DA 
behaves like a facilitator. For someone trained and experienced in PSDM conduction it may be difficult to 
avoid to take back his ‘natural’ role for which he has been taught. For instance, the actual facilitators may be 
struggling and the DA cannot control himself from leaving his role of participant and help them behaving like 
a facilitator. On top of that, the facilitation team is reduced of at least member. As said in the weaknesses 
this makes life harder for the remaining facilitators and the fatigue can lower the quality of their 
performance, especially in long workshops. Lastly, if it is performed in one session out of a series of 
workshops, the setting could create confusion on DA’s contribution. For instance, some of DA’s suggested 
structures might be integrated in the model in the session in which the DA is performed and then proposed 
to be left out in a latter workshop. The facilitator may be trapped in a situation in which he covers two roles: 
the former DA and the actual facilitator.  
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Figure 4-3: New Devil’s Advocate SWOT analysis 
Source: conceived by the author 
 
 
Table 4-2: New Devil’s Advocate risks and 




4.5.5. Potential risks and mitigation 
The elevate number of potential threats creates a high degree of risk. Therefore, this makes necessary to 
prepare mitigation strategies. These are reported in Table 4-2 below. Some of the mitigations are already 
integrated in the approach while others have been specifically elaborated to diminish the related risks. These 
mitigation strategy are expected to decrease the degree of potential risk that the new DA setting can face 
when applied in real cases.  
 
Expected risk Mitigation strategy 
Reaction of participants to the facilitator’s loss of neutrality Transparency from the beginning of the role of the DA 
DA perceived credibility by other participants 
All the issues the DA wants to raise are previously studied and 
documented (backed by sources) in the provided script 
DA steers the process 
The other facilitators make sure the DA is not going to become a 
talking head or lead the group process 
Struggle for the DA to step in the discussion 
DA should be self-confident and consider himself as much as 
possible as a participant 
The facilitation team ‘loses’ one of the member and it can 
become more energy demanding for the other facilitators 
Shorter workshop, more breaks (if needed), different structure 
than the usual one in which the participants are more active (e.g. 
table top modelling) 
Confusion of the DA in his role between being a participant 
and a facilitator. The facilitator will act as a DA only during 
a workshop some structures suggested by him might be 
integrated in the model in that session and then proposed 
to be left out in a later session 
Once the role game of the DA is over, the DA assumes back the role 
of facilitator and therefore he is neutral with respect of the content. 
He may just ask the participants to explain why and let them to 
decide.   
DA behaves like a facilitator 
It might be that in addition to play his role the DA absentmindedly 
acts a facilitator (e.g. after speaking they give instructions, as “it is 
your turn to speak”, that are usually given by the facilitator). In this 
case, the actual facilitator should politely interrupt him, get the 
control back of the workshop and remember him his role of DA. 
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4.5.6. New Devil’s Advocate setting post-execution analysis 
Since what has been described is an original setting, a careful and scrupulous analysis needs to be done after 
it has been employed. This is crucial in order to understand the performance of the new DA approach. First, 
since it is planned to record the workshops, the sessions in which the new DA is used can be transcribed and 
then analyzed. This because studying a session transcription allows to have some ‘hard’ data to build a 
preliminary assessment upon. To interpret this data the transcription is coded adapting the guidelines of 
Hyunjung and Andersen (2012) to the case. Specifically what is coded are all the interventions made by a DA 
during the session.  For intervention it is meant what is communicated by a participant when they take the 
floor to talk during a group discussion. All the other interventions made by the other workshop’s participants 
are analyzed too, because their understating is instrumental to the coding of the DA’s interventions. 
However, they are not coded since there is no necessity to do that to analyze the DA contribution. The coding 
process is finalized to evaluate how the DAs intervened during the session and how they contributed to the 
map. To assess this last, an established ‘linking the map to the data source’ approach is use during the coding 
process (Hyunjung & Andersen, 2012). To complete this operation the transcript is cross-compared with the 
map resulting from the workshop, thus the structural changes made or impacted by the DA can be identified 
and tracked back in the DA’s interventions. Below in Table 4-3 the description of the coding scheme to adopt 
is reported. Obviously, a deep assessment of the new setting needs to take into account the feedback of all 
the people in the session: participants, DAs and facilitators. This is important because feelings, emotions, 
perceptions and other personal and relevant opinion related to the new DA approach probably do not 
emerge during a workshop discussion and in this case, the best way to collect it is to openly ask them for 
their opinion about the method used. Then, these can be complemented with short memos (following the 
guidelines in Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 2013) written by the actual workshop facilitators right after the 
workshop containing their personal reflection on how the session unfolded. They can be valuable because 
they could provide additional information than the simple oral feedbacks. In addition, once the setting is 
performed, in order to have a complete overview, its outcomes can be compared with the expected risks 
previously identified, to see whether they emerged or not and, in case these problematic situations appeared 









Type of code Description Why How 
Repetitions 
Interventions that are repetitions of a 
previous one or a continuations after an 
interruption 
Counting them allows to not 






Interventions directly suggesting variables 
or connections and that are refused by 
the group 
This code shows how the 
unsuccessful rate of the DA 
suggestions was. 






Interventions directly suggesting variables 
or connections and that are accepted by 
the group 
This code shows how the successful 
rate of the DA suggestions was. 
Moreover, the code helps to keep 
track of the structural changes 
directly ascribable to the DA actions 
and links maps to the data source 





Interventions that contributed to a 
discussion that leaded to structural 
change (e.g. suggestion of an idea that 
was translated in a structure, suggestion 
of a name for a variable for a topic under 
discussion, etc.) 
It keeps track of all the structures in 
which the DAs were directly involved 
in the creation or modification 
(contribution to a 
structural change) 
Discussion started 
by a DA 
Interventions of the DAs that stimulated 
discussion in the group on new issue of 
from a new perspective. 
These interventions are mostly questions 
or informational support 
To purpose of this code is to see how 
much were the DAs able to open new 
discussions 
(discussion started 
by a DA) 
Generic 
interventions 
All the interventions that are clearly 
categorizable in the other categories (e.g. 
clarifications, information, etc.) 
It is necessary to no leave out of the 
coding scheme any DAs’ intervention 





All interventions that are closer to what a 
facilitators does than to how a participant 
behaves during a workshop 
This code allows to account for the 
times the DAs leave their role of 
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5. Results and discussion 
The research results will be presented in the following way. Initially, the process (how the method was 
applied in practice) and its outcomes are described. The purpose of that is to show the reader how the 
process unfolded and what outcomes were produced over time. After that, a detailed analysis of the results 
obtained is conducted. First, the application of the new DA setting is assessed and discussed and then, the 
results and insights from the SFD model are displayed.  
5.1. Process and outcomes 
As said, the research was conducted with the PSDM approach described before and it engaged only 
policymakers from BEIS, in the context of a joint project between BEIS and UCL. The time span available to 
perform the study was extremely short, since it was from the late February until the end of April. Four system 
dynamicists constituted the research team: an experienced SD and PSDM lecturer and practitioner from UCL, 
a PhD student from UCL with e solid expertise on homeowners renovations’ decision-making but no previous 
knowledge on PSDM, a fellow EMSD colleague and the author of this thesis. It needs to be specified that the 
PhD student only helped during the workshops and did not contribute any further to the realization of the 
project. The process consisted of preliminary interviews in February, two workshops interspersed by an 
interview with the gatekeeper, five interviews with experts in BEIS to refine and quantify the model and a 
final follow-up meeting with participants and open to all the policymakers interested in the outcomes.   
Fig 5-1 shows how the process unfolded.  
 
5.1.1. Preliminary interviews 
In February, preliminary interviews took place between the research team and the gatekeepers. In this case, 
the first contact with the gatekeepers was crucial under many aspects. It served the purpose of familiarizing 
Figure 5-1: Participatory System Dynamics Modelling process employed  
Source: Cappuccio et al., 2017, p. 6 
 
 
F gure 5-2: Problematic behaviours brainstormed during the first 
workshopFigure 5-1: Participatory System Dynamics Modelling process 
employed  





the organization with the methodology. Moreover, exactly in this stage of the process, the research team 
was informed of the high time pressure and of the confidentiality issues with the information involved and 
that, due to these conditions, it would not have been possible to have other participants to the project than 
policymakers in BEIS. This meeting also helped to structure the process and to set clear deadlines. In this 
particular case, there was room only for two workshop sessions in March and for a final follow-up meeting 
in April in which the researchers would have shared the results of their work. However, gatekeepers provided 
their availability to arrange interviews with their experts. The result of this interview was an agreed document 
in which a detailed plan of action was black on white. It was very important in order to have complete clarity 
on how the process would have looked like, on what would have been the outcomes and to manage the 
gatekeeper expectations. 
5.1.2. First workshop 
The first workshop took place in the beginning of March. It was a full day workshop (6 hours) and attending 
to it there were six participants and the entire research team (four facilitators). First, there was an 
introductory moment in which all the participants and facilitators had time to introduce themselves. 
Thereafter, a facilitator presented to the group previous applications of SD to similar topics, highlighting what 
the outcomes lookalike, what is the methodology potential and what it does stands for (e.g. prediction and 
forecasting). Second, the script ‘Hopes and Fears’7 was used in order to let all the participants to express 
what they hoped to achieve what their concerns were for the session and the project. It was extremely 
helpful, since it let the researchers know that a couple of important participants had to leave earlier than the 
official ending time of the workshop and that consequently they would have liked to get into the mapping 
process as soon as possible. Knowing this allowed the facilitator to get in touch with the ‘group life’ (Phillips 
& Phillips, 1993) and adapt the session to the participants’ needs. This was possible because the session was 
structured on ‘chunks’ based on scripts making it flexible to be readjusted to the group need. Consequently, 
facilitators agreed to skip what was not strictly necessary and to move as quickly as possible to the mapping 
phase. Then the SD language, symbols and main concepts (stock, flow, variable, polarity, feedback and 
behaviour over time) were introduced to the participants, using the well-known metaphor of the bathtub 
(Sterman, 2002; Sweeney & Sterman, 2000). After that the introductory part was over and the participants 
became more actively involved. In order to define and clarify the problem the script ‘Graphs over time’8 was 
utilized. Participants were asked to draw graphs over time in blank sheets of paper of what they perceived 
to be problems in the system. Unfortunately, the task seemed to be not explained clearly enough and most 
                                                          
7 https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Scriptapedia/Hopes_and_Fears      
8 https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Scriptapedia/Graphs_over_Time  
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of the participants started to list with words what they think the problems were instead than depicting 
behaviours over time (Fig 5-2).  
 
Nonetheless, all the input were clustered on the board and used as starting point for the mapping process 
that lasted until the end of the workshop. Facilitators then began to ask for causes and consequences, as 
traditional group model building prescribes (Vennix, 1996). The discussion was very dense of content and the 
participants appeared to be very excited and active in sharing their ideas. Although group members’ high 
involvement is a definitely positive sign, the session resulted to be a little bit chaotic. Participants were so 
eager to share their ideas that they resulted to be ‘hasty’ in formulating them in form of variables and 
relations creating some confusion. The entire workshop got recorded.  
5.1.3. First workshop outputs 
Nevertheless, the feedbacks from the participants were very positive at the end of the session. They liked 
the process, they found useful to have a map serving as a group memory during their discussions and 
appreciated the fact that they could already identify some important loops. Also among the research team 
during a debrief post-session there was an overall feeling of satisfaction with the outcomes. However, the 
facilitators agreed that in some moments the session was chaotic and the discussion among the participants 
was not very structured. As said, the mapping process started from the scratch and the result at the end of 
the day is shown in Fig 5-3 below. 
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Figure 5-4: First workshop refined map. In green the variables explicitly 
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Behind the scenes, this map was translated in Vensim software (Annex A). Then it was revisited and refined 
by the researchers with the help of the recording in order to clean it up, namely avoiding duplication of the 
same concepts or disaggregating variables (Fig 5-4). On this revised CLD, the main loops were identified, 
highlighted and analyzed (Annex B). These outcomes from the first workshop were sent to the participants 
in form of workbook after the session, as Vennix (1996) recommend. In addition to show them the outcomes 
of their efforts and to be transparent on the work done by the research team between the sessions, it served 
as validation step: the participants were asked to refer back if any inconsistency was found or to bring their 
concerns directly to the next workshop.  
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Figure 5-5: New Devil’s 
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Figure 5-4: First workshop refined map. In green the variables explicitly mentioned in the workshop; in orange the ones coming from 
the disaggregation of variables mentioned in the workshop and in black the variables added by the research team 
Source: conceived by the author 
 
 
Figure 5-5: New Devil’s Advocate introductory slideFigure 5-4: First workshop refined map. In green the variables explicitly 
mentioned in the workshop; in orange the ones coming from the disaggregation of variables mentioned in the workshop and in black 
the variables added by the research team 
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5.1.4. Second workshop 
In preparation of the next session a short meeting with the gatekeeper was hold. It served to set up the 
workshop and to inform the organization about the willingness of the researchers to try a new approach to 
overcome the homogeneity issue among participants. The second session was completely devoted to revise, 
expand and improve the work done so far. The research team prepared a ‘hybrid model’ to be used as a 
starting point for the group work (Annex C). This map was an adjustment of the refined map resulting from 
the previous workshop (Fig 5-4). Here the key stocks and flows were identified, variables arranged in sectors 
(homeowner decision-making, supply chain, lenders, physical stock and renovations) and loops slightly 
simplified. Since this model combines the CLD features of the previous map and some characteristics of SFD, 
it was renamed ‘hybrid’. This decision was made because the previous map was judged too ‘row’ to be used 
as a starting point in a new session (risking to generate confusion) and therefore an adapted version was 
believed to better facilitate discussion and increase the speed of the work.  
The workshop lasted four hours and there were five participants and four facilitators. One of the participants 
did not attend the first session. In this workshop the Devils Advocate setting was performed. At the beginning, 
the slide below was used to provide the key information about it to the participants (Fig 5-6).  
 
Two facilitators played the Devil’s Advocate (DA) role while two facilitated, and this setting remain for the 
whole session. It was decided that the experienced SD practitioner and the PhD student performed the DAs 
Figure 5-5: New Devil’s Advocate introductory slide 
Source: conceived by the author 
 
 
Figure 5-6: Second workshop map. In black structure 
of the hybrid map at the beginning of the workshop 
and in red the addition made during the sessionFigure 
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because in possession of a wider expertise on the subject under discussion. In this case, the missing 
stakeholders that needed to be represented in the session were identified based on the input of the first 
workshop and on a preliminary review of the literature. Three main points of view were recognized as 
potentially lacking: lenders, supply chain stakeholders and homeowners. However, one of the participants 
had a background of working in a financial institution and therefore he was judged enough to represent the 
mental model of lenders. Therefore, in order to collect information on the interests and issues of the 
remaining two missing stakeholders, three interviews with experts (two on the supply chain and one on 
homeowner decision processes) were conducted and a literature review was performed. Then all the inputs 
received were collected in a ‘script’ (following the guidelines described in paragraph 4.4) that was provided 
to the two DAs a few days before the session. Here there were described all the information about the 
behaviour to adopt during the workshop and the issue likely to be raised by the missing stakeholders that 
the DAs should have tried to bring into the session. The script used for this workshop can be found in the 
Annex D. The workshop was composed of two major parts. First, the hybrid map was revised. Second, the 
participants were provided with posties on which to write variables they considered important and missing 
and stick them on the model, where they believed it was appropriate. Then, the group discussed added 
variable by added variable and, once agreement was achieved, it was connected to the structure. It is 
important to note that the two DAs were actual participants and took part to all the group tasks and were 
treat as the others by the facilitators for the entire session. Lastly, also this session was recorded.  
5.1.5. Second workshop outputs 
Participants provided positive comments on the session and expressed appreciation for the new DA setting. 
The research team was satisfied with the session and its outcomes. Then the resulting map was translated in 
Vensim. In figure 5-5 the starting structure of the hybrid map is reported in black and all the addition made 
during the workshop are highlighted in red. On the initial structure there was only a revision (it was erased 
since the effect was judge as negligible) of a causal link and it is portrayed in Fig 5-5 with a dotted red arrow. 
This represents the fact that the aforesaid link was not realistic. Lastly, the recording of the workshop has 
been transcribed (Annex E) and one of the two facilitators wrote a memo on his perceptions, ideas and 
feelings about the session (Annex G). 
5.1.6. Interviews 
Based on the new map it was built a SFD model. During the construction process, five additional interviews 
with experts from BEIS were arranged in order to clarify uncertain concepts, to collect data for the 
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Figure 5-6: Second workshop map. In black structure of the hybrid map at the beginning of the workshop and in red the addition made during the session 
Source: conceived by the author 
 
 
Figure 5-7: UK homeowner retrofit uptake Stock and Flow modelFigure 5-6: Second workshop map. In black structure of the hybrid map at the beginning of the 




By the end of April, the SFD has been concluded and presented in a follow-up meeting with workshop 
participants and other BEIS experts that were interested in the outcomes of the project (twelve people in 
total). Fig 5-6 below shows the model structure. The SFD is focused on the UK homeowners retrofit uptake 
rate and on the portion of housing stock that they own. The model is composed of more than 3000 symbols 
and takes into account five different energy efficiency measures that were considered as sensitive by BEIS: 
condensing boiler, double-glazing, loft, solid and cavity wall insulation. It simulates the uptake of these 
measures between 2000 and 2050. Due to the complexity of the map the participants were provided with a 
simplified CLD of the model in which all the most important loops have been reported (Fig 5-8). Several run 
and insights arising from the model structure were presented to the participants. With the support of the 
simplified CLD they were even able to track back by themselves the structural at the origin of some 
behaviours. Also in this case the participants feedback were very positive and constructive. In addition, they 
stated their willingness to continue further the research on the subject with the use of PSDM methodology 
in collaboration with UCL. Finally, few days after the follow-up, a report with the full explanation of the results 
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Figure 5-7: UK homeowner retrofit uptake Stock and Flow model 
Source: conceived by the author 
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5.2. New Devil’s Advocate setting analysis  
In the following section the performance of the new DA setting used during the second workshop is assessed 
and discussed.  
5.2.1. Coding analysis: how did the ‘new’ Devil’s Advocate influence the model? 
The second workshop recoding was transcribed and then codified following the instructions displayed in 
detail in section ‘4.5.6’ (Annex E). All the interventions made by both the DAs during the mapping phase of 
the workshop (duration 3h30min approximately) have been coded. Two important aspects need to be 
mentioned. First, the audio recordings of the session were in some parts inaudible and therefore difficult to 
understand. This has slightly vitiate the quality of the row data. Second, the coding process has been carried 
out in a ‘conservative mode’. This means that when there was low degree of confidence on which code 
attribute to the intervention, this last was classified as generic intervention. This choice was taken in order 
to decrease as much as possible the chances of overestimating the impact of the DAs.  
The goals of this coding analysis were to assess how the DAs intervened during the session and how they 
contributed to the map. In Table 5-1 are reported the overall results of the coding, namely the sum of 
interventions done in the workshop and the number of directly attributable variables and connections 
addictions done by the DAs and the other participants. A variable or connection is directly attributed to the 
DAs when they clearly suggest or mention it, in all the other cases the item is attributed to the other 
participants.   
 
Items accountable to Interventions Variables Connections 
DAs 111 14 26 
Other participants 452 40 49 
TOTAL 5639 54 75 
 
From this information it is possible to appreciate the quantitative impacts of the DAs: they made the 19.7% 
of the total interventions during the workshop and they directly contributed respectively for 26% and 34.7% 
of new variables and causal links. Table 5-2 outlines how the specifics of each DA interventions have been 
categorized through the coding (DA1 and DA2 refers to the two different facilitators playing the role, 
                                                          
9 The interventions made by the facilitators have been left out from the calculation 
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respectively the experience practitioner and the PhD student). In addition, cross-comparing the coding 
transcription and the resulting map from the second workshop (Fig 5-6 in the previous chapter), it has been 
possible to link back all the DAs contribution to the map. Thus, all the variables or connections directly and 
explicitly suggested by the DAs and therefore directly attributable to them have been highlighted in Fig 5-8 
below. This is a way to show graphically the impact of the news setting on the model development.   
 
Type of intervention DA1 DA2 Total DAs 
repetitions  6 0 6 
variable or connections unaccepted 0 0 0 
variable or connection accepted 15 1 16 
contribution to a structural change 13 0 13 
discussion started by a DA 8 0 8 
generic intervention  56 3 59 
facilitation intervention 9 0 9 
TOTAL 107 4 111 
 
All these data provide interesting information. First of all, the DAs the impact on the session was quite 
significant. As shown in Table 5-1 the actively participated in the discussion and contributed remarkably in 
defining the system structure. Moreover, looking at the coding results (Table 5-2), it is possible to appreciate 
that the DAs did not just  directly ‘suggest variables’ (code ‘variable or connection accepted’) into the session, 
but they provided support to other structure structural changes (code ‘contribution to a structural change’ ), 
started discussions (code ‘discussion started by a DA’) , etc. In this respect, surprisingly, the group did not 
refuse any of the structures directly hinted by the DAs. Therefore, it is reasonable to state that the DAs had 
a broader impact on the session that just proposing prepared issues and structures. However, looking in 
detail it is possible to see that the vast majority of the contributions only comes from one facilitator, the 
experienced one. The same DA in few occasions abandoned her DA role to intervene as facilitator (8.4% of 
her interventions have been coded as ‘facilitation intervention’). The frequency of these facilitation 
interventions is higher in the second part of the session. Nevertheless, the percentage of these contributions 
is relatively low. In addition, a comparison has been done between the resulting map (Fig 5-6) and the inputs 
provided to the DAs in the scripts. To recall, these inputs were possible issues that some of the missing 
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stakeholder could have raised in the session. There were 45 inputs provided to the DAs before the session 
and it was possible to identify at least partially 20 of them in the map (Annex F). Also from this perspective 
the performance was satisfactory: raising all the 45 issues or items was realistically almost impossible and 20 
is a good result. However, it is very difficult to extrapolate and isolate the contribution of the DAs from the 
others. This because a PSDM workshop is a group process and all the participants influence each other. For 
instance, what has been categorized as a generic intervention of a DA maybe can have prompt a reflection 
in a participant that later, influenced by that intervention, proposed a structural change. Consequently, an 
intervention that led to a structural change would have been classified as a generic one, and so on. Therefore, 
the researcher’s judgemental component in this analysis was very strong. Obviously, the reliability of these 
data is relative, however they still offer interesting information. Although there may be disagreements in 
some of the coding that has been done, the overall results are clear and they are a valuable first assessment 
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5.2.2. Participants’ feedbacks 
After the explanation of the new setting, all the participants welcomed positively the idea of having someone 
trying to act as some of the missing stakeholder. They motivated this favourable acceptance stating that it is 
good to have a challenge to their usual way of thinking.  
When in the end the participants were asked about their experience with the DAs, they replied (Annex E): 
“As he said [referring to one of the participant that in the beginning of the session expressed his positive 
opinion], it’s good to have challenge and more input. I think it works well.”  
In the same line another participant added: 
“For avoiding group thinking I think it’s really important… Because we will all ultimately work together and 
work on [inaudible] it’s good to have a challenge.”  
Then the participants were asked  how they felt during the process: 
 “I thought it was quite useful [referring to the new DA], just a different thought process” 
 “Yeah, working in a different way” 
Lastly, when the researchers explicated them their initial worries on the effectiveness of the new setting and 
on their reactions to the inputs of someone external to the group, a participant said: 
 “You got trust [to do this]” 
In general, there were not negative comments about the new DA setting and the workshop attendants had 
a positive reaction to it. The participants liked the idea of having new perspectives that questioned their 
behaviour and helped to avoid group thinking. What is very interesting is the reason why participants said 
they were willing to be challenged with this original setting. They said that their reactions were positive 
because the research team gained trust before. This factor seems to be something important to not 
underestimate. 
5.2.3. Facilitators’ feedbacks 
In the subsequent days after the session, interviews were performed with the two facilitators that executed 
the DA role during the workshop. Both reported they had good feelings during the session. They thought it 
went well and when they were asked whether they would consider using this new setting again if they found 
themselves in a similar ‘cooker-pressure’ situation, they responded affirmatively. Another aspect that was 
highlighted by both facilitators is the ‘experience’ required to perform the role. It means that according to 
them, more experience on the DA role can make the difference. This translates in the idea that if they have 
to play it again it would be much easier for them. However, they also reported some issues they faced. The 
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unexperienced facilitator found several times difficult to step in the conversation because she was not feeling 
completely comfortable to jump in the group discussion and because she was trying to formulate her 
intervention in the most consistent way with SD and this slowed her down. On the contrary, the other 
facilitator did not have this problem. As described above, the experienced PSDM practitioner mixed her DA 
role with the one of facilitator few times. When asked why she thought it happened she said in that precise 
moment she was not aware she was mixing up her DA role with the facilitation one and that she realized that 
few time after it happened, probably due to lack of experience abovementioned. However, both the 
behaviours were far from what stakeholders do. Certainly, they usually do not limit themselves if they do not 
elaborate their thoughts in the most consistent way with SD and they normally do not interfere with the 
facilitation process. Fortunately the DAs were two in the session so the experience facilitator were able to 
compensate for the lack of confidence of the other one and luckily the DA that could not resist to act as a 
normal facilitator, concentrated it at the end of the session when already most of the work was done. In this 
respect, it must be noted that it seemed that other participants did not notice that and gave importance to 
the fact. Concluding, the background and personality of the facilitators playing the DA appear to have a strong 
impact on the way the DA role is carried out. The more self-confident and PSDM experienced facilitator was 
more able to perform the role although she felt in the trap to use her expertise for helping the two actual 
facilitators during that workshop in a moment of difficulty. However, this idea needs to be taken with a grain 
of salt: these are the results of only the first case in which the new DA setting was applied, therefore it is too 
early to generalize. Lastly, the two actual facilitators debriefed the second workshop right after its conclusion 
and one of them wrote a short memo on the session following the guidelines of Miles, Huberman and 
Saldana, (2013) (Annex G). From these sources, overall, the new setting for the session was judged as positive. 
It did not create any conflict among the participants and the group dynamics were fluid, namely there was 
not any interruption of friction due to the DAs interventions. The DA did not appear to steer in any way the 
process with their rooted knowledge in SD. The other participants seemed to accept very well the idea of 
having two new ‘experts’ in the room. Moreover, the whole process seemed to be much more structured 
than the first session in which participants were more discussing among themselves with the use of the map 
than formulating variables. The reasons identified for this outcome were two. First, the two facilitators were 
more experienced with the group dynamics and more capable to manage and conduct the session in the right 
way. Second, the DAs provided to the other participants an example on how to suggest variables and links in 
a proper manner, ending up leading them by example. Unfortunately, also both the facilitators noted that 
few times the experience SD practitioner mixed her role of playing a stakeholder with the one of being a 
facilitator. However, it was perceived that it happened most in the end of the session, in a moment in which 
both the actual facilitators were struggling in attempt of depict in the map a concept arose by a participant 
and she helped in sorting out the problem. Complicity and teamwork among the whole research team were 
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appreciated and believed important to the good results of the workshop. Lastly, both of facilitators were 
satisfied with the ‘quality’ of the map resulting from the workshop. 
5.2.4. Assessment with respect of the predicted risks 
In Table 4-2 the possible risks the setting could have faced were reported. For each expected risk a mitigation 
strategy was defined. It is worth to assess if these accidents appeared in the session, whether the mitigation 
strategies were successful or not and if other elements played a role in that situation. Table 5-3 below, 
reports the results of this analysis. This assessment was done based on the participants’ and facilitators 
feedbacks, workshop transcription and outcome map analysis. It is important for two main reasons. First, it 
provides an idea on the effectiveness of the mitigation strategy and second, it shows where efforts are 





Expected risks Mitigation strategy Outcomes 
Reaction of participants to the facilitator’s loss of neutrality Transparency from the beginning of the role of the DA 
The risk did not lead to unfavourable situations and the 
mitigation strategy is thought to have contributed to that; the 
trust participants had in the research team helped  
DA perceived credibility by other participants 
All the issues the DA wants to raise are previously studied and 
documented (backed by sources) in the provided script 
The risk did not lead to unfavourable situations in the workshop  
DA steers the process 
The other facilitators make sure the DA is not going to become 
a talking head or lead the group process 
The risk did not lead to unfavourable situations in the workshop  
Struggle for the DA to step in the discussion 
DA should be self-confident and consider himself as much as 
possible as a participant 
One out of two DAs faced this issue, the mitigation strategy did 
not work well enough 
The facilitation team ‘loses’ one of the member and it can become more 
energy demanding for the other facilitators 
Shorter workshop, more breaks (if needed), different structure 
than the usual one in which the participants are more active 
(e.g. table top modelling) 
The actual facilitators at the end of the session were relatively 
tired and this may have contributed to the issues that pushed 
the experienced practitioner playing the DA to help them in the 
last part of the workshop 
Confusion of the DA in his role between being a participant and a 
facilitator. The facilitator will act as a DA only during a workshop some 
structures suggested by him might be integrated in the model in that 
session and then proposed to be left out in a later session 
Once the role game of the DA is over, the DA assumes back the 
role of facilitator and therefore he is neutral with respect of the 
content; he may just ask the participants to explain why and let 
them to decide.   
The DA was performed in the last participatory session and 
therefore this risk could not be ‘experienced’  
DA behaves like a facilitator 
If, in addition to play his role, the DA absentmindedly acts a 
facilitator (e.g. after speaking they give instructions, as “it is 
your turn to speak”, that are usually given by the facilitator), the 
actual facilitator should politely interrupt him, get the control 
back and remember him his role of DA. 
The mitigation strategy did not work perfectly since one DA 
acted as a facilitator in some moments  
Table 5-3: New Devil’s Advocate expected risks and mitigation strategies assessment 
 
Table 5-3: New Devil’s Advocate expected risks and mitigation strategies assessment 
 
Table 5-3: New Devil’s Advocate expected risks and mitigation strategies assessment 
 
Table 5-3: New Devil’s Advocate expected risks and mitigation strategies assessment 
 
Table 5-3: New Devil’s Advocate expected risks and mitigation strategies assessment 
 
Table 5-3: New Devil’s Advocate expected risks and mitigation strategies assessment 
 
Table 5-3: New Devil’s Advocate expected risks and mitigation strategies assessment 
 
Table 5-3: New Devil’s Advocate expected risks and mitigation strategies assessment 
Source: compiled and conceived by the author 
 
 
Figure 5-9: UK homeowner retrofit uptake simplified Causal Loop Diagram. In light green R1, dark green B1, orange R2, violet R3 blue R4, light blue R5, brown R6, black parameters and red 
policiesSource: compiled and conceived by the author 
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5.2.5. A comparison with Gerrits & Vaandrager (2017) 
Comparing the results of the new DA setting with the approach used by Gerrits and Vaandrager (2017) 
described the method chapter is interesting. Both the research teams tried new techniques to overcome 
homogeneity in the participants group. The projects’ settings and structures were almost the same: 
preliminary contacts with gatekeepers, two workshops and a follow-up for sharing the results. In addition, 
the environments in which the studies took place were very similar: while this research collaborated with 
policymakers in a British Department, Gerrits and Vaandrager did the same with policymakers in a Dutch 
municipality. On top of that, both the participants were under huge time pressure. Although there were so 
many similarities, the results of the two projects are the opposite. The ‘adventure’ of Gerrits and Vaandrager 
had a negative outcome and the collaboration between researchers and organization ended. Contrarily, this 
study was successful and set the ground for future fruitful cooperations between the two partners. In the 
light of the new experience gained on pressure-cooker PSMD by the use of the new DA setting, it is interesting 
to relook at the attempt of Gerrits and Vaandrager: how did it come that the two approaches leaded to such 
contrasting outcomes? 
The insufficient results obtained by Gerrits and Vaandrager can clearly be ascribed to the poor script design. 
The most critical part of their technique can be identified in the request made to the participants to perform 
interviews with people outside the organization between the two workshops and create maps out of these 
interviews. The task was carried out by very few participants and besides that the quality of these ones was 
extremely low and not usable to start the discussion in the next session. But the real point still not been 
discussed is how two expert practitioners, such as Gerrits and Vaandrager, failed to actuate a script that on 
paper in the preparation stage seemed to work (their participants expressed the willingness to gain some 
system thinking skills and letting them practicing through mapping interviews seemed a good idea). The 
response in this question could be that they missed to take into account and assess the ‘group life’ (Phillips 
& Phillips, 1993). Groups are not just a sum of people, there are entities per se with their own emotional life, 
constrains, attitudes and influences. From this perspective, they made two mistakes: one from a practical 
and one from a pragmatic point of view. From the practical side it was not optimal to ask to a group that is 
already under time pressure to spend some extra time, in addition to the one allocated for the workshops, 
to perform interviews and mapping. If participants are already experiencing lack of time, asking them time-
consuming activities can be harmful. Most probably, they will not do the task, if they perform the assignment 
the results are likely to be poor and even if they carry the task in a satisfactory way they won’t be very happy 
for all the stress they have been exposed to. All these clearly are negative outcomes for a PSDM project. 
Second, from a pragmatic perspective they underestimated the initial skepticism that there was in the group 
towards the facilitators and the methodology. To perform the type of activity Gerrits and Vaandrager 
designed a lot of ‘support’ and ‘trust’ are required. Participants need to be open to, supportive to and curious 
80 
 
about the tasks they are asked to do during a project. To reach that group emotional stage it takes time. A 
PSDM project, although compressed, is a common journey that participants and facilitators undertake 
together through which a relationship is constructed (Campbell, 2001). It is similar to every human 
relationship: to trust, respect and align the point of view with someone takes time, you do not rely too much 
in someone you perceived as a stranger. With groups, it is the same. Skepticism, lack of support and trust 
towards the methodology is common at the beginning of every project. However, after a solid relationship is 
built between the different actors in the room, performing tasks, even if original, is much easier. To get to 
that point it takes time and it requires facilitators ability to understand the group life. Actually understanding 
the group life is one of the main tasks of facilitator: “to understand the group the facilitator observes verbal 
and non-verbal behaviour, attends to relationships between participants and maintains awareness of his or 
her own feelings” (Phillips & Phillips, 1993). Gerrits and Vaandrager did not understand the group and its lack 
of confidence and involvement in PSDM, and this translated in them asking the participants to perform extra 
work for a project that they were not confident with. It is not very surprising it did not work. Therefore 
understanding the group life seems to be crucial in a PSDM. It is not compelling only for the activities that 
facilitators do with the group during the sessions but also for the preparation of the workshops. This is true 
because it helps to tailor the session structure to the group’s real needs, and it appears to be even more 
crucial when developing new approaches, scripts, techniques and settings for PSDM.  
The facilitators’ group life lack of understanding can be a possible partial explanation for such different 
outcomes. However, there could be more. So far, it has been assumed that the contexts in which the project 
took place were almost equal. Although many characteristics were equal (dealing with policymakers under 
time pressure in a homogenous context), there is still an important feature that was different: the cultural 
environment. Gerrits and Vaandrager did not described in detail this aspect in their article. However, it is 
possible to imagine how working with policymakers from a Dutch municipality and from a British department 
is different. The participants from BEIS were very eager to improve their understanding, to acquire new 
knowledge and to be challenged. This translated in them to be open to all the inputs and challenges 
facilitators posed to them. This provided a fertile ground for trying a new approach. Instead, Gerrits and 
Vaandrager may have faced a different cultural context that undermined their attempt.  
5.2.6. New Devil’s Advocate setting limitations 
The new DA setting has inevitably multiple limitations or still unanswered questions that may impede its 
applications. First of all, as all PSDM practices it is heavily context dependent (Gerrits & Vaandrager, 2017). 
Exact replication of the contexts only works in lab settings: closed and decontextualized environments. This 
because it is almost impossible to replicate for complex social situations such as PSDM (Gerrits & Vaandrager, 
2017). Therefore, it is really difficult to state whether the new DA setting worked well because of its intrinsic 
good structure or because of it was tried in very favourable environment.  Moreover, the selection of the 
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inputs provided to the DAs in the script before the session (see Annex D) was not thoroughly systematic. 
From this angle, there were two main weaknesses. Firstly, the stakeholders that needed to be represented 
somehow in the workshops were selected among the one mentioned during the first workshop by 
participants. Although this decision offers a certain solidity (these stakeholders have been chosen based on 
the knowledge of experts), it is impossible to state that the whole range of stakeholder have been at least 
considered. It is still possible that during the first workshop the participants did not mention some important 
players. The second weakness regards the way information about stakeholders have been collected and 
categorized. As said, interviews with experts and stakeholders and a scientific and grey literature analysis 
have been performed. However, it is impossible to determine whether and when all the issues that are 
important for stakeholder have been included. Moreover, the way this information are categorized in the 
script is still completely up to the facilitators preparing the role. Another limitation regards the freedom left 
to the facilitator playing the DA. As we saw in the extremely different performance of the DA1 and DA2, 
personal factors, such as background and personality, can affect the way the role is played. Although backed 
and sounded guidelines on stakeholders interests and suggestions on how to share these ideas with the 
group are provided in the script, ultimately how to intervene and the content of the intervention is 
completely left to the ‘will’ of the DA. Therefore, the choice of who plays the role is a very sensitive issue, 
because a DA interpreting the role in the wrong way can have no impact in the model (e.g. too shy to 
intervene during group discussion or to raise any issue) or even a negative one (e.g. if DA intervention harm 
the group dynamics or if the content of the interventions is wrong and unreal). At the moment, the selection 
is recommended on the background, self-confidence, interpersonal skills and capacity of adaptation of the 
facilitator, but analysis of the skills needed to be a good DA could improve this process. Lastly, the originality 
of the approach is one of the strengths but also a weakness. To assess correctly and understand better how 
this setting works, more analysis are needed. Now these are not there yet, therefore many ideas are still at 
a preliminary stage.  
5.2.7. Bringing together the results on the New Devil’s Advocate setting   
From all the perspectives of analysis the DA shows overall positive results. It had a remarkable impact on the 
workshop map and it did not have any detected side effect on the participants, rather they accepted the idea 
of ‘being challenged’ for the outcome sake very favourably. The loss of neutrality of someone that was 
previously a facilitator was not perceived as a problem. Moreover, it seems it served the purpose of being a 
‘knowledge brokerage’ between the workshop participants and the stakeholders that could not attend the 
session. The feeling among the research team was that the issue of homogeneity was partially overcome.  
However, in this facilitated setting the importance of the ‘human’ component in the facilitation team is even 
higher than the usual. First, the personality of the DA affects how the two facilitators played the role: the 
more experienced one (assumed to be self-confident in a PSDM workshop) performed dramatically better 
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than the inexperienced one (that stated to feel somehow ‘shy’ with respect of the group). In this respect, in 
our experiment having two DAs made possible that one compensated for the lack of the other. Second, the 
importance of teamwork among facilitators has not been stressed properly yet. Teamwork was necessary 
during the preparation phase (working together in developing the DA setting), in the selection of the roles 
(how the different roles were assigned), in the workshop conduction (need of ‘complicity’ and ‘harmony’ in 
the facilitation team) and in the unusual interactions during the session (facilitators playing the DAs had new 
relationships with their facilitator colleagues compared to the usual ones). However, this topic is not new in 
PSDM literature. Richardson and Andersen (1995) already highlighted the importance of teamwork in 
facilitated SD. Nevertheless, sometimes practitioners forget this aspect but this new setting proved even 
more the prominence of teamwork in PSDM. Another factor that emerged as crucial is the facilitators ability 
to understand the ‘group life’ they are working with (Phillips & Phillips, 1993a). This skill was necessary to 
develop this new approach and suited it to the participants needs. It could be one of the reasons why the 
attempt of Gerrits and Vaandrager (2017) failed, while the one used in this study succeeded. More in general, 
understanding the ‘group life’ (mood, necessities, feelings, etc.) seems to be important for every PSDM but 
a minimum requirement to whom want to perform original settings, scripts or unorthodox variations from 
the traditional approach. However, excluding the cultural context as an important aspect could be 
misleading: it was not possible to determine whether the new DA setting worked well just because of its 
good design or because the environment in which it was ‘played’ was favourable. A side outcome that arose 
from the employment of the setting was that the workshop discussion among the participants became more 
structured than it was in the previous session. It seems that the DAs showed to the other participants how 
to properly formulate variables and express their concepts in order to include them in the map. This could 
be one of the future applications of the approach: guiding ‘undisciplined’ PSDM groups to adopt more 
productive ways to discuss and to relate to the task they are working on. 
Nevertheless, there is one last aspect that needs to be highlighted and discussed.  The DAs have a broad 
freedom during the session and most of their decision are left to their judgment. Although they may have 
tent to follow very carefully the script they were provided it is reasonable to assume that to a certain degree, 
even unwillingly, they might have expressed also personal opinions (it is impossible not to give a personal 
contribution playing this role, for instance the way the issues are raised already contains some personal 
influences). In this respect, it is difficult to clearly state and separate how much of the DAs contribution was 
depending on the DAs personal opinion and on the inputs belonging to the missing stakeholders written in 
the script. Therefore, it would be more precise to affirm that the DAs in the new setting work first as an 
asynchronous knowledge broker between the participants and the missing stakeholders, but also, to some 
extent, as a way for facilitators to express their opinion on the content under discussion in the workshop.   
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5.3. Model based policies’ analysis 
A picture of the final model has been reported in Fig 5- 7 before. As said the model is composed of more than 
3000 symbols and takes into account five different energy efficiency measures that were considered as 
sensitive by BEIS: condensing boiler, double-glazing, loft, solid and cavity wall insulation. It simulates the 
uptake of these measures between 2000 and 2050 and, at present, the model produces relevant outputs. In 
this section, the main model dynamics, the insights gained on the homeowner retrofit uptake and on the 
policies under analysis are discussed.  
5.3.1. Model validation 
Before looking at the insights gained through the model, it is important to discuss how much the model can 
be trusted. In other words, to what extent it can be considered as a reliable representation of reality.  
In SD, models do not aim to claim to be true because all models are to some extent ‘wrong’ (Sterman, 2002) 
since they are “limited, simplified representation of the real word [and] they differ from reality in ways large 
and small, infinite in number” (Sterman, 2000, p. 846). Therefore “no models are valid or verifiable in the 
sense of establishing their truth” (Sterman, 2000, p. 890) but the question modelers need to answer is “never 
whether a model is true but whether it is useful” (Sterman, 2000, p. 890). In this perspective model validity is 
strictly related to the model purpose (Barlas & Carpenter, 1990). Consequently validation is a 
formal/objective and semi-formal/subjective activity that aims to build confidence on the usefulness of the 
model with respect of its purpose (Barlas, 1996). As Barlas (1996) recognizes, although model validation is 
typically and technically defined to be conduct after model construction, in practice it has a “distributed and 
prolonged” (Barlas, 1996, p. 184) nature and it exists in every phase of the methodology. This was the 
approach adopted for the validation of the model built in this research. The structural validity (Barlas, 1996) 
has been evaluated through extreme condition tests (Barlas, 1996; Sterman, 2000), unit consistency (Barlas, 
1996; Sterman, 2000), constants and parameters assessment through use of expert opinion and literature 
(Sterman, 2000); ‘walkthroughs’  (Barlas, 1996) and reviews of the structure with experts (Barlas, 1996) while 
model behaviour validity has been assessed mainly in two different way. First, stress tests in which 
parameters were set to extreme values to check the reasonability of the behavioural outputs, have been 
performed. Second, the model replicates quite well six different reference modes. It reproduces the uptake 
of the five considered measures (Fig 5- 10 and Fig 5-12) and the decrease over time in the average households 
energy consumption (Fig 5-11). These figures are discussed in detail in the next sections. However, the fact 
that the model replicate the behaviour of several variables in different sectors of the model can be 
considered as a good sign of the reliability of the outputs.  
Moreover, the stock and flow model has been drawn upon knowledge of subject-experts in BEIS and this fact 
may increase even further the model’s reliability. In addition, the five interviews performed with experts in 
84 
 
BEIS during the last part of the project supported the validation process and help to increase the confidence 
in the model even further. On top of that, the fact the model has been built in joint collaboration with subject-
experts provides a preliminary assessment of the model boundaries adequacy (Sterman, 2000). Following 
Sterman (2000) and Sterman & Rahmandad, (2012), model documentation is provided in Annex H.  
5.3.2. Main dynamics 
The model structure can help to understand what the main dynamics involved in the UK homeowner retrofit 
uptake rate are. However, looking at the model in its entirety may prevent the reader to capture what the 
pivotal loops and interactions are. This is mostly due to the model large size and its consequent difficult 
analysis. Therefore, the main dynamics have been portrayed in simplified a CLD visible in Fig 5-9 (side note, 
this CLD was the one provided to the follow-up participants).  
Seven crucial loops have been identified. The loop named R1 represents the fact that the more retrofit 
measures are installed, the more they become popular because of a raise in retrofit awareness. It can be 
considered a word of mouth effect.  However, it is necessary to specify that, although similar, the concepts 
of awareness and popularity are different. Awareness of retrofit refers the degree to which homeowners 
know the existence of a retrofit measure. Instead, measures popularity is a step beyond awareness. 
Popularity merges the concepts of awareness with the one of positive or negative opinion because 
homeowners aware of retrofit may have a good or bad consideration about it. In case there is awareness and 
a good opinion about a measure, it is possible to say that it is popular. Consequently, the increase in measures 
popularity pushes more households that are already undertaking other renovations in their property to 
consider topping up these interventions with retrofit measures leading to a raise in the retrofit demand and 
uptake rate. Visibility is different for every measure and this determines different ‘speeds’ of this loop per 
each retrofit type. For example, double-glazing and boilers have a great visibility since their position in the 
edifice make them easily noticeable and, moreover, they are one the first things people look at in a property. 
On the contrary, cavity wall and solid wall insulation have a low visibility due to physical (they are embedded 
and hidden in the walls) and behavioural (people tend to overlook at them when examining a property) 
reasons. Renovation rate represents the number of generic renovations that are done over time in the UK. 
Measure affordability relates to the costs of a measure. The higher the upfront cost of installing a measure 
is, the lower the demand for that measure is because, obviously, less people can afford to pay for it. The 
costs range of the five measures considered is quite high. To give an idea, a solid wall insulation can cost on 
average around 12000£, cavity wall and loft insulation approximately 500£ while condensing boilers and 
double-glazing costs on average around 4000£ (although the cost of double-glazing depends most on the 
number of windows to install). 
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Balancing loop B1 represents the potential retrofit measures to install. This means that it not possible to 
install more energy efficiency measures than the potential available in the UK housing stock and that, 
therefore, there is a natural limit to the retrofit uptake. Another limiting factor to the uptake rate is the supply 
chain size. The supply chain needs to sustain the demand for retrofit. Namely, the supply chain must be 
developed enough in order to meet the demand, otherwise, the demand remain unsatisfied. However, it 
must be noted that there is a positive connection between retrofit measures demand and supply chain size: 
when the demand for retrofit increases, the supply chain tends to increase, namely more companies become 
available to do retrofit installments, because they see new opportunities for profits. 
Reinforcing loop R2 portrays a mechanism through which a retrofit measure becomes perceived among the 
population as something that adds value to the property, not just as a way to decrease the house energy 
consumption. This depends on the measure popularity, and it influences the number of renovators doing 
retrofit as amenity renovation and consequently it raises the demand for retrofit, closing the feedback loop. 
The key idea here is that when a measure gets popular, households begin to consider more that retrofit type 
when they evaluate a property. This raise in the importance given by the households translates in an increase 
in the perceived benefits added to the home by that specific retrofit measure, making it worth installing 
besides energy efficiency consideration. Therefore, it is not just an efficiency improvement to top up on an 
amenity renovation anymore, but it becomes an amenity renovation itself (called retrofit as amenity), that 
adds value to the house. 
Similarly, in R3, measures popularity has been recognize also for having a positive effect on the non-financial 
attractiveness of the retrofit measures. The non-financial attractiveness of a measure is a variable that takes 
into account the intrinsic ‘appeal’ a retrofit intervention has. It incorporates the measure aesthetics value, 
the thermal comfort, etc. It is not only composed by ‘positive factors’. In this case, they are integrated in the 
measure hassle factor and it represents the hassles involved in the installation phases (e.g. disruption, time 
and effort needed, paperwork, etc.). This factor has a negative impact on the non-financial attractiveness 
and it decreases its value. The non-financial attractiveness is then combined with the financial attractiveness 
(namely, how much the ratio between perceived savings by measure and measure upfront costs is appealing) 
to define the measure desirability. This directly and positively influences the demand for that measure: the 
more desirable it is, because of non-financial and financial considerations, the more homeowners will go for 
it. In this respect, retrofit affordability plays a key role. Retrofit affordability refers to the extent households 
can afford to pay for a specific measure, for instance a very expensive instalment has low affordability while 
relatively cheap ones have high affordability. It works as a funnel to retrofit desirability, since even if a 
measure is judged as desired by homeowners, they will not go for it if they can not afford to pay for. As said, 
the loop is closed because it has been found that the measure popularity positively affects the non-financial 
attractiveness. This is because the more popular a measure is, the more its non-financial features are 
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perceived and acknowledged by homeowners. This mechanism is very similar to the one in R2, the only 
difference is that it affects different households’ decision point.  
The measure aesthetics value is a dependant variable. It is influenced by the supply chain investments in 
technology because technological progresses have been found to be also focused to increase the aesthetics 
of retrofit measures. Since the investments depends overall on the supply chain size, the positive feedback 
loop R4 is closed. A dotted arrow has been drawn between supply chain investments in technology and 
measure upfront costs. This because technological improvements can decrease the cost of a measure, 
however this effect, although identified by workshop participants, seems to have almost no impact on the 
system so far.  
Reinforcing loop R5 reflects the fact that a bigger supply chain can invest more in training and therefore have 
skilled workers that make good quality installations. This is important because poor quality installations 
deliver lower savings on the energy bill than what the ones promised ‘on paper’. On the contrary, high quality 
job ends to positively impact the homeowners’ perceived savings and so the financial attractiveness, closing 
a positive loop.  
The quality of installations has a positive effect also on measure popularity. An installation of a retrofit 
measure that is not properly done, can generate unintended consequences or be aesthetically not similar to 
what homeowners expected. Therefore, the opinion of the households becomes adverse and the popularity 
is negatively affected by that. Contrarily, a well done job tends to increase the measure popularity.  This is 
the underlying logic behind reinforcing loop R6.  
Lastly, red arrows represent where the two financial polices assessed, stamp duty rebate and green mortgage 
premium for energy efficiency, are going to affect the system: they are supposed to economically support 
buyers, thus increase the measures’ affordability, and to stimulate the market in evaluating more energy 
efficiency.  
This is an aggregated depiction of the main dynamics in a very large model. This representation is useful 
because it helps to understand what the interrelations involved in the homeowner retrofit uptake system 
are. However, many loops have been left out for the sake of simplicity. This is the reason why in this simplified 
CLD the vast majority of the loops is reinforcing. Many balancing loops are present in the complete version 
































































































Figure 5-9: UK homeowners’ retrofit uptake simplified Causal Loop Diagram. In light green R1, dark green B1, orange R2, violet R3 blue R4, light blue R5, brown R6, black parameters and red policies  
Source: conceived by the author 
 
 
Figure 5-10: Stock and Flow model baseline run. Clockwise starting from top-left: double-glazing, loft, boiler and cavity wall. The graphs show the cumulative number of measures installed for each 
category in the baseline scenario. The light green line indicates the (target) potential measures to be installed, the red line represents historical reference data and the thin black line shows the simulation 
outputFigure 5-9: UK homeowner retrofit uptake simplified Causal Loop Diagram. In light green R1, dark green B1, orange R2, violet R3 blue R4, light blue R5, brown R6, black parameters and red 
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5.3.3. Base run and future trends 
Firstly, in Fig 5-10 the baseline simulations report the total measures installed for double-glazing, condensing 
boiler, loft and cavity wall insulation between 2000 and 2050. These runs assume current polices (see ECO 
subsidies) to remain in place. The model captures the homeowner decision process in which retrofit 
measures’ affordability and desirability are dependent on the upfront cost, with the subsidies depicted as 
discounts on these costs. That is the way EEC, CERT and ECO subsidies are portrayed in the model. The Green 
Deal policy has been left out because of the low impact on the system. Moreover, the model structure 
simulates also the compulsory regulation from 2005 regarding boilers replacement with new efficient ones 
(condensing boilers). The growth trends relate to the accumulations of the measures installed. As show in 
the previous paragraph, there are numerous reinforcing loops driving the system to grow. Nevertheless, this 
growth ‘naturally’ slows down as the market approaches its saturation (balancing loop B1). For the initial 
period of the simulation it is possible to compare the model runs (thin black line) with the historical data 
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Figure 5-10: Stock and Flow model baseline run. Clockwise starting from top-left: double-glazing, loft, boiler and cavity wall. The graphs 
show the cumulative number of measures installed for each category in the baseline scenario. The light green line indicates the (target) 
potential measures to be installed, the red line represents historical reference data and the thin black line shows the simulation output 
Source: conceived by the author 
 
 
Figure 5-11: Baseline run average households energy consumption.Figure 5-10: Stock and Flow model baseline run. Clockwise starting 
from top-left: double-glazing, loft, boiler and cavity wall. The graphs show the cumulative number of measures installed for each category 
in the baseline scenario. The light green line indicates the (target) potential measures to be installed, the red line represents historical 
reference data and the thin black line shows the simulation output 
Source: conceived by the author 
89 
 
As figure 5-10 shows, the model runs match relatively well the reference data, thus increasing the confidence 
in model validity. Double-glazing curve is boosting even without the support of any policy effort and, from 
the model, it seems it will reach the maximum potential diffusion in the UK way before 2050. Condensing 
boiler uptake was heavily affected by the compulsory regulation approved in 2005. The impact is clearly 
visible on the slope of the curve that suddenly increases in that year. This situation seems to ensure that 
efficient boilers will get to their potential in time for helping the UK to meet its pledges. With respect of loft 
and cavity wall insulation, their curves appear to have a lower inclination than the other two. Nonetheless, 
they still seem adequate to reach the target in a reasonable amount of time.  
It is worth looking at the monthly average energy consumption per households (Fig 5-11). Also in this case 
the model is able to produce outputs (thin black line) that match acceptably the historical data (thick red 
line), although the model captures only the general trend and not the reference model oscillations. Despite 
the decrease in energy consumption is depending not only on retrofit uptake but also on a multiplicity of 
reasons (e.g. increase in energy price, better appliances, etc.), it provides extra confidence in the model 
validity and quality. However, after 2015 the decrease in energy consumption is completely dependent on 
the retrofit uptake since the other factors do not vary anymore. Looking at the future trend, it is visible that 
energy consumption still decreases but with a lower steepness. 
 
What is missing in the discussion is the retrofit uptake of solid wall insulation. Also in this situation the base 
runs depict adequately the reference mode (Fig 5-12). However, the trend clearly appears to be problematic 
and way below the potential (target), especially if compared with the others’ measures. The reasons for this 
situation have been identified in the high upfront costs compared to the energy savings it delivers (long 
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Figure 5-11: Baseline run average households energy consumption. 
Source: conceived by the author 
 
 
Figure 5-12: Solid wall cumulative uptake in the baseline scenario. The 
light green line indicates the (target) potential measures to be installed, 
the red line represents historical reference data and the thin black line 
shows the simulation outputFigure 5-11: Baseline run average 
households energy consumption. 
Source: conceived by the author 
 
 
Figure 5-12: Solid wall cumulative uptake in the baseline scenario. The 
light green line indicates the (target) potential measures to be installed, 
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low non-financial attractiveness (the measure is not perceived as something that may improve the aesthetics 
of the house).  
 
Hereinafter the analysis will focus on the solid wall insulation uptake rate since the other four measures 
(double-glazing, condensing boilers, cavity and loft insulation) seem to be already in good track.  
 
5.3.4. Impact of subsidies 
Before looking at the impact of new policies, it is important to assess the effects of the previous ones. From 
the model it quite definitely emerges that subsidies mechanisms had a significant impact on the homeowners 
retrofit uptake. This can be seen in the Fig 5-13. It reports the base simulation in which subsidies are in place 
(thin black line), a scenario in which current policies are interrupted in 2017 (purple line) and a run in which 
it is portrayed what would have been likely to happen if these policies had never been implemented (orange 
line). From the graph, it is clearly visible that the slopes of the three curves are completely different, and this 
means that subsidies dramatically changed the number of solid wall measures installed. Nevertheless, their 
effect does not appear to be strong enough to assure the uptake rate of solid wall insulation sufficiently 
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Figure 5-12: Solid wall cumulative uptake in the baseline scenario. The light green line 
indicates the (target) potential measures to be installed, the red line represents historical 
reference data and the thin black line shows the simulation output 
Source: conceived by the author 
 
 
Figure 5-13: Solid wall cumulative uptake for subsidies different scenarios: base run with 
subsidies (thin black), scenario in which subsidies are stopped (purple) and have never been 
implemented (orange)Figure 5-12: Solid wall cumulative uptake in the baseline scenario. The 
light green line indicates the (target) potential measures to be installed, the red line represents 
historical reference data and the thin black line shows the simulation output 
Source: conceived by the author 
 
 
Figure 5-13: Solid wall cumulative uptake for subsidies different scenarios: base run with 
subsidies (thin black), scenario in which subsidies are stopped (purple) and have never been 
implemented (orange) 
Source: conceived by the author 
 
 
Figure 5-14: Solid wall cumulative uptake for different policy scenarios: base run (thin 
black), mortgages policy with current subsidies (blue) and mortgages policy without 
subsidies (violet).Figure 5-13: Solid wall cumulative uptake for subsidies different scenarios: 
base run with subsidies (thin black), scenario in which subsidies are stopped (purple) and 
have never been implemented (orange)Figure 5-12: Solid wall cumulative uptake in the 
baseline scenario. The light green line indicates the (target) potential measures to be 
installed, the red line represents historical reference data and the thin black line shows the 
simulation output 
Source: conceived by the author 
 
 
Figure 5-13: Solid wall cumulative uptake for subsidies different scenarios: base run with 
subsidies (thin black), scenario in which subsidies are stopped (purple) and have never been 




5.3.5. Mortgage policy and stamp duty policy impacts 
Fig 5-14 reports model runs with the introduction of the green mortgage, policy while Fig 5-15 shows 
simulations with the addition of a stamp duty rebate. As mentioned above the focus is only on solid wall since 
the other measures are much closer to the targets and already affordable by the vast majority of 
homeowners. It appears clear that both the policies do not seem to have a remarkable impact. It needs to 
be specified that the reason why the two graphs look very similar is because both the policies depend on the 
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Figure 5-13: Solid wall cumulative uptake for subsidies different scenarios: base run with 
subsidies (thin black), scenario in which subsidies are stopped (purple) and have never been 
implemented (orange) 
Source: conceived by the author 
 
 
Figure 5-14: Solid wall cumulative uptake for different policy scenarios: base run (thin 
black), mortgages policy with current subsidies (blue) and mortgages policy without 
subsidies (violet).Figure 5-13: Solid wall cumulative uptake for subsidies different scenarios: 
base run with subsidies (thin black), scenario in which subsidies are stopped (purple) and 
have never been implemented (orange) 
Source: conceived by the author 
 
 
Figure 5-14: Solid wall cumulative uptake for different policy scenarios: base run (thin 
black), mortgages policy with current subsidies (blue) and m rtgages policy without 
subsidies (violet). 
Source: conceived by the author 
 
 
Figure 5-15: Solid wall cumulative uptake for different policy combination scenarios: base 
run (thin black), stamp duty rebates with current subsidies (blue) and stamp duty rebates 
without subsidies (violet).Figure 5-14: Solid wall cumulative uptake for different policy 
scenarios: base run (thin black), mortgages policy with current subsidies (blue) and 
mortgages policy without subsidies (violet).Figure 5-13: Solid wall cumulative uptake for 
sub idies diff rent scenarios: base run with subsidies (thin black), scenario in which 
subsidies re stopped (purple) and have never been implemented (orange) 
Source: conceived by the author 
 
 
Figure 5-14: Solid wall cumulative uptake for different policy scenarios: base run (thin 
black), mortgages policy with current subsidies (blue) and mortgages policy without 
subsidies (violet).Figure 5-13: Solid wall cumulative uptake for subsidies different scenarios: 
base run with subsidies (thin black), scenario in which subsidies are stopped (purple) and 
have never been implemented (orange) 
Source: conceived by the author 
 
Figure 5-14: Solid wall cumulative uptake for different policy scenarios: base run (thin black), mortgages policy with 
current subsidies (blue) and mortgages policy without subsidies (violet). 
Source: conceived by the author 
 
 
Figure 5-15: Solid wall cumulative uptake for different policy combination scenarios: base run (thin black), stamp duty 
rebates with current subsidies (blue) and stamp duty rebates without subsidies (violet).Figure 5-14: Solid wall 
cumulative uptake for different policy scenarios: base run (thin black), mortgages policy with current subsidies (blue) 




The motive for the scarce effect of the policies to a conspicuous degree relates to the small size of the 
demand from households who are buying a house (red line in Fig 5-16) compared to the demand from those 
who start to plan renovations (blue line in Fig 5-16). Renovations are almost ten times more recurrent than 
property purchases. The reader should not be fooled by the overall demand decrease. It happens because 
this graph combines all five measures, including those that are reaching their potential. So the more a 
measure closes the gap, the less instalments are done due to the saturation effect.  
 
The reasons why the policies have a tiny impact on the system do not only reside in the small demand of 
households buying a house. On top of that, for buyers getting to the point of retrofitting their new property 
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demand from renovations : mortgages
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Figure 5-15: Solid wall cumulative uptake for different policy combination scenarios: base run (thin black), 
stamp duty rebates with current subsidies (blue) and stamp duty rebates without subsidies (violet). 
Source: conceived by the author 
 
 
Figure 5-16: Number of households installing retrofit measures every month. The blue line describes those 
households who retrofit during their renovations, the red line those who retrofit when buying a new houseFigure 
5-15: Solid wall cumulative uptake for different policy combination scenarios: base run (thin black), stamp duty 
rebates with current subsidies (blue) and stamp duty rebates without subsidies (violet). 
Source: conceived by the author 
 
 
Figure 5-16: Number of households installing retrofit measures every month. The blue line describes those 
households who retrofit during their renovations, the red line those who retrofit when buying a new house 
Source: conceived by the author 
 
 
Figure 5-17: Renovators (above) and buyer (below) cutting phasesFigure 5-16: Number of households installing 
retrofit measures every month. The blue line describes those households who retrofit during their renovations, 
the red line those who retrofit when buying a new houseFigure 5-15: Solid wall cumulative uptake for different 
policy combination scenarios: base run (thin black), stamp duty rebates with current subsidies (blue) and stamp 
duty rebates without subsidies (violet). 
Source: conceived by the author 
 
 
Figure 5-16: Number of households installing retrofit measures every month. The blue line describes those 
households who retrofit during their renovations, the red line those who retrofit when buying a new houseFigure 
5-15: Solid wall cumulative uptake for different policy combination scenarios: base run (thin black), stamp duty 
rebates with current subsidies (blue) and stamp duty rebates without subsidies (violet). 
Source: conc ived by the author 
 
 
Figure 5-16: Number of households installing retrofit measures every month. The blue line describes those 
households who retrofit during their renovations, the red line those who retrofit when buying a new house 
Source: conceived by the author 
Figure 5-16: Number of households installing retrofit measures every month. The blue line describes those 
households who retrofit during their renovations, the red line those who retrofit when buying a new house 
Source: conceived by th  author
 
 
Figure 5-17: Renovators (above) and buyer (below) cutting phasesFigure 5-16: Number of households installing 
retrofit measures every month. The blue line describes those households who retrofit during their renovations, the 
red line those who retrofit when buying a new house 





takes many steps, each of which constitutes a cut in the initial potential flow. Fig 5-17 compares the ‘cutting 
phases’ of homeowners starting a renovation and ending up retrofitting their property (above) with house 
buyers that finish to eventually improving their new dwelling (below).  
 
 
Even if it is assumed an optimistic scenario for the mortgage policy in which both lenders’ and mortgage 
takers’ are willing to engage with green mortgages, there are still other conditions that need to be overcome 
before retrofit: eligibility (it relates to the saturation effect, namely not all of them are buying houses where 
the measure has still to be installed) and desirability.  
5.3.6. The importance of the amenity renovations mechanism 
The analysis of the model has highlighted an important aspect related to the homeowners retrofit uptake. 
The demand for retrofit deriving from renovations has two origins. The first refers to homeowners starting a 
renovation for generic reasons (such as amelioration of kitchen and bathroom) but ending up also 
considering retrofit measures (due to word of mouth effect). Instead, the second source, called ‘retrofit as 
amenity’, refers to households who consider retrofit measures from the very beginning due to their 
desirability. The principal difference in these two types of demand lies in the budget homeowners allocate 
to retrofit. In the first case, retrofit is a top-up, and because of this the budget is restricted, while in the 
Figure 5-17: Renovators (above) and buyer (below) cutting phases  
Source: conceived by the author 
 
 
Figure 5-18: Double-glazing cumulative uptake. Potential (green), historical data (red), base 
run (thin black) and glazing uptake with ut amenity effects (grey).Figure 5-17: Renovators 
(above) and buyer (below) cutting phases  
Source: conceived by the author 
 
 
Figure 5-18: Double-glazing cumulative uptake. Potential (green), historical data (red), base 
run (thin black) and glazing uptake without amenity effects (grey). 
Source: conceived by the author 
 
 
Figure 5-19: Summary of the causal connections influencing the variable ‘added value to 
property of measures’. Variables in boxes represent accumulations that change only with 
delayFigure 5-18: Double-glazing cumulative uptake. Potential (green), historical data (red), 
base run (thin black) and glazing uptake without amenity effects (grey).Figure 5-17: 
Renovators (above) and buyer (below) cutting phases  




‘retrofit as amenity’ situation, the uptake depends on the desirability without a similar constraint on the 
investment. In practice in the first process, households are willing to consider to spend an extra, estimated 
in the 10%  of the expenditure for the generic renovation they are undertaking (Energy Saving Trust, 2011), 
while in the second case, since the purpose of renovation is the retrofit itself, the homeowners do not have 
particular constraints because all the investment they make is for that measure. A vivid example of this 
retrofit as amenity mechanism is the double-glazing uptake in which only the first type of demand would not 
explain the uptake trends (Fig 5-18). 
 
Looking in detail at the retrofit as amenity mechanism can help to understand better how it works. Fig 5-19 
below offers a summary of this specific underlying structure. Added value to property by measures positively 
influences the total retrofit demand, because the higher it is the more homeowners are prone to retrofit as 
amenity. This variable refers to the homeowners’ willingness to retrofit if a specific measure is perceived to 
add value to their house. This value slowly changes over time depending on the measure’s popularity (how 
much the measure is known and the positive opinion associated with it) and the non-financial attractiveness 
(like aesthetic value, safety and thermal comfort, but not bill savings). Moreover, the added value to property 
by measures can be affected also by how much retrofit is considered as a financial added value to the house. 
Namely, whether the energy efficiency of a property provides some financial advantages or not. At the 
moment in the system, this link is null because there is not any financial advantage from this point of view. 
However, triggering this relation is one of the possible outcomes of the two policies under exploration. 
Accessing to bigger mortgages due to the house efficiency level, getting extra credit to retrofit a new 
property, paying a lower stamp duty for retrofitted dwellings or for a purchased houses that get retrofitted, 
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Figure 5-18: Double-glazing cumulative uptake. Potential (green), historical data (red), base run (thin black) 
and glazing uptake without amenity effects (grey). 
Source: conceived by the author 
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Figure 5-20: Solid wall uptake with mortgage policy for delay durations for changing t e added value to a 
property: 5 years (brown), 10 years (blue, equivalent to mortgages run), 20 years (red), 30 years (green).Figure 
5-19: Summary of the causal connections influencing the variable ‘added value to property of measures’. 
Variables in boxes represent accumulations that change only with delayFigure 5-18: Double-glazing 
cumulative uptake. Potential (green), historical data (red), base run (thin black) and glazing uptake without 
amenity effects (grey). 






5.3.7. Insights on financial policies: the importance of market assimilation time 
In this respect, what appears to be a very sensitive factor related to the measure financial added value is the 
time the market needs to ‘assimilate’ the new opportunities deriving from the two policies. In other words, 
the time needed until the market values improvements in energy efficiency, namely the time required to 
households to appreciate the financial benefits brought by energy efficiency, strongly influences the impact 
of the two policies. Fig 5-20 shows how the cumulative number of solid walls insulations grows with 
increments in the markets reactiveness (lower time to perceive the financial benefit added by energy 



























Installed measures[insulation] : mortgages, time to add value 5 years
Installed measures[insulation] : mortgages, time to add value 10 years
Installed measures[insulation] : mortgages, time to add value 20 years
Installed measures[insulation] : mortgages, time to add value 30 years
Figure 5-19: Summary of the causal connections influencing the variable ‘added value to 
property of measures’. Variables in boxes represent accumulations that change only with delay 
Source: conceived by the author 
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Figure 5-20: Solid wall uptake with mortgage policy for delay durations for changing the added 
value to a property: 5 years (brown), 10 years (blue, equivalent to mortgages run), 20 years 
(red), 30 years (green). 
Source: conceived by the author 
 
 
Figure 5-21: Solid wall uptake for different values of budget for retrofit: base run with a max. 
10% retrofit expenditure compared to renovation expenditure (black), retrofit budget x2 (blue), 
x3 (red), x4 (green).Figure 5-20: Solid wall uptake with mortgage policy for delay durations for 
changing the added value to a property: 5 years (brown), 10 years (blue, equivalent to 
mortgages run), 20 years (red), 30 years (green).Figure 5-19: Summary of the causal 
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Figure 5-21: Solid wall uptake for different values of budget for retrofit: base run with a max. 10% retrofit 
expenditure compared to renovation expenditure (black), retrofit budget x2 (blue), x3 (red), x4 
(green).Figure 5-20: Solid wall uptake with mortgage policy for delay durations for changing the added 
value to a property: 5 years (brown), 10 years (blue, equivalent to mortgages run), 20 years (red), 30 years 
(green). 
S urce: conceived by the author 
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Unfortunately, despite the importance in the exact duration of this delay in the UK households’ perception, 
its realistic estimations still necessitate to be done since neither scientific or grey literature provide any 
satisfactory description.  
5.3.8. Financial affordability: only one of the barriers 
Since increasing the financial affordability has been the main goal of most of the UK policies, with the model 
it has been explored what would the changes in the solid wall uptake be for different homeowners’ budget 
values for retrofit. Surprisingly, the effects of increasing the budget without any further actions (e.g. policies, 
improvement in non-financial attractiveness, etc.) are very small. This is shown in Fig 5-21. Here the base run 
(thin black) in which households are willing to add the 10% on their generic renovation expenditure for 
installing a retrofit measure is reported and then the cases in which they are willing to top up two (thick 
blue), three (thick red) and four (thick green) times more are tested. This happens because affordability is 
only one of the criteria that homeowners take into account when they need to decide whether retrofit or 
not. Therefore, a measure that becomes affordable does not get ‘automatically’ installed if it is not also 
desirable.  
 
5.3.9. Importance of ‘popularity’ and ‘non-financial attractiveness’’ 
On the contrary, non-financial attractiveness has a remarkable impact on the solid wall uptake rate, even 












Installed measures[insulation] : base run
Installed measures[insulation] : budget for retrofit x2
Installed measures[insulation] : budget for retrofit x3
Installed measures[insulation] : budget for retrofit x4
Figure 5-21: Solid wall uptake for different values of budget for retrofit: base run with a max. 
10% retrofit expenditure compared to renovation expenditure (black), retrofit budget x2 
(blue), x3 (red), x4 (green). 
Source: conceived by the author 
 
 
Figure 5-22: Solid wall uptake for different values of non-financial attractiveness of solid 
wall: base run (thin black), and different scenarios for 2 times, 5 times, 10 times and 20 times 
(like doubl -glazing) higher attractiveness of solid wall insulation.Figure 5-21: Solid wall 
uptake for different values of budget for retrofit: base run with a max. 10% retrofit 
expenditure compared to renovation expenditure (black), retrofit budget x2 (blue), x3 (red), 
x4 (green). 
Source: conceived by the author 
 
 
Figure 5-22: Solid wall uptake for different values of non-financial attractiveness of solid 




After the model analysis, non-financial attractiveness appears to be a crucial leverage point especially if 
compared with changes in the affordability through variations in homeowners’ budget, previously explored. 
Thus, an action that reinforces and improves the aesthetic value, perceived safety and thermal comfort of 
solid wall (although this idea applies to any measure) seems to be crucial, or even necessary, to reach the 
desired targets. This because it triggers the reinforcing mechanism that shifts this measure into an amenity 
renovation that a households desires for those aspects independent from just energy efficiency. In this 
respect, it may be worthwhile to recall that the hassle factor acts as a limiting factor for the non-financial 
attractiveness, like solid wall insulation installation that requires high disruption.  
So far, the main lesson is that households do not install a non-desirable measure, even if they have an 
increased expenditure capacity. The motivation is that recognizing the retrofit measures as something 
attractive because of its thermal comfort, aesthetics, or because it adds value to the property is pivotal for 
homeowners when it comes to retrofit. These characteristics can make a retrofit measure not just 
‘something’ to add to an already decided amenity renovations, but an amenity renovation itself which 
households directly strive for. In addition, also popularity seems to have a compelling role in increasing the 
retrofit uptake of solid wall insulation (this accounts for all the measures). Popularity is important because it 
triggers the reinforcing mechanism of demand through three different ways: it increases the awareness of 
energy efficiency among homeowners planning renovations making them consider retrofit, it improves 
measures desirability and it raises their added value to a property. This effect is explored in Fig 5-23.  Step 
changes in popularity of solid wall in 2020 of 10 (thick blue line), 20 (thick red line), 40 (thick green line) and 












Installed measures[insulation] : base run
Installed measures[insulation] : solid non-financial attractiveness x2
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Installed measures[insulation] : solid non-financial attractiveness x10
Installed measures[insulation] : solid non-financial attractiveness x20
Figure 5-22: Solid wall uptake for different values of non-financial attractiveness of solid wall: base run (thin black), 
and different scenarios for 2 times, 5 times, 10 times and 20 times (like double-glazing) higher attractiveness of 
solid wall insulation. 
Source: conceived by the author 
 
 
Figure 5-23: Popularity effect on cumulative solid wall uptake. On the left: Solid wall uptake for different step 
changes of popularity 2020: base run when popularity grows naturally (thin black), step increase in popularity at 
time 2020 of 10% (blue), 20% (red), 40% (green) and 60% (grey). 
On the right: Effects on po ularity: base run when popularity grows naturally (thin black), st p increase in 
popularity at time 2020 of 10 percentage points (pp) (blue), 20 pp (red), 4 pp% (green) and 60 pp (grey).Figure 5-
22: Solid wall uptake for different values of non-financial attractiveness of solid wall: base run (thin black), and 
different scenarios for 2 times, 5 times, 10 times and 20 times (like double-glazing) higher attractiveness of solid 
wall insulation. 
Source: conceived by the author 
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Figure 5-23: Popularity effect on cumulative solid wall uptake. On the left: Solid wall uptake for different step 
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the right. On the left the corresponding solid wall insulation cumulative uptake are portrayed. Looking at 
both graphs makes clear the strong correspondence between the two elements: for example, even a small 
increase of 10 percentage points can be amplified and accumulated over time, bringing the system to reach 
a number of solid wall insulations at the end of 2050 twice as the base run. These reinforcing loops are some 
of the key drivers for retrofit demand and anything that supports these mechanisms, like for example 
marketing, would increase the uptake rate.  
 
 
5.3.10. Model assumptions and limitations 
The model produced and used for this analysis has several limitations, as all the models have, since they are 
mere simplifications of reality. In this paragraph, all the limitations identified and acknowledge by the author 
are discussed. The confidence in the model is considered solid enough to judge as reliable the model outputs. 
However, further testing and validation are recommended mainly for three reasons. First on one hand, the 
fact the model is drawn upon knowledge of subject-experts can provide strong model reliability, on the other 
hand, this could be seen as a downside since it limits the structure to the joint expertise available. Although 
we included the new DA setting in the second session, the lack of ‘real’ stakeholders in the workshops may 
still have lead the participants to overlook important structure of the system. Second, the large size of the 
model increases the necessity of validation. Although several tests have been carried out so far, they still may 
have neglected some inconsistencies. Related to this aspect, modellers faced a general lack of reliable data 
for quantification on the supply chain sector of the model and on some specific qualitative connections. 
When it was not possible to ground in scientific literature, governmental reports or other written reliable 
sources, the quantification was based on best guesses done by experts in BEIS and researchers themselves. 
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Popularity of measures[insulation] : base run
Popularity of measures[insulation] : popularity step 0,1
Popularity of measures[insulation] : popularity step 0,2
Popularity of measures[insulation] : popularity step 0,4
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Figure 5-23: Popularity effect on cumulative solid wall uptake. On the left: Solid wall uptake for different step changes of 
popularity 2020: base run when popularity grows naturally (thin black), step increase in popularity at time 2020 of 10% 
(blue), 20% (red), 40% (green) and 60% (grey). 
On the right: Effects on popularity: base run when popularity grows naturally (thin black), step increase in popularity at time 
2020 of 10 percentage points (pp) (blue), 20 pp (red), 4 pp% (green) and 60 pp (grey). 
Source: conceived by the author 
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conducted continuously over time (Barlas, 1996) since nobody can ever tell to be 100% confident on a model. 
This limitations need to be accounted especially in cases of further researches drawn upon this study. 
In addition, assumptions needed to be done to capture such a complex system in a model. First, in the base 
case all the people who retrofit are part of the people who renovate. Moreover, any window of opportunity 
(a period of the households’ life in which it is more likely they undertake home renovations) has not been 
modelled, and then all the homeowners are assumed to be have the same probability to do a renovation. In 
the model homeowners can only choose among four different measures (wall insulation, loft insulation, 
double-glazing and condensing boilers) when they make decision on retrofit (cavity wall and solid wall are 
both included, but are considered mutually exclusive in the model, since they can not be installed in the same 
house). These have been chosen because they are the main measures monitored by governmental bodies, 
but in reality the spectrum of possibilities is wider. During the model building process, it has been chosen not 
to take into account new measures potential, and new dwellings as well. This assumption is realistic since 
the replacement rate of the UK housing stock is extremely low (Shrubsole et al., 2014). Therefore, the housing 
stock results to be static and not dynamic. Also technical possibilities that would have increased the potential 
for measure instalment, such as triple glazing, have been excluded, since exploring it was outside the scope 
of the study. Some assumptions were taken also in the mortgage policy structure. First, the mortgage lenders 
reactions to the new policy are not modelled. Thus some possible unintended consequence of this policy 
arising in this sector is still unknown. This decision was made because of the lack of knowledge on this part 
of the system. Moreover, households refinancing their mortgages to do retrofit are not taken into account 
(assumed to be zero). This means that homeowners that have issues in repaying their mortgage are not 
offered the green mortgages focus of the policy. Lastly, rebound effects (Ürge-Vorsatz, Harvey, et al., 2007) 
have not been explored.  
5.3.11. Policy Implications 
There are several relevant policy lessons that can be drawn upon this analysis. Regulatory measures have 
been very effective in the UK. This is clearly visible from the case of condensing boiler: the regulation that 
made mandatory install only this new type of efficient boilers completely changed the uptake trends. Now, 
these trends seem comfortable enough to help the UK to meet its pledges on time. This result is not 
unexpected: as outlined in the literature review, energy efficiency mandatory regulations, such as building 
codes and appliance standards, have been already identified as successful policy instruments (Lucon et al,. 
2014). Similar is the case of energy efficiency obligation scheme (CERT, EEC, ECO) that proved to be effective 
in the sustainment of the uptake of several measure. From this perspective they can be consider, to some 
extent, to be successful since the trends of some specific measures, such as loft and cavity wall insulation, 
are in a good track to meet the targets on time. These outcomes are not new, since good results of these 
types of policies have been already appreciated (Bertoldi, 2012 cited in Lucon et al, 2014, p. 720). However, 
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this instrument also highlighted a side effect well described in the literature (Eyre et al., 2009 cited in Lucon 
et al, 2014, p. 720): this mechanism of subsidies works well to incentivize cheap and mass market measures, 
such as loft and cavity wall insulation, rather than massive, expensive and more effective in terms of energy 
saving, like solid wall insulation. Therefore, the concerns among policymakers on the capability of this type 
of schemes not being the best for achieving long-term high saving targets, appear to be founded (Eyre et al., 
2009 cited in Lucon et al, 2014, p. 720).   
For what concerns market based financial policies, thorough the model analysis, it has been possible to gain 
also many insights. First of all, financial tools aiming to support the diffusion of green mortgages or to provide 
tax rebates seem to have direct low impact on the whole system because they target a very tiny portion of 
households (basically only who is buying a house). This acts a major limitation on the direct effects on the 
retrofit uptake. However, it can be interesting to look at the spill-over effects they can have, namely at the 
feedback loop that these policies aim to stimulate. As discussed above, these interventions seem to be 
somehow able to trigger the financial added value by measure mechanism. However, the impact of this 
mechanism on the solid wall uptake rate is strongly dependent on the time households need to appreciate 
and react to these new financial benefits. Specific knowledge on this is still lacking, as highlighted before, but 
it seems worth investing efforts to understand better the exact values of this information delay (e.g. market 
analysis, surveys, etc.) in order to support future policymaking actions in the best way possible. However if 
we look at other countries experiences, it is possible to see how this effect is actually in place in this type of 
financial policies. In the literature review, it was briefly outlined the German loan mechanism via the KfW 
(Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau), the German development bank, through which many building retrofit 
refurbishments were supported (Rosenow et al., 2013). This is the story of a successful intervention, however 
looking at Fig 5-24, in which the amount of loans and grants delivered are shown, it is possible to appreciate 
the fact that it took time (from 2001 to 2006) to the policy to work at one’s best (appreciable in the size 
increase). When designing financial policies, policymakers should keep in mind that the broad impact of their 
intervention may be delayed in time and that the magnitude of the results is strongly dependent on this 
delay. Consequentially, in case they opt for these tools, they need to be willing (have enough political capital 





In addition, since these are market-based interventions, the policymakers have to ‘play following the rules of 
the game’. It means that these tools and measures need to be appealing to the customers. First, this is 
especially the case of green mortgages to support energy efficiency uptake. To prompt households to go for 
them it is necessary that they have a very competitive interest rate or other desired features. For instance, 
looking at the example of two successful financial items, the German scheme mentioned above offers very 
low interests compared to other financial products (Rosenow et al., 2013) or in Japan, financial institutions 
sell products that provide a discount greater than 1% on mortgages and loans for constructing or buying a 
house, depending on the grade of efficiency (Murakami et al., 2004 cited in Lucon et al, 2014, p.720). Second, 
what is definitely a minimum requirement for any market-based to be successful is the fact that the ‘thing’ 
this financial tools want to support must be desired by homeowners. Otherwise, policymakers will end up 
again, as they did with the Green Deal scheme, ‘selling the loan instead the car’  (Rosenow & Eyre, 2016). 
Therefore, if policymakers want to continue the path of developing financial based policies, much effort 
needs to be done in order to make more appealing the retrofit, in the UK case solid wall in specific (e.g. 
technological developments to decrease costs and disruption entailed by installation). Lastly, policymakers 
should start to focus more on the awareness and popularity of retrofit among households. Out of the analysis, 
it has appeared to have a major impact on the system. Most of the important loops in the system pass 
through this concepts and, as shown, variations in their value dramatically change the behaviour of the 
system. Consequently, any attempt to support an increase in awareness and popularity can not but benefit 
the uptake of retrofit measure. Policymakers have already some policy tools to act on this part of the system 
(e.g. advertising, awareness campaigns, etc. in Lucon et al, 2014) and many other could be developed tailored 
on the context they will be applied to.   
  
Figure 5-24: German Federal funding of the financial scheme supporting retrofit and loans and grants issued 




6. Conclusions and Further Research 
6.1. Main lessons 
This dissertation primarily aimed to improve the understanding of the dynamics involved in the homeowners 
retrofit uptake, considering the UK as a case study. Especially, the objective was to increase the knowledge 
on the loops, barriers, drivers and interactions between different actors and their decision-making processes 
related to the homeowner energy efficiency demand. To answer this question a PSDM approach was thought 
to be best suited for the challenge, and therefore applied.  It was used in a context of a joint project between 
UCL and BEIS, and through a series of workshops and interviews with policymakers from BEIS a SFD model 
was developed and validated. Hence, using SD modelling, this research mapped interlinkages and explored 
dynamics between homeowners’ decision-making about retrofit and other actors in the system (the retrofit 
supply chain and mortgage lenders). Model simulations uncovered that four out of the five retrofit measure 
analyzed are probable to reach their potential before 2050, thus being on track for helping the UK to meet 
its long-term carbon savings pledges. These measures are double-glazing, energy efficient boilers 
(condensing), loft and cavity wall insulation. Instead, solid wall insulation showed problematic installation 
trends that would not make this measure to reach the desired level on time. Therefore, it appeared clear 
that solid wall insulation requires incentives and policy support that go beyond currently implemented 
policies. Although the large model size, it was possible to distil out seven main loops that were deeply 
described and discussed in section ‘5.3.2’. Many lesson have been drawn out the model analysis, however, a 
very important insight consisted in the fact that a retrofit measure’s uptake seems to be remarkably affected 
by its ‘popularity’ and ‘non-financial attractiveness’ (aesthetics, thermal comfort and low hassle factor). 
These characteristics generate reinforcing virtuous loops that raise the perceived retrofit measure’s added 
value to the property by homeowners, such that this specific measure starts to be installed also for amenity 
purposes rather than only for energy efficiency. Technological improvements can potentially be a key driver 
to trigger this non-financial attractiveness since they can increase the aesthetics and thermal comfort of a 
retrofit measure and decrease the hassle factor involved in the installation procedure. However, it takes time 
for a measure to become popular by word of mouth without any binding regulation or extraordinary external 
events and, unfortunately, this effect cannot be overcome by any financial policy. The historical uptake of 
double-glazing seemed to be a clear example of this mechanism.  
Speaking about financial policies, the second research question of this dissertation aimed to assess the 
impact on the uptake rate of financial policies, such as a green mortgage policy or a stamp duty rebate, and 
to explore what would be their effectiveness from a dynamic perspective (namely would they be able to 
trigger virtuous or enable vicious feedback loops?). The analysis of the model showed that the two policies 
direct impact on the homeowners retrofit uptake would be limited. The main reason for that is because that 
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the additional potential demand coming from house buyers and targeted by the policies is very small 
(approximatively one tenth) compared to the usual demand from renovators. However, the indirect effects 
these policies triggered seem to be more important and substantial. These indirect consequences relate to 
the fact that policies’ impact becomes more ‘tangible’ if they are able to enhance a change in a measure’s 
perceived added value to the property. These effects could be primed by an increase in the financial benefits 
associated to that measure (in this case, extra credit issued by lenders or lower taxation) that would 
contribute to the general measure’s added value to the property. Then, this, combined with the intrinsic 
features of the measure (‘measure non-financial attractiveness’) and catalysed by its popularity, can make 
the measure sufficiently attractive to become an amenity renovation itself, and not just an energy efficiency 
top up on another renovation done for amenity purposes as it usually is. However, it takes time for markets 
to assimilate changes on stamp duty or green mortgage lending caused by policy interventions. These delays 
consist in how much time homeowners need to perceive a measure, in this specific case solid wall insulation, 
as an added value to their property since it guarantees bigger mortgages or a reduced stamp duty. These 
delays might impede the UK to reach its pledges because the policies’ effectiveness is very sensible to how 
quickly and strongly households perceive such added energetic, financial, aesthetic and comfort value. Future 
efforts might aim to explore and develop policy instruments to strengthen and fasten these processes. In 
addition to all of that, from the analysis another important aspect arose. Increasing homeowners’ 
affordability for energy efficiency is a conditio sine qua non for the uptake rate of measures such as solid wall 
insulation. However, it is definitely not enough; the measure also needs to be perceived as desirable by 
homeowners. Previous policies in the UK were mainly only focused on the financial aspects of the system. 
Green mortgage and stamp duty policies may also have some spillover effects by stimulating desirability, 
influencing measure’s added value through financial benefits, but they seem to be insufficient to reach the 
installed solid wall insulation targets in 2050, even in the optimistic case of an extremely reactive market, 
without any intervention towards making solid wall insulation more desirable to households. Therefore, it 
appears clear that there are no ‘silver bullets’ for reaching deep and at scale retrofit. This condition was 
already highlighted by Papachristos (2015) in his study on the Dutch context and it can be extended to the 
UK. To British policymakers, this research suggests that to make any financial policy adequately effective, it 
is required to integrate it with other policy tools directed to increase, support and stimulate factors like 
measure’s popularity, non-financial attractiveness and perceived retrofit added value to the property. Some 
of these tools already exist (Lucon et al, 2014) and some of them still need to be developed. However, a mix 
of policy instruments tailored to the UK context seems to be the solution (standards, informational 
campaigns, smart technology, behavioural incentives, national innovation policies, etc.). Moreover, in case 
policymakers want to pursue the path of financial policies, it is necessary to reduce the time markets and 
homeowners need to perceive their effects. Only in this way, these type of policies would trigger virtuous 
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reinforcing loops that will favour the uptake rate of energy efficiency measures, such as solid wall insulation, 
in a reasonable amount of time.  
The research context made the research team face a very challenging situation. Due to time pressure and 
confidentiality on the issues dealt with, only policymakers from BEIS attended the workshop. Having 
heterogeneity and plurality of points of view and stakes among group participants is one of the most 
important conditions for PSDM (Vennix, 1996). Although this is not such an uncommon problem (Gerrits & 
Vaandrager, 2017), an approach to overtake this issue was still not available in the literature. In response an 
adaptation of the traditional Devil’s Advocate was develop for this purpose. This approach tried to ‘artificially’ 
recreate in the workshop room the mental model of the missing stakeholders through a facilitator acting as 
them (the DA). Therefore, this thesis aimed to explore the effectiveness of the adapted and new DA setting 
as a tool to overcome homogeneity in a PSDM group of participants in a case in which relevant stakeholders 
cannot be involved in the participatory process. Overall, the results were positive. The two facilitators that 
played the DAs were able to raise some issue that would have been likely to be raised by the missing 
stakeholders and, as it was shown, their actions had a great impact in the map structure. Moreover, other 
participants appreciated the new setting: they liked being challenged by new and fresh ideas and they did 
not feel problematic the fact that facilitators, that before were neutral, became involved in debates on the 
content. A positive side effect of this approach was that the group discussion became more structured than 
it was in the previous session. This was identified to be due to the enhanced facilitators’ experience with the 
group but also to the DAs that lead by example the other participants on how to conduct a fruitful discussion 
in a PSDM session. However, this setting required a lot of preparation time, especially if compared with other 
scripts and techniques. Moreover, the study highlighted that playing the DA may be challenging for a 
facilitator: it could be difficult to step in the group discussion or it could be hard to completely avoid behaving 
as a facilitator and act just as a stakeholder would do. Ultimately, when using this new approach, a lot of 
freedom is left to the DA judgment. However, the applications of the new DA setting performed in this study 
was the first, and at the moment it is very difficult to separate the good results obtained from the cultural 
context in which the approach was used. Nevertheless, the author is confident to state that the setting was 
effective with respect of the purpose. It helped in carrying out a successful PSDM project in a ‘pressure cooker 
conditions’, namely a PSDM project ‘compressed’ because of external constraints (in this case time and 
confidentiality, but it could be also, for example, budgetary) in which homogeneity conditions might have 
undermined the quality of the outcomes (Gerrits & Vaandrager, 2017). From a broader perspective, this 
original setting for PSDM showed to what extent the methodology can be flexible (the scripted part mixed, 
omitted, extended, etc.) and thus compressed, should the situation require. It demonstrated that PSDM 
works well also in less than ideal situations whereby there is confidentiality and time pressure and in which 
there is little room to execute the method as prototypically described (Vennix, 1996). These might be valuable 
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lessons for practitioners that will face in the future similar circumstances. Last but not least, this study proved 
again that PSDM is “still more art than science” (Andersen, Richardson, & Vennix, 1997, p. 187). To prepare 
and perform original setting and scripts, it seems required to researchers some types of skills that appear to 
be not teachable. In these cases, a particular inner sensitiveness to understand the group life (Phillips & 
Phillips, 1993) and judge all the factors (e.g. trust) and details involved is necessary. Unfortunately, these 
abilities cannot be fully taught to someone, but they are something that people develop by themselves during 
their life.  
6.2. Further research and developments 
The work described and contained in this dissertation can be seen as a starting point for further research in 
two main directions: one with respect of the model and one concerning methodological developments for 
the new DA setting.  
Six major paths of future work on the model or related issue have been identified. First, refinements in order 
to increase the robustness of the quantification process seem to be a crucial next step to perform. As said, 
some values and relationships are not well rooted in the literature, therefore, specific and targeted research 
appears to be the most suited way to increase the confidence in them. Second, structural improvements 
could increase further the reliability of sensitive SFD structures. These structural progresses may consist in 
supplementary validation (see: Barlas, 1996; Sterman 2000), and a revision and assessment of the 
assumptions taken and limitations involved. This is mostly due to model’s large size and this process would 
remarkably contribute to enhance researchers and audience confidence on the outcomes. Third, additional 
participatory group sessions to revise, build and validate relationship could be done. These would increase 
further the built structure’s reliability and they might enlarge the level of details in the model. In this respect, 
these sessions might include a wider range of stakeholders in the workshops in order to extend the shared 
understanding created also to these individuals and to integrate in the model their point of view, thus 
decreasing the probability of overlooking important causal structures. Fourth, the model could be expanded 
and used as starting point to analyze new parts of the system. Potential lies in the possibility to explore 
dynamics of mortgage lenders and retrofit supply chain more in detail. This might lead to widen the scope of 
the model. Fifth, it could be considered to make the model go through a ‘gamification’ process in order to 
create a user-friendly interface and thus support learning and policy evaluations. Sixth, from a much broader 
perspective, future researches could aim to assess the long-term impacts of the PSDM project on 
governmental organisations like BEIS, as called by Cappuccio et al. (2017). For example, questionnaires 
evaluating could be submitted to workshop participants to assess whether the approach had a long-term 
impact on consensus, commitment, insights and communication about the subject or not.   
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Further work with respect of the new DA setting appears to be necessary to consolidate the approach not as 
a promising practice but as an established one. More applications of the setting need to be performed and 
evaluated to understand whether the good outcomes obtained in this case study are depending on the 
approach or on contextual factors (e.g. organization culture could have been the real reason for the positive 
results). Therefore, an increased number of applications of the setting would provide more data to assess 
the effectiveness of the approach and to see if it works well also in other contextual situations. Moreover, 
future research on the method should be directed toward an improvement of the approach’s rigorousness, 
especially for what concerns the preparation of the script. In this sense, the selection of the missing 
stakeholders might be improved. Here, it was based on the literature and on the inputs received by the 
workshop participants during the first session. Integrating this procedure with other techniques, for example 
the ones suggested by Bryson (2004), could increase the reliability of the selection. In addition, the choice of 
the sources used to construct the possible issues that would have been likely to be raised by the missing 
stakeholder and the way they are embedded in the DA script, can be improved. In the sense that it could be 
done in a more systematic way. However, techniques to do so have not been found yet, so that there might 
be a new path of research. This would increase the confidence of facilitators in the issues the DAs raise in the 
sessions. Moreover, the setting was tried in only one workshop of PSMD project; future research could try to 
apply it in a series of sessions, to see whether it still works well or its performance decreases as the workshops 
go on. Lastly, the way the approach was assessed in this study is just a preliminary attempt to evaluate such 
an original setting. This evaluation process is still open for revisions, suggestions and improvements in order 
to make it comprehend more all the aspects influenced by the new DA setting. Summarizing, future studies 
on the new DA approach should go towards increasing its rigorousness and to increase the number of 
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Source: conceived by the author 
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LOOP NUMBER Meaning 
B1 Saturation loop 
R1 Word of mouth effect 
R2 High visibility loop 
B2 Low visibility loop 
R3 Single measure supply chain (SC) growth 
R4 Deep measure SC growth 
R5 Integrated SC growth 
R6 Integrated single measure SC growth 
R7 Integrated deep measures SC growth 
R8 Credibility reinforcing loop 
B3 Counteracting effect of fragmentation by increased hassle factor 
B4 Counteracting effect of fragmentation by loss of credibility 
R9 Incentive to prioritize energy efficiency lending due to reduced default likelihood 
R10 
Incentive to prioritize energy efficiency lending due to increased reliability of Energy Performance 
Certificate (EPC) 




Table: Loop name and explanation 
Source: compiled and conceived by the author 
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Source: conceived by the author 
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Annex D: The New Devil’s Advocate Script 
DEVIL’s ADVOCATE FACILITATION ROLE 
The facilitators introduce him and his role (mainly his loss of neutrality) in the beginning of the workshop.  
[Facilitator] “As you saw last time, facilitators don’t interfere with the content under discussion among the 
participants. What they can do is to ask question that challenge the participants. Today DA1 and DA2 will 
leave their neutral facilitation role and act as one of the participants for most of the session. The reason why 
we made this choice is that we want to bring some issue into ‘the workshop room’ that might be raised by 
the stakeholders (that unfortunately can’t attend the workshop). The idea is to stress the model/map as much 
as possible in order to increase its truthfully with respect of reality. We expect this process to increase the 
quality of final output since it can lead to integrate into the model ‘things’ that were not considered before”. 
“However, it is your right to stop it. It means that if you think that this approach is annoying or useless just 
let us know and say that you do not want that facilitator to be there”.  
What does the Devil’s Advocate (DA) do? He acts as one of the participant, but a “special one”. Guidelines: 
- He sits among the participants and not among the facilitators. 
- He suggests links and variable as any participant. Therefore, he participate to the nominal group 
techniques and the modelling phase (suggesting variables, links, arising questions, etc.). 
- He does not interfere in the group activity that requires reaching a consensus among participants. He 
has ‘less power’. This because reaching consensus is an internal group process through which the 
commitment on the model is built and so nobody of the facilitation team should interfere with it. In 
practice, after every discussion in the modelling phase, in which also the DA can take part, the 
facilitator usually ask to the participants if they all agree on the suggested item. In this moment the 
DA should not interact (if something appears to be extremely wrong he can ask clarifications but he 
cannot put a veto or start a conflict) 
- The goal of the DA is to add more perspective to the group and then improve the model quality. 
Remember that with this adjustment we are exploring to what extent a facilitator can leave his role 
and intervene on the content and what contribution can give to the model. To do so, the DA can share 
his reasoning as a normal participant and the data source these ideas come from. He should try to set 
himself in an inquiry mode when suggesting variable, etc. For example: 
 NO: “this is wrong, the literature says this, this and this.” obviously their reaction can 
quite negative towards the workshop setting 
 YES: “I see. But, have you ever consider this option described in this source?” or “I read 
some articles. This might be placed here and connected to this. Is it useful? Why don’t 
you think so?” or “Let’s consider other possible options – what questions could we 
come up that pose issues to the option we have been discussing?”. In this case, the DA 
just challenge their ideas and do not impose anything. The burden of thinking about 
the stimulus from the DA is shifted to the participants since they need to think about 
in order to answer to the question. Moreover, questions are less “harmful” in a 
discussion than statements. 
- Ultimately the role of the DA is just posing ideas (backed by sources), explaining the reasoning why 
these ideas could be relevant and then support the participants to accept them or not. They are the 
one who take a decision. The DA should never forget this while conducting his role.  
- All the issue that DA will arise are studied and analyzed before with the facilitation team in order to 
check and assess their robustness and relevance. All the issues needs to have a stakeholder they could 
be referred to, the source backing that claim (literature, interview with experts, …), a sentence as 
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guideline for the DA on how to present the issue to the other participants and a list of possible 
variables related to. (see the table below).  
However, there is not much information (almost nothing) on this type of approach. It is a quite new 
setting in GMB what we are doing, and there could be some aspects we are not taking into account and 
then something not expected can arise in the workshop.  
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Existing dwellings are likely to represent 70–80% of 
the 2050 stock. 30% are going to be new houses. In 
2016 140,660 houses have been completed. 
 
(Legislation “Building Regulations and associated 
technical guidance”, regulation called “Zero carbon 








“At the moment new houses are not 
relevant in the model. It is a stock 
outside the core structure. But I 
think that if we adopt a long term 
view they can be important and 
therefore valuable to be taken into 
account”. 
“Are there any legislative 
requirements for energy efficiency 
and GHG emissions from new 
buildings? (‘in which stock is the rate 
going in?’) 
“New building rate”, 
“demolition rate”, 
(Shrubsole et al., 
2014), (UK 
Government, 2017) 
Top renovation payments methods: 
1) Savings/personal finances 85% 
2) Cash from home mortgage refinance 14% 
3) Credit card – to be paid off over time 14% 
4) Gift/inheritance 11% 
5) Personal loan from friends/family 4% 
Renovation 
expert 
From what I know only 14% of the 
people that are renovating chose to 
pay with cash from home mortgage 
refinance. Is this data realistic 
according to you? “Do you agree 
that knowing the magnitude of 
people paying in this way is 
important? 
“Percentage of people 
using mortgages 
refinance for paying 
renovations” 
(Houzz report, 2016) 
People in UK are very reluctant in undertaking 




Households in UK are not very 
willing to take a loan or refinance 
their mortgage to pay for their 
renovations. This can have an impact 
on the policy. 
“Reluctance towards 
mortgages and loans” 
“Percentage of people 
using mortgage refinance 
to pay for renovations” 
Esfand Burman, 
research associate, 
UCL Institute of 
Environmental Design 
and Engineering with 






Households seems reluctant to accept financial 




“Generally, those who chose not to 
pursue support despite being 
contacted described being ‘put off’ 
by the method of contact. Cold-calls 
and leaflets were viewed with 
suspicion by some participants, and 
associated with experiences of 
‘scams’ or nuisance sales contact. 
There was also widespread cynicism 
about the offer of financial support, 
and a sense that there would be 
drawbacks – ‘there’s always a 
catch’.” 






It is not so easy for a household to move from a 
renovation plan to a plan that include also retrofit. 
Many times the people pay for their renovations 
with their savings; therefore, it is not so easy to 




Many times people wait to save 
enough to pay for the whole 
renovation before to undertake it. In 
this perspective it could be 
challenging for them to add some 
extra costs for retrofitting to their 
initial plan. (quote from Yekatherina 
“sometimes it is more difficult to 
take the decision to retrofit when 
you are already renovating”) 
“cost of the retrofit 
compared to the cost of 
the renovation” 
Yekatherina Bobrova, 





“The assumption of reduced energy demand as a 
result of better insulated buildings will be affected 
by, for example, comfort take-back thereby 
potentially undermining policy objectives. Increase 
in disposable income and on the other hand, 
increased consumption of ‘goods’, while possibly 
providing economic benefits, could increase carbon 
emissions in other sectors such as agriculture or 





“Now we are assuming that once the 
people retrofit their house they will 
keep their internal temperature 
stable. Are we sure about that? I 
mean I can imagine households 
raising their house internal 
temperature since heating their 
home becomes cheaper. Is this a 
minor issue or does it need to be 
somehow expressed in the model?” 
“Average internal 
temperature” 




People habits drive the energy consumption. 
Living in a house that has been retrofitted requires 
different practice to the householders. The way 
householders behave dramatically effect the energy 
use they make (and therefore consume). 
Households needs to be taught on how to ‘use’ the 
new measure. 
Householders 
For having an impact on the energy 
consumption it not just necessary to 
change the stock of houses but also 
the householders need to change 
their behaviour accordingly. Living in 
a retrofitted house might recognize 
different habits than what the 
householders were used to.  
Households might need to be taught 
on how to do it.  
“Energy use” depends on 
the “EE level of the 
house” and on the  
“Compliance of 
householders behaviour 
with the new retrofit 
measure” 
Yekatherina Bobrova, 
PhD candidate at UCL 
Institute of 
Environmental Design 
and Engineering ; 





and Engineering with 
long experience in the 
construction sector 
  
Unintended consequences of retrofit on 
householders. 
If not properly carried out the retrofit can create 
unintended negative consequences on the 
householders’ life.  
Householders 
Currently in the model, all the 
retrofit measures just create 
benefits for the householders. This 
may not actually be the case in 
reality. Many times retrofitted 
houses generate unintended 
consequences that decrease life 
quality or create severe issues on the 
building in which they live (increase 
in internal humidity, dust mites, 
allergies, fabric damage etc.). (From 
Katya personal experience: “I live in a 
house that has been retrofitted but 
that is uncomfortably warm! It is 
because when the retrofit has been 














heating system or a reconstruction of 
the ventilation strategy) 
Negative word of mouth. 
If householders experience negative unintended 
consequences, they might start to talk around in a 
negative way about retrofit. This might generate a 
negative word of mouth that disincentive other 
householders to retrofit. Moreover, most of the 
time negative rumours spread quicker than 
positive ones. 
Householders 
Once a householder experience 
negative unintended consequences, 
they will start to talk negatively 
about it. Moreover, negative 





“negative word of 
mouth”; “speed of 
negative word of mouth” 
Yekatherina Bobrova, 





Quality of retrofit.  
The quality of retrofit is what has a major effect on 
the unintended consequences of retrofit. A retrofit 
work properly done has much less probability of 
generating unintended consequences.  
Householders 
Householders do not know about 
retrofit. The quality of the work 
depends mostly on the installers. The 
quality of how they carry out the 
work will in the end affect the 
probability of facing unintended 
negative consequences  





PhD candidate at UCL 
Institute of 
Environmental Design 
and Engineering,  
(Bonfield, 2016) 
Fragmentation of the market and installers’ skills. 
 
Householders 
What affects the quality of retrofit is 
that usually they are not carried in a 
holistic way. You can call a plumber, 
he can suggest some retrofit measure  
but he won’t be able to carry them 
out properly 
“Fragmentation 
“quality of retrofit”; 
“Skills of installer” 
“quality of retrofit” 
Yekatherina Bobrova, 




The performance of the retrofit measures are not 
all the same. 
They depend on how properly they are installed, 
on the level of maintenance they receive, and on 
how the households behave.  
Retrofit 
installers 
For example many ventilation 
systems do not perform to their 
designed standards, with poor 
installation and maintenance cited 
as reasons for further reductions in 
capacity (failure to achieve the 
energy savings anticipated from 
design data).  
Moreover, increased ventilation 
without heat recovery could lead to 
 “Quality of the 
retrofit” “Performance 
of the retrofit measure” 
, “Maintenance 
capacity” 
“Performance of the 
retrofit measure”; 
“Customer behaviour” 
”Performance of the 
retrofit measure” 
Yekatherina Bobrova, 
PhD candidate at UCL 
Institute of 
Environmental Design 




energy efficiency gains being offset 
by ventilation heat losses with GHG 
emission increased or remaining 
unchanged and increased fuel bills, 
especially so if systems are not 




Decreasing energy demand in order to decrease the 
carbon emissions is more an interest for the 
policymakers than for the householders. 
Retrofitting their house is still not perceived as a 
problem from the majority of the householders. 
Since savings in the energy bills and thermal 
comfort seems to be not yet 100% guaranteed by 
the retrofit measures, it can be hard to imagine why 
people should start to care about it.  
 
Consumers engagement is an issue also highlighted 
by the Bonfield Report 
Householders 
Decreasing energy demand in order 
to decrease the carbon emissions is 
more an interest for the policymakers 
than for the householders. 
Retrofitting their house is still not 
perceived as a problem from the 
majority of the householders. Since 
savings in the energy bills and 
thermal comfort seems to be not yet 
100% guaranteed by the retrofit 
measures, it can be hard to imagine 
why people should start to care 
about it. (quote from Yekatherina: “It 
is not a problem of the people, but 
only of stakeholders”) 
/ (perspective issue) 
Yekatherina Bobrova, 





Lack of trust in the Government intentions and 
support to a low carbon future as one of the reason 
why the supply chain won’t gear up. Uncertainty.  
Industry 
stakeholders  
“People in the industry have got long 
memories”. After the push of the 
previous Government and the 
subsequent cancelation of its flagship 
policy (Green Deal) and related 
schemes, the people in the industry 
that made investments went out of 
business as result of this. Because 
they were expecting the Government 
to provide a stable business context 
in order to flourish overtime. “Now if 
you are a company and you had 
invested a lot on that, if the new 
“Industrial trust for 
making investments” 





and Engineering with 




Government will tell you: let’s go in 
that road again, what would you do? 
They won’t get their fingers burn 
again”. It is necessary to persuade 
industry and investors. 
Decrease in the industrial trust on the Government 
because Zero Carbon Homes has not be enrolled out 
yet and because of other direction take by the 
Government (e.g. policies in supporting of fracking). 
Moreover, “Brexit” can increase the general  
uncertainty at national level (and it might decrease 
the likeability for the Industry to undertake 




The fact that the Zero Carbon Homes 
Scheme hasn’t been released yet 
(although it was said that it would be 
out in 2016) decrease the confidence 
on the effort the Government will put 
on supporting a low carbon future. 
Moreover, other policies, for instance 
in support of fracking, show that the 
Government might be other priorities 
in its agenda. In addition to all of that, 
“Brexit” increases the overall 
uncertainty and it is high people tend 
to not make investments.  
“Industrial trust for 
making investments” 





and Engineering with 
long experience in the 
construction sector 
Assuming that the demand for retrofit suddenly and 
considerably increases, it could be that the industry 
doesn’t have the capacity to meet the demand. It 
may require to import more.  
Industry 
stakeholders 
If the demand suddenly increases and 
the industry is not expecting it, it will 
require between 12 and 24 months to  
12-24 months to get it up, calibrate it, 
and make it running. In the 
meanwhile it may be required to 
import in order to meet the demand. 
“Industry capacity”; “time 
to adjust capacity” 
(estimated in 1-2 years)   





and Engineering with 
long experience in the 
construction sector 
Installer skills.  
In order to install the proper EE measure it is 
required to the installer specific skills. These skills 
regards more the ability to understand the whole 
building and what can be installed and what can’t, 
not just how to carry out the installation process.  




“It doesn’t take a huge amount of 
skills to put many simple 
interventions in such cavity walls 
insulations, but the problem is 
knowing and understanding about 
the building so that you don’t put in 
something that is detrimental”. In a 
case in Wales it has been applied the 
“Installer skills”, “Time to 
gain skills, Skilled 
workers” 





and Engineering with 






same measures to different houses 
and that created more unintended 
consequences than benefits. 
Acquiring this type of skill takes 
time.  
 
The skills needed to carry out the right job in the 





Previously retrofit measures were 
put in place by companies that were 
specialized in other things, so they 
were doing an additional work. That 
is probably not the best scenario 
because they do not understand the 
whole picture of what they are doing 
and they might install a measure that 
generate unintended consequences. 
Therefore, now it seems that in the 
companies this type of skills is low.  
“Unskilled workers”, 
“Skilled workers gap” 





and Engineering with 









If the demand increases, meanwhile the 
companies closes the skill gap what may happen? 
Unskilled people may try to meet the demand and 
they could carry out improper jobs.  
Industry 
stakeholders 
In the hypothetic case in which the 
demand will start suddenly to 
increase, while the other companies 
are acquiring the knowledge and 
proper capacity to carry out the right 
retrofit measure in the right place, 
there will be people willing to do 
satisfy the demand. Sort of 
“cowboys” willing to take the risk of 
carrying out the retrofit measure 
without holding all the necessary 
skills. It is reasonable to assume that 
the work they are carrying out won’t 
be the highest quality possible, 
“Unskilled workers”  
“Skilled workers gap”  
“Installers skills”  
“quality of retrofit” 





and Engineering with 




UCL Institute of 
Environmental Design 
and Engineering with 
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increasing the probability of 
unintended consequences. 
long experience in the 
construction sector 
 
Companies might see the financial gaining but they 
also see the financial risks involved with that. 
Before starting to make EE improvements in 
existing buildings, companies want to have 
minimized the potential risks (for example 
accumulating enough skills and expertise). 
Industry 
stakeholders  
“If you do an activity with what you 
are not familiar with it is likely to 
carry a high degree of risk”. “People 
from the industry need to feel 
comfortable that what they are 
doing is not to come back to bite 
them back later on”. Therefore, 
before to make EE improvements in 
buildings, companies needs to see 
the potential risks decreased. For 
example accumulating enough skills.  
“Skilled workers”  
“Potential risks”  
“Propensity of companies 
to do retrofit” 





and Engineering with 
long experience in the 
construction sector 
Lack of confidence in supply chain 
Industry 
stakeholders 
There is a lack of confidence in the 
industry (e.g. poor quality 
installation or assessments done in 
the past; actual savings differs from 
the potential savings presented to 
the households, etc.). To most of 
households the house is their most 
valuable asset, they are very careful 
before to undertake retrofit into 
their house.  
 
“Quality of retrofit”  
“Performance of the 
measures” 
“Credibility of the 
industry”  “Risk 
attitude of households” 




UCL Institute of 
Environmental Design 
and Engineering with 
long experience in the 
construction sector 
 
Quality affect demand 
Industry 
stakeholder 
In the case retrofit demand 
increases, if the quality delivered is 
very poor then the households 
would not continue retrofit and the 
demand decreases. 
“Quality””Credibility of 




UCL Institute of 
Environmental Design 
and Engineering with 




Performance of the measure Households 
The performance of the measures 
are directly reflected in the actual 
savings. 
“Performance of the 




UCL Institute of 
Environmental Design 
and Engineering with 
long experience in the 
construction sector 
 
Lack of supply chain skills 
Industry 
stakeholder 
At the moment, the supply chain 
seems not to have the necessary 
skillset to implement these 
measures (e.g. Green Deal 
assessors). “Lack of skill in who 
assess and but also in who 
implement the technology” 




UCL Institute of 
Environmental Design 
and Engineering with 
long experience in the 
construction sector 
 
Low rate of skilled workers 
Industry 
stakeholder 
In the country there is a low 
formation of trained skilled workers 




UCL Institute of 
Environmental Design 
and Engineering with 
long experience in the 
construction sector 
 
Staff turnover in the industry 
Industry 
stakeholder 
Construction industry is deeply 
affected by economic cycles: during 
growth periods it expands, while 
during crisis it reduces quickly. This 
results that during bad moments the 
industry tend to layoff or dismiss 
workers. Therefore, the shift in 
personnel in the construction 
industry is higher than in other types 
of industries. In this way, skills are 
“Economic cycles” 




UCL Institute of 
Environmental Design 
and Engineering with 





lost and to recover them it takes 
time. This is an historical and 
endemic problem of all construction 
industry 
Perspective: 
The construction professional are not usually 
involved in this type of projects. The stakes of the 
industry many times seemed to be overlooked. To 
make a sound policy it is necessary to integrate in 
the decision process the industry.  
Industry 
stakeholders 
The construction professional are 
not usually involved in this type of 
project. The problems industry has 
don’t even come across the radar of 
these people. “You need 
stakeholders from every aspect in 
order to formulate good, sound 
policy. You cannot make policies in a 
vacuum. Because they 
[policymakers] don’t think that way, 
it’s not their fault, they do not have 
the experience”.  
/ (perspective) 





and Engineering with 




Even if the retrofit measures are installed correctly 
is it always economically convenient to retrofit? 
What is the probability that the projected costs 
savings from the measures installed do not exceed 
the loan repayments (or the investments if we set 
the payback time on a reasonable time range?)?  
Householders 
To what extent a householders can 
rely on the fact that the projected 
costs savings from the measures 
installed exceed the loan repayments 
(or the investments?)? Can we call 
these uncertainties as Uncertainty 
costs and how they could be 
measured? How do they affect the 
decision making process? 
“Uncertainty costs” 
(Rosenow & Eyre, 
2016) 
People perceive things as less valuable or 
significant if further away in time (temporal 
discounting), even if such things afford long-term 
benefits 
Households 
For example, people often ‘discount 
the future’ by preferring smaller 
immediate rewards (e.g., $5 now) 
over larger future rewards (e.g., $10 
next year), and they may avoid 
actions that are costly in the short-
term (e.g., outlaying time and money 
to purchase new energy-efficient 






(Frederiks et al., 2015) 
132 
 
switch energy retailers), despite 
offering longer-term benefits (e.g., 
reduced electricity bills). This 
tendency to be short-sighted and 
make time-inconsistent judgements 
often leads to procrastination and 
inertia 
Households might aim to reach a satisfactory level 
of thermal comfort and saving instead pursue the 
optima solution 
Households 
People are satisfied by exerting only 
the effort needed to achieve a 
satisfactory rather than an optimal 
result; that is, settling for ‘good 
enough’ rather than ‘best’. This can 
be reflected in the way they chose to 
retrofit  
“Level of satisfaction” (Frederiks et al., 2015) 
General households’ aversion to take risk (e.g. 
make investments in retrofit). 
Risk aversion leads households on the low-risk of 
energy-saving practices and investments that are 
safe, stable and secure, particularly where energy-
efficiency technology is new, expensive, or not yet 
mainstream. Uncertainty around electricity supply, 
market prices, government policies and long-term 
financial payoffs make investing in energy-saving 
products and services seem like a risky decision for 
many consumers.  
Households  
People generally prefer to avoid risk 
even given the prospect of positive 
outcomes (i.e., gains). but more risk 
seeking when faced with certain 
losses or uncertain gains. Retrofit 
can be seen a risk, and therefore 
households might be reluctant to 
retrofit their house.  
“Risk aversion attitude” (Frederiks et al., 2015) 
Fuel poverty. 
Concerns over the fuel poverty and the gap 
between the better-off and poor, with the neediest 





Are the neediest truly going to 
benefits from the policy? Moreover, 
“schemes can have on-costs such as 
increased installation/maintenance 
costs, reducing disposable income 
and creating stress” 
“Fuel poverty” (Shrubsole et al., 2014) 
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Policy makers are eager to increase 
the quantity but the tend to 
overlook quality. Increase in 
monitoring can increase the quality. 
/perspective 
 
“Monitoring”  “quality” 
Esfand Burman, 
research associate, 
UCL Institute of 
Environmental Design 
and Engineering with 






It need to be taken into 
consideration that some types of 
retrofit measure can have 
maintenance costs. Maintenance 
costs decrease the actual savings.  
“Maintenance costs”  
“Actual savings” 





and Engineering with 
long experience in the 
construction sector 
 
Low cost of energy doesn’t incentivize people to go 
for energy efficiency 
Other 
policymakers 
The cost of energy is still too low to 
prompt households to invest in 
energy efficiency. Increase the cost 
of energy could make them more 
willing to invest. However, increasing 
the fuel costs will increase the 
people that live in a fuel poverty 
condition.  
“Cost of energy” 
”potential savings”; 




UCL Institute of 
Environmental Design 
and Engineering with 
long experience in the 
construction sector 
Priority given to retrofit Householders 
Households have other priorities 
instead retrofit. They prefer to invest 
money on other options. Moreover, 
in these difficult economic 
conditions can decrease even further 
their available capital to invest. 
“Disposable income”  
“Priority given to retrofit” 
Esfand Burman, 
research associate, 
UCL Institute of 
Environmental Design 
and Engineering with 
long experience in the 
construction sector 
Income distribution and behaviour differences 
Based on the fact that the households prefer to 
pay for renovations with their saving, it might be 
Households 
Are there relevant differences in 
how people react to retrofit 




evidence on the able-
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 available for 
investments” 






Industry is developing over time. We 
can’t expect an huge increase in the 
measure efficiency as it is in other 
industries (e.g. IT). However a 
marginal improvement can be 
expected 
“Marginal improvements” 
 “Technological level” 




UCL Institute of 
Environmental Design 
and Engineering with 
long experience in the 
construction sector 
 
Same savings can be obtained sometimes by 
changing energy supplier.  
Industry 
stakeholders 
Sometimes, instead than installing a 
retrofit measure (with all the related 
possible unintended consequences), 
it is possible to save the same 
amount of money just by changing 
the supplier and contract (e.g. 
school) 
“Other suppliers”  




UCL Institute of 
Environmental Design 
and Engineering with 
long experience in the 
construction sector 
Households’ criteria for decision. 
Households include more criteria in their decision 
making process than just economic ones.  
Households 
Main criteria people look at when 
deciding whether adopt a 
measure(bold more important): 
- Familiarity 
- Savings (compared to costs) 
- Disruption (time for 
installation etc.) 
- Quality guarantees 
- Aesthetic benefit 




“Potential savings of the 
measure”; 
“Disruption of the 
measure” (Hassle factor); 











Who households trust more. 
Households trusts more the opinion of family and 
friends than installers and Energy Saving Trust 
Households 
“Receiving information from trusted 
sources is particularly important. 
Family and friends are more trusted 
(34%) than both installers and 
tradespeople (18%) and the Energy 




evidence on the able-
to-pay sector including 
owner-occupiers 
Appeal of the retrofit measures. 
Deep retrofit present a very low appeal to the 
households. They present high costs, lows savings 
and high disruption. From this point of view it is 
clear why households opt for light retrofit and why 
they do not consider deep retrofit. 
 
Households 
Deep measures seems to be very 
undesired by the households, 
because they generate low savings 
and they are highly disruptive. It’s 
difficult to understand why 
households should undertake them. 
On the other hand light measure 
(cavity wall and loft insulation) show 
high saving and have limited 
disruption. That’s one of the reasons 
why they are spreading much faster 
than the deep measures.  
The question is: why should and 
households go for the deep retrofit? 
It doesn’t seem to give them much 
benefits. 
“Potential savings of the 
measure”  “Desirability 
of the measure“; 
“Level of disruption of the 
measure”  “Desirability 








Households’ necessity of retrofit: lack of interest 
Can you keep the living room warm in winter?                                             
Households 
“Focusing on the able-to-pay and 
particularly owner-occupiers, future 
policies are likely to need to tackle 
lack of interest and unwillingness to 
prioritise energy efficiency and low-
carbon heating measures above 
other capital investments in the 
home. Our research shows that this 
is likely to be driven by a lack of 
perceived benefits (most owner-
“Need for retrofit” 
(Priority for investment) 
Source: English 
housing survey 2013 
to 2014 (DCLG, July 
2015), in ‘Domestic 
buildings: evidence on 







occupiers feel they can keep their 
home warm enough already) and 
lack of desire for the product 
compared to other more visible 





















Annex E: Second workshop transcripts 
Workshop - 30th March 2017 
MF1:   Male Facilitator 1 
MF2: Male Facilitator 2 
DA1: Devil’s Advocate 1 
DA2: Devil’s Advocate 2 
M1: Male Participant 1 
M2: Male Participant 2 
M3: Male Participant 3 
M: Male Participants 
Coding scheme:  
(variable name) = green 
(contribution to a structural change)= 
(discussion started by a DA) = orange 
(generic interventions) = red (clarifications etc.) 
 
START OF  MAPPING PART 
00:22:23 
MF1: So we can start to discuss and see together the model.  So feel free to go around, share, discuss, if you have notes, 
anything, questions. 
 First we want to ask to ask you to revise it, so if you see the flow is something that is not right, come here and we 
discuss it and next step is to add things that are missing, so we give the [inaudible] and you have some time for thinking 
about the [inaudible] ? 
00:23:10 
M1: So likelihood of defaults, default fraction.  I don't know if we've seen any hard evidence that suggests there's a cordial 
relationship between people, better EPSs and lower default rates.   
 From the conversations we have with mortgage lenders, it sounds like the kinds of people that invest in energy 
efficiency are just generally people that are less likely … their working assumption is that those are people that are less 
likely to default, generally, because they may be from a particular social strata that priorities doing energy efficiency 
and therefore, you might get a slightly biased outcome, so that link, for me, feels quite weak and there's a lack of 
evidence around it at the moment and it could be quite a powerful driver for mortgage lenders, but it's not really there 
at the moment and when we talk to the Council for Mortgage Lenders, they did pick us up on this. 
00:24:23 
M2: I think the only driver is that thing about, if there were more defaults, which there aren’t that many of at the moment, if 
the interest rates rise, you would think that they would want to take more concern over their affordability assessments 
and look at energy efficiency more.  I don't know whether, necessarily, there would be a strong enough drive to get 
them to say 'well, we need to get legal improving their home; I think the driver would be 'oh, we've actually got to make 
sure we're taking account of this affordability more,' if you were starting to get defaults. 
M3: Yes, so I think the only thing is we're in historically low interest rates at the moment and therefore level of debt distress 
is likely to be historically low, so the actual percentage difference between defaults of people that in different 
[inaudible] is likely to be a very, very weak signal at the moment and I agree, if you're getting to a much higher interest 
rate, a much higher interest rate is likely to have a more material impact, but that's maybe not likely to happen for 
another 10 years, five or 10 years. 
00:25:29 
M2: I think, from our discussion because we met with the Council of Mortgage Lenders recently and the strong driver is kind 
of lend more money, obviously … can I lend more money on this and the barrier is - one of the big barriers I think - is 
around trust in … does this actually save money?  Does this actually save bills?  Would you say that's fair?   
00:26:10 
M3: I would say that feels like a more powerful driver because given the current fiscal climate, the fact that they're losing 
business, buy to let mortgages, so they need to try and generate business from elsewhere and they saw this more as an 
opportunity as somewhere where they could increase their volume of lending, subject to their being evidence. 
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DA1: Also, with the paying customer, for example, through an energy efficiency improvement, reduce the monthly payments, 
that is totally uninteresting for them. (generic intervention) 
00:26:42 
M: I don't think it is, but I think they're saying there's a scepticism, about energy efficiency improvements reducing bills, so 
it's not that it's not interesting, they just say 'well, where's the evidence for the data?' 
00:26:57 
M: So the other thing that came up as well is that it's difficult for them to lend money o the basis of future cash flows, so 
they kind of assess you as you currently are and therefore, we got into talking about if you could have guarantees, if 
people could do work to their property and issue a guarantee, is that the kind of thing that you could lend against, if it 
was kind of an insurance back guarantee and it picks up on this point about the uncertainty about the actual 
improvement that will be driven by the energy efficiency measures and the degree to which they will be … the 
behavioural variance will counteract any energy efficiency improvement. 
00:27:38 
M: The other thing is that you could lend … isn't it also that you can lend on the basis of the improvement to the asset 
value?  They were sceptical about whether it leads to an improvement in the asset value, so if you know that an 
improvement is going to lead to increase in the asset, then you extend the line of credit. 
MF1: But the whole point is that improvement is going to happen?   
00:28:16 
M3: It's a bit like the default rate, it's the uncertainty of the lack of evidence makes it hard for them to … because they came 
across as very risk averse. 
00:28:33 
M1: This is key to the whole discussion, whether this increased the asset value.  If mortgage lenders had that evidence, then 
they would, but they don’t have the evidence. 
 
 There is one other thing, we're assuming that the interest rates are the same for a traditional loan and an EPC loan.  
When you spoke to the mortgage lenders, did they talk about that?  It's just the way lenders work, not necessarily just 
default rates, it's actually the rate at which they can learn.  So even if a particular market has a high default rate, at long 
as they can charge a higher interest rate, they might say to that actually, it might be a more attractive market for them 
because the really low interest rate markets are very, very competitive and everyone's lending and they're actually 
making a tiny spread on it, so a high default market doesn’t mean to say that there won't be more capital to lend to 
that, that isn't the case, so if something's wrong with one of those circles, it's the loans repaying and capital shift of EPC 
lending, so you can have a higher default rate, as long as they can charge appropriately, that actually might increase the 
capital more 
MF1: Obviously the interest rates are going to be …? 
DA1: Interest rate and the repayment rate both influence their decision. (generic intervention) 
00:30:05 
M: Yeah, so it's what they can charge. 
DA1:   I think last time you mentioned that a reduction in the interest rate might be one of the policy options, right?  
(discussion started by a DA)     
M: So one of the things we talked about is reducing capital as EPC requirements, of which it might mean that they are then 
prepared to lend at a slightly lower interest rate on greener investments, which could create a differential, potentially.  
They have certainly been incentivised to lend more, whether they actually pass that on in terms of at lower cost, as well 
as more, is another question. 
00:30:53 
M: It would be the volume would increase, so the volume would, but there wouldn't, necessarily, be a lower rate. 
DA1: What was their reaction to it, how did they react to that? (contribution to a structural change) 
00:31:08 
M: Anything that allows them to do more lending  … they kind of perked up at the idea of that.  This question around 
whether it increases volume, or whether there would be an incentive to reduce costs on it.  I guess that their rate is a 
reflection of the fact that they have to hold  certain amount of capital against their loan book and that's got an 
associated cost to it, so if they're holding less capital, then they have less back office cost, effectively.  So theoretically, 
they should be able to pass through their cost saving to customers, or at least a portion of that cost saving to customers 
because they won't have to hold as much capital against that loan. 
00:32:01 
M: I think it's more the opportunity cost of that capital, so rather than having secure government bonds, they're going to 
be actually investing in something and they could pass a proportion of that difference on to the consumer, dependent 




M: So instead of the amount of capital that they have to hold is an insecure asset, in a very liquid asset, is decreased, they 
can invest that in something with a higher return and they may - dependent on how competitive the market is - they 
may pass some of that on through a lower interest rate to consumers.   
00:32:45 
M: I think that's right and I think that competitive angle is key.  So if other banks like the market, then the rates will come  
[inaudible] Other banks, who don’t like the market, they'll charge as much as … so like the smart meter programme, 
you've got only two lenders, effectively, and they charge very, very high rates indeed. 
00:33:06 
M: Which means it's important to bring all people lenders on board with you to do something like this, which is where the 
voluntary stuff falls down, if you don’t get everyone participating. 
DA1: What [inaudible] so that they voluntarily ?? (generic intervention)  
00:33:34 
M: It depends on how credible that[inaudible] is and I think it depends on having agreement to cross government because 
otherwise, you can get into trouble going round threatening … (laughter) 
00:33:59 
M: I think we would have to issue a call for evidence, or something, that set out the prospect of doing something much 
harder edge, alongside some softer edge things, with a view that that would encourage them all to take action and do 
the softer edge things, rather than be regulated, but getting to a position where we'd be able to publish that would be 
quite challenging … obviously, within the confines of the room and the recording, it would be quite challenging to get 
that.  I think it's plausible that we could get that. 
 I think the other thing is how many carrots we can offer because the more carrots we can offer, the more likely we are 
to get high participation, so if only those people that are agreeing to voluntary targets get these incentives and it's not 
spread across the market, then they're more likely to be willing to take on the targets in return for things like relaxing of 
capital adequacy requirements. 
00:35:05 
M: And then the other one is just directly subsidising their interest rate. 
MF1: Now, we are going to the enforcement of the policy, so we can come back later, when we've settled the point.  Do you 
have any other flaw that you can identify? 
00:35:29 
M: Just thinking about in that area, I think it's important to capture that … so we've got the trust bit, the other thing is … 
the flow for demand for measures is that still flowing in into …it needs to link in to the mortgage area. 
MF1: Do you have any idea how the demand impact on the lenders, basically? 
00:36:12 
M: So where we've got the additional lending … because we'd got into a discussion with M3 saying 'okay, what happens 
when someone is doing up their home, then come to us, ask you for credit, presumably … yes, they do, obviously, that's 
something you go to your bank for quite often, or sometimes you'd probably go to an intermediary as well, but from the 
bank's perspective, they say … if we see like a demand for a certain product, or an opportunity around like solar panels, 
or something, then we might start offering something specific for that. 
MF1: If the demand increased, most probably the demand for lending will increase and there could be some incentives, if 
they get lower interest for EPC measures, so should I draw a link from here to here?  So lending for making retrofit. 
00:37:28 
M1: Yes, so consumers have got to see the benefits as much as the lenders, so it's not just the lenders thinking about 
increased cash flows as you made savings, increased asset value - that's all about the demand area too - so both parties 
have got to see that. 
 
00:37:47 
M3: Yes and I think the key is, I think this can be two way, I think this can feed back in terms of … maybe not straight to the 
demand, but at least to the awareness to something because if there is more demand and if they lend more, then it's 
like the prominence that they offer to people of that product for lending increases. 
MF1: In the model, basically, you have here this connection … is it all the story, or are we missing something? 
DA1: That is also kind of my question, is that all the story, the people who retrofit go to their bank.  If you buy a car, or a 
caravan, you go to your car dealer and they offer you a financing plan; is there anything like that existing already? 
(discussion started a DA)  
00:38:48 
M: I think it depends very much on the supply chain.  The supply chain do this atypically quite small, they are small building 
firms and they rely on people being able to access finance separately, so they just then charge for the work, rather than 
like you go to IKEA and they provide you the finance for your kitchen as well as the kitchen, you don’t tend to have that 
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in this market, so people have to find funding from elsewhere and whether that's a home improvement loan, or 
whether that's going to their mortgage lender, or just using their own financing and we did some research, looking at 
how many people, when they do home improvements, how much is it people's own money, as opposed to borrowed 
money. 
MF1: Eighty four per cent use their own savings, actually, so it is most of the market, unfortunately. 
00:39:43  
M: So that is something we should definitely try and capture within this. 
M: So if you think of [inaudible] per cent, so what's the percentage you drop out because obviously, people will get it done 
and you're not capturing maybe the people who are like 'oh, it's so much hassle to go get the credit' because they don’t 
want to go down the Green Deal route, it's all about financing, but I'm sure there's a drop off point there. 
MF1: Can I say, they will be preferential lending, also incentive for people who want to retrofit, so there will be … 
M: … and incentive. 
MF1: Yes, kind of preferential … you go to the bank, they want to retrofit, just in five minutes, I withdraw my money and 
there's all the paperwork. 
00:40:22 
M3: The KFW loans seem to work in terms of encouraging people to do more than they would otherwise do. 
00:40:33 
M1: The German ones where they had zero per cent, basically. 
M3:  So there's a strong carrot there for people to actually do the work and that might reduce the potential drop off rate and 
it seems to be about people's … I guess the other challenge is people's willingness to borrow because they're perceiving 
it as borrowing money as opposed to … if you could de-risk that borrowing, I think that will make a difference … anyway, 
we're talking about the policy now. 
MF1: I think this could be a preferential way for borrowing money for them, it could be an incentive. 
M3: I don't know whether there's a market here already, but whether or not people doing work can offer guarantees on the 
work that they're doing in terms of the energy savings and whether that would have a positive loop within this system.  
Does that make sense? 
M: Yes, in terms of credibility and more credibility from …  
M3: You get a guarantee, an insurance backed guarantee that the work that you're doing is going to deliver the savings that 
you’ve been told and whether then mortgage lenders see that guarantee as something that they can lend against, or 
they're more willing to lend against it. 
M: We can, for example, connect credibility of retrofit with this lending, but if we think about that insurance, if I think about 
myself, the [inaudible] will increase because not only do I have to go to the bank, but also I have to go to an insurance 
company.  
00:42:21 
M3: So you're reliant on the supply chain being able to offer you … so I'll come and do this retrofit work for you and as part 
of that, I will offer you a certificate, a kind of evidence, or a guarantee that this is going to deliver this many savings and 
you already see it in the non domestic market with ESCOs energy service companies and energy performance contract, 
where people say 'we're going to save you this much money and if we don’t deliver this much money, we'll install extra 
work, or write you a cheque for the difference.'  So I wonder if it's another link in this chain that we haven't really 
thought about. 
00:43:02 
M1: I don't want to go down the route too much … so you're offering a guarantee on the measure, not on the bills. 
M3: That is what you'd need to look at further … 
M1: Because there is an importance there, to [inaudible] the mortgage lender, do they really care what the ?? says, they just 
care … 
M3: I think the way it works is it's a bill saving, so it's the actual energy saving in the non-domestic sector in terms of 'we are 
going to save you this much money.  If we don’t save you this much money, we will take remedial action.'  So rather 
than measure, it's actually a saving they think they can deliver and they control for things like occupancy and stuff like 




M2: And [inaudible] changes is quite a big one.  If you were told, no matter what, you'd save a certain amount of money off 
your bill, maybe you don’t bother turning off your heating, or just put it up a couple of degrees, which you can't really 
account for, wouldn't guarantee it. 
M1: So they are contractual stipulations and how they address that in terms of people continuing to use the building in the 
same way, or a similar way, rather than just suddenly opening all their doors. 
DA1: Do they participate in the savings, in the energy performance contract, they participate in the savings, or they have an 
interest to install something, that generates the savings. (generic intervention) 
M3: Exactly, so they get a proportion of the savings, but it depends on the different models because you can have these gain 
share models where the ESCO gets some saving and the householder gets some saving, or you can have other variances 
on that, but yeah, you're right, it's a kind of aligned incentive. 
DA1: Do you have any evidence to how that translates to the domestic market? (discussion started by a DA)  
M3: So we're starting to see potential new business models, where suppliers, or where installers could do work to a 
property and issue guarantees for performance, but they tend to be quite deep retrofit.  So you've got companies like 
Energiesprong, which is a Dutch company, starting to look at the UK market. 
 We think that there are a number of barriers that are preventing this happening at the moment - and we're currently 
looking at it - but it allows you to close the link because one of the big issues is around uncertainty associated with the 
impact of the work and if we can address that issue, then … 
00:45:53 
M: … it just sits a bit centred in all these kind of areas, as we've been saying, it's like this uncertainty, what is this work 
going to do. 
MF1: For example, you mentioned behavioural change.  Is it like I can maybe put along these factors, there's determine the 
attractiveness, not strictly financial, but like there is thermal comfort.  Maybe behavioural change is something that 
keeps people … 'I also have to change my habits.'  Maybe people are less …? 
00:46:31 
M: With the way the technology is and everything, with the smart heating, into other stuff, we no longer speak about 'I 
have to change my behaviour,' it's all automated and that's where the future is going and that's within behaviour 
change, but really, it's just about how efficiently are you using … not even changing the fabric of the home, how 
efficiently is the thermostat being used, basically?  Mostly, all the bad behaviour changes, user error, leaving it on for 
hours, that's where the waste comes. 
M3: And so the ESCOs that you're potentially seeing will build off these kind of platforms, like Nest and things like that and 
they will use the data, to be able to work out the before and after and the degree of comfort taking and things like that 
you might get after an energy efficiency improvement.  So you'll have quite a rich, data picture, where you'll be able to 
build some bankable propositions off the back of. 
MF1: So it's a monitoring …? 
M3: Yes a monitoring and a kind of accurate assessment is going to be really crucial in a lot of this. 
DA1: Actual assessment of people's behaviour? (generic intervention)  
M3: So the impact of the measure and understand the impact of a measure in the context of people's behaviour, I think … 
DA1: It was one of the things [inaudible] mentioned that we discussed was if you have a deep retrofit, it might require a 
different behaviour from the customer, so if they continue to behave as they did, either because they just heat for the 
same amount of time, or because they continue not to ventilate … either inefficiency, but also severe, unintended 
consequences.  It does really need the interlink with the customer's behaviour and also behaviour change that might be 
required if you deeply retrofit.  (behavioural compliance) 
00:48:39 
M2: It was interesting because that came up in the Retrofit for the Future reports I was reading, in terms of once the work's 
been done to the homes, making sure that the homeowners are really aware about the new controls and how they 
have to operate them and that was important in terms of delivering the kind of savings, so I think it's important. 
 The question for me is the degree to which a lot of it can just be automated.  If they are in the habit of always leaving 
the window open, that might have an impact on a house that's trying to be a passive house, for instance … that is a 
challenge, definitely a challenge. 
DA1: It's a huge one because that creates, for example, if they're in the habit of never opening their windows and then they 
retrofit without having any other ventilation system and then they sit in a mouldy house and they tell their neighbours, so 





M: So technology is quite a big solver to this problem, as long as you can make more and more stuff automated, use AI, or 
whatever, that's actually a way of solving this problem, apart from the obvious, by leaving the window open. 
00:50:00 
DA1: Is that so much technology, or is that something about being familiar, having lived with that, having the experience of a 
measure of how you go about it. (‘behavioural compliance’ and all related connections) 
M3: I think it's about the techno/social interface, so it's about how new technologies, the feedback and interactions that 
new technology provides to humans, so at the heart of this, the most important thing that you are able to provide 
feedback to humans in terms of what they're doing might be having an impact, so you're already getting this with 
indoor air quality monitoring, where you get a load of feedback to homeowners about 'well, you need to open the 
window because you’ve done all this cooking, or you've sprayed all these chemicals around the house, so indoor air 
quality, there's already this kit and there's the potential for it all to become more integrated and once you do that, you 
can control for some of these things and people are aware because the problem is, at the moment, people won't know 
if there's mould growing behind their internal wall insulation and an indoor air quality device might allow them to 
assess that and they might be able to provide feedback to them, to encourage them to change their behaviour. 
 So I think it's once they’ve moved into the house, that there's an ongoing process of engagement with the homeowner 
in terms of how they optimise the performance of their house, rather than we install the kit and we leave. 
00:51:36 
M: So basically, I think there's a loop which goes from after the retrofit happens, then at the moment, as you said because 
of behaviour and lack of knowledge, you can end up getting the mould and you can also not getting the savings that the 
measure should deliver. 
MF1: Shall we call it unintended consequences? 
00:52:12 
M1: Yeah, so it's two things, one is if I [inaudible] and then one is savings not delivered because of the behaviour change and 
you think one of the things that could moderate this, as you were saying, is technology which provides feedback, which 
automates the management of … 
00:52:39 
M: When you turn your dishwasher on, all those things, turning the heating … 
M3: At the moment, that's really mediating with everything around the trust and the desirability and the measures because 
then people don't use it properly … 
MF1: Can I try to re-frame it … so the performance of the measure, that could be a good way.  So the performance … 
00:53:07 
M: It's like saving [inaudible] or savings delivered. 
MF1: Kind of here, unintended consequences, by the behaviour, here and the performance, awareness, the idea of that, 
that's what you were saying, for …? 
00:53:35 
M1: Yeah, what I'm saying is it reduces the perceived savings from the measure, it reduces savings and so I'm feeding it back 
to these kind of loops, where you're thinking people don’t exactly … 
00:53:53 
M3: … that's the issue, if you don't address it … and also other things as well because it might be around retrofit desirability, 
so it might not just be monthly savings, it might be around the fact that my house feels overheated, so it's unintended 
consequences links to various things as well, it's not just about how much energy I save. 
MF1: So do we see any other link from unintended consequences for the parts of the model? 
M: We've got the rebound option here, if people have lower electricity bills, they just use more electricity, we've got that 
somewhere. 
DA1: So that was energy savings not … you had a nice expression of that … not fulfilled, or something because of rebound, or 
because of many other behavioural things. (‘rebound effect’ and all related connections) 
I just would like to bring up something again that you already [inaudible] because you're just developing technology, this 
stuff that you see that technology comes in with the measures, so I think we might need variables about that, to which 
extent there is technology about the measures, to which extent there is understanding of the occupants of the 
technology because I don't think if you do a loft insulation, or even if you do an external wall insulation, you necessarily 
then have knowledge of technological devices in your house; so they might come together, but they may also come 





M3: We're starting to see examples of where, in the US, Nest and going in alongside Johns Mandville, which is a big, fabric 
insulation provider, so they do technology and geo efficiency improvements, fabric improvements, at the same time 
and the idea is that that delivers bigger savings for some, it's bigger than the pot, these things work effectively together, 
so then the Nest thermostat, I guess, adapts how the building is being heated, based on this new, thermal performance 
to try and achieve, through automation, but for me, I would say that's more kind of a deep retrofit, where you're getting 
combinations of technology and fabric measures going at the same time and the single measures are more just like one 
thing. 
00:57:03 
M: There's no reason, at the moment, [inaudible] that would happen at all, it would never happen [inaudible] still saying 
people are selling the different products, you've got Google, basically and I suppose it could happen with a supplier 
offering [inaudible] heating; sometimes, the supplier might offer both the retrofit measure and slide heating control, but 
in a lot of instances, probably not.   
MF1: Can we try to rebuild everything you said because I think it's quite important, like for example, this story would make 
sense, like performance, or effectiveness, for showing friends like the savings.  So they are retrofit, retrofit performance 
and this is affected by the behaviour and the behaviour could be like rebound effect, or like mis-use, so also unintended 
consequences. 
DA1: Understanding of the technology.  So there are examples where there was a retrofit and, for example, a ventilation 
system was built and that report just put it off, or they had the new heating system, it was something technological and 
they just didn't know how to operate it, so they just stopped it completely. (generic intervention)  
 
00:58:35 
M: There's got to be some sort of technology follow-up, once something's been installed, actually, you have to know how 
to use it and that's often not the case. 
DA1: Do they have a interest actually, do they have any incentive to spend the extra effort to inform the occupants? 
(discussion started by a DA)  
(talking amongst themselves) 
00:59:19 
M3: … subscription services may allow them to offer things other than energy, it's like comfort and so things are Hive, for 
instance, and things associated with Hive controllers, that provide tailored feedback to the customers on an on-going 
basis, so there are new market opportunities for them, the question is, do they make as much money from doing that as 
they do just shifting units … 
00:59:47 
M: That is an interesting point though, is that model in the US, where it is actually in the supplier's interest to cut demand 
because of the [inaudible] day, with the heat demand.  The suppliers don’t want to shift more units than they actually … 
if they have to buy it, it's more expensive for them to get the suppliers, so it's actually in their interest to cut demand 
and there is a model, which Deutsche Bank have, which is based on that and they're actually financing the suppliers to 
install this stuff.  So that's based on that whole daily diagram. 
01:00:32 
M: So we're looking at that as well because it can align incentives a bit better.  You can control for things like performance 
effectiveness. 
MF1: So, for example, we have retrofit performance effectiveness, so more savings.  These are affected by the behaviour and 
the level of technology of the measure, also single measures because they are weaker, compared with deep [inaudible] 
comes from technology, but also affect behaviour because with [inaudible] maybe people [inaudible] feedback forms, 
you are using this retrofit, so [inaudible] mis-use, I understand when you talk about understanding, that creates mis-
use, like a lack of understanding creates mis-use, so behaviour and then also rebound impacts on the behaviour, so 
finally on the effectiveness of the performance.  
 Technology [inaudible] follow up is people started to explain that it increases the behaviour, variable and also single 
measure degrees, technology ?? because deep measure, maybe they follow more the client, the consumer. 
01:02:09 
DA1: Could I make some suggestions.  If you go do the technological follow up and you link that into understanding, rather 
than to behaviour and also, the single measure retrofit, you could also … you say the single measure we'd use as the 
performance effectiveness, what if you say it increases because it's simple, it's easier to make a single measure work than 
a combined measure, so maybe there is, first of all, the potential of the measure and then there is the [inaudible] to what 
extent it fulfils its original potential and mainly there is more risk in a deep retrofit than in a single measure.  Is that right? 




M3: I don't know what the evidence would be like … if the supply chain knows what they're doing and they did install it in 
one, particular measure, then you probably can have a greater degree of confidence, but they're doing something that's 
more complicated, more likely to have less … it's likely to be increasingly different for the homeowner and probably 
harder for the installer, so their level, the chance of them doing it as well is probably never, I guess, you could probably 
make that argument. 
01:03:34  
M1: This loop just brings in a whole, massive, other set of different behavioural things, so we haven't mentioned 
demographics, like housing stock and the age of the people in the housing stock.  At which point, all of this is not going 
to happen and the demand and it goes back, so you need a younger demographic, just to get this stuff going and then 
you’ve got about 27 million homes, 10 of which may be old people.  There are two bigger things to bring in to this, 
without technology and … 
DA2: Also, some evidence suggests that installers tend to get advice on measures that seem to get bigger returns, ultimately, 
with the ultimate [inaudible] behaviour, whereas for the household, it might not be an option, like installing something  
your old lady who needs to actively get involved in changing filters and climbing to her loft to do that every three months. 
(‘maintenance frequency’ and all related connections) 
01:05:18 
M2: On a similar sort of thread, so on your perceived monthly savings … so I guess you've got to determine what the 
payback period is and what the discount rate is.  Is that factored in there? 
MF1: We have financial attractiveness … that's something we can discuss, how would we, for example, put in terms of 
equation … 
M1: If banks knew that, they would be able to lend.  That's the thing, you can't model the saving.  It's easy to model an 
income stream pluses, but it's the saving, that's a massive thing, that is quantifiable, it's much easier. 
M2: But if someone wanted a personal discount rate, how you would value, say 10 years down the line. 
M: I see what you mean, so if you're 80 …  
M2: … you'd rather have money now than in years, especially at 80. 
01:06:27 
M:  A payback period. 
MF1: So, for example, these are what we call financial attractiveness … 
01:06:37 
M: There's the value of the homes as well, it's not just the [inaudible] it's a return on the investment in terms of your ? 
M1: And even if you're old, you often do things on the basis that your kids will benefit.  
 
M3:  What else do you put your money into, you just plough into the home, or save it for your kids. 
 
M1: That's why,  I think, you find empty nesters do quite a lot of investment before they retire, in their home.    
MF1: That's return in terms of property value. 
M3: I think the other thing, we're very much focused on savings, but I think the performance effectives links to all these 
other things like comfort and aesthetic impact, so if you have shoddy work done that wasn’t very attractive, you'd put 
people off, even if it delivered the savings.  If they do a good job, it will tick all of these boxes; if they do something that 
just delivers you savings, but it doesn’t really improve your comfort, or doesn’t deliver any aesthetic … 
MF1: … so this is a point of plus, basically because if it was a proper job, your aesthetic should be perfect.  Okay, just to get 
back on track … 
M3: … if they did a proper job, your aesthetic could improve as well, I think the risk is that it does [inaudible] 
DA1: Would they group, or would they just not decrease so much? (generic intervention)  
01:08:26 
M1: It depends … a solid wall insulation in a rubbish property, with ?? the rendering should definitely improve the aesthetic 
quality, whereas an internal wall insulation where you're taking away some of the thickness of the indoor of the room 
and the whole period features on the outdoor, it's going to decrease it. 
MF1: So it's plus and minus? 
M: It depends. 
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MF1: But you can reduce, for sure, the negative impacts, that's clear; it could also be a plus … 
M3: … if they do it well and so we've seen good examples of where they do external solid wall insulation, more expensive, 
but it improves the aesthetic appearance of the house, rather than just bolted … 
01:09:06  
M2: … and I think this is a challenge, I guess, with the quantifying stuff, is that in some instances, you can see probably a 
dramatic aesthetic improvement, which makes the value of the investment really quite attractive, whereas in many 
instances, you [inaudible] quantifying the difference on that; there's a whole ream of properties, it's just like well … if 
you do solid wall insulation, it's not really that nicer. 
M3: And most of our solid wall insulation is driven by ECO and ECO probably just encourages people to do the cheapest 
possible solid wall insulation, rather than one that has the best aesthetic appeal, which creates probably a negative 
feedback because then people see ugly, solid wall insulation and think 'I don't want to do it.'  I don't know. 
01:09:55 
M: I don't know, I challenge that … 
MF1: I think that's not just slightly typical [inaudible] energy performance, or just feedback ?? can have an effect on their 
word of mouth, physically, that's our main drivers for ?? model.   
DA1: But is the [inaudible] model affected by the performance, or by the outcomes, kind of 'oh, I feel warmer.'  'Oh, it looks 
nice.'  So that actually, those things affect the word of mouth. (‘gained thermal comfort’ and ‘gained thermal comfort’ 
connection to ‘general public awareness about retrofit’ and ‘gained thermal comfort’ connection to ‘non-financial 
benefits’) (‘aesthetic impact’ and ‘aesthetic impact’ connection to ‘general public awareness about retrofit’) 
M: Yes, I think you're probably right. 
DA1: Performance effectiveness is basically the accommodation for [inaudible] (generic intervention)  
01:10:43 
MF1: This is like before the retrofit, this desirability, let's say, so starting from the information that they have, then they 
retrofit and there should be some individual, where they experience the retrofit, so something … yeah, the experience 
of the retrofit, that depends also on the quality of installations. 
 Someone was mentioning that old people, they appreciate it more if the value of the house after retrofitting increases, 
that's why they could do it.  Should we anchor this decision for …?  Basically, if the house price of the [inaudible] 
increase, it's more likely to appreciate. 
01:11:55 
M:   [inaudible] anchor, so that demand one as well, there's a demand for retrofit as well. 
MF1: At the moment, yeah.  The value that you see the house price increase if you have a retrofit house, so [inaudible] more, 
so then demand increase. 
DA1: What drives the house price increase? (discussion started by a DA)  
01:12:19 
M: This is where we need to talk to RICS. 
DA1: It's difficult to say that exactly [inaudible] (generic intervention) 
01:12:25 
M3: So we've had some work that has [inaudible] analysis, looking at the impact of EPCs, or correlation between EPCs and 
house price values, they suggest there is a link, but I … 
M1: ??  impact and you can see the measure, like that's probably the thing that goes back and drives the value.  The EPC 
value outright, whether it's B or C will, to some extent, drive value, but small, really small. 
01:13:09 
M: It's a regional thing too, so that the increase in the values in the south east are probably offset by stamp duty, or 
something; whereas if you are somewhere else in the country [inaudible] 
01:13:22 
M: So this is what the value is. 
DA1: And by house category, right?  A Victorian house probably has a lower EPC than a 1980s built house, but maybe the 
Victorian houses are more valuable [inaudible] energy efficient Victorian one; is that how you appraise them then, on the 
energy efficient Victorian one?  (generic intervention) 
01:13:46 




M1: But then these are percentages, not absolute, so depending on the house. 
01:14:07 
MF1 So before we forget this concept, to what issues anchor the change in the house price, to something here, or something 
…? 
01:14:12 
M2: I think the interest rate differential … so we're talking about bank charges and different interest rates [inaudible] energy 
efficiency ?? that would have a significant impact on people's mindset. 
01:14:30 
M:  [inaudible] being able to borrow, or lower monthly outgoings … 
M2: Exactly. 
MF1: So the price influences the interest rate. 
M: The other way round. 
DA1: The interest rate differential. (contribution to a structural change) 
MF1: It's just not the demand that drives the price? 
M2: The demand drives the price, but the demand … 
M: … there's a link, I guess.  The demand for retrofit would be increased if it was cheaper … 
M2: … you could borrow at a cheaper rate and therefore your house would command a higher price. 
MF1: But on the aggregate level, it would be the opposite. 
DA1: The interest rate differential, that also drives demand? (generic intervention)  
M3: Yes, if you know it's cheaper for you, your monthly outgoings would be lower if you were in a more energy efficient 
property, you would have thought, all things being equal, that would incentivise demand. 
DA1: If the interest rate differential is given on to customers. (contribution to a structural change) 
M3: Yes, so there's an assumption there about pass through to which that happens. 
M2: And that should link in to your perceived, monthly savings as well; it's not just energy savings, but also interest savings. 
DA1: So we need to distinguish the interest rate for banks and for customers? (generic intervention)  
M2: Yes. 
MF1: So it is interest rate differential for banks, or for a customer? 
M2: What is charged to customers, so there is a differential, assuming it's competitive, then you can imagine there being a 
split between the interest rate charged to highly efficient properties and those of lower efficiencies and that would feed 
through to how much the customer thinks they will save per month and will impact how financially attractive the whole 
concept is. 
DA1: But there is an entire model behind the interest rate for the customer, how that comes about and how that links back to 
the interest rate and the bank actually. (facilitation intervention) 
M2: Yes. 
01:17:04 
M1: The house price percentage per band is driven by the demand, pure and simple, I think, that's what the value is, we 
don’t set value.  If people desire a house that's more efficient … 
MF1: … since more people ask for it, it would become more … 
M2: And it might not be that they're looking at it and saying 'that's a more efficient house,' it might be that the other 
features that happen to go with it, like improvement in the aesthetic quality is what they're really [inaudible] but that is 
creating the differential. 
DA1: So you said the demand for retrofit, not the demand for housing, the demand for retrofit, that changes … (contribution to 




M2: I think houses that are more efficient, for whatever reason they are, are more desired, then you have that house price 
percentage per band.  It's the demand for an efficient house, but as I say, that could be actually like a proxy, it might not 
be that they're looking saying 'this one is better,' it might be they're looking at the wall and saying 'this looks nicer than 
the one that's been newly rendered.' 
DA1: If 90 per cent of the population want an energy efficient home, then you would expect [inaudible] (generic intervention)  
M: [inaudible] made a simple point [inaudible] in terms of into the value of [inaudible] 
MF1: Do you see any other mistake in the model, or do they continue to add new things actually? 
M1: This is actually more like retrofitting … where's the light retrofit range … that's what increases … because it's basically a 
policy that we might do and hopefully will do, which is that when you make … and it also links in to the renovation thing, 
when you do renovation to your home, in terms of an extension, you have to do low cost measures for retrofitting your 
home at the same time, so you're going to extend, if you're going to build a conservatory, then you also have to, at the 
same time … 
(talking amongst themselves) 
01:19:51 
M Habitable space. 
M1: Okay, when you expand, then you have to do these other measures at the same time, it's like a regulation that we're 
going to put in place. 
MF1: So when you do renovation, basically all the people have to plan a retrofit, right? 
01:20:18 
M3: Only where they're increasing habitable space.  Where they're increasing habitable space, like doing a kitchen 
extension, or a loft conversion, they would also need to do wider energy efficiency measures at the same time. 
DA1: Just in the new space, not … (generic intervention) 
M3: In the new space, we would increase the thermal standards and in the whole property … lofts, cavities, hot water tanks. 
DA1: So it's not right to use this term to express the fact that people who already retrofitted lightly, then go to … (generic 
intervention) 
M3: … no, it's not.  It's not about light retrofit when you are extending … 
DA1: But if you extend your habitable space, you can be forced with a policy, just not doing [inaudible],but also retrofit, right? 
(generic intervention) 
M3: Yes, so it's pushing people back into … anyone that goes there ends up automatically coming back into planning retrofit 
because they have to. 
DA1: So if my house is lightly retrofitted …(generic intervention) 
M3: … you wouldn't have to do it, if you'd already done it, you wouldn’t have to do it. 
DA1: So nobody will deeply retrofit, not anymore? (generic intervention) 
M3: They might, if they're being encouraged to do these things, they might decide to go a bit further and do some other 
things at the same time, potentially. 
MF1: Because [inaudible] like 2020, something like that.  So once retrofit, lightly, 2020, it stops, if you cut of this flow, 
actually. 
DA1: I think we just need to re-name it, it's not a full consequential [inaudible] (light to deep retrofit) 
MF1: Do you have a better terms for it? 
DA1: Deep retrofitting, or light to deep retrofitting? (light to deep retrofit\\repetition) 
01:22:35 
MF2: A question, I think something I heard, what happens if like forcing people to do energy efficiency and they are not so 
interested in that, they would probably go for the light retrofit, but is it the case that some measure … if I do this 
measure light, then I want to do a deep, I have to dis-install the light and so it's even more costly, it's even counter … 
M1: I don't think so.  It's more to do with the fact that in some properties … it's more to do with the type of property, you 
could very easily light retrofit some, you just do the cavity wall insulation, it's very cheap and the other requires the 
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solid wall insulation, different types of properties really.  So there would be some properties, properties built after 
1930/1940 with a cavity wall and with a hot water tank, so it doesn’t have a combi-boiler, so it could be an older, semi-
detached 1930s onwards houses. 
MF1: Will it make sense because we talked about easy, medium, hard to retrofit, the last time, we didn’t make sense just to 
say cavity wall and side wall because I think it's more available in terms of data about them, it's easier to say 'okay, 
cavity wall,' but it doesn’t make sense, or it's not accepted like this?  So associate cavity wall with easy to retrofit and 
solid wall with hard to retrofit.  Will it make sense? 
01:24:22 
M3: There are other things you can do.  I guess if you use it as a proxy … it's a proxy in terms of cost, it's going to be a lot 
more expensive. 
DA1: How would you define light, medium and deep retrofit and do we also need to distinguish? [inaudible] I think you talked 
about that last time already, but if you could just repeat that. (discussion started by a DA)  
M2: So do you want me to talk about it in terms of the number of measures? 
DA1: Yes, what measures would you consider to be light retrofit, what would you consider deep?  Is there a medium and, if 
so, which measures …? (discussion started by a DA\\repetition) 
M1: I think you could probably say, things that were low hassle, low cost were probably light and things that were more 
hassle, more cost were going to be … 
MF1: That's what you sent us last week, M1 … but, yes, [inaudible] certain point [inaudible] loft insulation and cavity wall can 
be kind of limited disruptions with easy to do.  Boiler, first time central heating is kind of between [inaudible] so it might 
be deep retrofit for us at the moment.  Do you think this is a good distinction? 
01:25:49 
M3: The only thing it doesn’t really talk about doesn’t really factor in these kind of smart technologies and I think a deep 
retrofit, for me, provably involves a combination of measures, involving some element of smart, to be honest, that 
would be my distinction here. 
M2: Including what kinds of technology? 
M3: Like metering, automated control, those kinds of things, which you wouldn't really get otherwise, that would be my only 
addition. 
DA1: Even if we had an option of retrofitting [inaudible] standard without going to any technology solutions? (generic 
intervention)  
M: I don't think, if you were to do solid wall insulation on its own, I wouldn't necessarily call that a deep retrofit. 
DA2: But if you [inaudible] really deep insulation of all your house and just plenty of natural ventilation, just get aware of how 
it is done and in deep, significantly change your behaviour to make sure that your house is comfortable. (generic 
intervention) 
M3: So I guess, when you talk about improving the insulation of your whole house, what are you talking about because that 
sounds like a lot of work, so that would probably be a deep retrofit for me. 
DA2: Yes, but then it wouldn't include any technology, would it. (generic intervention) 
M3: No, so I'm just saying, somewhere in here, we don’t have ethnology at the moment and I think, at the most extreme 
end, a combination of fabric measures and technology will deliver you the biggest savings, I would have thought. 
MF1: Smart technology, right?  So insulation plus marks is a deep? 
M3: Yeah, but the thing is, with smart technology, is it's cross cutting because it actually is not very disruptive, you can go in 
and install a smart thermostat very easily, it takes an hour for and E.ON guy to come in and install it, so it's appealing, 
but it also maximises, potentially, the impact of these other things. 
01:28:02 
M1: [inaudible] so much, it's like, to be honest, it's a separate kind of market probably with slightly separate drivers - I'm not 
saying we shouldn't include them, I think we should - but it's probably going to accelerate on its own course, quite 
unrelated to some sense, how much people are retrofitting their homes. 
M3: So I think there is, potentially, quite a virtuous feedback loop in terms of people who do this become more aware and 
then they're more likely to … and that's where you're starting to see some companies that offer these thermostats and 
controls, then offering bolt-on, energy efficiency packages afterwards because they can develop a rich picture of what 
the house looks like and what kind of measures would work in that house. 
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DA1: I think the retrofit technology is an important one and last time, I think we distinguished between the light, medium and 
deep that light was on this side.  You called medium a single installation of one of the deeper ones, by just having a heat 
pump and nothing else, or just having a solid wall insulation and then the deep one would be the combination of the 
deeper measures.  Is there something that we need to capture about the combination of measures because that might … 
is there some supply chain skill involved in being able to just offer one thing really, offer them in combination.. 
(facilitation intervention) 
M3: That's where you need architect, or engineers … if you were doing a combination of measures to make sure you 
minimise the risk of things like mould and stuff like that, so if you were to be doing solid wall insulation, you might need 
to have mechanical ventilation installed at the same time.  So talking to some builders that do these kind of deep 
retrofits, it involves working with the designer, with the engineer, having a project manager that oversees all of the 
work together and it's certainly more complex proposition from the supply chain angle - it might be that the consumer 
only has one person that they deal with, like the project manager, so they don't see the complexity, but I think it's a 
slightly different supply change. 
01:30:20 
M1: That's the key differentiator though, one of them is then that it's a very different supply chain because you can still get a 
solid wall insulation job done by [inaudible] relatively few people and that does happen. 
DA1: But you say then, it's a totally different thing of having a real deep retrofit, that's not what your subsidy programmes that 
you currently have triggered … (generic intervention)  
M1: Yeah, that's triggered a single measure … on solid wall as well, definitely, there's a not insignificant amount of solid wall 
insulation being done and subsidy programmes, but it's very much that and that's it. 
MF2: So it makes sense to have a single measure supply chain and deep, or an integrated, somehow, like in the sense that 
they offer not only that measure, but more measures and also some smart technologies to keep track, or maybe we can 
capture that effect in terms of this kind of retrofit also creating feedback in terms of awareness, more awareness of the 
people. 
01:31:45 
M1: If I was a minister, or an outsider, looked at that … the elephant in the room is where's the windows?  That's the first 
question that comes to mind.  I know we talked about why don’t we have the experience of in the supply chain, 
replacement windows, why isn't that part of the whole … 
M3: In terms of on here? 
M1: Yeah, as a light retrofit.  Presumably, it's the first thing and that's where … 
DA1: It's what people do, but it's not really the most effective thing. (generic intervention) 
MF1: So double-glazing here? 
01:32:34 
M1: … with the longest experience, going back 20/30 years of power, these retrofits work on the supply chain and how 
people pay for it, knowing that they're going to, hopefully, save some money. 
DA1: Do people do windows because of energy efficiency, or are there actually other reasons to do with the windows? 
(discussion started by a DA)  
01:33:00 
M3: Again, you guys might have seen from my recent research, when prompted, people will point to that as something they   
did  Also, you're right, probably it's noise and [inaudible] evidence of [inaudible] noise reduction. 
01:33:18 
M: Thermal comfort is as well [inaudible] 
M: It makes the room warm. 
M2: I think there is probably a strong link between double-glazing and property value because whenever I look at a 
properties on Zoopla, or whatever, it specifically states whether it's got double-glazing or not, it doesn’t mentioned loft 
insulation. 
01:33:40 
M1: And there must be a big data set going back a long time. 
MF1: It's also quite visible actually … 
M3: And it's not something that's typically happened through any of our supplier obligations, it's very much a separate 
market because it's people that just go to Anglia Windows, who then charge £10,000 to replace three windows and 
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offer you a £5,000 saving, so it's very consumer led, it's not the kind of thing that we subsidise to date.  Loft insulation 
as well, it's a completely separate supply chain. 
M2: Do they offer financing? 
M1: They do offer financing, with the bigger companies. 
MF1: For now, we have two parallel supply chains, deep and single measure, but would it be possible, somehow … I 
mentioned a lot of people who do, for example, only boilers, a lot of people do only cavity, to create something like to 
put them together, a supply chain than called them is not like other people, but use those people, so somehow, the kind 
of flow from single measures to deep measures, would it be possible that that's maybe what we are interested in? 
M: So the relationship between single and deep? 
MF1: Yes, some people working on only single things, passing them into these stocks, or like deep [inaudible]  that they are in 
contact with a project manager, so it's something that we maybe can think about, having a flow from here to here?   
01:35:37  
M: It’s the other way round. 
DA1: What exactly would drive that, what would that mean in reality? 
M3: I'm guessing it's [inaudible] and this is where the super homes comes in and it's the idea that people start - it's a bit of a 
journey - so people start by doing one or two efficiency measures and they get the buck and they go a bit further and 
they do more and more and more.  I don’t know how strong the link is between these two different supply chains, but I 
think it's probably word of mouth and it's also a perceived benefit, if you feel you're getting benefit from having done 
these single measures, you might think about doing more, so it's partly your own, individual experience, I think, would 
encourage you to do more and then contact other people. 
MF1: But would it be like another single measure? 
M1: The other thing to think about is where that supply chain is and is likely to develop is in a particular area, which is 
around social housing, is around where people have a really strong incentive to just re-do the entire property and they 
don't necessarily get along with the people who actually live there; so they're either a developer, or they're a social 
housing animal and that's where that market that we're noticing at the moment is emerging. 
 So it's a different kind of one, whereas the single measures that are done at the moment are kind of all over the place.  
Some are in the same area in the social housing, but somewhere where we are interested in are the owner/occupier, so 
I think that's key to fed across, they're aiming at different markets at the moment, they're aiming at different consumer 
groups. 
MF1: So they are quite separate. 
DA1: And they are also completely separate companies. (generic intervention)  
M3: I suspect so.  The kind of people that might do these single measures might be British Gas engineers, for instance, doing 
your boilers, or they might be eco-installers doing lofts, or doing oil boiler replacements.  They just do that, specialise in 
doing one and do it as effectively as possible.  I think they are quite different. 
MF1: Quite different, okay. 
MF2: There is no chance that there is a figure that knows who to call, like the insulation company and the other company who 
do boilers, can make them work together in the same house, no? 
M3: That would be a project manager, who might come in under the deep supply chain.  I don’t know … when I had my loft 
done under eco, some people just rocked up in a van and just rolled out insulation and left and really didn’t speak to me 
much.  So I don't think they're there to on-sell other services, or try and engage the customer in trying to do other work, 
if they’ve already done the statement. 
DA1: And you're also not thinking about a mechanism and how to create the capacity for deep measures with individual 
installers that just have the capacity for one thing at a time. (generic intervention) 
M3: What we're thinking about is probably trying to incentivise different thing that might encourage people to look at doing 
more than one measure, which might mean that you get a supply chain reconfiguration, which might mean we get more 
supply chain that's similar to this kind of deep retrofit market, but we haven't thought specifically about whether you 




M2: … I think, again, it's fair to say that we have tried to artificially create deep retrofit through our subsidy programmes 
before, by requiring multiple measures and things and it hasn’t worked that well because of the way we tried to do it, I 
guess. 
01:40:21 
M1: I was going to say because of the way the market's structured, so effectively, you've trained your life to be a gas fitter, 
you pay your [inaudible] for that, you're not going to pay £1,200 a year to do other things … it's not like an Amazon, or a 
shop who can sell more than one product, it's not exactly a shop with a shop front, it's a man with a van. 
M3: Bringing the whole thing together into like a [inaudible] offer is really complicated, which is why … 
M2: … and even then, it will be different people within the company. 
M3: They will sent out multiple people to do the work. 
M2: Exactly, so you do the boiler, you do the loft insulation … they might do it at the same time. 
M3: So effectively, it will be a virtual project manager, who will manage behind the scenes and say 'I'm going to send these 
three people out to do the work.  Which is why, trying to create this whole, new model, it's very hard to do it ad hoc. 
01:41:24 
M3: We do it with the kitchens and we do it for bathrooms because the commercial appeal of those as a product, as a thing, 
is large enough to justify having the project manager on top of the tasks. 
M2: What's the benefit of not doing it separately?  Is there an additional benefit of one person doing it altogether? 
M3: When we previously did this, we thought that because of the challenge in terms of the perceived benefits, if you do one 
measure, your actual perceived benefits are quite slight and intangible;  if you do a lot of work, you can make a really 
noticeable difference to the home in terms of its aesthetic value, it's comfort, its energy savings, which will create a 
positive word of mouth loop  … 
M: … and, I guess, less hassle 
M3: Exactly, less hassle and we're working on the basis that you're only going to have one or two shots at doing a retrofit in 
these homes, between now and 2050.  So you could go at it and continually re-acquire that client and do a measure by 
measure approach, but the costs go up … 
01:42:28 
M1: If you think about our thing of trying to link it, where we talked about tax reduction or something, I suppose we talked 
about where can we do it, or even I think the stamp duty … where can you do it so that you incentivise the deeper 
retrofit, so that you start to create all of that that we're talking about actually having more of a product at the top of the 
market and then, hopefully, that other things fall into place, but if you think about where we sit and what we can 
actually do in terms of influencing the market, we can't go out there and train all the people to do it, but you can say 
'well, let's give some extra incentives for doing it.' 
DA1: With also incentives, you say giving some incentives; what we hear a lot from industry is they say they would invest in 
anything if the incentives were just constant, if they knew that they would still exist in three or five, or that many years 
time, so that seems to be a crucial element in them going into any direction.  How can you ensure …? (‘industry trust’ and 
all related connections) 
 
01:43:45 
M1: You can't in a democracy, is the short answer, because any future politicians have the right to overturn in a new 
manifesto and a new mandate. 
M3: What we're thinking about in the private rental sector and social housing is that you could have longer term targets to 
work towards and it gives you a visibility over the next 10 to 15 years in terms of the improvements and that was part of 
the reason for thinking about could you do something similar with mortgage lenders because at least it's set, so kind of 
a long term signal to the market that says, over time, they're going to have to improve this work and even if the actual 
short term incentives, or grants, or tax breaks ever flow, overall, there's still a signal in the background that's just driving 
increasing improvement. 
 If you look at a comparable sector, you're looking at something like vehicle emissions directive which requires fleet 
average of cars to improve over time.  You've also got the government, every so often, injecting a bit of money, to try 
and encourage people to buy electric vehicles, by subsidising electric vehicles, putting people through at the top end 
and the idea is this is kind of short term and subject to political will, whereas this underlying trend of improving vehicles 




MF1: Okay … [inaudible] industry trust, that you can have ?? investment ??  EPC  ?  to the consumers, give the direction to 
industry, right, okay and it should have a long term … 
01:45:36 
M1: What M3 is really talking about is the target … I guess it's a fraction of EPC capital then, but it's more … 
M2: It's the projects we can set regulatory, or laws which can last some time.  You can't set monies that last some time, is 
the short answer.  So through law, we can set very long term signals, but we can't guarantee monies beyond … probably 
three years. 
M1: We’ve got to put on here, unfortunately, to go with these incentives, we've got to put on here that the subsidy 
expectation delay impact, it's like deflation, you're not going to do something now because you're going to get a lower 
price in the week and there's that and we did talk about that last time, in the demand and the supply chain, just the 
expectation of government intervention is actually freezing current activity, so that's going to have to go somewhere. 
MF1: So the subsidy's expectation is creating investment because they are waiting for the right moment to do that. 
M1: If you were expecting a better entry point, just going to wait, so just the expectation is, in itself, blurring demand, 
demand for retrofit … it's increasing the whole thing. 
MF1: So because of the delay in the system …? 
M1: If I think there's going to be a subsidy next week, I'll wait … 
MF1: So subsidy expectations … 
M1: There is probably a more elegant way of saying that.  It's when you're delaying action because of a … it's like the 
expectation of a subsidy, rather than the subsidy itself.   
M3: The point is, if you invest and then tomorrow, a subsidy came along and somebody who had waited for that subsidy to 
come along, then they are going to be compatibly better, they're ??  better.  So investing at the wrong moment is the 
key point and that could be too late. 
MF1: So subsidy expectation works on the industry, or on the customer? 
M1: The customer …both. 
MF1: Both … can I draw an arrow? 
M1: Yes. 
DA1: That also works strongly on the communication of the industry to the customer (generic intervention). 
M3: And penalties?  Is there the same standard for penalties, than incentives? 
M1: If penalties were going to come in yeah, and that's the same as a subsidy ending and when that ends, by December 
31st, you get a massive amount of activity and then it drops off a cliff in January, that's the same, it's just the reverse of 
that, so a penalty would be the same as a subsidy ending, effectively. 
M3: But with a penalty, so if you introduce a penalty, saying that we're going to introduce a penalty as of this date, do 
people start to take action pre-emptively?  So this idea of diesel vehicles in London being penalised, people are starting 
to sell diesel cars way in advance of that. 
M2: You can see that now. 
M1: Which maybe pushes us more towards the kind of … 
M2: That would have an implication on costs though. 
M1: Well, it depends how you design the penalties. 
M2: If you did a kind of set date [inaudible] reverse, from now on there is a massive penalty, you suddenly increase demand, 
which would allow the company to increase the cost.   
M1: We're talking about incentives, so we should be talking about penalties and incentives in the same breath and thinking 
about how they could work … even if it's just to sweep up at the lower end of the market. 
M: What are the objectives of today? 
M1: It's just to try … this is the map off the back of our last workshop, which is trying to fill in the gaps, to work out anything 
we're missing in here, other relationships in their model, which allows them to then build a more robust and unique 
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model, where we [inaudible] show relationships.  So this is the key thing that we're talking about here is the retrofit … 
so this is the lenders, this is about retrofitting factors, household retrofitting factors, this is about the supply chain and 
how the different supply chains may work. 
01:51:09 
M: It's really helpful actually, in trying to … 
M1: In understanding relationships? 
M: Yeah, well also segmenting the problem.  
M1: So what it allows us to do is work out if we do particular interventions, what it might do. 
M3: Effectively, they can choose to go anywhere.  Manufacturers obviously have very strong links because they make the 
products … it's still interesting.  We've been talking about, for a while, the idea of some kind of pay for performance. 
M2: I think that's a really good idea. 
M3: And that allows you then to top to pilot measures that might not be [inaudible] compliant, but where people feel that 
they can at least deliver larger energy savings, which then helps us build up evidence to then be able to, potentially, 
include them in SAP. 
M2: The difficulty at the moment, the thing I've got, which is you're not effectively measuring measure performance, which 
is where we're having difficulties with house performance.  So are you including measures like when the phone 
company rings up and says [inaudible]  
M3: Well, we'll need to think about this. We, ultimately, leave it to the companies to decide how they achieve the outcome, 
it could be a mix of … it's likely to encourage deeper retrofit and a range of both fabric and behavioural measures. 
M2: It's almost certainly going to be because again, cost would drive it, so it will be … because most [inaudible] basically, ?? 
demand, exactly what happens on the grid is they just ?? customers and say 'don't use much energy.' 
M3: So what's happened in the US where they’ve done it is you’ve got Nest, partnering with people like Johns Mandeville, 
fabric insulations, they do smart thermostats and then they do a bunch of energy efficiency improvements, fabric 
improvements at the same time. 
M2: But if you are driven by cost, which stakeholders are, in this case [inaudible] electricity market, to see what happens. 
M3: That's a good point, we have to think about that and think about whether you control … 
M2: … to be honest, I think the need turn their thermostat down might be a behavioural issue which you wanted to do. 
M1: Yeah, I think what you'd want to do is you'd want to do it together, so if you do it, it would be part of fabric 
improvements, rather than just on its own, maybe.  So you'd have the fabric improvements and then behavioural … 
M3: I think that's even worse [inaudible] If you're saying that you need both fabric and behavioural ?? for measuring 
household performance, trying to work out what proportion ?? behavioural is going to be.  
M: Hard. 
M2: Yeah and so many components for behavioural as well and they all kind of link together. 
M1: So ??  innovation, but yeah. 
M: I think you need a really good kind of metric and this is what they're developing in California, this is what we need and … 
01:54:55 
M2: The California one, it's interesting though because they're not … 
M3: They're not what? 
M2: It's a straightforward reduction of the household … it's really easy because you don’t need to ascribe it to anything, it's 
really easy, as soon as you need to ascribe it to something … 
(01:55:10 to 01:59:50 - not transcribed) BREAK 
MF1: I would like to ask you to brainstorm, like two or three variables that you are think are missing in the model because 
maybe we are just missing something, that didn’t come up in discussion, they are overlooked, so we can be assured that 
everything is in sight and then, when you are done, I would like to ask you to start to place them on the map, where you 




M2: The wider economic outlook, when you're making the investment, will feature into … if you're in the middle of a 
recession, you're not going to make a best investment. 
 This is what I was saying, so the relative attractiveness of this versus other things and then ditto for the economic 
markets, so the lender's market will come into this market, if the market [inaudible] other markets. 
M2: And the other one I was thinking of as well is the economy scale and supply chain will push them down either … they 
thought they could do really well be focusing on one thing, or focusing on the deep retrofit. 
M3: I've just written down 'skills' which isn't very helpful and you’ve probably discussed it already … I didn't quite know 
where to put it.  I think it basically comes out of college.  You go to college, you learn one thing, you set up a small 
business in one thing and then the fact that we want a different model doesn’t affect the way that we … 
(Talking amongst themselves) 
DA1: What exactly do you mean by that? (generic intervention)  
M3: If you have this, it's likely to increase the desirability and leads to people more actively telling other people, through 
word of mouth … 
DA1: Who gives feedback and whose work? (generic intervention) 
M3: There's a question, so it might be at the moment, people do the work and then go, but actually, what you want is 
people that do the work and then continue to provide advice.  It's a service, rather than just a one off bit of work.  Less 
turnover sales of homes making straight potential for deeper retrofit.  So if we were assuming that deeper retrofits are 
going to be more invasive and increase hassle factor, if there are people more likely to be staying in their homes, less 
likely to be moving, then … you've kind of got that already. 
 Willingness of other actors to contribute to retrofitting … commission might increase the desirability, financial 
attractiveness … so it's you are paying for most of the costs, but other people might be contributing to that cost because 
there might be benefits to them and then, I guess, something around the capability, the supply chains respond to 
demand for deeper retrofit. 
02:10:15 
DA1: We still have quality and monitoring … then the technological development of deep retrofit, which might sit between the 
deeply retrofitted and the costs, so that if you do a lot, then that technology becomes cheaper to do the same thing, or 
you connect more. (‘quality’ and related links) (‘monitoring’) (connection between ‘technological development of deep 
retrofit’ and ‘suppliers cost for SM’) (connection between ‘technological development of deep retrofit’ and ‘suppliers cost 
for DR’) 
DA1: Then we have the household side on the one hand, there are sustainability concerns and the preference for energy 
efficiency. (‘households sustainability concerns’ and related links) (‘households preference for energy efficiency’ and 
related links) 
02:11:21 
M: It's five to eight percent of people …  it seems to be relatively constant, it seems to more that stage of life thing. 
DA1: We talked about technology and particularly the deep retrofit that you would see together with technology, but also 
there might be a question of maintenance, the maintenance costs and also the maintenance frequency that has an 
effect on how good the retrofit actually performs. (‘maintenance costs’ and all related links) 
M3: That's true, if it produces maintenance costs, then that's another … 
DA1: Cost and also performance … (generic intervention)  
M3: And that's on the of the things that Energiesprong … reduced maintenance costs as well as energy savings.  
M1: It's the consumer retrofit tax credits; in other words, the money you pay, you just take off your tax and that will just kick 
start the whole … 
MF1: So basically, the upfront cost, it could be lower? 
M1: It could be here, it could be here.  It just means that you know, for you, it's going to be netted out, you're not going to 
be spending anything and that's how, in the US, they tend to incentivise most energy schemes with a tax credit.  
MF1:   I don't know if everybody heard what you were saying, what are your variables.  This one was …?  It's this one, right? 
M3: Yes, it's limited to this one, if there's less turnover, it will be harder for people to do deeper retrofit, assuming that 
there's lots of hassle and disruption … less turnover of property sales might make it harder and we're in a climate where 
people are staying in their existing houses for longer. 
155 
 
M1: Could house prices go up, irrespective of sales?  If the energy value is reflected, I don’t know … 
M2: What about people who don't move, the cost of doing like the next step up, or whatever, it's so hard. 
MF1: How strong is the link? 
M3: I don't know, it's just in my head. 
M1: But building work and refurbishment, generally, are related to change in ownership. 
M3: My argument is extensive building work - deep, more incentive works, it's more likely to happen around the time that 
people move. 
02:14:20 
M1: So a correlation between it. 
M3: Yeah, so maybe a correlation. 
MF1: This one, can you explain capability of supply chain to respond to … 
M3: … demand for deeper retrofit.  So if there isn't much of a market there, then if we were to enact changes that led to 
demand, it's whether or not there would be the capability to respond to that demand. 
M1: It's a limiting factor.  Any policy that we do, where we're trying to incentivise the deeper retrofit, whether the tax 
deductions, or whatever, the impact is going to be really heavily limited by the fact … 
MF1: … but it cannot be up to the industry to provide the measures … that's quite important, actually. 
MF2: Will it create an incentive for that industry to grow?   
M3: Yes, if there is a demand, then there will be a response, but I guess it's how quick that response is.  You might have to 
signal the fact that you're going to be doing something … 
M1: … another five years, or something. 
M3: Yeah, exactly. 
MF1:   [inaudible] because I think it's very important, like there's an increase that increases the stock of the supply chain, 
right? 
M3: Yeah. 
MF1: It depends on the investment, I assume. 
M3: Yeah. 
MF1: And on this, we can call as 'time' basically? 
M3: Yeah and skills, I guess skills is linked in there, isn't it. 
MF1: Yeah, sure.  You put skills, do you think [inaudible] like to connect the skills to the supply chains. 
M3: Yes, for deep retrofit, yes … it's not just deep retrofit, it could also be … the classic one I'm thinking of is the major 
delays up in [inaudible] where because most of the supply chain weren't trained in how to install condensing boilers, so 
they fought it tooth and nail.  It was only because British Gas trained all their installers … 
M3: … it got through. 
M1: Yes because basically, half the market could do it, half the market couldn't, so they had to learn to come up, but until 
then, there was no incentive to re-train, to be able to learn a new product. 
MF1: So the technology goes also to the stock of the supply chain, right [inaudible] new technology, we need new skills, that’s 
what you are saying. 
M1: Yes. 
DA1: So it reduces the skills, until they are really rebuilt. (contribution to a structural change) 
M3: Yes.  Basically, you're [inaudible] skilled and again, it has to be [inaudible]  make sure [inaudible] everyone skills up to be 
… so they [inaudible]  information packs and therefore, lots of people had spent thousands of pounds and wasted it.  If 
you remember heat pumps, everyone changed up to heat pumps - most of them don't ever install heat pumps - 
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because the demand wasn’t there, so therefore, effectively, from their perspective, wasted lots and lots of money, so at 
the moment, no-one is re-training for anything. 
MF2: So would it make sense to have supply chain as a stock, but it's not really specifying whether it's a skill … 
M3: So the question for me is the existing skills are there, but the challenge is more bringing those skills together and that 
might be the challenge, it might take time to identify that there are four or five different sub-contractors you might 
need to be able to do some work on a property and if it's the first time you've done it, developing those relationships … 
so there's a skills issue and then having trusted subcontractors you're prepared to work with. 
02:18:18 
M2: But then it's reinforcing the time and the cost and hassle needed for you to aggregate those skills is reflected in the cost 
to the consumer, so from the consumer's perspective, it's better to do it measure by measure because the alternative is 
an aggregator that's … 
M1: … it's that really good point where we always bet down to chicken and egg.  People say 'oh, there's no demand.'  We say 
'oh well, there's no product.'   
M2: Consumers are happy with the market where they're going measure by measure, then the alternative is [inaudible] 
takes time to [inaudible]   We've got evidence from the Green Deal on this, so look at the Green Deal legislates, see the 
ones that did.  It wasn't received in Scotland [inaudible] single measure and we just plugged them really hard. 
 The ones that failed were the ones that tried to aggregate [inaudible]  Green Deal offer, but the additional cost wasn't 
attractive to consumers. 
DA1: Do we need to distinguish what drives the size, whereas also what drives the capability of the different supply chains?  It 
could be different things and one capability seems to be linked to skills and so on, but you can drive the size without 
improving capabilities and skills. (discussion started by a DA)  
M3: The incentive will drive the size, but it won't necessarily improve the capability. 
02:20:02 
MF1: Since we are talking about the supply chain … can you just explain the tailored feedback to consumers? 
M3: So this is a kind of positive, reinforcing loop; so if consumers perceive that there's a benefit, but they don’t really have 
hard evidence, they won't be as talkative, but if they get a monthly feedback report saying well, having done this, it's 
delivered x, y and z, then they're much more likely to be able to spread it via word of mouth. 
DA1: And the tangibility … (‘tangibility’ and all related connections) 
M3: … tangibility, yeah, it makes it much more real for them and they can tell their money saving expert friends that they’ve 
saved this much money from doing this work and it starts to create a virtual circle, but if you don't give them the 
numbers, or the evidence, then it's harder for them to convince other people. 
 The only other one I had was willingness of other actors to contribute to retrofitting, which might improve the financial 
attractiveness, so I'm thinking about local authorities, clinical commissioning groups, DNOs. 
MF1: So we can be more rigorous, also we need to start from this part, from supply chain, we are still missing perhaps some 
information .. so DA1, I think you put the technological development and so far, it is different to the supply chain.  Do 
we see any other connection? 
M2: Yes, one bit you really need and which I think is a bit weird and out there, imagine this was the market, we had a new 
product and say it was fairly prescriptive, we would be starting with product desirability going to doing something and 
then following it through.  So the technology development has to lead through in to product desirability, or something, 
or retrofit desirability because the things that … aesthetic appeal, non-financial benefits, all of this stuff [inaudible] 
desirability got to be where the innovation comes from. 
MF1: So you say like if there is something new, people want that thing new because …? 
M2: Desirability of product … the place we've got that on the board at the moment is aesthetic impact, but product 
desirability is the short answer and innovation tends to be quite good at product desirability; so it is that loop over, it's 
quite an indirect loop on the amount that's … 
DA1: Not only aesthetic, it is on all of them. Basically, it's something like the retrofit desirability that is already there, but 
specified for different products. (contribution to a structural change) 
M3: But you obviously can have cheerleader products. 
DA1: Like the windows. (generic intervention) 
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M3: Yeah, just in a bundle.  You lead on one thing, so you bundle something in at the same time.  We do [inaudible] places. 
MF1: Do you see any other connection? 
DA1: I would say that technology drives down … well, technology is influenced by how many …. what's the install base and then 
it drives down costs. (connection between ‘retrofitted stock’ and ‘technological development of deep retrofit’) 
MF1: Does everybody agree? 
All: Yes. 
MF1: And this lowered the cost, here. 
M2:  It might not lower the cost, but it may increase the efficiency… it might be more expensive insulation, but it would have 
twice the effect. 
MF1: Because of the performance you are seeing. 
M2: Yeah, so that the cost to the consumer may be higher. 
02:24:14  
M: Or lower, [inaudible] 
M3: This is what I really, really hate (laughter).  As much as I love it … 
M2: … it starts getting messy. 
M3: Yeah. 
MF1: Is that all the story of the technological development? 
M3: No.  I mean, the other thing is obviously, technology develops in ways which don't work in the other way too, that's all I 
was thinking. 
MF1: How much time does it take to improve the technology, for example? 
M3: What do you mean? 
DA1: A significant improvement on the performance, for example. (generic intervention)  
M3: It depends on what you mean by significant.   
MF1: Fifty per cent, kind of … 
M1: The thing is about technology that they'll say is they kind of limit to it, we're not … to really improve, you need - as I 
think we've got here - the scale of delivery. 
M3: The technology, we're up against the hard laws of physics, so we're pretty close … we can probably squeeze an extra 10 
to 20 per cent out of the law in those things. 
MF1: In how much time? 
M3: A few years … but genuinely, that's not where the problem is, the problem is, nobody wants these things, so it's 
aesthetics.  I don’t want to keep banging on about this, but its looks, its noise, it's the fact that … if these were iPhones, 
we wouldn't be having this conversation because the market would do it.  If we were selling any other visual product, 
we'd have focus groups and consumers in and that's what we'd be doing, we'd be doing this for consumers and testing 
it on them, so that's where I think the technological innovations [inaudible].  It will be things like noise, it will be looks, it 
will be attractiveness; it will also be, as you were saying, installation and delivery process, like the 3D printing … 3D 
printing has an opportunity here, I think. 
02:26:13 
M2: The technological improvements might not improve how effective the product is, it could improve the desirability of 
that product.  
M1: So if you want to have a policy or something, that's something we are doing and funding, so the aim of doing all those 
things, making the product easier to install, so you bring down the installation time, bring down the hassle factor and 
make it just an easier product to get to know.  It might not always reduce the cost, but it will b without the hassle. 
MF1: More desirable. 
M1: Yeah, exactly. 
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DA1: When I think of external wall insulation, for example, I would say there is a cost factor as well, like if you do that multiple 
times, then you drive down the cost of external wall insulation. (contribution to a structural change) 
M2: And economies of scale. 
M3:  You'd think so, unfortunately it's a question of how bespoke, for external installation   each installation has to be 
because of the accumulation of stuff on the outside of the house each time, so … 
M1: … and somebody could do it for a lot cheaper, like when then do some scale things and then like some of those … 
M3: … with a lot of planning, yes.  So easy ones to do … yeah. 
M2: You're spreading your fixed costs. 
M3: You're spreading your fixed costs, that's true. 
M1: And more profits. 
M3:  Yes, true. 
DA1: So how many properties would you need to retrofit in order to drive down costs by … I don't know, 50 percent or 20 per 
cent? (generic intervention)  
M3: It would just be the installation costs.  So we know that 20,000 isn’t … 50,000 we are achieving on, actually is 
insufficient. 
02:28:03 
M1: But it's more about if you're doing a ton of them in the area and you've got the supply chain built up and then it's all 
those efficiencies, from what we understand, you can bring the costs down and we know solid wall insulation being like 
£6,000 I think, which is significantly cheaper than the £10,00 that … so if you were [inaudible] and you could say 'fine, 
maybe you could bring it down by 40 per cent,' if you, literally, just had a whole change built up and you were doing it 
home by home in the area and the whole system was really efficient. 
M3: But you need to fix the market for that. 
M1: Yeah … so those ones, they will have been doing it to local authority, so they know that they can do it in the buildings, 
they don’t have to worry about demand. 
DA1: I'm not asking what is happening at the moment, I'm asking like 'okay, if this was [inaudible] (generic intervention) 
M3: No, but what we're saying is the UK market, the issues don't come around the size of the total market of the UK, it will 
be around the fact that because most of this relates to delivering installation, it's about the numbers within a very small 
geographic area, so it would probably be easier to do cross reduction in pockets … 
M1: … if you think you've got a model there, like some people can deliver it really, really efficiently, but only in very isolated 
instances at the moment;  they'd do best to think about okay, well that's maybe your target of late, if you can have a 
wider model and a company that could do that in an area, then you'd say yeah, maybe you could drive cost down by 
40/50 per cent from what it is currently. 
02:30:00 
MF1: How does the economy of scale we are talking about works?  So it depends on the stock … ? 
M3: Physical transportation, so basically, how much does it cost to drive from one site to another, how many can you do 
within a fixed time period under that contract for that period, so it's, basically, the cost of petrol and scaffolding costs. 
MF1: What do you mean, scaffolding costs? 
M3: (talking over) … and then you can just move it down the road to the next one.  It's cheaper than if you had dismantle it 
all, take a couple of weeks and fit it all up, so it would be too expensive. 
M1: If you were to buy insulation for 100 homes as a company, or whatever, the cost per home would fall as well. 
M2: It does, but not … yeah, you're right, it does … if you're buying enough, so for example, what the housebuilders do is 
they work out five years in advance what they need and they put in a bit with a call off section on it that says, basically, 
'I'm bidding you the x amount I'm prepared to buy at this price.  If you ever reach this price, we will buy it' and then they 
wait for that period to come along.  So if you’ve got a large enough market, it's going to be there, then that's what you 
do and then you hedge against … but you get the idea, you can start doing that kind of thing 
M2: That's when you get the proper economies of scale .. 




M3: So for housebuilders, you're looking at … housebuilders need tens of thousands of product a year and they need to 
know it's there.  They're okay because they're in a market which, effectively, they fix themselves, so demand massively 
outstrips supply.  The market we're looking at, there isn't the demand, so you're guessing, so you can't do this thing 
because you can't know in advance what the state of the market's going to be in five years time, but housebuilders 
pretty much do. 
02:32:00 
MF1: So there's going to be so much economy of scale, you would say, here? 
M3: The people who were doing this already [inaudible] because ??  company, they own most of the products, they have a 
product called MyHouse, which allows them to do deep retrofit where you choose a company and what brands they 
have, but they are struggling to find a customer, to be honest because there is no customer who thinks like that.  
They’ve got massive economies of scales as a manufacturer because they're huge and suppliers, they're huge and 
they've also got large installation as well, but that has to be a … 
MF1: … supply and demand. 
M3: Yeah. 
MF1: So we have these things, like are red, we don’t know much, we have talked a lot, now lets' try to give rule and then 
maybe even if it's not complete … so what would be the costs depending on the main thing? 
M1: You're also breaking it down to cost … there's the installation cost, there's the materials cost and [inaudible] 
MF1: So fixed material costs … is it?  Does it make sense, yes or no. 
M3: How big is the company? 
MF1: Okay, so like a company size in the sense that the bigger is the size of the company and the lower is the cost, right?  I 
guess. 
M3: In general.  I was just thinking that … the problem is, we're talking about so many things at different levels, so the man 
in the van, effectively, it's just in time purchase because you don't know what business you're going to get and if you 
run out halfway through, you pop down to Wickes, or something; whereas if you're a big company, it's still just in time, 
but you do it through warehouses and then you offset your cost of material import by … I dunno, hedging on the … 
02:34:51 
M1: Are we trying to find out what are the costs? 
M3: Mmmm. 
M1: So obviously, cost of goods is one, clearly, regardless of what size company it is and then you've got employment cost 
and then you’ve got financial cost, you've got those three things.  Then you've got operating costs going [inaudible] 
they're going to have to buy those goods however, effectively, they never do that; so you've got costs of things and then 
you've got costs of sales, which is like employment costs …   
DA1:  Also, labour, in general. (contribution to a structural change) 
M1: And  that's part of that, so then you've got the other bit, which is labour and then you might have some interest 
expense, just financial costs, it's really those three things.  It's gross margin, operating margin and then … 
MF1:  … plus financial costs, like taxis. 
M2: Interest payments/debts. 
02:36:00 
M1: So looking at the single measures in particular because you've got it split out there because I think if you then add on … 
the point about if you're look at the deep retrofit, you've got to add on that factor, all the transactions, costs and 
difficulties that we've been talking about, which make doing a deep retrofit much more expensive than just the sum of 
its parts. 
MF1: As far as [inaudible], maybe you have more knowledge about the lending part, lenders' things? 
M1: Possibly.  I think the one thing I'd add in terms to do with policy incentives is the idea you shock the system to get it 
going, given that you were saying there is no demand for this product, actually, you need quite a substantial shock to 
the system and I'll put the US example there, which is this tax credit; so actually, in the UK, x amount of money on 
retrofitting your house, you just get the whole lot back, so you just write it off against your tax and that’s how most US 
renewable subsidies work out.   
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 So effectively, you're paying nothing and obviously, that's an extreme measure, it would actually create a serious stock 
to the system and of course, once you do that, then there a lots of objections, 'oh you can't do this, can't do that,' but 
you have to think in terms of 'actually, we need to really shake this up, to get it moving and we get this feedback, even 
in the North Sea, with all the infrastructure and stuff and you get people coming back and saying 'what you need to do 
is give the system a serious shock, not just play around with a few incentives, you need to change this really quickly 
because as you say, there's no demand there at the moment. 
M3: That's what they do on the non-domicile, as opposed to domesticised, that's exactly what they do on the … so climate 
change levy exemptions were the way of doing this for non-domestic buildings and then, if you choose products from 
the energy technology list, you get tax breaks on those. 
02:38:27 
M1: So, for the consumer, you've already got stamp duty, but I'm thinking, this idea of shocking the system of a really 
substantial one, so you'd have to limit it, effectively, but if you're going to spend £10,000 actually, you're just going to 
take that on your tax bill and it's obviously going to impact one part of the market and not another part, but it will 
actually create an immediate incentive for people and the market would come into being quite quickly. 
M3: So for business, it's straightforward because it's tax or business, but consumer, which bit of the tax were you thinking 
about. 
M1: The easiest way for consumers if your income tax, you actually just take it straight off your income tax and then, 
suddenly, you have a demand because at the moment, clearly demand is an issue. If people start thinking 'I'm going to 
spend £10,000, I might as well buy some of these things, they're not actually unattractive and then you get a supply 
chain … clearly, with the building trade and everything else, there are all sorts of issues that could arise, but they would 
arise anyway because this is the building trade.  If you're going to do something, you need to make it really quite … good 
luck with that, I have to leave now and go to another meeting. 
02:40:23 
MF1: You put quality, DA1, here, close to skills.  Can you explain what you were thinking when you wrote it. 
DA1: Yes, the skills have a great impact on the quality of the work that is done and the quality of the work then also … you have 
the performance down there, that affects the performance and also monitoring of the process, for example, also affects 
the [inaudible] (connection between ‘SC skills’ and ‘quality’) (connection between ‘monitoring’ and ‘quality’) 
M: It also affects the aesthetic impact. 
DA1: Yes, all of the ones on the left. (contribution to a structural change) 
MF1: And monitoring, sorry, what do you think should …? 
DA1: Monitoring of, for example, it could be monitoring of [inaudible] building the job, so it's the monitoring of the … (generic 
intervention39)  
MF1: … of the quality, okay. 
DA1: It depends on whether you see this as disagreeing/agreeing. (facilitation intervention) 
M1: The policy element is pretty huge and it's important to have that, it links the skills, it links to the … I think we've got it 
elsewhere, if business  substantially increases, like actual shocks to the market, all those types of things tend to 
decrease quality, don't they, would you say M2, like a dramatic rush. 
02:42:09 
M3: What we're thinking about is … so there come a point where the market collapses because effectively … or TV reports, 
or news reports say that there are problems with this and then everyone rushes out at the same time. 
DA1: It can set off a positive as well as a negative … word of mouth, right? (connection between ‘measure performance’ and 
‘word of mouth effect) 
M3: So you’ve got word of mouth.  I think then general public awareness about retrofit going to more people planning to 
buy, word of mouth obviously can go the other way and create a negative loop as well. 
DA1: So then word of mouth is knowing about okay these things have been done, so that comes from the retrofitted stock, but 
whether that's actually a nice word, or a really bad word, depends on what they see, either in the quality, or also in the 
desirability and I think we had several poor performers. (connection between ‘measure performance’ and ‘word of mouth 
effect\\repetitions) 
MF1: So we should connect, at the moment, performance and word of mouth, just to give the idea that if the performance is 
negative, word of mouth can be negative. 
M3: So the performance then links to skills, good, yes, it works. 
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MF1: This one, I think was from you M … 
M2: And so the idea is that, dependent on where you are in the economic cycle would have an impact on whether you 
decide to make, on some of these, quite a substantial investment. So if you're in the middle of a recession, no matter 
what the benefits you think will be in 10 years, you probably won't make that big investment at this current moment in 
time.  You may think about doing it later, but … 
02:44:03 
MF1: … so this was for the homeowners … 
M2: … and mortgage providers and businesses. 
MF2: How would we somehow quantify that, is there a measure for that? 
M1: A good one is to look at … it's a bit of a proxy, but looking just generally, how much people are investing in their homes 
because that's ultimately what we're asking about and that ebbs and flows, as Osman says, with the business … 
MF1: Somehow, it goes on the same trend of area regeneration rate would be … 
(02:44:56 talking over) 
M1: … so not just the amount of money people have, but just a general confidence in … 
M3: … yes, I think confidence is a big factor for every player in this market. 
DA1: Yes, that's an important point, confidence. (contribution to a structural change) 
MF1: Okay, we have the confidence of the industry at the moment, the trust.  I think with this one, for the customer, there is 
credibility?  Could be?  Also the lenders, do they have the same issue?   
M3: Hugely.  The interest rate is meant to cover risk and then [inaudible] the lower the risk, the lower the interest rate. 
MF1: Trust … DA1, you were mentioning something? 
DA1: Yes, we have the market fragmentation out there, so when we now start to move from the industry to the customer side, 
we need to get a clearer picture of what exactly we mean by market fragmentation and how it influences the credibility 
and the quality and performance and these things. (facilitation intervention) 
 
02:46:24 
M1: We've been talking about a lot of things like a lack of standards.  We were talking about a fragmentation in terms of 
ethic, which I think is important, any measure and any coherent finance offer, or anything like that, combined together 
what you were going to say M2 … 
M2: I was just going to say you looking at hundreds of thousands of tiny businesses, that's what you're talking about and the 
strength in that is it means that each [inaudible] has to be specialised and it has credibility because they're local and 
known and also they have been changed to a specific standard in a specific thing … it's basically, you are dealing with a 
market that consists of hundreds and thousands of small business. 
MF1: It seems positive to me. 
M2: Yes. 
M1: But also, the negative is [inaudible] trying to influence out with any kind of policy is very hard, so you're not dealing with 
a few, big glares … 
M2: That's why we deal with the energy suppliers so often because it's so much easier. 
DA1: So is market fragmentation then a proxy for the number of campaigns?  Whereas market fragmentation, there are single 
market focused instead of [holistically] and deep retrofit focused.  What exactly do we want to understand …? 
(facilitation intervention) 
M: The policy side, it's probably, for these purposes, it's probably the latter, so if we're coming up with a different policy 
and we look at the cost of delivering it, the fact that you're dealing with hundreds and thousands makes it really, really 
expensive, but that's a policy design issues.  For these purposes, it's probably just the consequence of having hundreds 
of thousands means that a certain number of things fall out of it.  So your risks are a lot higher if you diversify, if you re-
train, your risks are a lot higher, as a business person. 
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M3: It will be harder to ensure how effective the performance measure is because everyone will [inaudible] they might be 
trained to say, but they might have a different approach to doing something, which would make it difficult to ensure a 
level of quality of energy efficiency, which would make it difficult for lenders to back that up.   
MF1: To trust … 
M3: Yes, trust becomes weaker. 
MF1: So fragmentation is number of companies, would it be okay … 
DA1: No, it's the other one. (generic intervention)  
M3: I don't know, necessarily, whether the number …. It's more of the fact that you're trying to drive a number of different 
measures and behaviours and not the same person can do all of them and that's a limiting factor, it makes is really 
difficult for us as the main consumer. 
MF1: We can try to construct it a little bit because I think it's a quality issue actually.  So who does single pure measures … 
could have, to some extent, lower quality … no. 
M2: Not necessarily because with double-glazing, there is one, massive player. 
MF1: So how does it reflect … the number of [inaudible] on the ??   
DA1: So [inaudible] fragmentation, we might be able to understand one of the impacts, one is the number of companies and 
the other one is currently do the companies have the capabilities for deep retrofit, which means they are not fragmented 
because they can draw things together, or do they just have the capabilities for single measures, or for known measures 
at all, so they all drive fragmentation and then, if they are fragmented, that does not impact the quality of single 
measures, or light retrofit, but it does impact the quality of deep retrofits. (facilitation intervention) 
02:51:26 
M: Pretty much.  The other thing to not is if you are trained in two measures … say you're trained to do three, you would 
still only focus on one measure because the profit margin on one is likely to be higher than any other, so if demand was 
equal, you would still just focus on one because your profit margin on that one is the largest.  So even when you've got 
people trained to do, say, gas boilers and heat pumps, profit margin on gas boilers is higher because they install quicker 
and cheaper, they can do more in a day, blah, blah, blah, so you'd still only do gas boilers and you never do the other 
measures either, so it's like the eco effect, just because theoretically, everything is the same, everyone still … 
M1: … there are better margins on something. 
M: Exactly, so just the logic of the market means that, effectively, everything drives you towards just doing one measure. 
MF1: To optimise. 
M Yeah, to optimise professionalism specialisation. 
MF1: Profit margin … but what creates profit margin because we talked about cost and then you mentioned the price and just 
for a percentage to that cost … 
02:52:37 
M: … and subsidy benefit.  So if you knew the market was getting subsidy, then you add that subsidy benefit into you profit 
margin. 
MF1: Everybody go there. 
02:52:46 
M: Unless people can only do certain things, so only certain people can install a gas boiler because you need the 
certification to do so, whereas loft insulation it would be less.  There's a driver in the size of the company, if you have 
these small companies, or online ?? it's always going to be easier for them to just do the single measure thing, whereas 
if a bigger company is doing it, they can bundle up a few, different things and know that they'll get added value for 
margins from that. 
02:53:26 
M: Unless they take more than one person on because then labour costs are proportionate the tasks and again, we 
probably don't tend to train them on more than one. 
MF1: You say that [inaudible] fragmentation, better credibility… like fragmental means like I do only this, but I do it properly 
and so this more credible in terms of single measures. 
02:54:02 
M: That's logic, I can't prove that, but there was a logic there.  I can prove it in number of deaths from gas boilers, which 
has declined remarkably, which is why we don't even think about … 
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MF1: So we can think about credibility, deep and light, something like that also. 
02:54:26 
M: Yeah, but I think also, again, having lots of small ?? team specialised skills, there's an almost slightly imperceptible fear 
and lack of trust factor that drives other larger organisations, getting involved in it because when we speak to the 
Council of Mortgages, it's 'who do I deal with?'  All the mess down there is [inaudible] 
02:54:54 
M: The same happens to us, that is exactly the same problem, so regardless of who's doing it, whether it's us or another 
party, the market fragmentation just means the cost of delivery, or any measure of delivery, is just that much higher.  
It's basically hundreds of thousands times £20 as opposed to £4 or £5. 
02:55:25 
M: Does it not have an impact on how nimble the supply chain is, if there's loads of small players, it can react faster to a 
change in market condition then and massive players have made huge investments in one, particular area. 
M: Yeah, I think, probably to an extent. 
M: Maybe, I dunno. 
MF1: To go back … so you say that lenders would trust bigger companies, compared to … so maybe it's something we have to 
pay attention to. 
DA1: Just to summarise what you said because I think that was a really important thing that you said actually, if you have lots 
of market fragmentation that can enhance the credibility for single measures and that creates different types of feedback 
loops, so you might have a reinforcing feedback, what will really drive single measures that actually the answers are the 
deep measures because they work in a contrary way, that for single measures, market fragmentation increases 
credibility, but for deep measures, it increases the credibility because there, you need them to be able to integrate in 
their thinking. (facilitation intervention) 
02:56:51 
M: Totally.  You need one person who can bring it together who the customer can trust, which means less fragmentation 
layers, otherwise, the other model, you're just getting a local builder to come and do a single measure, you'd trust 
more.  That's a good point. 
DA2: Or, if you are to operate with single measures to do a deep retrofit, you kind of have to become an expert yourself and 
then where do you get the information from about how to [inaudible] so that would also be … thinking about a 
homeowner become a manager of the project, where did he get feedback from to do such a thing? (generic intervention)  
 
02:57:52 
M: It's probably unlikely for a homeowner ever to manage that kind of project on their own, it's like more it would be, as 
you were saying, in that area of a deep retrofit intermediary, no single person could do a lot of the measures, as we 
were saying, combined, or as ?? was saying, it's rare. 
DA1: Would it make sense, instead of talking about deep supply, deep measures supply chain, to talk about the intermediary 
supply chain, a number of intermediaries over companies that can integrate different expertise in the same company; 
homeowners just interact with the project manager, something like that. That, or in addition?  That you have the 
intermediaries in addition to also maybe companies who can do everything under one roof, or that you also maybe have 
the companies doing everything, plus you have the intermediaries than can draw together others. (facilitation 
intervention)     
02:59:01 
M: I think it only works … the customer is only one person in any of these markets and then you have a kitchen retrofit, or 
someone, it might be the store front you go into and then ask for kitchens, but then all the rest of it is behind the 
scenes, usually. 
MF1: So both of them, just whatever comes.  It's okay having ... like the company is having deep retrofit, or people dealing 
with you and organising deep retrofit with single installers - is it both of them, with these two groups of providers. 
02:59:46 
M: I guess so, yeah. 
DA1: And then the big players would then be [inaudible] and so on … (generic intervention)  
03:00:00 
MF1:  Okay, shall we move on.   
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M: There's another feedback to the consumer where they might get information around surveyors and other groups who 
are likely to actually tell you - or values - if you get someone round to value a house, if you get an estate agent round, all 
these types of things, people who are likely to say to you 'well, if you want to increase the value, you should consider …'  
I think people get their homes valued quite often, it's the standard thing to do and depending on … yeah, I think it's just 
that point that it's not the place that you get the knowledge from and the nudge to do that kind of work could really 
come from someone who's got knowledge about what improves the value, or the quality of your property. 
MF1: Would it make sense, to connect this thing to the fraction of renovations, considering retrofit?  People who renovate 
because they want to improve their house and probably they are suggested by these kind of consultancies.  So if they 
suggest to retrofit more, this fraction would be higher. 
MF2: [inaudible] you asses the value, the price of your house and where you are aware, you can facilitate some financial 
gains, that's why you move to retrofit because that's what I understood, that's [inaudible] are the both only one ??  
03:02:16 
M: As in what, as in which link of the two is … 
MF2: Yeah, or if there is both, or if they are different. 
MF1: Can you explain what you mean. 
MF2: So you have a price and then we [inaudible] financial documents.  I was thinking it could be like a frequency of house 
buyer assessment, then can be combined with the house price, so ?? if you check the house price, you became more 
attractive to the retrofit maybe. 
M: There's something like … all the way up here in terms of tax deduction and tax incentive and … maybe it's already in 
there, but I just feel like there's a point that the intermediary recommending the kind of retrofit to do, but I guess it all 
depends on all the other things, like it all depends on the desirability incentives. 
M: For some of the works theoretically, so the equivalent of this is Scotland.  So Scotland, basically, we do community NG, 
they have a service that just holds your hand through the entire process, but the fact is that's state funded and Scottish 
funded and they act as the intermediary and they take you through it and guide you through with the bits that you need 
for the project as it goes along, so it's that kind of intermediary. 
MF2: It's expensive? 
M: Yeah. 
MF2 And a place for that as well, right? 
M: It does in Scotland, for [inaudible] 
03:04:05 
M: If we go back to the intermediary point, it's probably lacking in the system and the moment and maybe you can park the 
one about the … 
M: … well, I think there's something there, for example, estate agents, so the answer is that there are these intermediaries, 
but the intermediaries aren't pushing the sort of products we're looking for.  So what you traditionally get is 'oh okay, 
first of all, can we rename one of your things with an extra bedroom?'  That's your biggest win, followed by the usual 
de-cluttering and painting it magnolia, so the advice you get - because it's linked to the price that you pay for a house - 
eventually, they'll get on to the energy efficiency measures, but they'll probably put [inaudible] conversion extension for 
that. 
 I think, if you don't have central heating, that will come pretty high and eventually double-glazing might get there, 
possibly, depending what it's replacing. 
M: So they're there, influencing this and they come back, all the way back to the demand, they tell you things on the basis 
of what interest rates … 
M: It comes back to my earlier one, which is this is all competing with other things the householder could be doing with the 
spare money in this space, which won't necessarily be the kind of things that we were talking about. 
M: It does come back to that thing, that's why whenever we think of our tax breaks, we think about increasing the 
profitability, or incentive to do this in relation, or in addition to these other thins because, as you were saying, there's 
some real, strong competitors and that's the space we're in basically, competing with loft conversions. 
DA1: All of the intermediaries, they seem then to be able to … if there is a benefit, they are in the position of strengthening the 




M: It we could show there was a consumer benefit, they would reinforce that, going round.  I think that at the moment, it's 
a bit hard and the fact that they need an incentive to do it, demonstrates that it's not there.  So again, if these produces 
worked, they wouldn't need government incentives, but when they're given an incentive, it tends to suggest that they 
don’t work. 
M: M3 just wanted to quickly put one more thing up there, which was on like how the PRS sector regulations influence … 
MF1: … on second, because we didn’t connect intermediaries to anything so far, sorry, so they work on the awareness, we 
said, here, on the fraction … 
M: It's parameters of the awareness, but they also just … where's all the bit about them doing it instead of other retrofit? 
MF1: So here. 
M: And there, the link to them actually promoting it, it's definitely a complete move because it comes back to wherever 
they value it. 
MF1: So this one is connected … intermediaries.  So if intermediaries see the …is it, or the other way around? 
M: Yeah.  Also, it's not only the value, it's also the … maybe I was thinking about the attractiveness of the measures and 
stuff because estate agents know what the people are look for basically, like what do people want in their homes. 
03:08:14 
DA1: Maybe desirability. (contribution to a structural change) 
M: Yeah. 
M: Is it not just so the value of the house, but how quickly you can sell it as well.  They're not necessarily the same.  So you 
have got really high end properties that are really difficult to shift because they're so expensive, but if your house is 
ready to move in, it's already got all these energy efficiency measures, would the sale go through quicker, maybe?  I 
don't know. 
M: Are you suggesting it's not a perfect market? (laughter) 
M: It comes back to what we said earlier, the driver of this stuff would be if we could demonstrate improved convenience 
over comfort and cost, so convenience would be good, if you'd show that the house with these things was more 
convenient to operate … 
M: … easy to shift. 
M: Yeah, if you could lose … I was thinking about, yeah, easier to shift in some senses, but again, that comes back to an 
aesthetics of what it is and the ones that I'm thinking about, ones where you lose radiators.  If, for example, under floor 
heating was a retrofit measure, I could pretty easily sell that on because you lose radiators and the radiators take up 
space and they're ugly and so, in convenience terms, probably the cost is, if anything, slightly worse, but in convenience 
terms, I can sell that, do you see what I mean?  On aesthetics, convenience terms, they are the things they're looking for 
… and space, you could convert space into a value as well, in house value terms.   
 So things that are smaller, things that are prettier, things that are more convenient, I can really easily sell, or give you a 
financial value for [inaudible] Reduced running costs, in comparison, are tiny. 
03:10:13 
M: But it's a really important link because it's not, wherever you can, necessarily about bringing down the cost of the 
measures always, it's always like how much do they … as you say, directly improve your set of impacts, that increases 
the amount that people will be …  If find it easier to say 'get these things because it will sell.' 
DA1: That's what customers basically desire and how each of the measures that you might want to put in scores on those 
things. (generic intervention)  
M: Yeah, which is a different chart to the way we chart [inaudible] energy saves, so our thing, so the reason for us choosing 
our measures is how much energy they're saving, therefore how much carbons have changed, say.  The chart is 
completely different and the ones we're looking at, the ones with the almost complete mis-match.  So I'd probably find 
it easier, in some respects, to sell a Google nest than I would a £30 programmable thermostat, just because I could 
show a nut value from that in terms of these other things, even though probably, you ?? 90 per cent of the benefit ?? in 
one sense, but people will pay a lot more for convenience and comfort. 
MF1: So we have a viable convenience, okay and where should we put convenience? 
M: It's a driver. 
MF1:  So no financial benefits … convenience. 
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M: You could probably cost convenience at some point. 
MF1: So it's both financial and  [inaudible] 
M: Yeah. 
 That's a question I had also for me because we talk about increasing the price of energy efficiency, but the reflection of 
energy efficiency on the price, but is it that contrary to the fact that yeah, I look for low cost things.  So maybe one thing 
is the value of how much people value things and how much it cost because the price makes me feel like I don’t want it, 
it costs too much. 
03:12:25 
M: That box is, I think, more about how you would use the stick measures rather than the carrot measures, so there you're 
looking at … your price is right irrespective of your setting.  You're doing [inaudible] whereas yeah, on the regulatory 
side, your language tends to be very terse and direct, this stuff's all marketing.  This is about improving product 
desirability, so you're lowering the need for these interventions because effectively, the market does the lifting for you.  
So if the language is around a different set of things … so you talk about value etc., etc., it's just that I think the context 
we're actually talking. 
M: I think the retrofit desirability, did you do any direct link to the estate agents and everyone kind of recommending it 
because you don't even need more people to be doing it, you just need more people to be desiring it, to then 
recommend it instead of other retrofit. 
MF1:  We had a link from the beginning and probably it's through this way?  From this one, this box, how it is reflecting on the 
price and to financial attractiveness. 
03:14:02 
DA1: That was a different one.  On the retrofit desirability to the communication of agents about it. (connection between 
‘retrofit desirability’ and ‘intermediaries’) 
M: Because they know what people like. 
 
03:14:25 - 03:15:07 (Talking amongst themselves) 
 
MF1: I want to keep 10 minutes to go through all the various issues you mentioned, so we know what you are talking about.  
So DA1, you were mentioning household sustainability concerns and there was some willingness of other actors to 
contribute to retrofit … that's probably connected, okay. 
  
DA1: Yes and the sustainability concern originally was paired with the preference by energy efficiency, so with the idea … well 
basically, what you said, they like convenience, they like aesthetics, they don't like greenness. (generic intervention)  
 
M: Some don't and some do.  
 
DA1: You said five to eight per cent. (generic intervention)    
 
M: It's actually sufficient to build a business on with a high profit margin on the offer, yes it's enough. 
 
MF1: I think it was you DA2, is availability of credit option over you?       
03:16:09 
M: I think that was me … availability of …? 
 
MF1: Credit options. 
 
M: Credit, yeah, finance option, yeah. 
 
MF1: So it would make it more desirable to do it, or more financially attractive. 
 
M: Yeah because I think, as we've talked about a bit before, there is basically 0 per cent on windows on stuff, 0 per cent 
finance and there isn't that on insulation measures, or things like that.  So again, if you're thinking about the 
comparison between different products, it's what I can get on 0 credit.   
 
MF2: Something like reduced interest rates, something like that? 
 
M: Yeah.  As we said … it's funny, we were talking about it the other day, weren't we M2 because even the 0 per cent, it's 
just cooked in to the cost somewhere else, but it would affect, I think, a clear credit offering, it doesn’t matter if, 
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financially, you're being fleeced because they are cooking it into the cost of the measure, but the coherent package, you 
see 0 per cent finance and that's attractive and that doesn’t really exist at the moment.  Again, if the measure's 
attractive, then … 
 




M: Or the ability to straight costs, depending on your financial circumstances.  So effectively, like you said, it's like when 
you buy clothes through one of these catalogues, it's in the measure cost, it's in the cost of it up front, the cost of 
borrowing is built into the cost up front, but the fact it says zero on it  
03:18:03 
M: I think it really is about directly … it's not a financial thing necessarily, but it directly links the desirability.  It's more to do 
with are there people offering like a clear, easy bundle package for a consumer because the drop out point on the 
customer journey is when you realise that the measure is expensive and then you realise that you have to go out and 
find the credit for it yourself. 
M: Desirability  [inaudible], you have the desire to do it and then there's an affordability element to it as well.  So it's the 
next step, you want to get your windows double glazed, how you pay for it and you fall at that hurdle, maybe. 
M: I think, honestly, it's partly two-way, there are two things because I think you can probably get your windows double 
glazed partly because someone's selling them to you at 0 per cent finance, so you think 'okay, that sounds like a good 
thing to do I'm not paying any surcharge, I'm not the lender of the money - even if you are … it's also, again, basically, 
you've this up somewhere …upfront cost.  So what's one of the key things, the measures that we're talking about in 
common, they tend to have larger upfront costs, so I'm interested in that bit. 
 If you have a company that offers … I've got the finance at 0 per cent, I've got the measure … 
MF1: So the [inaudible] is [inaudible] connected to this one? 
M: Yeah. 
MF1: I'll put already here, if you don't mind. 
M: Yeah. 
MF1: So would it make sense also to [inaudible] you said … so maybe that you could be the reason why there is a connection 
between ??   Then we have household's preference for EE, that should be ??  desirability. 
03:20:20 
DA1:    Yeah. (contribution to a structural change) 
MF1: Does everybody agree with that … okay. 
MF2: It is very connected to like attribute other things, like the priority, low priority. 
MF1: So the priority they give to energy efficiency … 
M: Over the [inaudible] 
MF1: The same, perfect … and I think one of the last ones ?? desirability versus other … 
M1: It's the same thing, but for lenders.  So lenders will only go to this market if they think they'll make more money in this 
market compared to doing similar things in different markets … so cars, I'm trying to think of other markets, but things 
that traditionally … 
M: Or credit cards, or whatever.  So all the things that we're talking about …I'd try and keep that, make it … yeah.   
MF1: Shall we also pick up PRS from M3?  Can someone explain … 
M: Yeah, so what he's saying there is the fact that you have a set of regulations requiring private rented accommodation to 
improve, I think we talked about it a bit last time, is here is pretty much exclusively owner occupiers on this map, but 
the fact that you have regulations on the rented properties improving and the general stock of those properties 
improving over time has a number of effects into this.  Over supply of houses which were really rubbish, into the owner 
occupier market from the private rental sector market for a start. 
03:22:18 
M: So there's a negative on the stock, basically.  It's increasing the non-retrofitted stock. 
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M: Yes, it's increasing the owner occupier port of retrofitted stuff, yes.  So do you get it because you're putting a regulation 
on rented properties to improve, if you can't rent the property because you have to improve it to a certain degree, you 
just sell it and someone buys it outright, to own, because then you don’t have the regulation in this area. 
 So because you're saying you can't rent a property unless it's at least E, which is what we're saying, and if you can't 
improve it for that amount, you just sell it and you sell it to someone who … so all those properties start to bleed in to 
this area; you've got low quality properties that are probably hard to retrofit. 
MF1: Is this price already in place? 
M: I think it started in [inaudible] 
MF1: So this   ??  increase the ?? 
MF2: Then more people buy house or sells house. 
MF1: But they don't retrofit them. 
M: It's always at the lower end.  So it's [inaudible] stock which is poor, if you've got that somewhere. 
DA1: It shifts … it sells off the retrofitted, so they drop and they go back to the susceptible non-retrofit, so it inverses the flow 
in some way. (contribution to a structural change) 
M: Yes, exactly. 




M: Coming back to size of market, quote rented stock is for the domestic sector … I can't remember the percentage of this 
… is it 15?  We don't know.  Anyway, how many  ?? G rated houses are there, there's not many.  So it causes demand for 
products of about 100,000.  If we believe that economies of scale drove supply chains, then in terms of product 
distribution, then you would see prices coming down, so it might positively improve the market and improve the install 
of suppliers livelihood.  Of course, it may also drag them out of the owner occupier sector, but … 
M: I think it's the thing to be aware of and it's important in many ways.    
M: Yeah, it's whether, basically, you get more money doing the private rented stocks, they're desperate to hit the April 
deadline  … 
M: … any beyond, if we can extend it.   
DA1: But what do you see in the actual numbers, you're probably monitoring this already, do you see … (generic intervention)  
M: … we are, yeah. 
DA1: Do you see that the old housing stock is already being sold?  The rented housing stock?  Do you see that the retrofit has 
already started? (generic intervention\\repetitions)  
M: Yes, but the thing is, we don't do tenure of sale, nobody reports tenure of sale, so you wouldn’t know whether they are 
POS going out into owner occupier, or whether they've always been owner occupier. 
M: It's had an impact on the values, like the value of properties. 
M: Yes, it has done.  It's also, in non-dom sectors, it's really had a massive effect and will continue to do so, even if it's in 
the owner occupier where you can't rent. 
03:26:28 - someone leaves the meeting 
M: The supply chain is, as you were saying, it's difficult to say because it should lead to an expansion because it's a 
considerable expansion in the demand in the sector, but it's just whether it just pulls everyone to that one area, like our 
policies tend to do, pull people towards doing those types of properties.  So it might have … what is the best link …?    
DA1: And probably does not deeply retrofit the [inaudible] they would then just barely meet the … (generic intervention) 
M: … not where it is at the moment, yeah.  On the whole, it's going to drive one or two measures and considering 
landowners, they're very unlikely to want to do anything more than they have to do. 
DA1: So they will just stop …? (generic intervention) 
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M: I think it effects the … I'm trying to look where … it's within the supply chain part … I think there's something, maybe, 
that we've got around installers, the amount of installers doing either kind of retrofit in the owner occupier market … it 
must be somewhere around. 
03:28:59 
M: Yeah, exactly.  It's kind of … 
MF1: So PRS stimulates the supply chain for single measures. 
M: Kind of, but in some ways not because it stimulates them for the other market that we're talking about.  Yeah, if you're 
taking the market as a whole, it does.  It probably is one market, yeah.  It's a complex thing because … do you see what I 
mean, the installers who just chase the kind of incentives and the profits will go straight to just focusing on private 
rented sector properties. 
M: That's where the monies are and if you think about just a general capacity of it … it might cause an expansion in capacity 
I suppose, you might get more people come in. 
DA1: Are you also saying that it might actually decrease the availability of that part of the supply chain for …? (facilitation 
intervention8) 
M: In the short run, while it adjusts. 
M: Yeah, but there's very few people who demand measures that are outside of the subsidy schemes anyway. 
03:30:06 
MF1: Okay, so it's [inaudible] 
M: It should and it could lead to expansion, I think.  You've got the valuation and then you've got … ?? mainstream.   I just 
wanted to catch … because we didn’t quite do the lenders trust thing.  So that goes to, what links to that is the 
perceived … there was a huge one we had about the return the savings and everything from the measures.  Basically, 
the lenders say … 
MF1: So this one influenced the trust of the lenders. 
M: Yeah.  That one does … is there a credibility one which is linked at some point to quality and all those types of things?  
Yes, that's already linked, it's part of the loop, isn't it. 
MF1: It goes through and  [inaudible] performance and then performance, I think, goes to … 
M: That is the one I was looking for, the performance.  Their concern goes on a number of things, the performance is really 
… yeah, on everything. 
DA1: It's not on the financial savings, it's also does it deliver what people want from it, like even if it's aesthetics, or something 
else like that. (connection between ‘measure performance’ and ‘lender trust’) (connection between ‘reliability of EPC’ 
and ‘retrofit credibility L/D’)  
03:32:03 
MF1: Okay, quality and credibility, or effectiveness, could it be? 
DA1: Credibility and performance of the measure, one of those, just make a shadow variable, so that we know that … 
(connection between ‘measure performance’ and ‘lender trust’\\repetitions) (connection between ‘reliability of EPC’ 
and ‘retrofit credibility L/D’\\repetitions) 
MF1: Performance, I think was everything. 
M: And finally, the quality also, they're not the only ones of course who lend, you have unsecured lenders who lend on like 
anyone who's not lending on the asset, on the basis of the asset they own, so any other kind of finance option, who will 
be responsible for the measure installed if it goes wrong, that's the difference between a secured and non-secured 
lender.  So you've got the availability of the financing options.  It's a little bit complicated because like a bank isn’t the 
only person who could feasibly lend you the money … 
M: … you could put it on the credit card, if you wanted to. 
M: Yeah, or you could have a personal loan, which wouldn't be against your home and on that, when it's lending like that, 
then you have the Consumer Credit Agreement and the person who lends you the money is responsible for the thing 
they lend you the money on, so if the installation is crap, they're liable, so poor quality installation decreases their 
willingness to get involved in the market and lend on it. 




M: Those kinds of things helped a lot and that's  ?  that's what some of those things are trying to address. 
MF2: ??  lenders are secure, unsecured … 
03:34:18 
M: It's based on the … secured lender, you're lending on the value of the asset of the home, rather than not doing so, 
which is like a personal finance loan would be different. 
DA1: So one time it's the asset of the value of the home and the other time is kind of the measure. (contribution to a structural 
change) 
M: Yes, exactly and so the lender doesn’t have the same issue around they're not liable for the thing installed, but they 
have a credibility issue with lending and they just have, as we talked about, if in any sense they're lending on the basis 
of savings, or anything for the types of products we're talking about, they mainly trust in the savings installed. 
MF1: We are getting to a closure … are you satisfied?  Do you think something is missing?  
M: I think we've covered a lot.  Something will come up at some point, in which case, I'll just drop you guys an email. 
MF2: Possibly a big, big question now is we have talked about some policies and all this model processes going on; what is the 
main question we want to explore?  What is it we want to know after all this effort of modelling?  We want to create a 
model able to simulate … it  would be not so much expert prediction, but more understanding … to improve the 
understanding of this map, so of the reality, let's say.  So what would be the highest priority to check, like what happens 
if I do this, or …?    
03:36:40 
DA1: In an order of priority. (generic intervention)  
M: We discussed it a bit in the first session, but the first one is around … a lot of it is to do with the kind of mortgage 
market in the sense it's like one is what if you have a target on the mortgage lenders to … like the kind of thing that M3 
was talking about, of improving the stock of the homes they're lending to. 
 The other is what would be the impact of a couple of the incentives that we talked about for mortgage lenders, like the 
capital lending requirement be relaxed, like the reduction on the interest rate that they're lending … 
MF1: So they can add more and the different interest rate, you … 
M: Yeah, exactly. 
MF1: Both of them are real? 
DA1: One is kind of the re-financing that is done with a different interest rate and the other one is their own capital that they 
need to reserve it. (generic intervention) 
03:38:11 
MF2: So this one, could it be like lending more money?    
M: Even lending more money, or lend at a lower rate - assuming that it's competitive. 
MF2 So is it kind of the same thing, or not?  So they lend more money if they … okay and interest rate, maybe they lend more 
money because they attract most people, something like that? 
M: Yeah, it's different.  There are different ways of achieving … 
MF1: So we try to change the way the market here will shift. 
MF2: So it would be important to understand … stamp duty? 
M: Yes, it goes out the same … say you offer .. 
MF1: You don’t pay the stamp duty when you buy … 
M: What it's most likely to be is you offer a rebate from the stamp duty, if you make some improvements in the period 
after you buy your home. 
M: A year or so. 
M: So you take it, or lose it - so once you buy the home, do those improvements - so it's a little rebate that way and 
potentially also, a fine that would be capturing the same properties that perhaps with IPRS, so if you're selling that 
property, you can still sell it, but it's going to cost you a bit more on top. 
MF1: So it works double sides. 
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M: Double sided, exactly. 
MF1: You retrofit, you pay, you get some money back and if you ?? you pay more. 
M: Yeah and you probably equal out the fine in the terms of a rebate that you receive.  Potentially, the rebate applies for 
more than just the properties at the bottom end, you could offer it to a wider array of people on the basis that 
[inaudible]  but the two would somewhat equal out. 
03:40:12 
DA1: And the fine would just apply to lower efficiency housing, not to all who do not retrofit (generic intervention) … 
M: And right at the bottom. 
M: So there's that and the final one - and this is a little ... as you've probably got from the discussions, is a little bit more 
complicated to capture - is around the tax. 
MF1: So the consumer has retrofit tax credit? 
M: Yeah, kind of.  The problem is that it's a complex area, to get exactly how it intends to work.  I don’t know whether it's 
easier just to … the aim is that when you do retrofit, either at the same time as doing renovation, then there's a 
deduction on the cost of the whole work.  So it actually can come in a number of different ways, the vehicle through 
which you would do it in would be a result of the kind of tax laws are there, but basically, it's trying to directly get in in 
that area … so that you're doing the same at the same time, or say okay, if you're doing your renovations to your home, 
if you also do the insulation, like it's going to be an additional saving, but say only at that time, or something, so 
again[inaudible]  
DA1: There would be a reduction to the entire renovation, not only to the retrofit. (generic intervention) 
M: Yeah, but not at a cost that would be ridiculous, not at the cost that would be more than the cost of the measure, say, it 
probably wouldn't make any sense. 
MF1: And if I just retrofit, I wouldn’t get any support, right. 
03:42:10 
M: No, you would still get it, but there wouldn't be as strong … the incentive would probably be the thing.  So the reduction 
would be a lot more if you were doing … 
MF1: Because it's a percentage of the …  kind of here, should be a percentage of the profit. 
M: Otherwise we'd be driving people to retrofit their kitchens, like doing strange things, so that would cover it. 
MF1: So the revision we apply to all the retrofit, but it depends on the amount of money they want to spend.  So if they just 
do loft insulation, it doesn't impact so much, but if they are reforming their kitchen, maybe … 
M: … and in the loft at the same time. 
MF1: Yeah, they will get a discount. 
M: The whole package. 
M: I wouldn't worry, no-one retrofits …  
MF1: I was thinking of representing the model and if we can put it here, like on the reduction on the up-front cost and we can 
anchor the reduction here to the … 
M: … the idea would be that you would only attract it if it was deep retrofit, so you wouldn't just be able to do your loft 
insulation and then get a massive discount, that wouldn't make any sense, but if you were going to do a substantial 
improvement to the property, then you could gain a substantial reduction.  So if you think of a large renovation that's 
taking place, if you're going to make it really efficient at the same time, you can get a significant reduction. 
DA1: Would the reduction be larger than the cost of the retrofit part? (generic intervention)  
M: No, I don't think so, no. 
DA1: Why don't you just then say 'okay, you get a 50 per cent reduction on the retrofit part.' (generic intervention) 
M: Yeah … I think it could …there's detail still to be worked out on it, I think you're right, that could be the way of doing it. 
03:44:12 
M: I think it starts to get a bit messy, as in your builder might say  … I dunno. 
M: If you could make it work that way, then I think that works just as well, but it's trying to, as you say, try and tie it at the 
time to the trigger point because then it makes sense to do it at the same time, otherwise I don't think it will have much 
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effect.  It could work in that respect.  It is probably, ultimately, a presentational issue about how … it's about limiting the 
money, there will be a limit on whatever you do, it's not a completely ridiculous bung where you're overpaying on 
subsidy for something, but it will be designed in such a way that it looks like 'oh, we really should do this at the same 
time.'  So presentation of what it's actually budged out, but the reality is, it wouldn’t exceed the cost of the retrofit, but 
it would be an incentive to do it at the same time. 
DA1: If you lower your income by the amount that you pay on retrofit and don’t pay income tax on that part. (generic 
intervention)  
M: I think income tax credits are quite tricky.  The tax deductions on your income … that sounds like a salary kind of thing. 
DA1: If you say 'oh this year, I spent £5,000 on retrofit, therefore I can lower my …' my income is basically lower … (generic 
intervention) 
M: … that's like a salary sacrifice, basically, that's what you get [inaudible] but actually, it's also another thing that … 
DA1: … but that's not what you were thinking. (generic intervention) 
M: No, that's one of the others, that's a final one.  It really is the delivery mechanism for achieving the same ultimate goal, 
but yeah, that's a tax deduction in a different way. 
03:46:11 
MF1: So the last mechanism is this one. 
MF2: ??  actions on renovations? 
M: It's somewhat different. 
DA1: And the tax reductions on the renovations, how do they then come in if it's not via the income tax?  What tax is that, is 
it sales tax that you don't pay? (generic intervention) 
M: Exactly … the VAT is already reduced - this would be one mechanism that you do - the VAT's already reduced for the 
energy efficiency project, but you could say for the whole retrofit, for the whole renovation, you could reduce the VAT, 
but cap the amount that doesn’t make it like a ridiculous … you could be doing a £100,000 improvement to your 
property and that would make … yeah, design it in such a way that it would make it void out, that would be one 
mechanism that could work. 
END OF THE MAPPING PART 
WRAP UP AND FEEDBACKS 
MF1: Before we close the session, I would like to ask you both for feedback on what you think about what DA1 and DA2 did 
because it was quite some differences from what we do usually, I think as participants, they were putting variables, they 
were suggesting places actually.  Did you feel any difference? 
M: As M3 said, it's good to have challenge and more input, I think it works well. 
MF1: Did they have any issue with …?   Nothing? 
M: I thought it was quite useful, just a different thought process. 
M: Working in a different way. 
M: For avoiding group thinking think it's really important … because we will all ultimately work together and work on 
[inaudible] it's good to have a challenge. 
MF1: That's good to hear, actually. 
M: You got trust 
03:48:16 to 03:50:36 - background chat  
DA1: I would just like to ask you what you got out of the day. 
M: I think I got, again, a deeper understanding of where some of the pressure points are, I think we got into some really 
interesting stuff around all of the things around the desirability and how that feeds back into the market in terms of 
intermediaries, through estate agents and everything and how important that is and getting down to the fact of all 
these elements are not to do with value and financial value that are really, really important for driving this market and 
then the complexity of our different markets around one geared to deliver single measures and one certainly not and 
finally, it was actually just interesting having the PRS and again, reminding ourselves that there is one market driver 
already that's going to push the kind of thing we're trying to achieve, so to summarise, actually putting things together, 
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it's about the performance of the measures and again, seeing that there are things in there that there has always been 
questions around behaviour and everything, but as we start to draw it together, we see some of the trends that are 
happening and the automation of the new technology, which might finally start to answer some of those issues and the 
barriers that have prevented all of the other players being involved in the market. 
03:52:13 
 It's really good to strengthen those things and think like we'll see what they come up with and suggest as well, but it 
feels like there's some real pressure areas around performance and trust in that and then some things around the 
market and then some things around the value propositions for customers that are very important and it would be good 
to know, as we look at our policies, like how much they might address it and where the shortfall might still be, but we'll 
see. 
 I'm fully aware that these things don't answer it in the whole, so as always, seemingly things like everything … y'know it 
was very telling, yeah. 
MF1: It was your first time? 
M: Yeah, I came to this not having a really rough idea of how this all fitted together and then I just realised, it's a bit of a 
mess.  The main takeaway is it's useful that we highlighted the areas where there are hurdles that the market itself is 
not crossing and that we, as government, where we can try and help and alleviate those problems, it's useful for policy       
[inaudible] . 
M: It is because we have a quid pro quo market based approach and I think, finally, people are starting to understand that 
it's very complicated.  For a market to work properly often requires intervention, like many leaders. 
M: And the right amount, otherwise … 
M: Yeah, totally.   
03:54:13 - 03:55:20 - background chat 
M: I think, in terms of the impact of the work inter-departmentally, it would help if we drew in a few other people, but we 
can do two different sessions. 
03:56:05 - 03:57:28 - background chat. 
M: To be perfectly honest, we're aiming for July, but depending on how conversations go with Treasury, if they say 'you 
can't publish these types of policy ideas in a call for evidence until we've had more discussion,' then it will be pushed 
back and I'm just trying to be realistic on how things often come around here, they get pushed back a lot.  So we do 
have an aim to get it done before the summer, but I can't give a certainty on whether that will happen or not. 





Annex F: Correspondence between Devil’s Advocate inputs and structure     
Structural input in the script* Corresponding structure in the map* 
“Rebound effect” “Rebound effect” 
“Probability of unintended consequences” “Unintended consequences” 
“Probability of unintended consequences” 
“Negative word of mouth”; “Speed of negative word of mouth” 
“Unintended consequences”  “Measure performance”  “Word 
of mouth effect” 
“Quality of retrofit” “Probability of unintended consequences” “Quality”  “Measure performance” 
“Energy use” depends on the “EE level of the house” and on the  
“Compliance of householders behaviour with the new retrofit 
measure” 
“Behavioural compliance”  “Measure performance” 
“Fragmentation “Quality of retrofit”; 
“Skills of installer” “Quality of retrofit” 
“Market fragmentation”  “Standards”  “Quality”; “SC skills”  
“Quality” 
“Quality of the retrofit” “Performance of the retrofit measure”; 
“Maintenance capacity” “Performance of the retrofit measure”; 
“Customer behaviour” ”Performance of the retrofit measure” 
“Quality”  “Measure performance”;  
“Maintenance frequency”  “Measure performance”; 
“Behavioural compliance”  “Measure performance”; 
“Industrial trust for making investments” “Industry trust” 
“Industry capacity”; “time to adjust capacity” (estimated in 1-2 
years)   
“Capability of response to demand” 
“Installer skills”, “Time to gain skills, Skilled workers” “SC skills” 
“Unskilled workers”  “Skilled workers gap”  “Installers skills” 
 “Quality of retrofit” 
“SC skills”  “Quality”  “Measure Performance” 
“Quality””Credibility of the industry”  “Demand” 
“Quality”  “Measure performance”  “Uncertainty Costs”  
“Perceived costs” 
“Performance of the measures”  “Actual savings” “Measure performance”  “Perceived monthly savings” 
“Economic cycles” “Industry staff dismissed”  “Skills” “Business Cycles” 
“Uncertainty costs” “Effectiveness uncertainty” 
“Monitoring”  “Quality”  “Monitoring”  “Quality” 
“Maintenance costs”  “Actual savings” “Maintenance costs”  “Financial attractiveness” 
“Disposable income”  “Priority given to retrofit” “Households preference for energy efficiency” 
“Marginal improvements”  “Technological level”  
“Performance of the measure” 
“Technological development of deep retrofit”  “Measure 
performance”  
“Trusted information (credibility)” “Tailored feedback to consumer on impact of their work” 
 
* the symbol ‘’ stands for a causal connection   
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Annex G: Facilitator’s second workshop memo 
London 30th March 2017 
 
Yesterday we performed the second workshop of the BEIS-UCL project for studying the homeowners retrofit 
uptake. It lasted more than 4 hours, there were 5 participants and we (the research team) were 4. Overall, it 
can be considered successful. N. and K. played the DAs in these session while V. and I were the facilitators. 
We introduced the DAs experiment to the participants in the beginning. They seemed very willing to try a 
new setting that could improve their understanding and the model. One of them clearly said “it is very nice 
to be challenged”. The word enthusiastic is maybe to strong but ‘I got good vibes’ from the participants when 
we said we want to try the new DA. We started the session with a recap of the previous session and the we 
described the new version of the system map (that we called ‘hybrid map’) and at the end we let the 
participants (including the DAs) to made all the modifications on the structure they though it was needed. 
Then we asked to them to brainstorm some variable that they believed important and missing in the system 
map. After that, in a round robin we discussed all these variables. The impression I got was that all the 
variables provided by the DAs were discussed and then accepted (with or without any adjustment). It seemed 
that the participants liked the session. For example, one of them needed to leave before the conclusion. After 
he left he sent a message to another participant asking to introduce a new variable that he just came up with 
in the map. This ‘extra effort’ done by him shows that there was interest. I think that everything went smooth 
and I didn’t see any conflict or tension in the group. It important to note that the DAs didn’t interfere with 
the facilitation of the workshop except at the end of the session when V and I were facing some troubles to 
depict in the map a group of concepts suggested by the participants (I have to admit that I was tired in that 
part and could be that I was not focus enough). In that moment, one of the DAs intervened and took the floor 
as a facilitator helping in clarifying the concept. However, I feel that among the research team there was a 
lot of team-work during the session (e.g. we respected our roles and accepted to be ‘treated’ differently, we 
tried to make the life of each other as much easy as possible, the two facilitators facilitated in an harmonic 
way in which there was a continuous change between being the modeller and the facilitator, etc.) and I think 
it was crucial for the good outcomes. At the end, participants expressed appreciation for the session and also 






Annex H: Stock and flow model documentation 
Model settings 
Model settings: Initial Time = 0; Final Time = 600; Time step = 0.5; Unit for time = Month; Integration method: 
Euler  
This setting represents a simulation period of 50 years, since the time frame to analyze was chosen to be 
2000-2050. This choice was made because the long term UK emission reductions’ targets are set for 2050. 
A test was conducted to assess whether the time step was appropriate for a correct integration and 0.5 
appeared to be adequate. 
The software used to build the model was Vensim PRO. It was needed since the free version does not allow 
to use arrays (called ‘subscripts’ in the software). Below are reported: first, a table with the specifics of the 
arrays used; second, a table in which all the variables in the model are described (equation, unit and a 
comment explaining the meaning for each variable are reported); lastly, the excel file in which the external 
real data used to ‘feed’ the model are outlined. All these information have been reported since they are all 
















Model subscripts (arrays) 
Subscript name Subscript items Subscript description 
SC resources techno, labour, skills Script used for the three different type of investments the 
supply chain (SC) can do: technology, labour and skills. 
SC type Single ,multi 
Script used to account for the two type of supply chain: 
single and multi. Single supply chain refers to installers that 
are able only to deliver one measure. Installers that are part 
of the multi supply chain are the ones who are able to install 
more than one measure at the same time in an intervention. 
stamp duty band 
up125, up250, up925, 
up1500, over1500 
Script used to group the houses purchased based on the 
stamp duty band they are part of. 
buyers type mortgage, stamp, both 
Script used to divide the three type of house buyers that 
consider retrofit because of the two policies. They can 
consider retrofit because they are offered with a green 
mortgage, because they are eligible of stamp duty rebate or 
because of both. 
EPC score 
epcAB, epcC, epcD, epcE, 
epcF, epcG 
Script used in the model to represent the different 
categories of EPC certificates. Certificates A and B have been 
grouped together because their performances are very 
similar from a broad perspective. Moreover, this choice is 
commonly done in literature. 
extent zero, one, two, three, four 
Retrofit extent indicates a continuum of the number of 
measures installed in a property. If there are only few 
measures installed, we can refer to that property as “lightly 
retrofitted”, whilst if the number of measures installed is 
close to the maximum available, the property can be named 
“deeply retrofitted. Therefore, in the model, extent zero 
indicates houses with zero retrofit measures installed, while 
extent one refers to dwelling with one retrofit measure 
installed and so on. 
interventions 
n, g, b, l, i, gb, gl, gi, bl, bi, li, 
gbl, gbi, gli, bli, gbli 
Intervention is a combination of retrofit measures that can 
be installed. Therefore this script is used to group all the 16 
possible combination of the four measures considered in the 
model simulations (cavity and solid wall insulation are 
mutually exclusive in the model simulations). Here the initial 
letter of every measure is used to create the combination. 
For example, ‘gbl’ means a combination of glazing, boiler and 
loft insulation. ‘N’ stands for the choice of doing nothing. 
measures insulation, loft, glazing, boiler 
Here the measures considered in the model are reported. 
Not to forget that cavity and solid wall are both categorized 
as insulation and they run separately in the model (there is a 
switch to pass from a simulation in which cavity is 
considered to one with solid). 
renovation type amenity, efficiency, extension 
Script used to take into account three different type of 
homeowners considering to top up their amenity and 
generic renovation with retrofit. First, people that started 
with only an amenity renovations and consider retrofit 
because installers’ recommendations (amenity); second, 
people that decided already by themselves to top up their 
renovation with energy efficiency measures because aware 
(efficiency); and third, people doing house extension 




Model Variables and Equations 
Variable name10 Equation Unit Comments 
Accumulated capacity 
gap for measures 
[SC type,measures]= INTEG (measures capacity 
gap accumulation[SC type,measures]-measures 












All the installed measures, also including the one of wall insulation that are mutually 
excluded by the scenario selection 
 
Accumulated number 
of measures per 
intervention under ECO 









number of measures per 
intervention*STEP(1,ECO start) 
measures 
Flow of the intervention done under ECO 
 
actual bill savings by 
intervention 




Real bill savings. They can differ from the expected ones (e.g. low quality installations can 
decrease the savings generated by a measure , or households increasing house 




percentage for training 
MAX(budget percentage for training,1-budget 
percentage for technological investment) 
 
Dmnl 
The budget of investments in workforce is calculated based on what is not invested on 
technology. However the function makes sure that not everything is invested in technology 
and that always something is invested in training 
actual energy savings 
by intervention 
("avg energy consumption for non-retrofitted 
households"-energy consumption by 
interventions 




Here the actual energy savings are calculated subtracting the  energy consumption 
after an intervention to the energy consumption of non-retrofitted households 
Added value to 
property of measures 










How much a measure is believed to add value to a property for reasons excluding energy 
savings 
 
                                                          




capacity due to green 
mortgage 
(1-no restrictions on additional mortgages)* 
MIN(upfront cost for consumer[SC 





Since the lenders have no restriction to the investment for the retrofit, the investing 
capacity for buyers going through green  mortgages correspond to the minimum 
between the cost of the intervention and the additional cash lent  
additional investing 
capacity due to stamp 
duty rebates 
(1+buyers flexibility for additional payments to 
avoid stamp duty)*maximum rebate from 
stamp duty usable to retrofit 
GBP/Interventions 
Total investing capacity of buyers that consider retrofit because stamp duty reasons 
 
adjustment time for 
backlog 
2 Month 
How quick the supply chain can adjust the workforce in order to cover an eventual capacity 
gap. The value is an educated guess made by researchers since no data were available 
 
affordability by buyer 
type 




Dmnl Here the affordability is calculated by the reason buyers are considering retrofit 
affordability by 
renovations type 





Here the affordability of renovators considering to top up their renovation with retrofit is 
calculated per each renovation type (amenity, directly efficiency, in case policy is activated 
also extension) 
affordability steepness 0.8 Dmnl 
Inclination of the tangent function for the affordability. The less inclined the more flat is 
the function and therefore the more spread is the affordability. This results in the fact that 
the range around the precise investing capacity is broader. The value of this function has 
been selected in order to fit best the reference modes 
aggregate measures 
uptake rate 
IF THEN ELSE(Potential for retrofit measures to 
install[measures]>0, MAX(0,SUM(retrofit rate 
by measures[SC type!,measures])),0) 
measures/Month 




cavity wall scenario*solid wall savings+ 




The alternative energy savings for cavity wall and solid wall. When cavity wall scenario is 
on, this variable reports the solid wall values in order to consider them when simulating 




cavity wall scenario*solid INIT distribution+ 
(1-cavity wall scenario)*cavity INIT distribution 
Dmnl 
The alternative stock distribution for cavity and solid depending on the scenario that is run 





cavity wall scenario*solid exogenous installed 
measures+(1-cavity wall scenario)*cavity 
exogenous installed measures 
measures 
This variable accounts for the wall insulation measures installed that are not calculated by 




IF THEN ELSE( cavity wall scenario>0.5, 
 exogenous popularity of solid wall, 
 exogenous popularity of cavity ) 
Dmnl 
The two popularity for cavity and solid are reported here. When the cavity scenario is on, 





IF THEN ELSE( cavity wall scenario>0.5, 
 exogenous retrofitted fraction for solid, 
 exogenous retrofitted fraction for cavity) 
Dmnl 
The alternative retrofitted fraction for cavity wall and solid wall. When cavity wall scenario 
is on, this variable reports the solid wall values in order to consider them when simulating 
the scenario. It works also vice versa 
automatization in use 
SMOOTH1( automatization potential , delay to 




These is the actual automatization in use in the system. The potential automatization that 
is develop through technological developments takes time (delay function) to be 







The automatization potential can increase due to technological improvements. Here it is 
averaged 
avg added value of 
renovations 
0.06 Dmnl 
This is the average value added to a property by a generic renovation. it is used as 
reference 
avg affordability for 
buyers 
SUM(affordability by buyer type[buyers 
type!])/ELMCOUNT(buyers type) 
Dmnl Here the affordability are integrated in one variable 
avg affordability for 
renovations 




Here all the affordability for renovators topping up are integrated in one variable since they 
are all the same 
avg boiler duration 120 Month 
Data retrieved from grey literature. Source:  
http://www.doityourself.com/stry/the-average-boiler-life-expectancy  
avg disposable income 20000 
GBP/Month/ 
households 
UK households average disposable income. Educated guess made by researchers 
avg energy bills 








reference consumption for non-retrofitted 




The reference non-retrofitted household energy consumption in 2000 is taken as a 
reference point. Then it is subtracted by external factors than retrofit that impacted the 




SUM(energy consumption by 
interventions[interventions!]*estimated 




Average energy consumed by household 
avg homeowners 
property sales 
reference avg homeowners property sales*risk 
taking attitude by economic cycles 
households/Month 
Average number of property sales per month multiplied by economic cycles. It is believed 
that economic cycle can increase or decrease the amount of sales depending whether the 
sector is in a boost or decline period 
avg installers working 
time 
240 Month It is assumed a worker stays in the industry for 20 years 
avg mortgage size 167000 GBP/Interventions 
Average mortgage size retrieved from grey literature. Source: 
http://www.zoopla.co.uk/discover/property-news/banks-approve-an-average-mortgage-
amount-of-167000/#4jK8D2303r3DPzGd.97  
avg number of 
measures per 
intervention under ECO 
ZIDZ(accumulated number of measures per 















Here the all the popularities of different measures are counted and averaged in order to 
calculated the average retrofit popularity. In this case alternative insulation popularity 
helps in taking into account the popularity of the different insulation scenario 
avg probability of 
measures failures 
(max unintended consequences probability*(1-





This is the average probability of a measure to fail. It depends on the skills of the workforce 
that weight the probability of having a failure, and on the households behavioural 
compliance 
avg profit per measure 
installed 
profit margin*reference prices for individual 
measure[measures] 
GBP/measures 
This is the average profit installers gain per measure 
 
avg quality of installed 
measures 





A number between 0 and 1. It represents how good is the average quality of the 
installations: if 1 it is very high, 0 the opposite 
avg renovation rate total housing stock*renovation fraction households/Month The fraction times the total gives the number of amenity renovations that are done 
avg significance of fuel 
costs 
avg energy bills/avg disposable income Dmnl This variable represents how important are energy bills on the homeowners income 
avg stamp duty 
SUM(avg stamp duty per band[stamp duty 
band!]*estimated property distribution per 
stamp duty band[stamp duty band!]) 
GBP/households 
 
The average stamp duty is calculated multiplying the property distribution by band per the 
relative average stamp duty. Then they are all summed 
 
avg stamp duty per 
band[up125] 
0 GBP/households 
Average stamp duty per house purchase range.  This value is for the range 0 GBP up to 
125000 GBP Source: https://www.gov.uk/stamp-duty-land-tax/residential-property-rates 
avg stamp duty per 
band[up250] 
1250 GBP/households 
Average stamp duty per house purchase range.  This case is for the range 125000 GBP up 
to 250000 GBP Source: https://www.gov.uk/stamp-duty-land-tax/residential-property-
rates 
avg stamp duty per 
band[up925] 
19375 GBP/households 
Average stamp duty per house purchase range.  This case is for the range 250000 GBP up 
to 925000  GBP Source: https://www.gov.uk/stamp-duty-land-tax/residential-property-
rates 
avg stamp duty per 
band[up1500] 
65000 GBP/households 
Average stamp duty per house purchase range.  This case is for the range 925000 GBP up 
to 1500000  GBP Source: https://www.gov.uk/stamp-duty-land-tax/residential-property-
rates 
avg stamp duty per 
band [over1500] 
181250 GBP/households 
Average stamp duty per house purchase range.  This case is for houses more expensive 
than 1500000  GBP Source: https://www.gov.uk/stamp-duty-land-tax/residential-property-
rates 
avg time before 
deciding 
2 Month Time people that are considering  to do a renovation need before to take a decision 
avg time for backlog 
customers drop out 
3 Month 
Average time customers that want a retrofit intervention are willing to wait because the 
supply can not satisfy their demand before to stop wanting that intervention 
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avg time for WF 
adjustment forecasts 
12 Month 
The reference time the supply chain use as horizon to estimate what size the future 
workforce should be when it makes forecasts of demand. It is equivalent to the time the 
supply chain needs to adjust the workforce in excess. Educated guess made by researchers 
avg worker wage 1700 
GBP/workers/ 
Month 
It is an educated guess made by researcher and supported by grey literature 
awareness spreading by 
word of mouth 
contact rate*retrofit 
visibility[measures]*potential fraction by 
measure[measures]*retrofitted fraction by 
measure[measures] 
1/Month 
Here the 'positive' word of mouth of retrofit is calculated. Measures' visibility, households 
contact rate and measures' installed fraction are multiplied in order to estimate the 








Backlog of interventions[SC 
type,interventions]/avg time for backlog 
customers drop out 
Interventions/ 
Month 
If the backlog demand for retrofit is not satisfy in reasonable time the households wanting 
to do an intervention change their mind and decide to not undertake the retrofit 




INTEG (interventions backlog accumulation[SC 
type,interventions]-interventions backlog 
depletion[SC type,interventions]-backlog 
interventions drop out[SC 
type,interventions],0) 
Interventions Accumulation of retrofit interventions not fulfilled by supply chain 








The potential savings then are discounted for the credibility of the retrofit industry. 
0<Retrofit credibility<1. If credibility is low the believed monthly savings are lower than the 
potential because homeowners do not completely believe the expected savings declared 
by the industry 
benefits attractiveness 
financial attractiveness[SC 
type,interventions]*relative importance of 
financial benefits+ "non-financial 
attractiveness per 
intervention"[interventions]*(1-relative 
importance of financial benefits) 
Dmnl 
Here the financial and non-financial attractiveness are integrated in one variable and 
weighted 
budget for upcoming 
month 




The monthly budget for investments is calculated dividing by the time horizon the 
expected profits for manufacturers (these last were calculated for that time horizon) 




This is percentage of the supply chain investment invested in technology development. 
Estimation made by researchers sine no data were available 
budget percentage for 
training 
0.05 Dmnl [0,1] 




buyers awareness of 
stamp duty rebates 
1 Dmnl 
In case the stamp duty rebate policy is activated, the percentage of buyers that when 




ZIDZ(fraction of buyers considering retrofit 
because of green mortgages but not stamp 
rebate,fraction of buyers considering retrofit 
because of green mortgages but not stamp 
rebate+fraction of buyers considering retrofit 
because of stamp rebate but not green 
mortgages+fraction of buyers considering 
retroift because of both stamp rebates and 
green mortgages) 
Dmnl 
Buyers considering retrofit distributed according to the reason why they are considering it 
(stamp duty, green mortgage, and both) 
buyers distribution 
[stamp] 
ZIDZ(fraction of buyers considering retrofit 
because of stamp rebate but not green 
mortgages,fraction of buyers considering 
retrofit because of green mortgages but not 
stamp rebate+fraction of buyers considering 
retrofit because of stamp rebate but not green 
mortgages+fraction of buyers considering 
retroift because of both stamp rebates and 
green mortgages) 
Dmnl 
Buyers considering retrofit distributed according to the reason why they are considering it 
(stamp duty, green mortgage, and both) 
buyers distribution 
[both] 
ZIDZ(fraction of buyers considering retroift 
because of both stamp rebates and green 
mortgages,fraction of buyers considering 
retrofit because of green mortgages but not 
stamp rebate+fraction of buyers considering 
retrofit because of stamp rebate but not green 
mortgages+fraction of buyers considering 




Buyers considering retrofit distributed according to the reason why they are considering it 
(stamp duty, green mortgage, and both) 
buyers drop out ratio 
ZIDZ(SUM(demand for retrofit from buyers[SC 
type!,n]), potential demand from buyers) 
Dmnl Fraction of buyer that after considering retrofit decide not to do anything 
buyers flexibility for 
additional payments to 
avoid stamp duty 
0.5 Dmnl 
Buyers willingness to top up even more the amount of money free up by stamp duty by the 
50% in order to avoid to pay the stamp duty. 50% is and educated guess made by 
researchers 
Buyers planning retrofit 
INTEG ( buyers starting to consider retrofit 
because of green mortgages but not stamp 
rebate 
+buyers starting to consider retrofit because of 
stamp duty rebates-potential demand from 
buyers 
households 




,(buyers starting to consider retrofit because of 
green mortgages but not stamp rebate 
+buyers starting to consider retrofit because of 
stamp duty rebates)*avg time before deciding) 
buyers starting to 
consider retrofit 
because of green 
mortgages but not 
stamp rebate 
fraction of buyers considering retrofit because 
of green mortgages but not stamp rebate*avg 
homeowners property sales 
households/Month 
Flow of buyers starting to consider retrofit only because of green mortgages and not 
because stamp rebate. 
 
buyers starting to 
consider retrofit 
because of stamp duty 
rebates 
stamp rebates eligible and aware fraction*avg 
homeowners property sales 
households/Month 
Flow of buyers starting to consider retrofit only because of stamp duty rebates. It is 





additional investing capacity due to stamp duty 
rebates 





additional investing capacity due to green 
mortgage[SC type,interventions] 





additional investing capacity due to stamp duty 
rebates+ additional investing capacity due to 
green mortgage[SC type,interventions] 
GBP/Interventions Investing capacities per buyers reason for considering retrofit 
cavity exogenous 
installed measures 
GET XLS DATA('energy.xlsx', 'Sheet1' , 'A' , L2' ) measures 
Here the cavity wall measures installed are calculated separately and then, when the solid 
wall scenario is running, exogenously introduced in the model 
cavity INIT distribution 1-solid INIT distribution Dmnl 
Since solid wall and cavity wall are mutually exclusive, the fraction of cavity walls is 
obtained with one minus the solid wall distribution 
cavity wall savings 1200/12 
kWh/Month/ 
measures 
Cavity wall energy savings per month. Source: DECC/BEIS report: 'NATIONAL ENERGY 
EFFICIENCY DATA-FRAMEWORK Summary of analysis using the National Energy Efficiency 
Data-Framework (NEED)' June 2016 
cavity wall scenario 0 Dmnl 
In this model cavity wall and solid wall are mutually exclusive. When the switch is on (1) the 
model simulates cavity wall and when it is of (0) it simulates solid wall. These are visible 
under the 'insulation' names. 
certification bodies 
quality 
effort intensity in enforcing monitoring 
quality+ (1-effort intensity in enforcing 
monitoring quality)*certification bodies quality 
without any enforcement 
Dmnl 
The actual quality certification bodies use in their work. It depends on the reference quality 





quality without any 
enforcement 
0.7 Dmnl 
This value between 0 and 1 represents the quality certification bodies (the entities in 
charge of monitoring retrofit) use in  their work. 1 the quality is maximum and 0 
minimum. It is set lower than the maximum, because during interviews with experts  in 
BEIS it has been said that certification bodies do not do a perfect job and they need to be 
controlled too by external entities 
change in measures 
added value to 
property 
potential for measures increase in added 
value[measures]*pressure to increase 
measures added value[measures]/changing 
time for added value to property 
1/Month Flow accounting for changes in the measures added value to property 
change in perceived 
interventions prices 
difference in prices[SC type,interventions]/past 
prices retention time 
GBP/Interventions/
Month 
Rate of change in perceived prices by homeowners 
change in perceived 
market volume 
(market volume for retrofit by measure[SC 
type,measures]-perceived market volume[SC 
type,measures])/perception time for perceived 
market volume 
GBP/Month/Month 
Rate through which change in market volume are perceived by the actor in the market 
 
change in price 
premium per EPC band 
housing market reactiveness in price change* 
(mortgage premium for EPC band-house price 
premium per EPC band)*STEP(1,EPC mortgage 
policy starting time) 
1/band/Month 
 
Units: Flow representing a closing gap between the mortgage premium for EPC band given 
by lenders and the actual price premium per EPC band in housing prices. In this flow the 
adjustment time is the housing market reactiveness in price change due to policy changes 
changing time for 
added value to 
property 
120 Month Time needed to homeowners to fully appreciate a measure as an added value to a property 
CO2 emissions per kWh 0.271 Kg/kWh 
United Kingdom housing energy fact file (2013): taking data about households energy 
consumption, number of households and CO2 emissions from households we get the 
emissions per unit of energy 
CO2 emitted from 
residential stock 
INTEG ( residential stock emissions, 0) Kg Accumulation of the CO2 emitted from the residential stock 
competitive 
alternatives for amenity 
renovations 
0 Dmnl Other alternatives for amenity renovations than just retrofit measure 
compulsory retrofit for 
extensions switch 
0 Dmnl 
This switch allows to test a policy that makes all compulsory for all the renovators to top up 
with retrofit 
consumers experience 
of measures benefits 
(1-relative importance of financial 
benefits)*thermal comfort by 
measure[measures]+relative importance of 
financial benefits*measures performance on 
bill savings[measures] 
Dmnl 
Here the benefits (non-financial benefits as thermal comfort and financial benefits like 
performance on bill savings) of a measure installed are aggregated and weighted by 
homeowners preference for financial or non financial benefits 
contact rate 0.08 1/Month How frequently households meet and talk about retrofit. This constitutes the contact rate 
contribution from other 
actors 
0 Dmnl 
The fractional contribution other actors in the retrofit system could give in order to 
decrease the retrofit upfront costs for homeowners 
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contribution to skills of 
newly hired 
MAX(0,reference skills of new 
workers*SUM(workforce growth[SC 
type!,measures])) 
workers/Month This flow represents the new workers hired weighted by their skills 
cost of a maintenance 
intervention[SC type] 
50 GBP/Interventions 
This is the cost of maintenance intervention. It is an averaged value and based on 
information found online by researchers that believed them to be reasonably realistic 
cost of hiring 
MAX(0, training costs for 
junior[measures]*desired hiring[SC 





Here the costs of hiring the desired workforce are estimated based on the training costs 
and wage costs. To this costs are subtracted the workers retiring in that time span 
 
costs for senior 
training[measures] 
2000 GBP/workers Educated guess on the costs of training workforce for a skills improvement 
current EPC distribution 
[epcAB] 
0.037 Dmnl 
Housing stock distribution based on the EPC (Energy Performance Certificate). A is very 
efficient while G is very inefficient. 
http://nesstar.ukdataservice.ac.uk/webview/index.jsp?v=2&mode=documentation&submo
de=abstract&study=http://nesstar.ukdataservice.ac.uk:80/obj/fStudy/7518&top=yes 
current EPC distribution 
[epcC] 
0.285 Dmnl 
Housing stock distribution based on the EPC (Energy Performance Certificate). A is very 
efficient while G is very inefficient. 
http://nesstar.ukdataservice.ac.uk/webview/index.jsp?v=2&mode=documentation&submo
de=abstract&study=http://nesstar.ukdataservice.ac.uk:80/obj/fStudy/7518&top=yes 
current EPC distribution 
[epcD] 
0.421 Dmnl 
Housing stock distribution based on the EPC (Energy Performance Certificate). A is very 
efficient while G is very inefficient. 
http://nesstar.ukdataservice.ac.uk/webview/index.jsp?v=2&mode=documentation&submo
de=abstract&study=http://nesstar.ukdataservice.ac.uk:80/obj/fStudy/7518&top=yes 
current EPC distribution 
[epcE] 
0.195 Dmnl 
Housing stock distribution based on the EPC (Energy Performance Certificate). A is very 
efficient while G is very inefficient. 
http://nesstar.ukdataservice.ac.uk/webview/index.jsp?v=2&mode=documentation&submo
de=abstract&study=http://nesstar.ukdataservice.ac.uk:80/obj/fStudy/7518&top=yes 
current EPC distribution 
[epcF] 
0.05 Dmnl 
Housing stock distribution based on the EPC (Energy Performance Certificate). A is very 
efficient while G is very inefficient. 
http://nesstar.ukdataservice.ac.uk/webview/index.jsp?v=2&mode=documentation&submo
de=abstract&study=http://nesstar.ukdataservice.ac.uk:80/obj/fStudy/7518&top=yes 
current EPC distribution 
[epcG] 
0.012 Dmnl 
Housing stock distribution based on the EPC (Energy Performance Certificate). A is very 




MAX( 0, DELAY1( aggregate measures uptake 
rate[measures]*fraction of retrofitting leading 
to failures[measures] , delay to manifest 
unintended consequences)) 
measures/Month 
Rate of measures installed that are defected and become failed measures. It depends on 
the quality of the installation and on the delay a poor installation need to show its low 
quality and become a failed measure 
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delay to implement 
automatization 
48 Month 
The time a new technological enhancement in automatization needs before to become 
systematically installed in the system 




The delay a poor installation need to show its low quality and become a failed measure. 
This estimation is based on the educated guess of Clive Shrubsole (UCL researcher) 
demand for retrofit by 
interventions[SC 
type,interventions] 
:EXCEPT:    [SC type,g],[SC type,i],[SC type,l],[SC 
type,b]= 
(demand for retrofit from buyers[SC 
type,interventions]+ SUM(demand for retrofit 
from renovations[SC 
type,interventions,renovation type!])) 
*interventions per household 
Interventions/ 
Month 
Total demand for retrofit (buyers, renovators, retrofit as amenity, and old boiler 
replacements) by intervention 
demand for retrofit by 
interventions[SC 
type,b] 
(demand for retrofit from buyers[SC 
type,b]+SUM(demand for retrofit from 
renovations[SC type,b,renovation 
type!]))*interventions per household+(retrofit 
measures installed as amenity[boiler]+old 




Total demand for retrofit (buyers, renovators, retrofit as amenity, and old boiler 
replacements) by intervention 
demand for retrofit by 
interventions[SC type,g] 
(demand for retrofit from buyers[SC 
type,g]+SUM(demand for retrofit from 
renovations[SC type,g,renovation 
type!]))*interventions per household+retrofit 
measures installed as 
amenity[glazing]/2/measures per intervention 
Interventions/ 
Month 
Total demand for retrofit (buyers, renovators, retrofit as amenity, and old boiler 
replacements) by intervention 
demand for retrofit by 
interventions[SC type,l] 
(demand for retrofit from buyers[SC 
type,l]+SUM(demand for retrofit from 
renovations[SC type,l,renovation 
type!]))*interventions per household+ retrofit 
measures installed as 
amenity[loft]/2/measures per intervention 
Interventions/ 
Month 
Total demand for retrofit (buyers, renovators, retrofit as amenity, and old boiler 
replacements) by intervention 
demand for retrofit by 
interventions[SC type,i] 
(demand for retrofit from buyers[SC 
type,i]+SUM(demand for retrofit from 
renovations[SC type,i,renovation type!])) 
*interventions per household + retrofit 





Total demand for retrofit (buyers, renovators, retrofit as amenity, and old boiler 
replacements) by intervention 
demand for retrofit 
from buyers 
SUM(buyers distribution[buyers type!]* 
MAX(0,  relative intervention desirability[SC 
households/Month 
 
The demand for buyers is constituted multiplying the potential retrofit demand from 
buyers per their distribution based on the reason why they consider to retrofit, per their 
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type,interventions]* retrofit affordability for 
buyers[SC type,interventions,buyers type!]* 
estimated retrofit potential fraction by 
intervention[interventions]* potential demand 
from buyers)) 
specific  affordability to retrofit, per the potential available in the housing stock, and per 
the relative intervention desirability 
demand for retrofit 
from renovations 
before affordability cut 
[SC type,i,buyers type] 
potential demand from buyers for potential 
fraction[buyers type,i]*(relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,i]/(relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,i]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,n]))+potential demand 
from buyers for potential fraction[buyers 
type,gi]*(relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,i]/(relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,i]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,g]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,gi]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,n]))+potential demand from buyers for 
potential fraction[buyers type,li]*(relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,i]/(relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,i]+relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,l]+relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,li]+relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,n]))+ potential 
demand from buyers for potential 
fraction[buyers type,bi]* (relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,i]/(relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,i]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,b]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,bi]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,n]))+potential demand 
from buyers for potential fraction[buyers 
type,gbi]* (relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,i]/(relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,i]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,n]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,g]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,b]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,gb]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,gi]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,bi]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,gbi]))+ potential demand from buyers for 
potential fraction[buyers type,gli]* (relative 
households/Month 
Here the demand for retrofit from renovators willing to top up their renovation with 
retrofit, and already distributed based on the potential, is distributed based on the 
intervention desirability. There are 16 different equations for the same variable because 
there are 16 different interventions. The equations are so long because for each the 
specific intervention desirability all the different buyers that can potentially install the 




intervention desirability[SC type,i]/(relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,i]+relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,n]+relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,g]+relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,l]+relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,gl]+relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,gi]+relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,li]+relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,gli]))+ 
potential demand from buyers for potential 
fraction[buyers type,bli]* (relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,i]/(relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,i]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,n]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,b]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,l]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,bl]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,bi]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,li]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,bli]))+potential demand 
from buyers for potential fraction[buyers 
type,gbli]* (relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,i]/(SUM(relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,interventions!]))) 
demand for retrofit 
from renovations 
before affordability cut 
[SC type,b,buyers type] 
potential demand from buyers for potential 
fraction[buyers type,b]* (relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,b]/(relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,b]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,n]))+potential demand 
from buyers for potential fraction[buyers 
type,gb]* (relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,b]/(relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,b]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,g]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,gb]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,n]))+ potential demand from buyers for 
potential fraction[buyers type,bl]*  
(relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,b]/(relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,b]+relative intervention desirability [SC 
type,l]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,bl]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
households/Month 
Here the demand for retrofit from renovators willing to top up their renovation with 
retrofit, and already distributed based on the potential, is distributed based on the 
intervention desirability. There are 16 different equations for the same variable because 
there are 16 different interventions. The equations are so long because for each the 
specific intervention desirability all the different buyers that can potentially install the 




type,n]))+potential demand from buyers for 
potential fraction[buyers type,bi]* (relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,b]/(relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,i]+relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,b]+relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,bi]+relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,n]))+ potential 
demand from buyers for potential 
fraction[buyers type,gbi]* (relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,b]/(relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,i]+relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,n]+relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,g]+relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,b]+relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,gb]+relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,gi]+relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,bi]+relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,gbi]))+ 
potential demand from buyers for potential 
fraction[buyers type,gbl]*(relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,b]/(relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,b]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,n]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,g]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,l]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,gl]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,gb]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,bl]+ relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,gbl]))+ potential demand 
from buyers for potential fraction[buyers 
type,bli]* (relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,b]/(relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,i]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,n]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,b]+relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,l]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,bl]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,bi]+relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,li]+relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,bli]))+potential demand from buyers 
for potential fraction[buyers type,gbli]* 
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(relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,b]/(SUM(relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,interventions!]))) 
demand for retrofit 
from renovations 
before affordability cut 
[SC type,g,buyers type] 
potential demand from buyers for potential 
fraction[buyers type,g]*(relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,g]/(relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,g]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,n]))+ potential demand 
from buyers for potential fraction[buyers 
type,gb]* (relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,g]/(relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,g]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,b]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,gb]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,n]))+ potential demand from buyers for 
potential fraction[buyers type,gl]*(relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,g]/(relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,g]+relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,l]+relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,gl]+relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,n]))+ potential 
demand from buyers for potential 
fraction[buyers type,gi]* (relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,g]/(relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,i]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,g]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,gi]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,n]))+potential demand 
from buyers for potential fraction[buyers 
type,gbi]* (relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,g]/(relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,i]+relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,n]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,g]+relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,b]+relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,gb]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,gi]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,bi]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,gbi]))+potential demand 
from buyers for potential fraction[buyers 
type,gbl]*(relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,g]/(relative intervention desirability 
households/Month 
Here the demand for retrofit from renovators willing to top up their renovation with 
retrofit, and already distributed based on the potential, is distributed based on the 
intervention desirability. There are 16 different equations for the same variable because 
there are 16 different interventions. The equations are so long because for each the 
specific intervention desirability all the different buyers that can potentially install the 




[SC type,b]+relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,n]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,g]+relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,l]+relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,gl]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,gb]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,bl]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,gbl]))+ potential demand 
from buyers for potential fraction[buyers 
type,gli]* (relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,g]/(relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,i]+relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,n]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,g]+relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,l]+relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,gl]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,gi]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,li]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,gli]))+potential demand 
from buyers for potential fraction[buyers 
type,gbli]* (relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,g]/(SUM(relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,interventions!]))) 
demand for retrofit 
from renovations 
before affordability cut 
[SC type,l,buyers type] 
potential demand from buyers for potential 
fraction[buyers type,l]* (relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,l]/(relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,l]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,n]))+ potential demand 
from buyers for potential fraction[buyers 
type,bl]*  (relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,l]/(relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,l]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,b]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,bl]+relative intervention desirability [SC 
type,n]))+ potential demand from buyers for 
potential fraction[buyers type,gl]* (relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,l]/(relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,g]+relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,l]+relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,gl]+relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,n]))+ potential 
demand from buyers for potential 
households/Month 
Here the demand for retrofit from renovators willing to top up their renovation with 
retrofit, and already distributed based on the potential, is distributed based on the 
intervention desirability. There are 16 different equations for the same variable because 
there are 16 different interventions. The equations are so long because for each the 
specific intervention desirability all the different buyers that can potentially install the 




fraction[buyers type,li]*(relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,l]/(relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,i]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,l]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,li]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,n]))+ potential demand 
from buyers for potential fraction[buyers 
type,bli]* (relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,l]/(relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,i]+relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,n]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,l]+relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,b]+relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,bl]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,li]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,bi]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,bli]))+ potential demand 
from buyers for potential fraction[buyers 
type,gbl]*(relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,l]/(relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,b]+relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,n]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,g]+relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,l]+relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,gl]+ relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,gb]+relative intervention 
desirability [SC type,bl]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,gbl]))+potential demand 
from buyers for potential fraction[buyers 
type,gli]* (relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,l]/(relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,i]+relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,n]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,g]+relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,l]+relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,gl]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,gi]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,li]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,gli]))+ potential demand 
from buyers for potential fraction[buyers 
type,gbli]* (relative intervention desirability[SC 




demand for retrofit 
from renovations 
before affordability cut 
[SC type,gb, buyers 
type] 
potential demand from buyers for potential 
fraction[buyers type,gb]*(relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,gb]/(relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,g]+relative intervention 
desirability [SC type,b]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,gb]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,n]))+ potential demand 
from buyers for potential fraction[buyers 
type,gbi]*(relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,gb]/(relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,i]+relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,n]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,g]+relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,b]+relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,gb]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,gi]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,bi]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,gbi]))+ potential demand 
from buyers for potential fraction[buyers 
type,gbl]* (relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,gb]/(relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,b]+relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,n]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,g]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,l]+relative intervention desirability [SC 
type,gl]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,gb]+relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,bl]+relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,gbl]))+ potential demand from buyers 
for potential fraction[buyers type,gbli]* 




Here the demand for retrofit from renovators willing to top up their renovation with 
retrofit, and already distributed based on the potential, is distributed based on the 
intervention desirability. There are 16 different equations for the same variable because 
there are 16 different interventions. The equations are so long because for each the 
specific intervention desirability all the different buyers that can potentially install the 
intervention must be taken into account. This needs to be done for all the 16 possible 
combinations. 
demand for retrofit 
from renovations 
before affordability cut 
[SC type,gl, buyers 
type] 
potential demand from buyers for potential 
fraction[buyers type,gl]* (relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,gl]/(relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,g]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,l]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,gl]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,n]))+ potential demand 
from buyers for potential fraction[buyers 
households/Month 
Here the demand for retrofit from renovators willing to top up their renovation with 
retrofit, and already distributed based on the potential, is distributed based on the 
intervention desirability. There are 16 different equations for the same variable because 
there are 16 different interventions. The equations are so long because for each the 
specific intervention desirability all the different buyers that can potentially install the 




type,gbl]* (relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,gl]/(relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,b]+relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,n]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,g]+relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,l]+relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,gl]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,gb]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,bl]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,gbl]))+ potential demand 
from buyers for potential fraction[buyers 
type,gli]*(relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,gl]/(relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,i]+relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,n]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,g]+relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,l]+relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,gl]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,gi]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,li]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,gli]))+ potential demand 
from buyers for potential fraction[buyers 
type,gbli]* (relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,gl]/(SUM(relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,interventions!]))) 
demand for retrofit 
from renovations 
before affordability cut 
[SC type,gi, buyers 
type] 
potential demand from buyers for potential 
fraction[buyers type,gi]* (relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,gi]/(relative intervention 
desirability [SC type,i]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,g]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,gi]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,n]))+potential demand 
from buyers for potential fraction[buyers 
type,gbi]* (relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,gi]/(relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,i]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,n]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,g]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,b]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,gb]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,gi]+relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,bi]+relative intervention desirability 
households/Month 
Here the demand for retrofit from renovators willing to top up their renovation with 
retrofit, and already distributed based on the potential, is distributed based on the 
intervention desirability. There are 16 different equations for the same variable because 
there are 16 different interventions. The equations are so long because for each the 
specific intervention desirability all the different buyers that can potentially install the 




[SC type,gbi]))+potential demand from buyers 
for potential fraction[buyers type,gli]* 
(relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,gi]/(relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,i]+relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,n]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,g]+relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,l]+relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,gl]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,gi]+ relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,li]+ relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,gli]))+ potential demand 
from buyers for potential fraction[buyers 
type,gbli]*(relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,gi]/(SUM(relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,interventions!]))) 
demand for retrofit 
from renovations 
before affordability cut 
[SC type,bl, buyers 
type] 
potential demand from buyers for potential 
fraction[buyers type,bl]* (relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,b]/(relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,b]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,l]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,bl]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,n]))+ potential demand 
from buyers for potential fraction[buyers 
type,gbl]* (relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,bl]/(relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,b]+relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,n]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,g]+relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,l]+relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,gl]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,gb]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,bl]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,gbl]))+ potential demand 
from buyers for potential fraction[buyers 
type,bli]* (relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,bl]/(relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,i]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,n]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,b]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,l]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,bl]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
households/Month 
Here the demand for retrofit from renovators willing to top up their renovation with 
retrofit, and already distributed based on the potential, is distributed based on the 
intervention desirability. There are 16 different equations for the same variable because 
there are 16 different interventions. The equations are so long because for each the 
specific intervention desirability all the different buyers that can potentially install the 




type,bi]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,li]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,bli]))+ potential demand from buyers for 
potential fraction[buyers type,gbli]* (relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,bl]/ 
(SUM(relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,interventions!]))) 
demand for retrofit 
from renovations 
before affordability cut 
[SC type,bi, buyers 
type] 
potential demand from buyers for potential 
fraction[buyers type,bi]* (relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,bi]/(relative intervention 
desirability [SC type,i]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,b]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,bi]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,n]))+ potential demand 
from buyers for potential fraction[buyers 
type,gbi]* (relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,bi]/(relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,i]+relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,n]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,g]+relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,b]+relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,gb]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,gi]+relative intervention  
desirability[SC type,bi]+relative intervention 
desirability [SC type,gbi]))+ potential demand 
from buyers for potential fraction[buyers 
type,bli]* (relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,bi]/(relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,i]+relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,n]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,b]+relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,l]+relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,bl]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,bi]+ relative intervention 
desirability [SC type,li]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,bli]))+potential demand 
from buyers for potential fraction[buyers 
type,gbli]* (relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,bi]/(SUM(relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,interventions!]))) 
households/Month 
Here the demand for retrofit from renovators willing to top up their renovation with 
retrofit, and already distributed based on the potential, is distributed based on the 
intervention desirability. There are 16 different equations for the same variable because 
there are 16 different interventions. The equations are so long because for each the 
specific intervention desirability all the different buyers that can potentially install the 
intervention must be taken into account. This needs to be done for all the 16 possible 
combinations. 
demand for retrofit 
from renovations 
potential demand from buyers for potential 
fraction[buyers type,li]* (relative intervention 
households/Month 
Here the demand for retrofit from renovators willing to top up their renovation with 
retrofit, and already distributed based on the potential, is distributed based on the 
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before affordability cut 
[SC type,li, buyers type] 
desirability[SC type,li]/(relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,i]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,l]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,li]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,n]))+potential demand 
from buyers for potential fraction[buyers 
type,bli]* (relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,li]/(relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,i]+ relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,n]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,l]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,b]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,bl]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,li]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,bi]+relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,bli]))+potential demand from buyers for 
potential fraction[buyers type,gli]*(relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,li]/(relative 
intervention desirability [SC type,i]+relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,n]+relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,g]+relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,l]+relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,gl]+relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,gi]+relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,li]+relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,gli]))+ 
potential demand from buyers for potential 
fraction[buyers type,gbli]* (relative 
intervention desirability[SC 
type,li]/(SUM(relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,interventions!]))) 
intervention desirability. There are 16 different equations for the same variable because 
there are 16 different interventions. The equations are so long because for each the 
specific intervention desirability all the different buyers that can potentially install the 
intervention must be taken into account. This needs to be done for all the 16 possible 
combinations. 
demand for retrofit 
from renovations 
before affordability cut 
[SC type,gbl, buyers 
type] 
potential demand from buyers for potential 
fraction[buyers type,gbl]* (relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,gbl]/(relative 
intervention desirability [SC type,b]+relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,n]+relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,g]+relative 
intervention desirability [SC type,l]+relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,gl]+relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,gb]+relative 
intervention desirability [SC type,bl]+relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,gbl]))+ 
households/Month 
Here the demand for retrofit from renovators willing to top up their renovation with 
retrofit, and already distributed based on the potential, is distributed based on the 
intervention desirability. There are 16 different equations for the same variable because 
there are 16 different interventions. The equations are so long because for each the 
specific intervention desirability all the different buyers that can potentially install the 




potential demand from buyers for potential 
fraction[buyers type,gbli]*(relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,gbl]/ 
(SUM(relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,interventions!]))) 
demand for retrofit 
from renovations 
before affordability cut 
[SC type,gbi, buyers 
type] 
potential demand from buyers for potential 
fraction[buyers type,gbi]* (relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,gbi]/(relative 
intervention desirability [SC type,i]+relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,n]+relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,g]+relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,b]+relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,gb]+relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,gi]+relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,bi]+relative 
intervention desirability[SC type,gbi]))+ 
potential demand from buyers for potential 





Here the demand for retrofit from renovators willing to top up their renovation with 
retrofit, and already distributed based on the potential, is distributed based on the 
intervention desirability. There are 16 different equations for the same variable because 
there are 16 different interventions. The equations are so long because for each the 
specific intervention desirability all the different buyers that can potentially install the 
intervention must be taken into account. This needs to be done for all the 16 possible 
combinations. 
demand for retrofit 
from renovations 
before affordability cut 
[SC type,gli, buyers 
type] 
potential demand from buyers for potential 
fraction[buyers type,gli]* (relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,gli]/(relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,i]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,n]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,g]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,l]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,gl]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,gi]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,li]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,gli]))+ potential demand 
from buyers for potential fraction[buyers 
type,gbli]* (relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,gli]/(SUM(relative intervention desirability 
[SC type,interventions!]))) 
households/Month 
Here the demand for retrofit from renovators willing to top up their renovation with 
retrofit, and already distributed based on the potential, is distributed based on the 
intervention desirability. There are 16 different equations for the same variable because 
there are 16 different interventions. The equations are so long because for each the 
specific intervention desirability all the different buyers that can potentially install the 
intervention must be taken into account. This needs to be done for all the 16 possible 
combinations. 
demand for retrofit 
from renovations 
before affordability cut 
[SC type,bli, buyers 
type] 
potential demand from buyers for potential 
fraction[buyers type,bli]*(relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,bli]/(relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,i]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,n]+ relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,b]+relative intervention 
households/Month 
Here the demand for retrofit from renovators willing to top up their renovation with 
retrofit, and already distributed based on the potential, is distributed based on the 
intervention desirability. There are 16 different equations for the same variable because 
there are 16 different interventions. The equations are so long because for each the 
specific intervention desirability all the different buyers that can potentially install the 
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desirability[SC type,l]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,bl]+ relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,bi]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,li]+relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,bli]))+ potential demand 
from buyers for potential fraction[buyers 
type,gbli]* (relative intervention desirability[SC 
type,bli]/(SUM(relative intervention 
desirability[SC type,interventions!]))) 
intervention must be taken into account. This needs to be done for all the 16 possible 
combinations. 
demand for retrofit 
from renovations 
before affordability cut 
[SC type,gbli, buyers 
type] 






Here the demand for retrofit from renovators willing to top up their renovation with 
retrofit, and already distributed based on the potential, is distributed based on the 
intervention desirability. There are 16 different equations for the same variable because 
there are 16 different interventions. The equations are so long because for each the 
specific intervention desirability all the different buyers that can potentially install the 
intervention must be taken into account. This needs to be done for all the 16 possible 
combinations. 
demand for retrofit 
from renovations 
MAX(0,demand for retrofit from renovations 
before affordability cut[SC 
type,interventions,renovation type]*retrofit 




Here all the households that desire to top up their renovation with and that are 'cut off' by 
affordability reasons. This number constitutes the demand for retrofit from renovation. It is 
divided by two because there are two competing supply chain (and therefore to not double 
count them) 
 
demand from boiler 
replacements 





The number of old boilers substituted per household is assumed to be one 
demand from buyers 
SUM(demand for retrofit from buyers[SC 
type!,interventions!])- SUM(demand for 
retrofit from buyers[SC type!,n]) 
households/Month  Retrofit intervention demand from buyers because of policy direct impact 
demand from 
renovation drop out 
SUM(demand for retrofit from renovations[SC 
type!,n,renovation type])+potential demand 
from renovations[renovation type] -





Households that were considering to top up their amenity renovation with retrofit, but that 




SUM(demand for retrofit from renovations[SC 
type!,interventions!,renovation type!])- 
SUM(demand for retrofit from renovations[SC 
type!,n,renovation type!]) 
households/Month 





To perceive changes in demand it takes time. This time is estimated in 6 months. It is an 
educated guess made by researchers based on the frequency of reports on the subject 
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desirability of not 
retrofitting 
2 Dmnl 
This variable represents how desirable is the option to not do nothing when people 
consider retrofit. The value has been chosen arbitrarily by researchers. It seems to match 
well the reference mode. 
desired change in 
future workforce 






Based on the projected demand divided by the workforce productivity (and taking into 
account the projected retiring rate) it is possible to calculate the desired future workforce 
needed for sustainable supply chain 
 
desired hiring 
MAX(0,desired change in future workforce[SC 
type,measures]) 
workers 
If the desired change in future workforce is positive, it means that new workforce is desired 
to be hired 
desired investment for 
quality improvement 
perceived gap in quality[measures]*costs for 
senior training[measures]/training time*total 
WF[measures] 
GBP/Month 
Based on the quality gap perceived and on the costs for training the total workforce the 
desired investment for improving the workforce skills is calculated 
desired lay-offs 
MAX(0,-desired change in future workforce[SC 
type,measures]) workers 
If the desired change in future workforce is negative, it means the supply chain wants to 
fire part of its workforce 
desired payback time 70 Month 
The time homeowners would like to repay back their investment. Source Mike Gentry from 
BEIS: from previous policy experience with Green Deal, 25 years is already a not desired 
payback time. However there is a knowledge gap in the organization on that. A good proxy 
might be the avg time homeowners stay in a house. 




How much time the supply chain investors would like to see repaid their investments. 
Educated guess made by researchers 
 
difference in prices 
prices of interventions[SC type,interventions]-
perceived prices of interventions for 
consumers [SC type,interventions] 
GBP/Interventions 
This variable accounts for changes in interventions prices due to subsidies 
 
ease of available credit 
options 
0 GBP/Interventions 
This is a variable representing the possibility for renovators willing to top up their amenity 
renovation to find easy credit to increase their investing capacity  
easy estimation of 
energy consumption 
per hh 
avg energy consumption for non-retrofitted 
households - energy savings per household 
from installed measures 
kWh/Month/ 
households 
Here to the average energy consumption for non-retrofitted households is subtracted the 
energy savings per households due to retrofit measure installed 
ECO start 156 Month The time in the simulation when the ECO subsidies start 
ECO subsidies[glazing] 0 Dmnl 
How much the ECO subsidies discount the final price for homeowners. These are 
estimation based on the information retrieved from Andrei Miller and Karl Haughton (BEIS 
experts) 
ECO subsidies[boiler] 0.17 Dmnl 
How much the ECO subsidies discount the final price for homeowners. These are 
estimation based on the information retrieved from Andrei Miller and Karl Haughton (BEIS 
experts) 
ECO subsidies[loft] 0.2 Dmnl 
How much the ECO subsidies discount the final price for homeowners. These are 






(1-cavity wall scenario)*0.7+ 
cavity wall scenario*0.45 
 
Dmnl 
How much the ECO subsidies discount the final price for homeowners. These are 
estimation based on the information retrieved from Andrei Miller and Karl Haughton (BEIS 
experts) 
economic cycles switch 0 Dmnl 
Switch to activate the oscillations of economic cycles 
 
economic cycles time 240 Month 
The time the SIN function needs to complete an oscillation. Twenty years is in line with the 
information retrieved from workshop participants 
 
EEC and CERT start 24 Month The time in the simulation when EEC and CERT subsidies start 
EEC and CERT 
subsidies[glazing] 
0 Dmnl 
How much the EEC and CERT subsidies discount the final price for homeowners. These are 
estimation based on the information retrieved from Andrei Miller and Karl Haughton (BEIS 
experts) 
EEC and CERT 
subsidies[boiler] 
0 Dmnl 
How much the EEC and CERT subsidies discount the final price for homeowners. These are 
estimation based on the information retrieved from Andrei Miller and Karl Haughton (BEIS 
experts) 
EEC and CERT 
subsidies[loft] 
0.5 Dmnl 
How much the EEC and CERT subsidies discount the final price for homeowners. These are 
estimation based on the information retrieved from Andrei Miller and Karl Haughton (BEIS 
experts) 
EEC and CERT 
subsidies[insulation] 
cavity wall scenario*0.5+ 
(1-cavity wall scenario)*0.1 
Dmnl 
How much the EEC and CERT subsidies discount the final price for homeowners. These are 
estimation based on the information retrieved from Andrei Miller and Karl Haughton (BEIS 
experts) 
effect of market 
fragmentation on 
credibility[single] 
impact of fragmentation on credibility*market 
fragmentation 
Dmnl 
Market fragmentation works in different way for the two supply chain. For the single 
supply chain market fragmentation can increase the credibility because single installers can 
create their niche of local market in which their are trusted by customers; while for the 
multi supply chain market fragmentation works in the opposite direction, since it tends to 
decrease the credibility of the industry (big companies offering multi services are not 
usually trusted in a fragmented environment). This distinction tries to incorporate different 
inputs discussed in the second workshop 
effect of market 
fragmentation on 
credibility[multi] 
-impact of fragmentation on credibility*market 
fragmentation 
Dmnl 
Market fragmentation works in different way for the two supply chain. For the single 
supply chain market fragmentation can increase the credibility because single installers can 
create their niche of local market in which their are trusted by customers; while for the 
multi supply chain market fragmentation works in the opposite direction, since it tends to 
decrease the credibility of the industry (big companies offering multi services are not 
usually trusted in a fragmented environment). This distinction tries to incorporate different 
inputs discussed in the second workshop 




This is the effort . The value is an educated guess made by researchers 
 
effort intensity in 
training 
MIN(1, ZIDZ(investments in 
training[measures], desired investment for 
quality improvement[measures] )) 
Dmnl 
Here the desired investments are confronted with the actual investments in order to 
obtain the actual effort the industry put in improving workforce skills 
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elasticity for impact of 
quality on energy 
performance 
0.3 Dmnl 
This elasticity expresses how much a unitary variation in quality of a measure installed 
impacts the energy performance of that measure 
 




How much a unitary variation in technology impact the non-financial attractiveness of a 
measure 
elasticity for 





How much a unitary change in temperature impact the energy consumption 





How a change in the total workforce, with respect of the reference workforce after which 
the economy of scale effect is activate, impact the costs of material. According to BEIS 
experts at the moment this effect is not there at the moment 
energy consumption 
adjustment 
MIN(Time/120/TIME STEP,1)*energy fall*0.75 
kWh/Month/ 
households 
Hunter Danskin (BEIS) made a guess for which roughly 25% in the decrease of energy 
consumption per household depended on retrofitted measures, the rest has been due to 
other factors. From data we saw that the fall in energy consumption from 2000 to 2010 
was around 200 kWh/Month so we assume a discount that increase over time until 2010 
up to a maximum of 0.75*200 
 
energy consumption by 
interventions 
energy consumption by retrofit intervention 
for reference temperature[interventions]* 
temperature to energy curve[interventions] 
kWh/Month/ 
households 
The energy consumption by intervention. It is calculated based on a reference temperature 
and if the temperature varies the energy consumed changes. In the model runs shown in 
the dissertation this temperature is assumed to be constant 
energy consumption by 
retrofit intervention for 
reference temperature 
avg energy consumption for non-retrofitted 
households- 
SUM(expected energy savings by 
intervention[SC 
type!,interventions])/ELMCOUNT (SC 
type)*interventions energy efficiency 





Here to the reference energy consumption for non-retrofitted households are subtracted 
the energy savings generated by a retrofit intervention adjusted to the performance the 
intervention will have 
 
energy fall 200 
kWh/Month/ 
households 
Decrease in energy consumption since 2000. Source: estimated from 'United Kingdom 
housing energy fact file 2013' (Figure 2a) 
energy price GET XLS DATA('energy.xlsx', 'Sheet1', 'A' , 'C2' ) GBP/kWh 
Data on the average energy consumption retrieved from Palmer & Cooper, 2013 Source: 
report released by DECC/BEIS: 'United Kingdom housing energy fact file 2013' 
energy savings per 
household from 
installed measures 
(weighted energy savings from alternative 
insulation+ weighted energy savings from 




Here all the energy savings due to measure installed are aggregated and translated in 
energy savings per household 
EPC band improvement 




Rough estimation made by the researchers of energetic savings generated by an EPC 
improvement of one band 
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EPC mortgage policy 
starting time 
216 Month 
Green mortgage policy starting time when it is activate. Year 2018 
 
estimated retrofit 
potential fraction by 
intervention[i] 
potential fraction by measure[insulation] 
-estimated potential fraction by 
intervention[gi]-estimated potential fraction by 
intervention[bi]-estimated potential fraction 
by intervention[li]-estimated potential fraction 
by intervention[gli]-estimated potential 
fraction by intervention[bli]-estimated 
potential fraction by intervention[gbi]-
estimated potential fraction by 
intervention[gbli] 
Dmnl 
Fraction of houses in which an intervention has not been done yet and, therefore, houses 
that are potentially available for that specific retrofit intervention 
estimated retrofit 
potential fraction by 
intervention[l] 
potential fraction by measure[loft]-estimated 
potential fraction by intervention[gl]-estimated 
potential fraction by intervention[bl]-
estimated potential fraction by intervention[li]-
estimated potential fraction by 
intervention[gbl]- estimated potential fraction 
by intervention[gli]- estimated potential 
fraction by intervention[bli]-estimated 
potential fraction by intervention[gbli] 
Dmnl 
Fraction of houses in which an intervention has not been done yet and, therefore, houses 
that are potentially available for that specific retrofit intervention 
estimated retrofit 
potential fraction by 
intervention[g] 
potential fraction by measure[glazing]-
estimated potential fraction by 
intervention[gb]-estimated potential fraction 
by intervention[gl]-estimated potential fraction 
by intervention[gi]-estimated potential fraction 
by intervention[gbl]estimated potential 
fraction by intervention[gli]-estimated 
potential fraction by intervention[gbi]-
estimated potential fraction by 
intervention[gbli] 
Dmnl 
Fraction of houses in which an intervention has not been done yet and, therefore, houses 
that are potentially available for that specific retrofit intervention 
estimated retrofit 
potential fraction by 
intervention[b] 
potential fraction by measure[boiler] 
-estimated potential fraction by 
intervention[gb]-estimated potential fraction 
by intervention[bl]-estimated potential 
fraction by intervention[bi]-estimated 
potential fraction by intervention[gbl] 
-estimated potential fraction by 
intervention[bli]-estimated potential fraction 
by intervention[gbi]-estimated potential 
fraction by intervention[gbli] 
Dmnl 
Fraction of houses in which an intervention has not been done yet and, therefore, houses 




potential fraction by 
intervention[gb] 
potential fraction by 
measure[glazing]*potential fraction by 
measure[boiler] -estimated potential fraction 
by intervention[gbi]-estimated potential 
fraction by intervention[gbl]-estimated 
potential fraction by intervention[gbli] 
Dmnl 
Fraction of houses in which an intervention has not been done yet and, therefore, houses 
that are potentially available for that specific retrofit intervention 
estimated retrofit 
potential fraction by 
intervention[gl] 
potential fraction by 
measure[glazing]*potential fraction by 
measure[loft]  -estimated potential 
fraction by intervention[gli]-estimated 
potential fraction by intervention[gbl]- 
estimated potential fraction by 
intervention[gbli] 
Dmnl 
Fraction of houses in which an intervention has not been done yet and, therefore, houses 
that are potentially available for that specific retrofit intervention 
estimated retrofit 
potential fraction by 
intervention[gi] 
potential fraction by 
measure[glazing]*potential fraction by 
measure[insulation]- estimated potential 
fraction by intervention[gli]-estimated 
potential fraction by intervention [gbi]-
estimated potential fraction by intervention 
[gbli] 
Dmnl 
Fraction of houses in which an intervention has not been done yet and, therefore, houses 
that are potentially available for that specific retrofit intervention 
estimated retrofit 
potential fraction by 
intervention[bl] 
potential fraction by measure[boiler]*potential 
fraction by measure[loft]- estimated potential 
fraction by intervention[bli]-estimated 
potential fraction by intervention[gbl]-
estimated potential fraction by 
intervention[gbli] 
Dmnl 
Fraction of houses in which an intervention has not been done yet and, therefore, houses 
that are potentially available for that specific retrofit intervention 
estimated retrofit 
potential fraction by 
intervention[bi] 
potential fraction by measure[boiler]*potential 
fraction by measure[insulation]- estimated 
potential fraction by intervention[bli]-
estimated potential fraction by intervention 
[gbi]-estimated potential fraction by 
intervention[gbli] 
Dmnl 
Fraction of houses in which an intervention has not been done yet and, therefore, houses 
that are potentially available for that specific retrofit intervention 
estimated retrofit 
potential fraction by 
intervention[li] 
potential fraction by measure[loft]*potential 
fraction by measure[insulation]- estimated 
potential fraction by intervention[gli]-
estimated potential fraction by intervention 
[bli]-estimated potential fraction by 
intervention[gbli] 
Dmnl 
Fraction of houses in which an intervention has not been done yet and, therefore, houses 
that are potentially available for that specific retrofit intervention 
estimated retrofit 
potential fraction by 
intervention[gbli] 
potential fraction by 
measure[glazing]*potential fraction by 
measure[loft]*potential fraction by measure 
Dmnl 
Fraction of houses in which an intervention has not been done yet and, therefore, houses 
that are potentially available for that specific retrofit intervention 
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[boiler]*potential fraction by 
measure[insulation] 
estimated retrofit 
potential fraction by 
intervention[gbl] 
potential fraction by 
measure[glazing]*potential fraction by 
measure[loft]*potential fraction by measure 
[boiler] -estimated potential fraction by 
intervention[gbli] 
Dmnl 
Fraction of houses in which an intervention has not been done yet and, therefore, houses 
that are potentially available for that specific retrofit intervention 
estimated retrofit 
potential fraction by 
intervention[gbi] 
potential fraction by 
measure[glazing]*potential fraction by 
measure[boiler]* potential fraction by 
measure[insulation]- estimated potential 
fraction by intervention[gbli] 
Dmnl 
Fraction of houses in which an intervention has not been done yet and, therefore, houses 
that are potentially available for that specific retrofit intervention 
estimated retrofit 
potential fraction by 
intervention[gli] 
potential fraction by 
measure[glazing]*potential fraction by 
measure[loft]*potential fraction by 
measure[insulation]- estimated potential 
fraction by intervention[gbli] 
Dmnl 
Fraction of houses in which an intervention has not been done yet and, therefore, houses 
that are potentially available for that specific retrofit intervention 
estimated retrofit 
potential fraction by 
intervention[bli] 
potential fraction by measure[loft]*potential 
fraction by measure[boiler]* potential fraction 
by measure[insulation] -estimated potential 
fraction by intervention[gbli] 
Dmnl 
Fraction of houses in which an intervention has not been done yet and, therefore, houses 
that are potentially available for that specific retrofit intervention 
estimated retrofit 
potential fraction by 
intervention[n] 
PROD(1-potential fraction by 
measure[measures!]) 
Dmnl 
Fraction of houses in which an intervention has not been done yet and, therefore, houses 
that are potentially available for that specific retrofit intervention 
estimated property 
distribution per stamp 
duty band[up125] 
0.229236 Dmnl 
Estimated housing stock distribution per stamp duty band. Source: House Price Statistics 




distribution per stamp 
duty band[up250] 
0.516736 Dmnl 
Estimated housing stock distribution per stamp duty band. Source: House Price Statistics 




distribution per stamp 
duty band[up925] 
0.247708 Dmnl 
Estimated housing stock distribution per stamp duty band. Source: House Price Statistics 




distribution per stamp 
duty band[up1500] 
0.004375 Dmnl 
Estimated housing stock distribution per stamp duty band. Source: House Price Statistics 






distribution per stamp 
duty band[over1500] 
0.00194444 Dmnl 
Estimated housing stock distribution per stamp duty band. Source: House Price Statistics 






retrofitted fraction by measure[insulation] 
-estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[gi] 
-estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[bi] 
-estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[li] 
-estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[gli] 
-estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[bli] 
-estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[gbi] 
-estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[gbli]  
Dmnl  
Fraction of houses in which an intervention has not been done yet and, therefore, houses 




retrofitted fraction by measure[loft] 
-estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[gl] 
-estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[bl] 
-estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[li] 
-estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[gbl] 
-estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[gli] 
-estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[bli] 
-estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[gbli] 
Dmnl  
Fraction of houses in which an intervention has not been done yet and, therefore, houses 




retrofitted fraction by measure[glazing] 
-estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[gb] 
-estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[gl] 
-estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[gi] 
Dmnl  
Fraction of houses in which an intervention has not been done yet and, therefore, houses 
that are potentially available for that specific retrofit intervention 
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-estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[gbl] 
-estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[gli] 
-estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[gbi] 





retrofitted fraction by measure[boiler] 
-estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[gb] 
-estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[bl] 
-estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[bi] 
-estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[gbl] 
-estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[bli] 
-estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[gbi] 
-estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[gbli] 
Dmnl  
Fraction of houses in which an intervention has not been done yet and, therefore, houses 




retrofitted fraction by 
measure[glazing]*retrofitted fraction by 
measure[boiler]-estimated retrofitted fraction 
by intervention[gbi]-estimated retrofitted 
fraction by intervention[gbl]- estimated 
retrofitted fraction by intervention[gbli] 
Dmnl  
Fraction of houses in which an intervention has not been done yet and, therefore, houses 




retrofitted fraction by 
measure[glazing]*retrofitted fraction by 
measure[loft]- estimated retrofitted fraction 
by intervention[gli]- estimated retrofitted 
fraction by intervention[gbl]- estimated 
retrofitted fraction by intervention[gbli] 
Dmnl  
Fraction of houses in which an intervention has not been done yet and, therefore, houses 




retrofitted fraction by 
measure[glazing]*retrofitted fraction by 
measure[insulation]-estimated retrofitted 
fraction by intervention[gli]- estimated 
retrofitted fraction by intervention[gbi] -
estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[gbli] 
Dmnl  
Fraction of houses in which an intervention has not been done yet and, therefore, houses 






retrofitted fraction by 
measure[boiler]*retrofitted fraction by 
measure[loft]- estimated retrofitted fraction 
by intervention[bli]-estimated retrofitted 
fraction by intervention[gbl]- estimated 
retrofitted fraction by intervention[gbli] 
Dmnl  
Fraction of houses in which an intervention has not been done yet and, therefore, houses 




retrofitted fraction by 
measure[boiler]*retrofitted fraction by 
measure[insulation]- estimated retrofitted 
fraction by intervention[bli]-estimated 
retrofitted fraction by intervention[gbi]- 
estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[gbli] 
Dmnl  
Fraction of houses in which an intervention has not been done yet and, therefore, houses 




retrofitted fraction by 
measure[loft]*retrofitted fraction by 
measure[insulation]- estimated retrofitted 
fraction by intervention[gli]-estimated 
retrofitted fraction by intervention[bli]- 
estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[gbli] 
Dmnl  
Fraction of houses in which an intervention has not been done yet and, therefore, houses 




retrofitted fraction by 
measure[glazing]*retrofitted fraction by 
measure[loft]*retrofitted fraction by 
measure[boiler]*retrofitted fraction by 
measure[insulation] 
Dmnl  
Fraction of houses in which an intervention has not been done yet and, therefore, houses 




retrofitted fraction by 
measure[glazing]*retrofitted fraction by 
measure[loft]*retrofitted fraction by measure 
[boiler]- estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[gbli] 
Dmnl  
Fraction of houses in which an intervention has not been done yet and, therefore, houses 




retrofitted fraction by 
measure[glazing]*retrofitted fraction by 
measure[boiler]*retrofitted fraction by 
measure [insulation]- estimated retrofitted 
fraction by intervention[gbli] 
Dmnl  
Fraction of houses in which an intervention has not been done yet and, therefore, houses 




retrofitted fraction by 
measure[glazing]*retrofitted fraction by 
measure[loft]*retrofitted fraction by measure 
[insulation]- estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[gbli] 
Dmnl  
Fraction of houses in which an intervention has not been done yet and, therefore, houses 






retrofitted fraction by 
measure[loft]*retrofitted fraction by 
measure[boiler]*retrofitted fraction by 
measure [insulation]- estimated retrofitted 
fraction by intervention[gbli] 
Dmnl  
Fraction of houses in which an intervention has not been done yet and, therefore, houses 




PROD(1-retrofitted fraction by 
measure[measures!]) 
Dmnl  
Fraction of houses in which an intervention has not been done yet and, therefore, houses 
that are potentially available for that specific retrofit intervention 
exogenous popularity 
of cavity 
GET XLS DATA('energy.xlsx','Sheet1','A','K2') Dmnl 
The popularity of cavity wall is calculated externally and the used as input when it is time to 
run the model for solid wall scenario 
exogenous popularity 
of solid wall 
0 Dmnl 
The popularity of solid wall is calculated externally and the used as input when it is time to 
run the model for solid wall scenario.  
exogenous retrofitted 
fraction for cavity 
GET XLS DATA('energy.xlsx','Sheet1','A','J2') 
Dmnl 
 
The retrofitted cavity wall fraction of the stock is calculated and then used here as an 
exogenous input when the model simulates for solid wall 
exogenous retrofitted 
fraction for solid 
0 Dmnl 
The retrofitted solid wall fraction of the stock is calculated and then used here as an 
exogenous input when the model simulates for cavity wall. However it is close to be zero in 
reality 
expected bill savings by 
intervention[interventi
ons] 






Expected bill saving by households per intervention. These are the savings declared at the 





expected energy savings by measure[SC 
type,insulation]* (1-measures savings discount 








expected energy savings by measure[SC 
type,loft]*(1-measures savings discount by 








expected energy savings by measure[SC 
type,glazing]*(1-measures savings discount by 








expected energy savings by measure[SC 
type,boiler]*(1-measures savings discount by 









(expected energy savings by measure[SC 
type,glazing]+expected energy savings by 
measure [SC type,boiler])*(1-measures savings 
kWh/Month/Interv
entions 
This variable calculates how much are the expected saving per each retrofit intervention 
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discount by combination[SC 




(expected energy savings by measure[SC 
type,glazing]+expected energy savings by 
measure [SC type,loft]) *(1-measures savings 
discount by combination[SC 
type,two])/interventions per measure 
kWh/Month/Interv
entions 




(expected energy savings by measure[SC 
type,glazing]+expected energy savings by 
measure[SC type,insulation]) *(1-measures 
savings discount by combination[SC 
type,two])/interventions per measure 
kWh/Month/Interv
entions 




(expected energy savings by measure[SC 
type,loft]+expected energy savings by 
measure[SC type,boiler]) *(1-measures savings 
discount by combination[SC 
type,two])/interventions per measure 
kWh/Month/Interv
entions 




(expected energy savings by measure[SC 
type,insulation]+expected energy savings by 
measure[SC type,boiler]) *(1-measures savings 
discount by combination[SC 
type,two])/interventions per measure 
kWh/Month/Interv
entions 




(expected energy savings by measure[SC 
type,loft]+expected energy savings by measure 
[SC type,insulation])*(1-measures savings 
discount by combination[SC 
type,two])/interventions per measure 
kWh/Month/Interv
entions 





(expected energy savings by measure[SC 
type,glazing]+expected energy savings by 
measure [SC type,boiler]+expected energy 
savings by measure[SC type,loft]+expected 
energy savings by measure[SC type,insulation]) 
*(1-measures savings discount by 









(expected energy savings by measure[SC 
type,glazing]+ expected energy savings by 
measure[SC type,boiler]+ expected energy 
savings by measure[SC type,loft]) *(1-measures 
savings discount by combination[SC 
type,three])/interventions per measure 
kWh/Month/Interv
entions 







(expected energy savings by measure[SC 
type,glazing]+ expected energy savings by 
measure[SC type,boiler]+ expected energy 
savings by measure[SC type,insulation]) *(1-
measures savings discount by combination[SC 
type,three]) /interventions per measure 
kWh/Month/Interv
entions 





(expected energy savings by measure[SC 
type,glazing]+ expected energy savings by 
measure[SC type,loft]+ expected energy 
savings by measure[SC type,insulation])*(1-
measures savings discount by combination[SC 
type,three])/ interventions per measure 
kWh/Month/Interv
entions 





(expected energy savings by measure[SC 
type,boiler]+ expected energy savings by 
measure[SC type,loft]+ expected energy 
savings by measure[SC type,insulation]) *(1-
measures savings discount by combination[SC 
type,three])/interventions per measure 
kWh/Month/Interv
entions 




0* expected energy savings by measure[SC 
type,boiler]/interventions per measure 
kWh/Month/Interv
entions 
This variable calculates how much are the expected saving per each retrofit intervention 
expected energy 
savings by measure 
reference energy savings by measure[SC 
type,measures]* Retrofit 




These are the expected energy savings by retrofit measure. These are based on an initial 




SUM(expected energy savings by 
intervention[SC 
type!,interventions])/ELMCOUNT 
(SC type)* EPC band improvement per energy 
saving/ measures per intervention 
band 
Here it is calculated how much each retrofit intervention contributes to an improvement of 
EPC band. Please note that the SUM is divided by 2 (ELMCOUNT(SC type)) in order to not 





SUM(expected energy savings by measure[SC 
type!,measures])/ELMCOUNT(SC type) *EPC 
band improvement per energy saving 
band 
Here it is calculated how much each retrofit measure contributes to an improvement of 
EPC band. Please note that the SUM is divided by 2 (ELMCOUNT(SC type)) in order to not 




expected EPC improvement by 
intervention[interventions]*mortgage 
premium for EPC band *STEP(1,EPC mortgage 
policy starting time) 
Dmnl 
Here the mortgage premium due to the green mortgage policy is calculated for 
intervention 
 
expected profits for 
manufacturers for 
investments horizon 
possible future measures installed[measures]* 
profit per measure for 
manufacturer[measures]* trust of 
industry[measures] 
GBP 
Here the expected future profits for the manufacturers are calculated multiplying the profit 




expenses for retrofit 
relative to renovations 
market volume for retrofit/market volume for 
renovations 
Dmnl 
The percentage of money spent in retrofit is compare with the total amount of money for 
renovations in order to appreciate the importance retrofit has 
extent distribution in 
interventions per 
month 
ZIDZ( SUM(interventions per month by extent 
by SC[SC type!,extent]), SUM(interventions per 
month by extent by SC[SC type!,extent!])) 
Dmnl 
How the monthly intervention per extent are distributed with respect of the total amount 
of intervention 
extents distribution in 
measures demand[SC 
type,one,glazing] 
ZIDZ(demand for retrofit by interventions[SC 
type,g] ,retrofit demand by measures[SC 
type,glazing])*measures per intervention 
Dmnl 
This variable calculate how often measure are installed alone or in combination with one, 
two or three other measures. It is calculated for all the four measures (4 measures 
multiplied 4 extents, equal 16 equations) 
 
extents distribution in 
measures demand[SC 
type,one,boiler] 
ZIDZ(demand for retrofit by interventions[SC 
type,b], retrofit demand by measures[SC 
type,boiler])*measures per intervention 
Dmnl 
This variable calculate how often measure are installed alone or in combination with one, 
two or three other measures. It is calculated for all the four measures (4 measures 
multiplied 4 extents, equal 16 equations) 
 
extents distribution in 
measures demand[SC 
type,one,loft] 
ZIDZ(demand for retrofit by interventions[SC 
type,l], retrofit demand by measures[SC 
type,loft]) *measures per intervention 
Dmnl 
This variable calculate how often measure are installed alone or in combination with one, 
two or three other measures. It is calculated for all the four measures (4 measures 
multiplied 4 extents, equal 16 equations) 
 
extents distribution in 
measures demand[SC 
type,one,insulation] 
ZIDZ(demand for retrofit by interventions[SC 
type,i], retrofit demand by measures[SC 
type,insulation])*measures per intervention 
Dmnl 
This variable calculate how often measure are installed alone or in combination with one, 
two or three other measures. It is calculated for all the four measures (4 measures 
multiplied 4 extents, equal 16 equations) 
 
extents distribution in 
measures demand[SC 
type,two,glazing] 
ZIDZ((demand for retrofit by interventions[SC 
type,gb]+ demand for retrofit by 
interventions[SC type,gl]+ demand for retrofit 
by interventions[SC type,gi]), retrofit demand 
by measures[SC type,glazing])* measures per 
intervention 
Dmnl 
This variable calculate how often measure are installed alone or in combination with one, 
two or three other measures. It is calculated for all the four measures (4 measures 
multiplied 4 extents, equal 16 equations) 
 
extents distribution in 
measures demand[SC 
type,three,glazing] 
ZIDZ((demand for retrofit by interventions[SC 
type,gbl]+ demand for retrofit by 
interventions[SC type,gbi]+ demand for retrofit 
by interventions[SC type,gli]), retrofit demand 
by measures[SC type,glazing])* measures per 
intervention 
Dmnl 
This variable calculate how often measure are installed alone or in combination with one, 
two or three other measures. It is calculated for all the four measures (4 measures 
multiplied 4 extents, equal 16 equations) 
 
extents distribution in 
measures demand[SC 
type,four,glazing] 
ZIDZ(demand for retrofit by interventions[SC 
type,gbli], retrofit demand by measures[SC 
type,glazing])* measures per intervention 
Dmnl 
This variable calculate how often measure are installed alone or in combination with one, 
two or three other measures. It is calculated for all the four measures (4 measures 
multiplied 4 extents, equal 16 equations) 
 
extents distribution in 
measures demand[SC 
type,two,boiler] 
ZIDZ((demand for retrofit by interventions[SC 
type,gb]+ demand for retrofit by 
interventions[SC type,bl]+ demand for retrofit 
by interventions[SC type,bi]), retrofit demand 
Dmnl 
This variable calculate how often measure are installed alone or in combination with one, 
two or three other measures. It is calculated for all the four measures (4 measures 




by measures[SC type,boiler])* measures per 
intervention 
extents distribution in 
measures demand[SC 
type,three,boiler] 
ZIDZ((demand for retrofit by interventions[SC 
type,gbl]+ demand for retrofit by 
interventions[SC type,gbi]+ demand for retrofit 
by interventions[SC type,bli]), retrofit demand 
by measures[SC type,boiler])* measures per 
intervention 
Dmnl 
This variable calculate how often measure are installed alone or in combination with one, 
two or three other measures. It is calculated for all the four measures (4 measures 
multiplied 4 extents, equal 16 equations) 
 
extents distribution in 
measures demand[SC 
type,four,boiler] 
ZIDZ(demand for retrofit by interventions[SC 
type,gbli], retrofit demand by measures[SC 
type,boiler])* measures per intervention 
Dmnl 
This variable calculate how often measure are installed alone or in combination with one, 
two or three other measures. It is calculated for all the four measures (4 measures 
multiplied 4 extents, equal 16 equations) 
extents distribution in 
measures demand[SC 
type,two,loft] 
ZIDZ((demand for retrofit by interventions[SC 
type,gl]+ demand for retrofit by 
interventions[SC type,gl]+ demand for retrofit 
by interventions[SC type,li]), retrofit demand 
by measures[SC type,loft])* measures per 
intervention 
Dmnl 
This variable calculate how often measure are installed alone or in combination with one, 
two or three other measures. It is calculated for all the four measures (4 measures 
multiplied 4 extents, equal 16 equations) 
 
extents distribution in 
measures demand[SC 
type,three,loft] 
ZIDZ((demand for retrofit by interventions[SC 
type,gbl]+ demand for retrofit by 
interventions[SC type,bli]+ demand for retrofit 
by interventions[SC type,gli]), retrofit demand 
by measures[SC type,loft])* measures per 
intervention 
Dmnl 
This variable calculate how often measure are installed alone or in combination with one, 
two or three other measures. It is calculated for all the four measures (4 measures 
multiplied 4 extents, equal 16 equations) 
 
extents distribution in 
measures demand[SC 
type,four,loft] 
ZIDZ(demand for retrofit by interventions[SC 
type,gbli], retrofit demand by measures[SC 
type,loft])* measures per intervention 
 
Dmnl 
This variable calculate how often measure are installed alone or in combination with one, 
two or three other measures. It is calculated for all the four measures (4 measures 
multiplied 4 extents, equal 16 equations) 
 
extents distribution in 
measures demand[SC 
type,two,insulation] 
ZIDZ((demand for retrofit by interventions[SC 
type,gi]+ demand for retrofit by 
interventions[SC type,li]+ demand for retrofit 
by interventions[SC type,bi]), retrofit demand 
by measures[SC type,insulation]) *measures 
per intervention 
Dmnl 
This variable calculate how often measure are installed alone or in combination with one, 
two or three other measures. It is calculated for all the four measures (4 measures 
multiplied 4 extents, equal 16 equations) 
 
extents distribution in 
measures demand[SC 
type,three,insulation] 
ZIDZ((demand for retrofit by interventions[SC 
type,bli]+ demand for retrofit by 
interventions[SC type,gbi]+ demand for retrofit 
by interventions[SC type,gli]), retrofit demand 
by measures[SC type,insulation])* measures 
per intervention 
Dmnl 
This variable calculate how often measure are installed alone or in combination with one, 
two or three other measures. It is calculated for all the four measures (4 measures 




extents distribution in 
measures demand[SC 
type,four,insulation] 
ZIDZ(demand for retrofit by interventions[SC 
type,gbli], retrofit demand by measures[SC 
type,insulation])*measures per intervention 
Dmnl 
This variable calculate how often measure are installed alone or in combination with one, 
two or three other measures. It is calculated for all the four measures (4 measures 
multiplied 4 extents, equal 16 equations) 
 




This variable calculate how often measure are installed alone or in combination with one, 
two or three other measures. It is calculated for all the four measures (4 measures 




INTEG (defection rate[measures]-fixing 
rate[measures], 0) 
measures Stock in which the measure that are defected accumulate 
financial attractiveness 
desired payback time/payback time[SC 
type,interventions]* impact of sense of 
opportunity non financial attractiveness[SC 
type,interventions] 
Dmnl 
Here the desired payback time is confronted with the actual payback time. Then the results 
are multiplied by the sense of  opportunity generated by the subsidies that can 
prompt homeowner to perceive an higher financial attractiveness 
firing aggressiveness 0.05 Dmnl 
This parameter is represents the hypothetical aggressiveness with which workers are fired 
if needed 
fixing rate[measures] Failed measures[measures]/fixing time measures/Month Rate in which failed measure gets repaired 
fixing time 3 Month 
The time a defected measure need to be detected and repaired. Educated guess made by 
researchers 
flexibility for extra 
investment 
0.1 Dmnl 
People are willing to spent the 10% more on their renovation to retrofit. Source: Energy 
Saving Trust Trigger Point Report 2011 (p.5) 
http://www.energysavingtrust.org.uk/sites/default/files/reports/EST_Trigger_Points_repor
t.pdf 
fraction of buyers 
among renovators 
0.4 Dmnl Percentage of buyers that also do renovation to their new property 
fraction of buyers 
considering retrofit 
because of green 
mortgages but not 
stamp rebate 
(1-stamp duty rebates switch)*fraction of 
buyers taking green mortgages + stamp duty 
rebates switch*fraction of buyers taking green 
mortgages*(percentage of buyers not paying 
stamp duty+stamp rebates eligible but not 
aware fraction) 
Dmnl 
Percentage of total house buyers considering retrofit because of green mortgages but not 
stamp rebate. It is important not to take into account people that gets aware due 
to the stamp duty rebate, otherwise there is the risk to over count the number of buyers 
getting aware. Therefore, in the case the stamp duty policy is activated, the variable sum 
the people that are not aware of the stamp duty rebate or do not pay the stamp duty and 
multiply them by the fraction of people that gets a green mortgage 
fraction of buyers 
considering retrofit 
because of stamp 
rebate but not green 
mortgages 
stamp rebates eligible and aware fraction*(1-
fraction of buyers taking green mortgages) 
Dmnl 
Fraction of buyers considering retrofit because of stamp duty rebate and not because of 
green mortgages 
fraction of buyers 
considering retroift 
because of both stamp 
rebates and green 
mortgages 
fraction of buyers taking green 
mortgages*stamp rebates eligible and aware 
fraction 
Dmnl 
In the potential demand for retrofit from buyers, fraction of buyers considering retroift 




fraction of buyers 
desiring a mortgage 
fraction of buyers taking mortgages Dmnl 
Percentage of people buying a house that desired a mortgage. It based on the actual 
number of households purchasing a property with a mortgage 
fraction of buyers 
eligible for stamp duty 
rebates 
STEP(stamp duty rebates switch,stamp rebate 
starting time)* (1-percentage of buyers not 
paying stamp duty) 
Dmnl 
The percentage of buyers that have to pay a stamp duty in case they buy a property 
 
fraction of buyers 
taking a conditional 
mortgage 
fraction of buyers with no access to mortgages 
due to low EPC level* fraction of lenders 
offering conditional lending for retrofit* 
willingness of mortgage borrowers to take a 
conditional mortgage* STEP(1,EPC mortgage 
policy starting time) 
Dmnl 
Percentage of home buyers purchasing a low EPC property, that do not access to credit, 
that are offered with a conditional mortgage and the are willing to accept this offer  
 
fraction of buyers 
taking green mortgages 
fraction of buyers taking a conditional 
mortgage+ fraction of buyers taking larger 
mortgages to retrofit 
Dmnl 
The total amount of borrowers getting a green mortgage. It is the result of the sum of the 
households getting a larger mortgage to retrofit and of the buyers purchasing a low EPC 
property that take a conditional mortgage to retrofit the new property 
fraction of buyers 
taking larger mortgages 
to retrofit 
fraction of buyers with access to mortgages* 
willingness of mortgage borrowers to take an 
additional mortgage* fraction of lenders 
offering additional lending for retrofit* 
STEP(1,EPC mortgage policy starting time) 
Dmnl 
Percentage of mortgage borrowers that can access to a mortgage, that are offered with 
additional cash on the initial mortgage to retrofit their new property and accept this offer 
 
fraction of buyers 
taking mortgages 
0.4603 Dmnl 
Percentage of buyers taking a mortgage when buying a new property in UK. Sourece: p.7 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/595785/
2015-16_EHS_Headline_Report.pdf . Knowing the proportion between outright buyers and 
mortgagors of current tenure we assume that the distribution for new property sales is the 
same 
fraction of buyers with 
access to mortgages 
(1-fraction of properties with no access to 
mortgages)* fraction of buyers desiring a 
mortgage 
Dmnl 
The number of buyers desiring a mortgage that access to it. In case lenders do not prioritize 
EPC when lending, and therefore do not lend to low EPC, all the buyers access to a 
mortgage. In case lenders prioritize, only part of the access to a mortgage 
fraction of buyers with 
no access to mortgages 
due to low EPC level 
fraction of properties with no access to 
mortgages* fraction of buyers desiring a 
mortgage 
Dmnl 
Fraction of buyers that at the same are asking for a mortgage, are buying a low EPC 
property and do not get a mortgage because lenders do not lend to low EPC property 
purchasing 
fraction of exstension 
of habitable space 
0.1*STEP(compulsory retrofit for extensions 
switch,216) 
Dmnl 
The real value is unknown so at the moment it is an educated guess to test the impact of 
the policy. However, in the model runs this policy has been switched off  
fraction of lenders 
offering additional 
lending for retrofit 
1 
 
Dmnl Percentage of lenders that offers additional cash for retrofit to buyers asking a mortgage 
fraction of lenders 
offering conditional 
lending for retrofit 
1 Dmnl 
Percentage of lenders offering conditional lending when a buyer ask a mortgage to buy a 
low EPC property. This conditional lending consist in offering extra credit to the buyer for 
retrofitting the new property. In case the buyer refuses the offer, the mortgage is denied 
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fraction of lenders 
prioritizing EPC 
0 Dmnl 
Percentage of lenders prioritizing the mortgages issued based on the EPC level. If the EPC 
level of the house purchased is low, lenders do not lend money to the mortgagor 
fraction of properties 
with no access to 
mortgages 
STEP(fraction of lenders prioritizing EPC,EPC 
mortgage policy starting time)* percentage of 
buyers with low EPC levels 
Dmnl 
In case lenders do not lend money to low EPC, this variable represents the fraction of 
properties with no access to mortgages 
fraction of renovations 
considering retrofit 
MIN(1,MAX(0, avg popularity of 
retrofit*impact of awareness on fraction of 
retrofit renovations + increased awareness by 
energy suppliers selling retrofit)) 
Dmnl 
Percentage of households doing amenity renovations that also consider to top up this 
renovation with retrofit 
 
fraction of renovators 
offering retrofit 
retrofit WF fraction* (max advise from 
renovators-market fragmentation) 
Dmnl 
Percentage of renovators offering retrofit to homeowners undertaking amenity 
renovations. It depends on the fraction of retrofit workforce over the total and on the 
number of advices the retrofit workforce give. However the positive effect is balanced by 
the market fragmented. The more the single supply chain dominates the multi the less they 
are prone to suggest to do retrofit 
fraction of retrofit 
measures installed as 
amenity 
Added value to property of 
measures[measures]/avg added value of 
renovations/ (1+competitive alternatives for 
amenity renovations)/ 
(1+reference hassle factor per 
measure[measures]) 
Dmnl 
Units: Here the added value to a property by each measure is confronted with a reference 
average added value, with other competitive alternative and discounted by the hassle 
factor involved in the installation that makes the measure less attractive 
fraction of retrofit over 
total renovations 
total retrofit interventions per month/ (total 
retrofit interventions per month+renovations 
without retrofit) 
Dmnl 
Percentage of retrofit intervention over the total number of renovations (with and without 
retrofit) 
 
fraction of retrofitting 
leading to failures 
MAX(0,  SUM( fractional retrofit rate by SC 
type[SC type!]* avg probability of measures 
failures[SC type!,measures])) 
Dmnl 
Fraction retrofit measure that are not properly installed and will become a failed 
installation. It depends on the average probability of measure failures and on the measure 
installed by supply chain 




Dmnl This is the maximum amplitude of the oscillation the economic cycles have 
fractional retrofit rate 
by SC type 
ZIDZ(SUM(retrofit rate by intervention[SC 
type,interventions!]), SUM(retrofit rate by 
intervention[SC type!,interventions!])) 
Dmnl Retrofit rate distributed per supply chain type 
from EE added value to 
max added value 
multiplier 
0.5 Dmnl 
How much the measures' added value because of house price premium per EPC band 
translates in added to a property by a measure. Educated guess made by researchers 
from single to multi SC 
flow 
IF THEN ELSE(Workforce for 
retrofit[single,measures], (perceived 
prevalence of combined 
interventions*SUM(Workforce for retrofit [SC 
type!,measures])- Workforce for 
retrofit[multi,measures])* readiness to shift 
from single to multi, 0) 
workers/Month 
This flow represents the rate workers in the single supply chain move to the multi. In 
practice, single suppliers once they realize multi measures interventions are demanded 






MIN( demand for retrofit by interventions[SC 
type,interventions]+interventions backlog 
adjustment 




All the demand for retrofit interventions (actual demand and eventually backlog) that is 
satisfy by supply chain 
guarantees on retrofit 
performances 
0 Dmnl 
This was a possible policy suggested by workshop participants. It represents the percentage 
of guarantees on the energy performance of the intervention installed (sort of insurance 
mechanisms). They are supposed to increase the trust homeowners have in the industry 
hh initiating amenity 
only renovations 
Households planning amenity only 
renovations/avg time before deciding*(1-
installers' advise impact) 
households/Month 
Households that initiate only amenity renovations 
 
hh starting to consider 
retrofit after advise 
Households planning amenity only 
renovations/avg time before 
deciding*installers' advise impact 
households/Month 
Flow of households starting to consider retrofit after installers advise 
 
hh starting to plan 
amenity only 
renovations 
avg renovation rate*(1-fraction of exstension 
of habitable space)*(1-fraction of renovations 
considering retrofit) 
households/Month Flow of households starting to plan only amenity renovations 
hh starting to plan 
retrofit 
renovations[efficiency] 
avg renovation rate*(1-fraction of exstension 
of habitable space)*fraction of renovations 
considering retrofit 
households/Month 
Flow of households directly starting to plan to top up an amenity renovation with a retrofit 
intervention 
hh starting to plan 
retrofit 
renovations[extension] 
avg renovation rate*fraction of exstension of 
habitable space 
households/Month 
Flow of households directly starting to plan to top up an amenity renovation with a retrofit 
intervention 
house price premium 
per EPC band 
INTEG (change in price premium per EPC band, 
0) 
1/band How much the price of a house increase per an improvement of one EPC band 
households behavioural 
compliance 
reference behavioural compliance*impact of 
maintenance on behaviour[measures] 
Dmnl 
The ability of households to use in the correct way the measure  installed is affected by 
the maintenance it requires. The more maintenance the less households will use over time 










INTEG (hh starting to plan amenity only 
renovations-hh initiating amenity only 
renovations- hh starting to consider retrofit 
after advise, hh starting to plan amenity only 
renovations*avg time before deciding) 
households 





INTEG (hh starting to consider retrofit after 
advise- potential demand from 
renovations[amenity], hh starting to consider 
retrofit after advise*avg time before deciding) 
households 
Stock of households planning renovation and retrofit. Here a script accounting for the 






INTEG (hh starting to plan retrofit 
renovations[efficiency]- potential demand 
from renovations[efficiency], hh starting to 
plan retrofit renovations[efficiency]*avg time 
before deciding) 
households 
Stock of households planning renovation and retrofit. Here a script accounting for the 




INTEG (hh starting to plan retrofit 
renovations[extension]- potential demand 
from renovations[extension], hh starting to 
plan retrofit renovations[extension]*avg time 
before deciding) 
households 
Stock of households planning renovation and retrofit. Here a script accounting for the 




Households propensity to positively considerate retrofit because of sustainability concerns. 
Based on workshop inputs 
housing market 
reactiveness in price 
change 
fraction of lenders prioritizing EPC* reference 
reactiveness of house prices* mortgagors 
appreciation of green mortgages 
1/Month 
This is the speed to which the housing market adapt to green mortgage policy changes. The 
usual speed of market adaptation is dampened since the policy targets only some buyers. 
Therefore, the fraction of buyers taking green mortgages over the total number of buyers 
taking a mortgage can give an idea on how green mortgage are appreciated. The less green 
mortgages are appreciated by the market the slower will be the housing price to change 
because of the new policy 
housing stock 
composition by retrofit 
extent[four] 
retrofitted fraction by 
measure[insulation]*retrofitted fraction by 
measure [glazing]*retrofitted fraction by 
measure[loft]*retrofitted fraction by 
measure[boiler] 
Dmnl 
This variable differentiate the housing stock based on how many measures have been 
installed (extent of retrofit) 
housing stock 
composition by retrofit 
extent[three] 
retrofitted fraction by 
measure[insulation]*retrofitted fraction by 
measure[glazing]* retrofitted fraction by 
measure[loft]+ retrofitted fraction by 
measure[glazing]*retrofitted fraction by 
measure[loft]*retrofitted fraction by 
measure[boiler]+ retrofitted fraction by 
measure[insulation]*retrofitted fraction by 
measure[glazing]*retrofitted fraction by 
measure[boiler]+ retrofitted fraction by 
measure[insulation]*retrofitted fraction by 
measure[loft]*retrofitted fraction by 
measure[boiler]- 4*housing stock composition 
by retrofit extent[four] 
Dmnl 
This variable differentiate the housing stock based on how many measures have been 
installed (extent of retrofit) 
housing stock 
composition by retrofit 
extent[two] 
retrofitted fraction by 
measure[insulation]*retrofitted fraction by 
measure [glazing]+  retrofitted fraction by 
measure[insulation]*retrofitted fraction by 
measure[loft]+ retrofitted fraction by 
Dmnl 
This variable differentiate the housing stock based on how many measures have been 
installed (extent of retrofit) 
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measure[insulation]*retrofitted fraction by 
measure [boiler]+ retrofitted fraction by 
measure[glazing]*retrofitted fraction by 
measure[loft]+ retrofitted fraction by 
measure[glazing]*retrofitted fraction by 
measure[boiler]+ retrofitted fraction by 
measure[loft]*retrofitted fraction by 
measure[boiler]- 3*housing stock composition 
by retrofit extent[three]- 6*housing stock 
composition by retrofit extent[four] 
housing stock 
composition by retrofit 
extent[one] 
1-housing stock composition by retrofit 
extent[zero]- housing stock composition by 
retrofit extent[two]- housing stock 
composition by retrofit extent[three]- housing 
stock composition by retrofit extent[four] 
Dmnl 
This variable differentiate the housing stock based on how many measures have been 
installed (extent of retrofit) 
housing stock 
composition by retrofit 
extent[zero] 
(1-retrofitted fraction by measure[insulation])* 
(1-retrofitted fraction by measure [glazing])* 
(1-retrofitted fraction by measure[loft])* (1-
retrofitted fraction by measure[boiler]) 
Dmnl 
This variable differentiate the housing stock based on how many measures have been 
installed (extent of retrofit) 
ideal percentage of 
controls 
0.2 Dmnl 
It has been estimate that the ideal percentage of installation quality controls should be the 
20%. Source: Hunter Danskin (BEIS) 
impact of awareness on 
fraction of retrofit 
renovations 
0.6 Dmnl 
How effective is retrofit awareness in making the homeowners renovating to consider 
retrofit 






use)*(1-tailored advise and smart metering[SC 
type])+ tailored advise and smart metering[SC 
type] 
Dmnl 
Here the effect households behavioural compliance has on the measure energy 
performance is calculated. The households behavioural compliance is slightly affected by 
the automatization in use and strongly affected by the tailored advise from the adviser and 
the use of smart metering 
 
impact of economic 
cycles on renovation 
fraction 
risk taking attitude by economic cycles 
  
Dmnl This variable represents the impact economic cycles can have on the renovation fraction 
impact of economy of 
scale on costs of 
materials 
MIN(1,  (total WF[measures]/workforce 
reference for economy of scale[measures]) 
^elasticity of economy of scale effect) 
Dmnl 






This variable reports the impact that market fragmentation has on credibility. It is an 
educated guess done by researchers 
impact of interventions 
technology on non-
1 Dmnl 
To calculate the impact of technology on intervention non-financial attractiveness a 
geometric mean has been used. Geometric mean because we need to mean impacts 





multiplication (not as terms as sum, in which case an arithmetic mean would have been 
more appropriate) 




impact of measures technology on non-
financial attractiveness [glazing] 
Dmnl 
To calculate the impact of technology on intervention non-financial attractiveness a 
geometric mean has been used. Geometric mean because we need to mean impacts 
among the measures of the intervention and these impacts will be used as factors in a 
multiplication (not as terms as sum, in which case an arithmetic mean would have been 
more appropriate) 




impact of measures technology on non-
financial attractiveness [boiler] 
Dmnl 
To calculate the impact of technology on intervention non-financial attractiveness a 
geometric mean has been used. Geometric mean because we need to mean impacts 
among the measures of the intervention and these impacts will be used as factors in a 
multiplication (not as terms as sum, in which case an arithmetic mean would have been 
more appropriate) 




impact of measures technology on non-
financial attractiveness [loft] 
Dmnl 
To calculate the impact of technology on intervention non-financial attractiveness a 
geometric mean has been used. Geometric mean because we need to mean impacts 
among the measures of the intervention and these impacts will be used as factors in a 
multiplication (not as terms as sum, in which case an arithmetic mean would have been 
more appropriate) 




impact of measures technology on non-
financial attractiveness [insulation] 
Dmnl 
To calculate the impact of technology on intervention non-financial attractiveness a 
geometric mean has been used. Geometric mean because we need to mean impacts 
among the measures of the intervention and these impacts will be used as factors in a 
multiplication (not as terms as sum, in which case an arithmetic mean would have been 
more appropriate) 




(impact of measures technology on non-
financial attractiveness [boiler]*impact of 
measures technology on non-financial 
attractiveness [glazing])^0.5 
Dmnl 
To calculate the impact of technology on intervention non-financial attractiveness a 
geometric mean has been used. Geometric mean because we need to mean impacts 
among the measures of the intervention and these impacts will be used as factors in a 
multiplication (not as terms as sum, in which case an arithmetic mean would have been 
more appropriate) 




(impact of measures technology on non-
financial attractiveness [glazing]* impact of 
measures technology on non-financial 
attractiveness [loft])^0.5 
Dmnl 
To calculate the impact of technology on intervention non-financial attractiveness a 
geometric mean has been used. Geometric mean because we need to mean impacts 
among the measures of the intervention and these impacts will be used as factors in a 
multiplication (not as terms as sum, in which case an arithmetic mean would have been 
more appropriate) 




(impact of measures technology on non-
financial attractiveness [glazing] * impact of 
measures technology on non-financial 
attractiveness [insulation])^0.5 
Dmnl 
To calculate the impact of technology on intervention non-financial attractiveness a 
geometric mean has been used. Geometric mean because we need to mean impacts 
among the measures of the intervention and these impacts will be used as factors in a 
multiplication (not as terms as sum, in which case an arithmetic mean would have been 
more appropriate) 




(impact of measures technology on non-
financial attractiveness [boiler] * impact of 
measures technology on non-financial 
attractiveness [loft])^0.5 
Dmnl 
To calculate the impact of technology on intervention non-financial attractiveness a 
geometric mean has been used. Geometric mean because we need to mean impacts 
among the measures of the intervention and these impacts will be used as factors in a 
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multiplication (not as terms as sum, in which case an arithmetic mean would have been 
more appropriate) 




( impact of measures technology on non-
financial attractiveness [boiler]* impact of 
measures technology on non-financial 
attractiveness [insulation])^0.5 
Dmnl 
To calculate the impact of technology on intervention non-financial attractiveness a 
geometric mean has been used. Geometric mean because we need to mean impacts 
among the measures of the intervention and these impacts will be used as factors in a 
multiplication (not as terms as sum, in which case an arithmetic mean would have been 
more appropriate) 




(impact of measures technology on non-
financial attractiveness [insulation]* impact of 
measures technology on non-financial 
attractiveness [loft])^0.5 
Dmnl 
To calculate the impact of technology on intervention non-financial attractiveness a 
geometric mean has been used. Geometric mean because we need to mean impacts 
among the measures of the intervention and these impacts will be used as factors in a 
multiplication (not as terms as sum, in which case an arithmetic mean would have been 
more appropriate) 




(impact of measures technology on non-
financial attractiveness [glazing]* impact of 
measures technology on non-financial 
attractiveness [boiler]* impact of measures 
technology on non-financial attractiveness 
[loft])^(1/3) 
Dmnl 
To calculate the impact of technology on intervention non-financial attractiveness a 
geometric mean has been used. Geometric mean because we need to mean impacts 
among the measures of the intervention and these impacts will be used as factors in a 
multiplication (not as terms as sum, in which case an arithmetic mean would have been 
more appropriate) 




(impact of measures technology on non-
financial attractiveness [glazing]* impact of 
measures technology on non-financial 
attractiveness [boiler]* impact of measures 
technology on non-financial attractiveness 
[insulation])^(1/3) 
Dmnl 
To calculate the impact of technology on intervention non-financial attractiveness a 
geometric mean has been used. Geometric mean because we need to mean impacts 
among the measures of the intervention and these impacts will be used as factors in a 
multiplication (not as terms as sum, in which case an arithmetic mean would have been 
more appropriate) 




(impact of measures technology on non-
financial attractiveness [glazing]* impact of 
measures technology on non-financial 
attractiveness [insulation]* impact of 
measures technology on non-financial 
attractiveness [loft])^(1/3) 
Dmnl 
To calculate the impact of technology on intervention non-financial attractiveness a 
geometric mean has been used. Geometric mean because we need to mean impacts 
among the measures of the intervention and these impacts will be used as factors in a 
multiplication (not as terms as sum, in which case an arithmetic mean would have been 
more appropriate) 




(impact of measures technology on non-
financial attractiveness [insulation]* impact of 
measures technology on non-financial 
attractiveness [boiler]* impact of measures 
technology on non-financial attractiveness 
[loft])^(1/3) 
Dmnl 
To calculate the impact of technology on intervention non-financial attractiveness a 
geometric mean has been used. Geometric mean because we need to mean impacts 
among the measures of the intervention and these impacts will be used as factors in a 
multiplication (not as terms as sum, in which case an arithmetic mean would have been 
more appropriate) 




(impact of measures technology on non-
financial attractiveness [glazing]* impact of 
measures technology on non-financial 
attractiveness [boiler]* impact of measures 
technology on non-financial attractiveness 
Dmnl 
To calculate the impact of technology on intervention non-financial attractiveness a 
geometric mean has been used. Geometric mean because we need to mean impacts 
among the measures of the intervention and these impacts will be used as factors in a 




[loft]* impact of measures technology on non-
financial attractiveness [insulation])^0.25 
impact of learning 
curve on labour costs 
EXP(-Installed measures[measures]/(installed 
measures to halve the price/LN(2))) 
Dmnl 
The ratio between the installed measures and the reference number of measure after 
which the price is halved provide the comparison needed to know whether this learning 
curve is active. The Exponential of this ratio in a negative form, divided by the logarithm of 
two gives an exponential decrease, gives 0.5 when the installed measure are equal to the 
installed measure to halve the price 
impact of maintenance 
on behaviour 
MIN(1,maintenance frequency acceptable for 
consumer/maintenance frequency for 
measures proper work[measures]) 
Dmnl 
This variable represents how the measure frequency can impact households behaviours 
and habits 
impact of measures 
technology on non-
financial attractiveness 
Retrofit technology[measures]^ elasticity for 
impact of technology on non-financial 
attractiveness 
Dmnl 
The impact of technological improvements on the reference non-financial attractiveness is 
calculated based on the relative elasticity 
impact of quality on 
energy performance 
avg quality of installed 
measures[measures]^elasticity for impact of 
quality on energy performance 
Dmnl 
Here the impact of changes in quality on the energy performance of the measure installed 
is calculated based on a elasticity 
impact of sense of 
opportunity non 
financial attractiveness 
(MAX(0,sense of opportunity[SC 
type,interventions]))^sense of opportunity to 
financial attractiveness elasticity 
Dmnl 
The impact of the sense of opportunity generated by the presence of subsidies is calculated 
based on the respective elasticity 
 
impact of tax 
reductions on 
renovation fraction 
(1+perceived tax reduction on 
renovations)^tax reduction to renovation 
fraction elasticity 
Dmnl 
This variable calculates the impact a tax reduction has on the fraction of homeowners 
doing renovations 
impact of technology 
on materials costs 
MIN(1, Retrofit 
technology[measures]^technology to cost 
elasticity) 
Dmnl 
Here the impact of technological improvements on material costs is calculated based on an 
elasticity 




How much unintended consequences (failed measures) impact the opinion formation 
(popularity) of households. Educated guess made by researchers. Failed measures make 
more 'noise' than measures installed properly 
incentive to invest 
IF THEN ELSE(projected return from 
investing[SC type,measures]>=return from not 
investing 
[SC type,measures], 1, 0) 
Dmnl 
If investing in the expansion of supply chain workforce is more profitable than not 
investing, it will be invested the necessary amount of money needed to cover any future 
workforce gap 
increased awareness by 
energy suppliers selling 
retrofit 
0 Dmnl 
Test variable to introduce in the model the possibility for an increase in awareness due to 
energy suppliers 
indoor temperature by 
intervention[n] 
indoor temperature by retrofit extent[zero] ° 
The indoor temperature is calculated per intervention, starting from extent (the number of 
measures installed) 
indoor temperature by 
intervention[g] 
indoor temperature by retrofit extent[one] ° 
The indoor temperature is calculated per intervention, starting from extent (the number of 
measures installed) 
indoor temperature by 
intervention[b] 
indoor temperature by retrofit extent[one] ° 




indoor temperature by 
intervention[l] 
indoor temperature by retrofit extent[one] ° 
The indoor temperature is calculated per intervention, starting from extent (the number of 
measures installed) 
indoor temperature by 
intervention[i] 
indoor temperature by retrofit extent[one] ° 
The indoor temperature is calculated per intervention, starting from extent (the number of 
measures installed) 
indoor temperature by 
intervention[gb] 
indoor temperature by retrofit extent[two] ° 
The indoor temperature is calculated per intervention, starting from extent (the number of 
measures installed) 
indoor temperature by 
intervention[gl] 
indoor temperature by retrofit extent[two] ° 
The indoor temperature is calculated per intervention, starting from extent (the number of 
measures installed) 
indoor temperature by 
intervention[gi] 
indoor temperature by retrofit extent[two] ° 
The indoor temperature is calculated per intervention, starting from extent (the number of 
measures installed) 
indoor temperature by 
intervention[bl] 
indoor temperature by retrofit extent[two] ° 
The indoor temperature is calculated per intervention, starting from extent (the number of 
measures installed) 
indoor temperature by 
intervention[bi] 
indoor temperature by retrofit extent[two] ° 
The indoor temperature is calculated per intervention, starting from extent (the number of 
measures installed) 
indoor temperature by 
intervention[li] 
indoor temperature by retrofit extent[two] ° 
The indoor temperature is calculated per intervention, starting from extent (the number of 
measures installed) 
indoor temperature by 
intervention[gbl] 
indoor temperature by retrofit extent[three] ° 
The indoor temperature is calculated per intervention, starting from extent (the number of 
measures installed) 
indoor temperature by 
intervention[gbi] 
indoor temperature by retrofit extent[three] ° 
The indoor temperature is calculated per intervention, starting from extent (the number of 
measures installed) 
indoor temperature by 
intervention[gli] 
indoor temperature by retrofit extent[three] ° 
The indoor temperature is calculated per intervention, starting from extent (the number of 
measures installed) 
indoor temperature by 
intervention[bli] 
indoor temperature by retrofit extent[three] ° 
The indoor temperature is calculated per intervention, starting from extent (the number of 
measures installed) 
indoor temperature by 
intervention[gbli] 
indoor temperature by retrofit extent[four] ° 
The indoor temperature is calculated per intervention, starting from extent (the number of 
measures installed) 
indoor temperature by 
retrofit extent[zero] 
reference indoor temperature ° 
Indoor temperature by retrofit extent. If there is no rebound effect all the temperature are 
equal 
indoor temperature by 
retrofit extent[one] 
indoor temperature by retrofit extent[zero]+ 
rebound effect*temperature increase per 
extent level 
° 
Indoor temperature by retrofit extent. If there is no rebound effect all the temperature are 
equal 
indoor temperature by 
retrofit extent[two] 
indoor temperature by retrofit extent[one]+ 
rebound effect*temperature increase per 
extent level 
° 
Indoor temperature by retrofit extent. If there is no rebound effect all the temperature are 
equal 
indoor temperature by 
retrofit extent[three] 
indoor temperature by retrofit extent[two]+ 
rebound effect*temperature increase per 
extent level 
° 
Indoor temperature by retrofit extent. If there is no rebound effect all the temperature are 
equal 
indoor temperature by 
retrofit extent[four] 
indoor temperature by retrofit extent[three]+ 
rebound effect*temperature increase per 
extent level 
° 




industry trust building 
time 




Fraction of the retrofit measure already installed in the housing stock by year 2000. 
Estimation based on two report released by DECC/BEIS: 'United Kingdom housing energy 
fact file 2013' and 'Households energy efficiency national statistics. Detailed report 2016'. 
Integrated with I. Hamilton (2014) 'Uptake of energy efficiency interventions in English 
dwellings'. We assumed the number of homeowners (and so of the potential measures to 
install) to be constant (around 18 millions) and that a constant fraction (around 70%) of the 




Fraction of the retrofit measure already installed in the housing stock by year 2000. 
Estimation based on two report released by DECC/BEIS: 'United Kingdom housing energy 
fact file 2013' and 'Households energy efficiency national statistics. Detailed report 2016'. 
Integrated with I. Hamilton (2014) 'Uptake of energy efficiency interventions in English 
dwellings'. We assumed the number of homeowners (and so of the potential measures to 
install) to be constant (around 18 millions) and that a constant fraction (around 70%) of the 




Fraction of the retrofit measure already installed in the housing stock by year 2000. 
Estimation based on two report released by DECC/BEIS: 'United Kingdom housing energy 
fact file 2013' and 'Households energy efficiency national statistics. Detailed report 2016'. 
Integrated with I. Hamilton (2014) 'Uptake of energy efficiency interventions in English 
dwellings'. We assumed the number of homeowners (and so of the potential measures to 
install) to be constant (around 18 millions) and that a constant fraction (around 70%) of the 
reported uptake rate is from the homeowners. 
INIT installed 
fraction[insulation] 
0.004*(1-cavity wall scenario)+ 0.314*cavity 
wall scenario 
Dmnl 
Fraction of the retrofit measure already installed in the housing stock by year 2000. 
Estimation based on two report released by DECC/BEIS: 'United Kingdom housing energy 
fact file 2013' and 'Households energy efficiency national statistics. Detailed report 2016'. 
Integrated with I. Hamilton (2014) 'Uptake of energy efficiency interventions in English 
dwellings'. We assumed the number of homeowners (and so of the potential measures to 
install) to be constant (around 18 millions) and that a constant fraction (around 70%) of the 




Fraction of the houses in which a measure was already or could be installed (by year 2000). 
Estimation based on two report released by DECC/BEIS: 'United Kingdom housing energy 
fact file 2013' and 'Households energy efficiency national statistics. Detailed report 2016'. 
Integrated with I. Hamilton (2014) 'Uptake of energy efficiency interventions in English 
dwellings'. We assumed the number of homeowners (and so of the potential measures to 
install) to be constant (around 18 millions) and that a constant fraction (around 70%) of the 




Fraction of the houses in which a measure was already or could be installed (by year 2000). 
Estimation based on two report released by DECC/BEIS: 'United Kingdom housing energy 
fact file 2013' and 'Households energy efficiency national statistics. Detailed report 2016'. 
Integrated with I. Hamilton (2014) 'Uptake of energy efficiency interventions in English 
dwellings'. We assumed the number of homeowners (and so of the potential measures to 
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install) to be constant (around 18 millions) and that a constant fraction (around 70%) of the 
reported uptake rate is from the homeowners. 
INIT measures 
distribution[insulation] 
solid INIT distribution*(1-cavity wall scenario)+ 
cavity INIT distribution*cavity wall scenario 
Dmnl 
Fraction of the houses in which a measure was already or could be installed (by year 2000). 
Estimation based on two report released by DECC/BEIS: 'United Kingdom housing energy 
fact file 2013' and 'Households energy efficiency national statistics. Detailed report 2016'. 
Integrated with I. Hamilton (2014) 'Uptake of energy efficiency interventions in English 
dwellings'. We assumed the number of homeowners (and so of the potential measures to 
install) to be constant (around 18 millions) and that a constant fraction (around 70%) of the 




Fraction of the houses in which a measure was already or could be installed (by year 2000). 
Estimation based on two report released by DECC/BEIS: 'United Kingdom housing energy 
fact file 2013' and 'Households energy efficiency national statistics. Detailed report 2016'. 
Integrated with I. Hamilton (2014) 'Uptake of energy efficiency interventions in English 
dwellings'. We assumed the number of homeowners (and so of the potential measures to 
install) to be constant (around 18 millions) and that a constant fraction (around 70%) of the 
reported uptake rate is from the homeowners. 
INIT stock 1.8e+007 measures 





0.9 Dmnl Initial market fragmentation. Based on the inputs of the  workshops 
initial total WF 135000 workers 





INTEG (aggregate measures uptake 
rate[measures]+fixing rate[measures]-
defection rate 
[measures],INIT stock*INIT measures 
distribution[measures]*INIT installed 
fraction[measures]) 
measures Cumulative stock of the measure installed 
installed measures to 
halve the price 
5e+008 measures 
The number of installed measures that lead to halve the labour costs because of learning 
effect in the industry (so it is able to optimize at the best all the components). Educated 
guess made by researchers 
Installed measures 
weighted by quality 





The installed measures are weighted by quality (namely the workforce skills level with 
which they are installed). If the number is equal to the number of the stock installed 
measures  it means the measures have been installed with the maximum quality. 
Otherwise, they have been installed with a lower one 
installers' advise impact fraction of renovators offering retrofit Dmnl 
Percentage of households considering only amenity renovation that starts to consider to 




performances in bill 
savings 
ZIDZ(actual bill savings by 
intervention[interventions], expected bill 
savings by intervention[interventions]) 
Dmnl 










If there is a gap between the demand for retrofit and the capability of the supply chain to 




Backlog of interventions[SC 
type,interventions]/backlog adjustment time 
Interventions/ 
Month 




MAX(0,  fulfilled interventions[SC 











Here the energy performance is calculated per intervention averaging the sum of the single 




measures energy efficiency 
performance[glazing] 
Dmnl 
Here the energy performance is calculated per intervention averaging the sum of the single 




measures energy efficiency 
performance[boiler] 
Dmnl 
Here the energy performance is calculated per intervention averaging the sum of the single 




measures energy efficiency performance[loft] Dmnl 
Here the energy performance is calculated per intervention averaging the sum of the single 




measures energy efficiency 
performance[insulation] 
Dmnl 
Here the energy performance is calculated per intervention averaging the sum of the single 




(measures energy efficiency 
performance[boiler]+ measures energy 
efficiency performance[glazing])/2 
Dmnl 
Here the energy performance is calculated per intervention averaging the sum of the single 




(measures energy efficiency 
performance[glazing]+ measures energy 
efficiency performance[loft])/2 
Dmnl 
Here the energy performance is calculated per intervention averaging the sum of the single 




(measures energy efficiency 
performance[glazing]+ measures energy 
efficiency performance[insulation])/2 
Dmnl 
Here the energy performance is calculated per intervention averaging the sum of the single 




(measures energy efficiency 
performance[boiler]+ measures energy 
efficiency performance[loft])/2 
Dmnl 
Here the energy performance is calculated per intervention averaging the sum of the single 






(measures energy efficiency 
performance[boiler]+ measures energy 
efficiency performance[insulation])/2 
Dmnl 
Here the energy performance is calculated per intervention averaging the sum of the single 




(measures energy efficiency 
performance[insulation]+ measures energy 
efficiency performance[loft])/2 
Dmnl 
Here the energy performance is calculated per intervention averaging the sum of the single 




(measures energy efficiency 
performance[glazing]+ measures energy 
efficiency performance[boiler]+ measures 
energy efficiency performance[loft])/3 
Dmnl 
Here the energy performance is calculated per intervention averaging the sum of the single 




(measures energy efficiency 
performance[glazing]+ measures energy 
efficiency performance[boiler]+ measures 
energy efficiency performance[insulation])/3 
Dmnl 
Here the energy performance is calculated per intervention averaging the sum of the single 




(measures energy efficiency 
performance[glazing]+ measures energy 
efficiency performance[insulation]+ measures 
energy efficiency performance[loft])/3 
Dmnl 
Here the energy performance is calculated per intervention averaging the sum of the single 




(measures energy efficiency 
performance[insulation]+ measures energy 
efficiency performance[boiler]+ measures 
energy efficiency performance[loft])/3 
Dmnl 
Here the energy performance is calculated per intervention averaging the sum of the single 




(measures energy efficiency 
performance[glazing]+ measures energy 
efficiency performance[boiler]+ measures 
energy efficiency performance[loft]+ measures 
energy efficiency performance[insulation])/4 
Dmnl 
Here the energy performance is calculated per intervention averaging the sum of the single 




















Only one measure per type can be done in an intervention 
 
interventions per 
month by extent by 
SC[SC type,one] 
retrofit rate by intervention[SC type,g]+
 retrofit rate by intervention[SC 
type,b]+ 
retrofit rate by intervention[SC type,l]+ retrofit 
rate by intervention[SC type,i] 
Interventions/ 
Month 
Intervention grouped by extent. An intervention with one measure installed has extent 
one, an intervention with two measures installed has extent two and so on 
interventions per 
month by extent by 
SC[SC type,two] 
retrofit rate by intervention[SC type,gb]+ 
retrofit rate by intervention[SC type,gl]+ 
retrofit rate by intervention[SC type,gi]+ 
Interventions/ 
Month 
Intervention grouped by extent. An intervention with one measure installed has extent 
one, an intervention with two measures installed has extent two and so on 
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retrofit rate by intervention[SC type,bl]+ 
retrofit rate by intervention[SC type,li]+ 
retrofit rate by intervention[SC type,bi] 
interventions per 
month by extent by 
SC[SC type,three] 
retrofit rate by intervention[SC type,gbl]+ 
retrofit rate by intervention[SC type,gli]+ 
retrofit rate by intervention[SC type,gbi]+ 
retrofit rate by intervention[SC type,bli] 
Interventions/ 
Month 
Intervention grouped by extent. An intervention with one measure installed has extent 
one, an intervention with two measures installed has extent two and so on 
interventions per 
month by extent by 
SC[SC type,four] 
retrofit rate by intervention[SC type,gbli] 
Interventions/ 
Month 
Intervention grouped by extent. An intervention with one measure installed has extent 
one, an intervention with two measures installed has extent two and so on 
interventions per 





Intervention grouped by extent. An intervention with one measure installed has extent 
one, an intervention with two measures installed has extent two and so on 
interventions 
popularity[i] 
Popularity of measures[insulation] Dmnl Here the popularity is translated from measure to intervention with a geometric mean 
interventions 
popularity[l] 
Popularity of measures[loft] Dmnl Here the popularity is translated from measure to intervention with a geometric mean 
interventions 
popularity[g] 
Popularity of measures[glazing] Dmnl Here the popularity is translated from measure to intervention with a geometric mean 
interventions 
popularity[b] 
Popularity of measures[boiler] Dmnl Here the popularity is translated from measure to intervention with a geometric mean 
interventions 
popularity[gb] 
(Popularity of measures[glazing]*Popularity of 
measures[boiler])^(1/2) 
Dmnl Here the popularity is translated from measure to intervention with a geometric mean 
interventions 
popularity[gl] 
(Popularity of measures[glazing]*Popularity of 
measures[loft])^(1/2) 
Dmnl Here the popularity is translated from measure to intervention with a geometric mean 
interventions 
popularity[gi] 
(Popularity of measures[glazing]*Popularity of 
measures[insulation])^(1/2) 
Dmnl Here the popularity is translated from measure to intervention with a geometric mean 
interventions 
popularity[bl] 
(Popularity of measures[boiler]*Popularity of 
measures[loft])^(1/2) 
Dmnl Here the popularity is translated from measure to intervention with a geometric mean 
interventions 
popularity[bi] 
(Popularity of measures[boiler]*Popularity of 
measures[insulation])^(1/2) 
Dmnl Here the popularity is translated from measure to intervention with a geometric mean 
interventions 
popularity[li] 
(Popularity of measures[loft]*Popularity of 
measures[insulation])^(1/2) 
Dmnl Here the popularity is translated from measure to intervention with a geometric mean 
interventions 
popularity[gbli] 




Dmnl Here the popularity is translated from measure to intervention with a geometric mean 
interventions 
popularity[gbl] 
(Popularity of measures[glazing]*Popularity of 
measures[boiler]*Popularity of 
measures[loft])^(1/3) 





(Popularity of measures[glazing]*Popularity of 
measures[boiler]*Popularity of 
measures[insulation])^(1/3) 
Dmnl Here the popularity is translated from measure to intervention with a geometric mean 
interventions 
popularity[gli] 
(Popularity of measures[glazing]*Popularity of 
measures[loft]*Popularity of 
measures[insulation])^(1/3) 
Dmnl Here the popularity is translated from measure to intervention with a geometric mean 
interventions 
popularity[bli] 
(Popularity of measures[boiler]*Popularity of 
measures[insulation]*Popularity of 
measures[loft])^(1/3) 
Dmnl Here the popularity is translated from measure to intervention with a geometric mean 
interventions 
popularity[n] 
1 Dmnl Here the popularity is translated from measure to intervention with a geometric mean 
investment effort in 
workforce 
incentive to invest[SC type,measures] 
Dmnl 
 
All the necessary amount of money to hire new workforce are invested 
 
investments horizon 120 Month 




budget percentage for technological 
investment*budget for upcoming 
month[measures] 
GBP/Month 
Here the budget invested in technology is calculated. It is obtained multiplying the budget 
for investments for the upcoming month by the percentage of technological investment 
investments in training 
actual budget percentage for training*budget 
for upcoming month[measures] 
GBP/Month The amount of money monthly invested in training 
labour contribution to 
costs 
MIN(1, labour costs fraction over total*impact 
of learning curve on labour costs[measures]) 
Dmnl 
Here the fractional labour costs are dampened by the impact of the learning curve. 
Learning curve is between zero and one 
labour costs fraction 
over total 
0.8 Dmnl 
Percentage of labour costs in a measure installed (the remaining is material contribution 
cost). Source: Niel Witney (BEIS) 
latency 60 Month 
The time frame in which someone that has done a renovation wait before to do another 
one 
learning by experience 
MAX(0, (maximum skills from 
experience*total WF[measures]-Workforce 
weighted by skills[measures]) /reference time 
for skills acquisition) 
workers/Month 
This flow represents workers gaining experience and improving their skills and therefore 
the quality of the job they do 
 
lenders restrictions on 
additional mortgage 
avg mortgage size*expected mortgage 
premium by intervention[interventions] 
GBP/Interventions How much additional money lenders give to buyers to retrofit their new property 
maintenance costs 





Here the maintenance costs for an intervention are multiplied by the frequency of the 





This is the maintenance frequency for intervention. For the interventions done by single 
supply chain it is the sum of the different frequency, since all the time the customer need 
to call a different installed. Instead, for the interventions done by multi supply chain, the 
frequency is given by the measure that the needs to be checked more often: this because 
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there is one the installer for all the measures and therefore once he comes for checking a 
measure he can also check the others 
maintenance 
frequency[SC type,g] 
maintenance frequency for measures proper 
work[glazing] 
1/Month 
This is the maintenance frequency for intervention. For the interventions done by single 
supply chain it is the sum of the different frequency, since all the time the customer need 
to call a different installed. Instead, for the interventions done by multi supply chain, the 
frequency is given by the measure that the needs to be checked more often: this because 
there is one the installer for all the measures and therefore once he comes for checking a 
measure he can also check the others 
maintenance 
frequency[SC type,b] 
maintenance frequency for measures proper 
work[boiler] 
1/Month 
This is the maintenance frequency for intervention. For the interventions done by single 
supply chain it is the sum of the different frequency, since all the time the customer need 
to call a different installed. Instead, for the interventions done by multi supply chain, the 
frequency is given by the measure that the needs to be checked more often: this because 
there is one the installer for all the measures and therefore once he comes for checking a 
measure he can also check the others 
maintenance 
frequency[SC type,l] 
maintenance frequency for measures proper 
work[loft] 
1/Month 
This is the maintenance frequency for intervention. For the interventions done by single 
supply chain it is the sum of the different frequency, since all the time the customer need 
to call a different installed. Instead, for the interventions done by multi supply chain, the 
frequency is given by the measure that the needs to be checked more often: this because 
there is one the installer for all the measures and therefore once he comes for checking a 
measure he can also check the others 
maintenance 
frequency[SC type,i] 
maintenance frequency for measures proper 
work[insulation] 
1/Month 
This is the maintenance frequency for intervention. For the interventions done by single 
supply chain it is the sum of the different frequency, since all the time the customer need 
to call a different installed. Instead, for the interventions done by multi supply chain, the 
frequency is given by the measure that the needs to be checked more often: this because 
there is one the installer for all the measures and therefore once he comes for checking a 
measure he can also check the others 
maintenance 
frequency[single,gb] 
maintenance frequency for measures proper 
work[glazing]+ maintenance frequency for 
measures proper work[boiler] 
1/Month 
This is the maintenance frequency for intervention. For the interventions done by single 
supply chain it is the sum of the different frequency, since all the time the customer need 
to call a different installed. Instead, for the interventions done by multi supply chain, the 
frequency is given by the measure that the needs to be checked more often: this because 
there is one the installer for all the measures and therefore once he comes for checking a 
measure he can also check the others 
maintenance 
frequency[single,gl] 
maintenance frequency for measures proper 
work[glazing]+ maintenance frequency for 
measures proper work[loft] 
1/Month 
This is the maintenance frequency for intervention. For the interventions done by single 
supply chain it is the sum of the different frequency, since all the time the customer need 
to call a different installed. Instead, for the interventions done by multi supply chain, the 
frequency is given by the measure that the needs to be checked more often: this because 
there is one the installer for all the measures and therefore once he comes for checking a 
measure he can also check the others 
maintenance 
frequency[single,gi] 
maintenance frequency for measures proper 
work[glazing]+ maintenance frequency for 
measures proper work[insulation] 
1/Month 
This is the maintenance frequency for intervention. For the interventions done by single 
supply chain it is the sum of the different frequency, since all the time the customer need 
to call a different installed. Instead, for the interventions done by multi supply chain, the 
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frequency is given by the measure that the needs to be checked more often: this because 
there is one the installer for all the measures and therefore once he comes for checking a 
measure he can also check the others 
maintenance 
frequency[single,bl] 
maintenance frequency for measures proper 
work[loft]+ maintenance frequency for 
measures proper work[boiler] 
1/Month 
This is the maintenance frequency for intervention. For the interventions done by single 
supply chain it is the sum of the different frequency, since all the time the customer need 
to call a different installed. Instead, for the interventions done by multi supply chain, the 
frequency is given by the measure that the needs to be checked more often: this because 
there is one the installer for all the measures and therefore once he comes for checking a 
measure he can also check the others 
maintenance 
frequency[single,bi] 
maintenance frequency for measures proper 
work[boiler]+ maintenance frequency for 
measures proper work[insulation] 
1/Month 
This is the maintenance frequency for intervention. For the interventions done by single 
supply chain it is the sum of the different frequency, since all the time the customer need 
to call a different installed. Instead, for the interventions done by multi supply chain, the 
frequency is given by the measure that the needs to be checked more often: this because 
there is one the installer for all the measures and therefore once he comes for checking a 
measure he can also check the others 
maintenance 
frequency[single,li] 
maintenance frequency for measures proper 
work[loft]+ maintenance frequency for 
measures proper work[insulation] 
1/Month 
This is the maintenance frequency for intervention. For the interventions done by single 
supply chain it is the sum of the different frequency, since all the time the customer need 
to call a different installed. Instead, for the interventions done by multi supply chain, the 
frequency is given by the measure that the needs to be checked more often: this because 
there is one the installer for all the measures and therefore once he comes for checking a 
measure he can also check the others 
maintenance 
frequency[single,gbl] 
maintenance frequency for measures proper 
work[glazing]+ maintenance frequency for 
measures proper work[loft]+ maintenance 
frequency for measures proper work[boiler] 
1/Month 
This is the maintenance frequency for intervention. For the interventions done by single 
supply chain it is the sum of the different frequency, since all the time the customer need 
to call a different installed. Instead, for the interventions done by multi supply chain, the 
frequency is given by the measure that the needs to be checked more often: this because 
there is one the installer for all the measures and therefore once he comes for checking a 
measure he can also check the others 
maintenance 
frequency[single,gbi] 
maintenance frequency for measures proper 
work[glazing]+ maintenance frequency for 
measures proper work[boiler]+ maintenance 
frequency for measures proper 
work[insulation] 
1/Month 
This is the maintenance frequency for intervention. For the interventions done by single 
supply chain it is the sum of the different frequency, since all the time the customer need 
to call a different installed. Instead, for the interventions done by multi supply chain, the 
frequency is given by the measure that the needs to be checked more often: this because 
there is one the installer for all the measures and therefore once he comes for checking a 
measure he can also check the others 
maintenance 
frequency[single,gli] 
maintenance frequency for measures proper 
work[glazing]+ maintenance frequency for 
measures proper work[loft]+ maintenance 
frequency for measures proper 
work[insulation] 
1/Month 
This is the maintenance frequency for intervention. For the interventions done by single 
supply chain it is the sum of the different frequency, since all the time the customer need 
to call a different installed. Instead, for the interventions done by multi supply chain, the 
frequency is given by the measure that the needs to be checked more often: this because 
there is one the installer for all the measures and therefore once he comes for checking a 
measure he can also check the others 
maintenance 
frequency[single,bli] 
maintenance frequency for measures proper 
work[loft]+ maintenance frequency for 
1/Month 
This is the maintenance frequency for intervention. For the interventions done by single 
supply chain it is the sum of the different frequency, since all the time the customer need 
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measures proper work[boiler]+ maintenance 
frequency for measures proper 
work[insulation] 
to call a different installed. Instead, for the interventions done by multi supply chain, the 
frequency is given by the measure that the needs to be checked more often: this because 
there is one the installer for all the measures and therefore once he comes for checking a 
measure he can also check the others 
maintenance 
frequency[single,gbli] 
maintenance frequency for measures proper 
work[glazing]+ maintenance frequency for 
measures proper work[loft]+ maintenance 
frequency for measures proper work[boiler]+ 
maintenance frequency for measures proper 
work[insulation] 
1/Month 
This is the maintenance frequency for intervention. For the interventions done by single 
supply chain it is the sum of the different frequency, since all the time the customer need 
to call a different installed. Instead, for the interventions done by multi supply chain, the 
frequency is given by the measure that the needs to be checked more often: this because 
there is one the installer for all the measures and therefore once he comes for checking a 
measure he can also check the others 
maintenance 
frequency[multi,gb] 
MAX(maintenance frequency for measures 
proper work[glazing], maintenance frequency 
for measures proper work[boiler]) 
1/Month 
This is the maintenance frequency for intervention. For the interventions done by single 
supply chain it is the sum of the different frequency, since all the time the customer need 
to call a different installed. Instead, for the interventions done by multi supply chain, the 
frequency is given by the measure that the needs to be checked more often: this because 
there is one the installer for all the measures and therefore once he comes for checking a 
measure he can also check the others 
maintenance 
frequency[multi,gl] 
MAX(maintenance frequency for measures 
proper work[glazing], maintenance frequency 
for measures proper work[loft]) 
1/Month 
This is the maintenance frequency for intervention. For the interventions done by single 
supply chain it is the sum of the different frequency, since all the time the customer need 
to call a different installed. Instead, for the interventions done by multi supply chain, the 
frequency is given by the measure that the needs to be checked more often: this because 
there is one the installer for all the measures and therefore once he comes for checking a 
measure he can also check the others 
maintenance 
frequency[multi,gi] 
MAX(maintenance frequency for measures 
proper work[glazing], maintenance frequency 
for measures proper work[insulation]) 
1/Month 
This is the maintenance frequency for intervention. For the interventions done by single 
supply chain it is the sum of the different frequency, since all the time the customer need 
to call a different installed. Instead, for the interventions done by multi supply chain, the 
frequency is given by the measure that the needs to be checked more often: this because 
there is one the installer for all the measures and therefore once he comes for checking a 
measure he can also check the others 
maintenance 
frequency[multi,bl] 
MAX(maintenance frequency for measures 
proper work[loft], maintenance frequency for 
measures proper work[boiler]) 
1/Month 
This is the maintenance frequency for intervention. For the interventions done by single 
supply chain it is the sum of the different frequency, since all the time the customer need 
to call a different installed. Instead, for the interventions done by multi supply chain, the 
frequency is given by the measure that the needs to be checked more often: this because 
there is one the installer for all the measures and therefore once he comes for checking a 
measure he can also check the others 
maintenance 
frequency[multi,bi] 
MAX(maintenance frequency for measures 
proper work[boiler], maintenance frequency 
for measures proper work[insulation]) 
1/Month 
This is the maintenance frequency for intervention. For the interventions done by single 
supply chain it is the sum of the different frequency, since all the time the customer need 
to call a different installed. Instead, for the interventions done by multi supply chain, the 
frequency is given by the measure that the needs to be checked more often: this because 
there is one the installer for all the measures and therefore once he comes for checking a 





MAX(maintenance frequency for measures 
proper work[loft], maintenance frequency for 
measures proper work[insulation]) 
1/Month 
This is the maintenance frequency for intervention. For the interventions done by single 
supply chain it is the sum of the different frequency, since all the time the customer need 
to call a different installed. Instead, for the interventions done by multi supply chain, the 
frequency is given by the measure that the needs to be checked more often: this because 
there is one the installer for all the measures and therefore once he comes for checking a 
measure he can also check the others 
maintenance 
frequency[multi,gbl] 
MAX(maintenance frequency for measures 
proper work[glazing],  MAX(maintenance 
frequency for measures proper work[loft], 
maintenance frequency for measures proper 
work[boiler])) 
1/Month 
This is the maintenance frequency for intervention. For the interventions done by single 
supply chain it is the sum of the different frequency, since all the time the customer need 
to call a different installed. Instead, for the interventions done by multi supply chain, the 
frequency is given by the measure that the needs to be checked more often: this because 
there is one the installer for all the measures and therefore once he comes for checking a 
measure he can also check the others 
maintenance 
frequency[multi,gbi] 
MAX(maintenance frequency for measures 
proper work[glazing], MAX(maintenance 
frequency for measures proper work[boiler],  
maintenance frequency for measures proper 
work[insulation])) 
1/Month 
This is the maintenance frequency for intervention. For the interventions done by single 
supply chain it is the sum of the different frequency, since all the time the customer need 
to call a different installed. Instead, for the interventions done by multi supply chain, the 
frequency is given by the measure that the needs to be checked more often: this because 
there is one the installer for all the measures and therefore once he comes for checking a 
measure he can also check the others 
maintenance 
frequency[multi,gli] 
MAX(maintenance frequency for measures 
proper work[glazing], MAX(maintenance 
frequency for measures proper work[loft], 
maintenance frequency for measures proper 
work[insulation])) 
1/Month 
This is the maintenance frequency for intervention. For the interventions done by single 
supply chain it is the sum of the different frequency, since all the time the customer need 
to call a different installed. Instead, for the interventions done by multi supply chain, the 
frequency is given by the measure that the needs to be checked more often: this because 
there is one the installer for all the measures and therefore once he comes for checking a 
measure he can also check the others 
maintenance 
frequency[multi,bli] 
MAX(maintenance frequency for measures 
proper work[loft], MAX(maintenance 
frequency for measures proper work[boiler], 
maintenance frequency for measures proper 
work[insulation])) 
1/Month 
This is the maintenance frequency for intervention. For the interventions done by single 
supply chain it is the sum of the different frequency, since all the time the customer need 
to call a different installed. Instead, for the interventions done by multi supply chain, the 
frequency is given by the measure that the needs to be checked more often: this because 
there is one the installer for all the measures and therefore once he comes for checking a 
measure he can also check the others 
maintenance 
frequency[multi,gbli] 
MAX(maintenance frequency for measures 
proper work[glazing], MAX(maintenance 
frequency for measures proper work[boiler], 
MAX(maintenance frequency for measures 
proper work[insulation], maintenance 
frequency for measures proper work[loft]))) 
1/Month 
This is the maintenance frequency for intervention. For the interventions done by single 
supply chain it is the sum of the different frequency, since all the time the customer need 
to call a different installed. Instead, for the interventions done by multi supply chain, the 
frequency is given by the measure that the needs to be checked more often: this because 
there is one the installer for all the measures and therefore once he comes for checking a 





This is what is believed to be an adequate and acceptable maintenance frequency that a 
household can take care of. Educated guess made by researchers based on the inputs 




for measures proper 
work[glazing] 
1/120 1/Month 
These are educated guesses on how often a measure needs maintenance to properly work 
over time 
maintenance frequency 
for measures proper 
work[boiler] 
1/36 1/Month 
These are educated guesses on how often a measure needs maintenance to properly work 
over time 
maintenance frequency 
for measures proper 
work[loft] 
1/60 1/Month 
These are educated guesses on how often a measure needs maintenance to properly work 
over time 
maintenance frequency 
for measures proper 
work[insulation] 
IF THEN ELSE(cavity wall scenario>0.5, 1/60, 
1/240) 
1/Month 
These are educated guesses on how often a measure needs maintenance to properly work 
over time 
market fragmentation 
MAX(0, ZIDZ(SUM(Workforce for 
retrofit[single,measures!]), SUM(Workforce for 
retrofit[SC type!,measures!]))) 
Dmnl 
This variable represents the fragmentation of the retrofit market. This aspect is 
represented dividing installers able to install only one measure by the installer that are able 
install more 
 
market volume for 
renovations 
renovations*reference expenditures for 
renovations[renovation type] 
GBP/Month Here the market volume of all the renovations is calculated 
market volume for 
retrofit 
SUM(market volume for retrofit by measure[SC 
type!,measures!]) 
GBP/Month The total volume of the business per month related to retrofit 
market volume for 
retrofit by measure 
reference prices for individual 
measure[measures]* retrofit demand by 
measures[SC type,measures] 
GBP/Month The monthly volume of business involved in retrofit installations is here calculated 
marketing 
max impact of marketing on popularity 
change[measures]*potential fraction by 
measure[measures] 
1/Month Here the impact of marketing is discount by the potential still available in the housing stock 
marketing pressure 
total WF[measures]/workforce threshold for 
marketing 
Dmnl This variable assess whether the workforce exceed the threshold for marketing 
materials contribution 
to costs 
(1-labour costs fraction over total)* impact of 
economy of scale on costs of materials[SC 
type,measures]* impact of technology on 
materials costs[measures] 
Dmnl 
Here the fractional material costs are dampened by the economy of scale and 
technological improvements. Economy of scale and technological improvements assumes 
both a value between zero and one 
 
max added value 
reference max added value+ measures added 
value for energy efficiency 
improvement[measures]*from EE added value 
to max added value multiplier 
Dmnl 
The maximum added value (non-financial reasons) is summed with the added value for 
measure mortgage premium (financial reasons) 
 
max advise from 
renovators 
2 Dmnl Number of maximum advices to do retrofit by worker. Estimation done by researchers 
max fractional 
popularity change due 
to marketing 
0.005 1/Month This represents the maximum change that marketing can do to popularity per unit of time 
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max fractional popularity change due to 




This is a S-shaped function that when the marketing pressure is bigger than 1 we reach the 






Realistic estimation of the maximal probability of unintended consequences when a 
retrofit measure is installed (this is the case in which it is installed by low skilled workers). 
Based on inputs with UCL experts 
maximum rebate from 
stamp duty usable to 
retrofit 
STEP(stamp duty rebates switch,stamp rebate 
starting time)* avg stamp duty* stamp duty 
rebate maximum fraction/ interventions per 
household 
GBP/Interventions  
The amount of money a buyer can invest per retrofit intervention because of a stamp duty 
rebate 
maximum skills from 
experience 
1 Dmnl One represents the maximum skill that can be gained by a worker 
measures added value 
for energy efficiency 
improvement 
house price premium per EPC band*expected 
EPC improvement by measure[measures] 
Dmnl 
How much a retrofit measure adds value to the property because of increase in house 
valued due to EPC improvements 
measures capacity gap 
accumulation 
MAX(0, retrofit demand by measures[SC 
type,measures]-SC capacity for measures[SC 
type,measures]) 
measures/Month 
This flow account for the monthly capacity gap that there could be between demand and 
supply 
measures capacity gap 
reduction[SC 
type,glazing] 
measures per intervention*(backlog 
interventions drop out[SC type,g]+ backlog 
interventions drop out[SC type,gb]+ backlog 
interventions drop out[SC type,gl]+ backlog 
interventions drop out[SC type,gi]+ backlog 
interventions drop out[SC type,gbl]+ backlog 
interventions drop out[SC type,gbi]+ backlog 
interventions drop out[SC type,gli]+ backlog 
interventions drop out[SC type,gbli]+ 
interventions backlog depletion[SC type,g]+ 
interventions backlog depletion[SC type,gb]+ 
interventions backlog depletion[SC type,gl]+ 
interventions backlog depletion[SC type,gi]+ 
interventions backlog depletion[SC type,gbi]+ 
interventions backlog depletion[SC type,gli]+ 
interventions backlog depletion[SC type,gbl]+ 
interventions backlog depletion[SC type,gbli]) 
measures/Month 
The more the demand backlog is monthly solved the more the capacity gap accumulated 
decreases. It is calculated per measure, summing all the intervention that include that 
measure 
measures capacity gap 
reduction[SC type, 
boiler] 
measures per intervention*(backlog 
interventions drop out[SC type,b]+ backlog 
interventions drop out[SC type,gb]+ backlog 
interventions drop out[SC type,bl]+ backlog 
interventions drop out[SC type,bi]+ backlog 
measures/Month 
The more the demand backlog is monthly solved the more the capacity gap accumulated 




interventions drop out[SC type,gbl]+ backlog 
interventions drop out[SC type,gbi]+ backlog 
interventions drop out[SC type,bli]+ backlog 
interventions drop out[SC type,gbli]+ 
interventions backlog depletion[SC type,b]+ 
interventions backlog depletion[SC type,bi]+ 
interventions backlog depletion[SC type,bi]+ 
interventions backlog depletion[SC type,gb]+ 
interventions backlog depletion[SC type,gbi]+ 
interventions backlog depletion[SC type,gbl]+ 
interventions backlog depletion[SC type,bli]+ 
interventions backlog depletion[SC type,gbli]) 
measures capacity gap 
reduction[SC type, loft] 
measures per intervention*(backlog 
interventions drop out[SC type,l]+ backlog 
interventions drop out[SC type,gl]+ backlog 
interventions drop out[SC type,bl]+ backlog 
interventions drop out[SC type,li]+ backlog 
interventions drop out[SC type,gbl]+ backlog 
interventions drop out[SC type,gli]+ backlog 
interventions drop out[SC type,bli]+ backlog 
interventions drop out[SC type,gbli]+ 
interventions backlog depletion[SC type,l]+ 
interventions backlog depletion[SC type,bl]+ 
interventions backlog depletion[SC type,li]+ 
interventions backlog depletion[SC type,gl]+ 
interventions backlog depletion[SC type,gbl]+ 
interventions backlog depletion[SC type,gli]+ 
interventions backlog depletion[SC type,bli]+ 
interventions backlog depletion[SC type,gbli]) 
measures/Month 
The more the demand backlog is monthly solved the more the capacity gap accumulated 
decreases. It is calculated per measure, summing all the intervention that include that 
measure 
measures capacity gap 
reduction[SC type, 
insulation] 
measures per intervention*(backlog 
interventions drop out[SC type,i]+ backlog 
interventions drop out[SC type,bi]+ backlog 
interventions drop out[SC type,li]+ backlog 
interventions drop out[SC type,gi]+ backlog 
interventions drop out[SC type,gbi]+ backlog 
interventions drop out[SC type,gli]+ backlog 
interventions drop out[SC type,bli]+ backlog 
interventions drop out[SC type,gbli]+ 
interventions backlog depletion[SC type,i]+ 
interventions backlog depletion[SC type,bi]+ 
interventions backlog depletion[SC type,li]+ 
interventions backlog depletion[SC type,gi]+ 
measures/Month 
The more the demand backlog is monthly solved the more the capacity gap accumulated 




interventions backlog depletion[SC type,gbi]+ 
interventions backlog depletion[SC type,gli]+ 
interventions backlog depletion[SC type,bli]+ 
interventions backlog depletion[SC type,gbli]) 




If more measures are installed together by just one installer in an intervention it is possible 
they cost less than installing them one by one in different interventions. This effect 
activates when 3 or more measure are installed together. Otherwise, multi supply chain is 
more expensive to in install one or two measure (because multi supply chain needs to 
mobilize  more resource to do an installation than single supply chain) 
measures discount by 
combination[multi,one] 
-0.2 Dmnl 
If more measures are installed together by just one installer in an intervention it is possible 
they cost less than installing them one by one in different interventions. This effect 
activates when 3 or more measure are installed together. Otherwise, multi supply chain is 
more expensive to in install one or two measure (because multi supply chain needs to 
mobilize  more resource to do an installation than single supply chain) 
measures discount by 
combination[multi,two] 
-0.1 Dmnl 
If more measures are installed together by just one installer in an intervention it is possible 
they cost less than installing them one by one in different interventions. This effect 
activates when 3 or more measure are installed together. Otherwise, multi supply chain is 
more expensive to in install one or two measure (because multi supply chain needs to 
mobilize  more resource to do an installation than single supply chain) 




If more measures are installed together by just one installer in an intervention it is possible 
they cost less than installing them one by one in different interventions. This effect 
activates when 3 or more measure are installed together. Otherwise, multi supply chain is 
more expensive to in install one or two measure (because multi supply chain needs to 
mobilize  more resource to do an installation than single supply chain) 




If more measures are installed together by just one installer in an intervention it is possible 
they cost less than installing them one by one in different interventions. This effect 
activates when 3 or more measure are installed together. Otherwise, multi supply chain is 
more expensive to in install one or two measure (because multi supply chain needs to 
mobilize  more resource to do an installation than single supply chain) 




If more measures are installed together by just one installer in an intervention it is possible 
they cost less than installing them one by one in different interventions. This effect 
activates when 3 or more measure are installed together. Otherwise, multi supply chain is 
more expensive to in install one or two measure (because multi supply chain needs to 
mobilize  more resource to do an installation than single supply chain)  
measures energy 
efficiency performance 
SUM(impact of behavioural compliance on 
measures energy performance[SC 
type!,measures])/ ELMCOUNT(SC type)* 
impact of quality on energy 
performance[measures] 
Dmnl 
Here the two aspects that affect the retrofit measure performance are aggregated (the 
households behavioural compliance and the quality of the measure installation). Since 





rate weighted by 
quality 
aggregate measures uptake 
rate[measures]*workforce skills[measures] 
measures/Month Flow of measure installed weighted by the workforce skills 
measures opinion 
formation 
awareness spreading by word of 
mouth[measures]* perceived measures 
benefits[measures]-negative wom from 
unintended consequences[measures] 
1/Month 
Here all the factors influencing the households' opinion are aggregated. The positive word 




0 measures Number of measure installed per retrofit extent 
measures per 
extent[one] 
1 measures Number of measure installed per retrofit extent 
measures per 
extent[two] 
2 measures Number of measure installed per retrofit extent 
measures per 
extent[three] 
3 measures Number of measure installed per retrofit extent 
measures per 
extent[four] 












Only measures are installed per intervention. The sense of this variable is to be a unit 
converter 
measures performance 
on bill savings[glazing] 
XIDZ(intervention performances in bill 
savings[g]*estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[g]+ intervention performances in 
bill savings[gb]*estimated retrofitted fraction 
by intervention [gb]+ intervention 
performances in bill savings[gl]*estimated 
retrofitted fraction by intervention[gl]+ 
intervention performances in bill 
savings[gi]*estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[gi]+ intervention performances in 
bill savings[gbl]*estimated retrofitted fraction 
by intervention[gbl]+ intervention 
performances in bill savings[gbi]*estimated 
retrofitted fraction by intervention[gbi]+ 
intervention performances in bill 
savings[gli]*estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[gli]+ intervention performances in 
bill savings[gbli]*estimated retrofitted fraction 
by intervention[gbli],  estimated retrofitted 
fraction by intervention[g]+ estimated 
Dmnl 
The actual and the expected bills' savings are compared in order to assess measure 




retrofitted fraction by intervention[gb]+ 
estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[gl]+ estimated retrofitted fraction 
by intervention[gi]+ estimated retrofitted 
fraction by intervention[gbl]+ estimated 
retrofitted fraction by intervention[gbi]+ 
estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[gli]+ estimated retrofitted 
fraction by intervention[gbli],1) 
measures performance 
on bill savings[boiler] 
XIDZ(intervention performances in bill 
savings[b]*estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[b]+ intervention performances in 
bill savings[gb]*estimated retrofitted fraction 
by intervention[gb]+ intervention 
performances in bill savings[bl]*estimated 
retrofitted fraction by intervention[bl]+ 
intervention performances in bill 
savings[bi]*estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[bi]+ intervention performances in 
bill savings[gbl]*estimated retrofitted fraction 
by intervention[gbl]+ intervention 
performances in bill savings[gbi]*estimated 
retrofitted fraction by intervention[gbi]+ 
intervention performances in bill 
savings[bli]*estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[bli]+ intervention performances in 
bill savings[gbli]*estimated retrofitted fraction 
by intervention[gbli], estimated retrofitted 
fraction by intervention[b]+ estimated 
retrofitted fraction by intervention[gb]+ 
estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[bl]+ estimated retrofitted fraction 
by intervention[bi]+ estimated retrofitted 
fraction by intervention[gbl]+ estimated 
retrofitted fraction by intervention[gbi]+ 
estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[bli]+ estimated retrofitted 
fraction by intervention[gbli], 1) 
Dmnl 
The actual and the expected bills' savings are compared in order to assess measure 





XIDZ(intervention performances in bill 
savings[i]*estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[i]+ intervention performances in 
bill savings[bi]*estimated retrofitted fraction 
Dmnl 
The actual and the expected bills' savings are compared in order to assess measure 




by intervention[bi]+ intervention performances 
in bill savings[li]*estimated retrofitted fraction 
by intervention[li]+ intervention performances 
in bill savings[gi]*estimated retrofitted fraction 
by intervention[gi]+ intervention performances 
in bill savings[bli]*estimated retrofitted 
fraction by intervention[bli]+ intervention 
performances in bill savings[gbi]*estimated 
retrofitted fraction by intervention[gbi]+ 
intervention performances in bill 
savings[gli]*estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[gli]+ intervention performances in 
bill savings[gbli]*estimated retrofitted fraction 
by intervention[gbli], estimated retrofitted 
fraction by intervention[i]+ estimated 
retrofitted fraction by intervention[bi]+ 
estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[li]+ estimated retrofitted fraction 
by intervention[gi]+ estimated retrofitted 
fraction by intervention[bli]+ estimated 
retrofitted fraction by intervention[gbi]+ 
estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[gli]+ estimated retrofitted 
fraction by intervention[gbli],1) 
measures performance 
on bill savings[loft] 
XIDZ(intervention performances in bill 
savings[l]*estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[l]+ intervention performances in 
bill savings[bl]*estimated retrofitted fraction 
by intervention[bl]+ intervention performances 
in bill savings[gl]*estimated retrofitted fraction 
by intervention[gl]+ intervention performances 
in bill savings[li]*estimated retrofitted fraction 
by intervention[li]+ intervention performances 
in bill savings[gbl]*estimated retrofitted 
fraction by intervention[gbl]+ intervention 
performances in bill savings[bli]*estimated 
retrofitted fraction by intervention[bli]+ 
intervention performances in bill 
savings[gli]*estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[gli]+ intervention performances in 
bill savings[gbli]*estimated retrofitted fraction 
by intervention[gbli], estimated retrofitted 
Dmnl 
The actual and the expected bills' savings are compared in order to assess measure 
performance. This is calculated starting from the intervention performance on bill savings 




fraction by intervention[l]+estimated 
retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[bl]+estimated retrofitted fraction 
by intervention[gl]+estimated retrofitted 
fraction by intervention[li]+estimated 
retrofitted fraction by intervention[gbl]+ 
estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[bli]+estimated retrofitted fraction 
by intervention[gli]+ estimated retrofitted 






According to the data showed in 'NATIONAL ENERGY EFFICIENCY DATA-FRAMEWORK 
Summary of analysis using the National Energy Efficiency Data-Framework (NEED), June 






Realistic estimation of the minimum probability of unintended consequences when a 
retrofit measure is installed (this is the case in which it is installed by high skilled workers). 
monitoring 
effectiveness 
MIN(1,percentage of controls by 
regulation/ideal percentage of controls)* 
certification bodies quality* market 
fragmentation 
Dmnl 
The monitor effectiveness is calculated comparing the percentage of control done because 
of regulation (the actual controls performed) with the ideal percentage of controls. This is 
multiplied by the certification bodies quality (in case certification bodies have use low 
quality in their job, the monitoring effectiveness decreases). Moreover market 
fragmentation make more difficult to perform monitoring 
mortgage premium for 
EPC band 
0.05 1/band 
If policies are in place, how much more extra money lenders are willing to give for an 
improvement of a EPC band. Data retrieved from confidential information in BEIS 
mortgagors 
appreciation of green 
mortgages 
ZIDZ (fraction of buyers taking green 
mortgages,fraction of buyers taking 
mortgages) 
Dmnl 
This division represents the fraction of buyers getting a green mortgage over the total 
number of buyer taking a mortgage. From this number it is possible to assess how much 




Technology is assumed to improve by itself, independently on investments, by a certain 
rate. This rate is an educated guess made by researchers since no data were available 
negative wom from 
unintended 
consequences 
impact of unintended consequences on 
opinions formation* retrofit failing fractional 
rate[measures]*contact rate 
1/Month 
Negative word of mouth obtained, as traditional way in SD, multiplying the contact rate by 
the fractional rate of failed measures and weighted by the importance households give to 




This flow represents the flow of new houses built that 'creates' new homeowners that have 
recently done a renovation. Since the housing stock is assumed to be static this inflow is 
null 
new potential 
measures to install 
new susceptible homeowners' 
houses*measures per household 




This flow represents the flow of new houses built that 'creates' new homeowners that have 




no restrictions on 
additional mortgages 
0 Dmnl 
If lenders not support the installation of the whole intervention. In this case lenders 





Here the non-financial attractiveness is calculated per intervention starting from the 




non-financial attractiveness per measure 
[glazing] 
Dmnl 
Here the non-financial attractiveness is calculated per intervention starting from the 




non-financial attractiveness per measure 
[boiler] 
Dmnl 
Here the non-financial attractiveness is calculated per intervention starting from the 




non-financial attractiveness per measure [loft] Dmnl 
Here the non-financial attractiveness is calculated per intervention starting from the 




non-financial attractiveness per measure 
[insulation] 
Dmnl 
Here the non-financial attractiveness is calculated per intervention starting from the 




non-financial attractiveness per measure 
[glazing]+ non-financial attractiveness per 
measure [boiler] 
Dmnl 
Here the non-financial attractiveness is calculated per intervention starting from the 




non-financial attractiveness per measure 
[glazing]+ non-financial attractiveness per 
measure [loft] 
Dmnl 
Here the non-financial attractiveness is calculated per intervention starting from the 




non-financial attractiveness per measure 
[glazing]+ non-financial attractiveness per 
measure [insulation] 
Dmnl 
Here the non-financial attractiveness is calculated per intervention starting from the 




non-financial attractiveness per measure 
[boiler]+  non-financial attractiveness per 
measure [loft] 
Dmnl 
Here the non-financial attractiveness is calculated per intervention starting from the 




non-financial attractiveness per measure 
[boiler]+  non-financial attractiveness per 
measure [insulation] 
Dmnl 
Here the non-financial attractiveness is calculated per intervention starting from the 




non-financial attractiveness per measure 
[loft]+  non-financial attractiveness per 
measure [insulation] 
Dmnl 
Here the non-financial attractiveness is calculated per intervention starting from the 




non-financial attractiveness per measure 
[glazing]+ non-financial attractiveness per 
measure [boiler]+ non-financial attractiveness 
per measure [loft] 
Dmnl 
Here the non-financial attractiveness is calculated per intervention starting from the 






non-financial attractiveness per measure 
[glazing]+ non-financial attractiveness per 
measure [boiler]+  non-financial attractiveness 
per measure [insulation] 
Dmnl 
Here the non-financial attractiveness is calculated per intervention starting from the 




non-financial attractiveness per measure 
[glazing]+ non-financial attractiveness per 
measure [loft]+  non-financial attractiveness 
per measure [insulation] 
Dmnl 
Here the non-financial attractiveness is calculated per intervention starting from the 




non-financial attractiveness per measure 
[boiler]+ non-financial attractiveness per 
measure [loft]+ non-financial attractiveness 
per measure [insulation] 
Dmnl 
Here the non-financial attractiveness is calculated per intervention starting from the 




non-financial attractiveness per measure 
[glazing]+ non-financial attractiveness per 
measure [boiler]+ non-financial attractiveness 
per measure [loft]+ non-financial 
attractiveness per measure [insulation] 
Dmnl 
Here the non-financial attractiveness is calculated per intervention starting from the 




(reference non-financial attractiveness per 
measure [measures]* impact of measures 
technology on non-financial attractiveness 
[measures]+ households sustainability 
concerns)* (1+Added value to property of 
measures[measures]) 
Dmnl 
It collects all the non-financial features of a measure (aesthetics, thermal comfort, etc.) 
that make the measure attractive to homeowners. In detail, it integrates a reference non-
financial attractiveness per measure (that can change over time due to technological 
improvements), with households propensity to retrofit because of sustainability concerns 
and with the added value that a measure can give to property 
non-susceptible stock 
INTEG (new non-susceptible homeowners' 
houses +renovations- re-getting susceptible, 
INIT stock/measures per household-
susceptible for renovations stock) 
households 
Stock of houses that recently undertook a renovations and that therefore are very unlikely 
to be susceptible to another renovation in a short period 
number of measures 
per intervention 
SUM(extent distribution in interventions per 
month[extent!]*measures per extent[extent!]) 
measures Variable counting the average number of measures installed per intervention 
old boilers replacement 
STEP(1,60)*Potential for retrofit measures to 
install[boiler]/avg boiler duration 
measures/Month 
From 2005 (month 60) it became compulsory to install a condensing boiler in case of boiler 
replacement. This calculate the old boilers that broke down and need to be replaced 
past prices retention 
time 
36 Month 
How much time people need to perceive variation in retrofit prices. It has been set to this 
value by researchers. The reason to set it to three year is that it is believe that households 
do not update themselves about retrofit prices and subsidies very often 
payback time 
MIN(1200, XIDZ(upfront cost for consumer[SC 
type,interventions],believed monthly savings 
[SC type,interventions])) 
Month 
Here the upfront costs are confronted with the believed monthly savings in order to obtain 
the actual payback time. 1200 represents the fact the maximum payback time considered 
is 100 years 
perceived demand[SC 
type,measures] 
SMOOTH(retrofit demand by measures[SC 
type,measures],demand perception delay) 
measures/Month The perceived demand is an informational delay of the actual demand 
perceived gap in quality 
(quality standards for installations-workforce 
skills[measures])*monitoring effectiveness 
Dmnl 
The quality of actual installation is equal to the workforce skills. This is confronted with the 
quality standards and the eventual gap generated is multiplied by the monitoring 
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effectiveness: if monitoring effectiveness is lower the one not the entire gap is perceived 
but only part of it 
perceived hassle factor 




The hassle factor can be amplified if the market fragmentation is very high (>1) or 
dampened if low (<1) 
perceived market 
volume 
INTEG (change in perceived market volume[SC 
type,measures], market volume for retrofit by 
measure[SC type,measures]) 
GBP/Month This is the perceived market volume by the actors in the sector 
perceived measures 
benefits 




Information delay. It represents the time homeowners need to perceived the experience of 
an installed measure 
perceived prevalence of 
combined interventions 
DELAY1(prevalence of combined 
interventions,perception delay for prevalence 
of combined interventions) 
Dmnl 
Perception delay. The supply chain needs time to perceived any prevalence of multi 
measure intervention over single 
perceived prices of 
interventions for 
consumers 
INTEG(change in perceived interventions 
prices[SC type,interventions],prices of 
interventions[SC type,interventions]) 
GBP/Interventions The stock accounts for the perceived retrofit prices by households 
perceived tax reduction 
on renovations 
SMOOTHI(STEP(tax reduction on 
renovations,tax reduction starting time), 
renovations tax reduction perception delay, 0 ) 
Dmnl Delay function representing the perception of a tax reduction by homeowners 
percentage of buyers 
not paying stamp duty 
estimated property distribution per stamp duty 
band[up125] 
Dmnl Buyers purchasing a property cheaper than 125000 GBP do not pay stamp duty 
percentage of buyers 
with low EPC levels 
current EPC distribution[epcE]+  current EPC 
distribution[epcF]+ current EPC 
distribution[epcG] 
Dmnl 
Percentage of buyers purchasing an inefficient property. E, F and G are considered as 
inefficient EPC bands 
percentage of controls 
by regulation 
0.03 Dmnl 
The percentage of controls that need to be done on the industry according to the law. 
Source: Hunter Danskin (BEIS) 
 




The time the supply chain needs to realize there is a prevalence of multi interventions over 
single intervention 




Time actors in the retrofit system need to perceived changes in the market volume. 
Educated guess made by researchers 
performance 
acknowledgement time 
2 Month Time homeowners need to perceived a change due to a retrofit measure installation 
policy coherence 0.5 Dmnl 
This parameter is assumed to range between zero and one. Zero is when policy coherence 
is very low, one is the opposite. Policy coherence is refers to the stability and harmony 
policies in the sector have. If these factors are present investors perceive the retrofit 
environment as stable and are more willing to invest. For example, if laws and schemes 








Here the flow of popularity change is calculated. It can be positive and thus increasing the 
popularity of a measure. But it also can be negative and therefore it decreases the 
popularity of the measure. The popularity saturation effect makes sure the popularity do 
not increase more than 1 
 
Popularity of measures 
INTEG (popularity change[measures], INIT 
installed fraction[measures]) 
Dmnl 
Popularity is the natural step beyond awareness. Popularity merges the concept of 
awareness with the one of a positive of negative opinion. Therefore, homeowners aware of 
retrofit may have a good or bad opinion about it. In case they are aware and have a good 
opinion, we ca say that the measure is popular. It is initialized with the fractional 
distribution of the measures among the housing stock. It has been believed it was a good 











MIN( SUM(retrofit demand by measures[SC 
type!,measures])*investments horizon, 
Potential for retrofit measures to 
install[measures]) 
measures 
Here the potential for retrofit is confronted with future demand. This variable makes sure 
the retrofit demand calculated over the investment horizon don't exceed the actual 
potential 
 
potential demand from 
buyers 
Buyers planning retrofit/avg time before 
deciding 
households/Month Buyers that are deciding whether retrofit or not 
potential demand from 
buyers for potential 
fraction 
estimated potential fraction by 
intervention[interventions]*potential demand 
from buyers* buyers distribution[buyers type] 
households/Month 
Here the potential demand from buyers (buyers considering whether to retrofit or not) are 
distributed based on they reason why they are considering retrofit (stamp duty or green 
mortgage or both) and then discounted by the intervention potential remaining 
 
potential demand from 
renovation for potential 
fraction 





Here the potential demand from renovators willing to top up with retrofit is adjusted for 
the actual potential available for intervention 
potential demand from 
renovations 
MAX(0, Households planning renovation and 
retrofit[renovation type]/avg time before 
deciding) 
households/Month Households deciding whether top up their amenity renovation with retrofit or not 
potential for measures 
increase in added value 
(max added value[measures]-Added value to 
property of measures[measures]) 
Dmnl 
This variable represents the different between what could be the maximum added value to 
a property of a measure installation and the actual added value by a measure. In the 
difference between the two the potential lies 
Potential for retrofit 
measures to install 
INTEG (new potential measures to 
install[measures]-aggregate measures uptake 
rate 




Stock accounting for the potential available for each measure (houses not retrofitted with 




potential fraction by 
measure 
MIN(Potential for retrofit measures to 
install[measures]/total measures[measures],1) 
Dmnl 
Fraction of houses in which a measure has not been installed yet and therefore are 
potential for retrofit 
potential measures 
INIT stock*INIT measures 
distribution[measures] 
measures 
The initial stock is multiplied by the measure distribution in order to obtain the actual 
number of potential measures 
potential savings 
MAX(0,  expected bill savings by 
intervention[interventions]-maintenance 
costs[SC type ,interventions]) 
GBP/Interventions/
Month 
These potential bill savings that homeowners take into account when they evaluate 
whether or retrofit or no. They do not just consider the expected savings but they subtract 
the maintenance costs 
 
pressure to increase 
measures added value 
non-financial attractiveness per measure 
[measures]* Popularity of measures[measures] 
Dmnl 
This variable aggregates measures' non-financial attractiveness and popularity in order to 




ZIDZ(extent distribution in interventions per 
month[four]+ extent distribution in 
interventions per month[three]+ extent 
distribution in interventions per month[two], 
SUM(extent distribution in interventions per 
month[extent!])) 
Dmnl 
This variable is a counter to calculate the percentage combine interventions (more than 
one measure installed per intervention, namely extent two, three and four) with respect of 
the total 
 
prices for individual 
measures 
(1+profit margin)* (1- subsidies / consumer tax 
credit [measures]*(1-STEP(stop of 
subsidies,subsidies stop time)))* suppliers 
costs for individual measuress[SC 
type,measures]* (1-contribution from other 
actors) 
GBP/measures 
The final prices are calculated adding to the costs for installers the profit the want to have, 
discounted by the subsidies (here a step function is used to modulate the introduction of 
different subsidies and to stop them when needed). Moreover it is reported the possibility 
of other externa actors (e.g. energy suppliers) support the uptake of retrofit measures, 
thus decreasing the price for homeowners 
prices of 
interventions[SC type,i] 
prices for individual measures[SC 
type,insulation]*(1-measures discount by 
combination[SC type,one])/ interventions per 
measure 
GBP/Interventions 
Here the price for the interventions are calculated. More measures installed in an 
intervention are cheaper than installing them in separate interventions. This effect works 
only for more at least 3 measures or more installed by multi supply chain 
prices of 
interventions[SC type,l] 
prices for individual measures[SC type,loft]*(1-
measures discount by combination[SC 
type,one])/ interventions per measure 
GBP/Interventions 
Here the price for the interventions are calculated. More measures installed in an 
intervention are cheaper than installing them in separate interventions. This effect works 
only for more at least 3 measures or more installed by multi supply chain 
prices of 
interventions[SC type,g] 
prices for individual measures[SC 
type,glazing]*(1-measures discount by 
combination[SC type,one])/ interventions per 
measure 
GBP/Interventions 
Here the price for the interventions are calculated. More measures installed in an 
intervention are cheaper than installing them in separate interventions. This effect works 




prices for individual measures[SC 
type,boiler]*(1-measures discount by 
combination[SC type,one])/ interventions per 
measure 
GBP/Interventions 
Here the price for the interventions are calculated. More measures installed in an 
intervention are cheaper than installing them in separate interventions. This effect works 






(prices for individual measures[SC 
type,glazing]+prices for individual measures[SC 
type,boiler])* (1-measures discount by 
combination[SC type,two])/interventions per 
measure 
GBP/Interventions 
Here the price for the interventions are calculated. More measures installed in an 
intervention are cheaper than installing them in separate interventions. This effect works 




(prices for individual measures[SC 
type,glazing]+prices for individual measures[SC 
type,loft])* (1-measures discount by 
combination[SC type,two])/interventions per 
measure 
GBP/Interventions 
Here the price for the interventions are calculated. More measures installed in an 
intervention are cheaper than installing them in separate interventions. This effect works 




(prices for individual measures[SC 
type,glazing]+prices for individual measures[SC 
type,insulation])* (1-measures discount by 
combination[SC type,two])/interventions per 
measure 
GBP/Interventions 
Here the price for the interventions are calculated. More measures installed in an 
intervention are cheaper than installing them in separate interventions. This effect works 




(prices for individual measures[SC 
type,loft]+prices for individual measures[SC 
type,boiler])* (1-measures discount by 
combination[SC type,two])/interventions per 
measure 
GBP/Interventions 
Here the price for the interventions are calculated. More measures installed in an 
intervention are cheaper than installing them in separate interventions. This effect works 




(prices for individual measures[SC 
type,insulation]+prices for individual 
measures[SC type,boiler])* (1-measures 
discount by combination[SC 
type,two])/interventions per measure 
GBP/Interventions 
Here the price for the interventions are calculated. More measures installed in an 
intervention are cheaper than installing them in separate interventions. This effect works 
only for more at least 3 measures or more installed by multi supply chain 
prices of 
interventions[SC type,li] 
(prices for individual measures[SC 
type,loft]+prices for individual measures[SC 
type,insulation])* (1-measures discount by 
combination[SC type,two])/interventions per 
measure 
GBP/Interventions 
Here the price for the interventions are calculated. More measures installed in an 
intervention are cheaper than installing them in separate interventions. This effect works 




(prices for individual measures[SC 
type,glazing]+prices for individual measures[SC 
type,boiler]+ prices for individual measures[SC 
type,loft]+prices for individual measures [SC 
type,insulation])* (1-measures discount by 
combination[SC type,four])/interventions per 
measure 
GBP/Interventions 
Here the price for the interventions are calculated. More measures installed in an 
intervention are cheaper than installing them in separate interventions. This effect works 




(prices for individual measures[SC 
type,glazing]+ prices for individual 
measures[SC type,boiler]+ prices for individual 
measures[SC type,loft])* (1-measures discount 
GBP/Interventions 
Here the price for the interventions are calculated. More measures installed in an 
intervention are cheaper than installing them in separate interventions. This effect works 
only for more at least 3 measures or more installed by multi supply chain 
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(prices for individual measures[SC 
type,glazing]+ prices for individual 
measures[SC type,boiler]+ prices for individual 
measures[SC type,insulation])* (1-measures 
discount by combination[SC 
type,three])/interventions per measure 
GBP/Interventions 
Here the price for the interventions are calculated. More measures installed in an 
intervention are cheaper than installing them in separate interventions. This effect works 




(prices for individual measures[SC 
type,glazing]+ prices for individual 
measures[SC type,loft]+ prices for individual 
measures[SC type,insulation])* (1-measures 
discount by combination[SC 
type,three])/interventions per measure 
GBP/Interventions 
Here the price for the interventions are calculated. More measures installed in an 
intervention are cheaper than installing them in separate interventions. This effect works 




(prices for individual measures[SC type,boiler]+ 
prices for individual measures[SC type,loft]+ 
prices for individual measures[SC 
type,insulation])* (1-measures discount by 
combination[SC type,three])/interventions per 
measure 
GBP/Interventions 
Here the price for the interventions are calculated. More measures installed in an 
intervention are cheaper than installing them in separate interventions. This effect works 




0*prices for individual measures[SC 
type,boiler]/interventions per measure 
GBP/Interventions 
Here the price for the interventions are calculated. More measures installed in an 
intervention are cheaper than installing them in separate interventions. This effect works 
only for more at least 3 measures or more installed by multi supply chain 
profit by measures 
SUM(extents distribution in measures 
demand[SC type,extent!,measures]* (1-
measures discount by combination[SC 
type,extent!])* avg profit per measure 
installed[measures]) 
GBP/measures 
The profit can be different if more measures are installed in only one intervention (they 
may cost less). This variable take this effect into account. Therefore sum all the profits that 
are done by measure also if installed in combination with other measures 
profit margin 0.2 Dmnl On the cost of a measure this is the profit margin that installers apply 
profit per measure for 
manufacturer 
avg profit per measure installed[measures] GBP/measures 
This variable is just to show that to the average profit per measure installed correspond a 
profit for the manufacturers that produce the retrofit measures. Considering the 
manufacturers is important since they are the one who make investments in technology 
and offer training courses 
projected change in 
demand 
(projected demand[SC type,measures]-retrofit 
demand by measures[SC type,measures]) 
measures/Month 
The projected demand is compared with the actual demand in order to assess if future 
demand will be higher or lower than the actual 
projected demand 
FORECAST(perceived demand[SC 
type,measures], avg time for WF adjustment 
forecasts, workforce adjustment horizon) 
measures/Month 
Then with the function FORECAST the perceived demand is projected in the future in order 
to see what is likely to be the demand value in in a future time horizon 
projected profit rate 
from change in demand 
projected change in demand[SC 
type,measures]*profit by measures[SC 
type,measures] 
GBP/Month 
Here the profit by measure is multiplied by the future projected demand in order to 




retirement rate[SC type,measures]*workforce 
adjustment horizon 
workers 
Here the retirement rate is multiplied by the workforce adjustment horizon in order to 
obtain a sort of prediction of the future amount of workers retiring in the time span of the 
adjustment horizon 
projected return from 
investing 
MAX(0,projected profit rate from change in 
demand[SC type,measures])* desired payback 
time for workforce investments* trust of 
industry[measures] 
GBP 
Here the projected profit returns are calculated based on the desired payback time and 
adjusted to the trust of industry  
projected wage costs 
avg worker wage*workforce adjustment 
horizon 
GBP/workers Here the projected wage cost for the considered time horizon are calculated 
quality standards for 
installations 
1 Dmnl This is the quality of intervention the system aims for. One is the maximum quality possible 
re-getting susceptible non-susceptible stock /latency households/Month 
Flow of households that have done a renovation and that get back to be susceptible to do 
another renovation 
readiness to shift from 
single to multi 
0.1 1/Month 
This variable represents the speed to which installers in the single supply chain move to the 
multi one. It is an educated guess made by researchers 
rebound effect 0 Dmnl Switch to activate the rebound effect 
REF avg energy 
consumption per 
household 
GET XLS DATA('energy.xlsx', 'Sheet1' , 'A' , 'D2' ) 
kWh/ (Month* 
households) 
Data on the average energy consumption retrieved from Palmer & Cooper, 2013 [Source: 
report released by DECC/BEIS: 'United Kingdom housing energy fact file 2013'] 
REF cavity insulations GET XLS DATA('energy.xlsx', 'Sheet1' , 'A' , 'E2' ) measures 
The data obtained for cavity wall insulation have been integrated in the model, so when 
the cavity wall scenario runs they can be taken into account when it is needed 
REF installed 
measures[glazing] 
GET XLS DATA('energy.xlsx', 'Sheet1' , 'A' , F2' ) measures 
These are the real numbers of the retrofit uptake rate. These estimations are based on two 
report released by DECC/BEIS: 'United Kingdom housing energy fact file 2013' and 
'Households energy efficiency national statistics. Detailed report 2016'. Integrated with I. 
Hamilton (2014) 'Uptake of energy efficiency interventions in English dwellings' 
REF installed 
measures[loft] 
GET XLS DATA('energy.xlsx', 'Sheet1' , 'A' , 'G10' 
) 
measures 
These are the real numbers of the retrofit uptake rate. These estimations are based on two 
report released by DECC/BEIS: 'United Kingdom housing energy fact file 2013' and 
'Households energy efficiency national statistics. Detailed report 2016'. Integrated with I. 
Hamilton (2014) 'Uptake of energy efficiency interventions in English dwellings' 
REF installed 
measures[insulation] 
IF THEN ELSE(cavity wall scenario<0.5, REF 
solid insulation, REF cavity insulations) 
measures 
These are the real numbers of the retrofit uptake rate. These estimations are based on two 
report released by DECC/BEIS: 'United Kingdom housing energy fact file 2013' and 
'Households energy efficiency national statistics. Detailed report 2016'. Integrated with I. 
Hamilton (2014) 'Uptake of energy efficiency interventions in English dwellings' 
REF installed 
measures[boiler] 
GET XLS DATA('energy.xlsx', 'Sheet1' , 'A' , 'H2' ) measures 
These are the real numbers of the retrofit uptake rate. These estimations are based on two 
report released by DECC/BEIS: 'United Kingdom housing energy fact file 2013' and 
'Households energy efficiency national statistics. Detailed report 2016'. Integrated with I. 
Hamilton (2014) 'Uptake of energy efficiency interventions in English dwellings' 
REF solid insulation 
GET XLS DATA('energy.xlsx', 'Sheet1' , 'A' , 'I10' 
) 
measures 
The data obtained for solid wall insulation have been integrated in the model, so when the 




measures for credibility 
5e+007 measures 
After this a reference number of retrofit measures installed is passed, credibility is 






Monthly number of property sales to homeowners per month. Source: House Price 






Reference ability of households to use the retrofit measures installed in the correct way. 







We get this value for reference energy consumption of non-retrofitted houses by imposing 
that the energy consumption estimated on the base of installed measures in 2000 is equal 
to that reported in: 'United Kingdom housing energy fact file 2013' 
reference costs for 
individual measures 
reference prices for individual 
measure[measures]*(1-profit margin) 
GBP/measures 
The real costs for suppliers are unknown. Since only the final prices for homeowners are 
known, these have been multiplied by (1-profit margin), in which the profit margin is the 
profit that  installers apply to their costs, in order to estimate the costs for 
installers through a reasonable backwards process 
reference energy 





Reference energy savings by measure per month. Source: DECC/BEIS report: 'NATIONAL 
ENERGY EFFICIENCY DATA-FRAMEWORK Summary of analysis using the National Energy 
Efficiency Data-Framework (NEED)' June 2016 
reference energy 
savings by measure[SC 
type,insulation] 
cavity wall scenario*cavity wall savings+ (1-
cavity wall scenario)*solid wall savings 
kWh/Month/ 
measures 
Reference energy savings by measure per month. Source: DECC/BEIS report: 'NATIONAL 
ENERGY EFFICIENCY DATA-FRAMEWORK Summary of analysis using the National Energy 
Efficiency Data-Framework (NEED)' June 2016 
reference energy 





Reference energy savings by measure per month. Source: DECC/BEIS report: 'NATIONAL 
ENERGY EFFICIENCY DATA-FRAMEWORK Summary of analysis using the National Energy 
Efficiency Data-Framework (NEED)' June 2016 
reference energy 





Reference energy savings by measure per month. Source: DECC/BEIS report: 'NATIONAL 
ENERGY EFFICIENCY DATA-FRAMEWORK Summary of analysis using the National Energy 




Data retrieved from the grey literature. Source: UK Houzz & Home 2016 (p.6) 
http://info.houzz.com/rs/804-JLJ-529/images/UK_%20Houzz%20%26%20Home.pdf This is 
in line with another source in the grey literature: 
http://www.homeadvisor.com/cost/additions-and-remodels/remodel-multiple-rooms/ 
However, there are different data from EST Trigger Point Report (2015): upper bound 
10'000 GBP 




The hassle factor calculated per intervention and supply chain type. In single supply chain 
the hassle factor is the sum of the hassle factors related to the measure installed, while in 
multi it is the higher hassle factor among the measure installed. This because in single 
there are different installer for different measures (with each relative hassle factor 
related), while in multi there is only one installer for all the measures (everything is done at 
the same moment, lowering the hassle) 
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reference hassle factor 
per interventions[SC 
type,g] 
reference hassle factor per measure[glazing] Dmnl 
The hassle factor calculated per intervention and supply chain type. In single supply chain 
the hassle factor is the sum of the hassle factors related to the measure installed, while in 
multi it is the higher hassle factor among the measure installed. This because in single 
there are different installer for different measures (with each relative hassle factor 
related), while in multi there is only one installer for all the measures (everything is done at 
the same moment, lowering the hassle) 
reference hassle factor 
per interventions[SC 
type,b] 
reference hassle factor per measure[boiler] Dmnl 
The hassle factor calculated per intervention and supply chain type. In single supply chain 
the hassle factor is the sum of the hassle factors related to the measure installed, while in 
multi it is the higher hassle factor among the measure installed. This because in single 
there are different installer for different measures (with each relative hassle factor 
related), while in multi there is only one installer for all the measures (everything is done at 
the same moment, lowering the hassle) 
reference hassle factor 
per interventions[SC 
type,l] 
reference hassle factor per measure[loft] Dmnl 
The hassle factor calculated per intervention and supply chain type. In single supply chain 
the hassle factor is the sum of the hassle factors related to the measure installed, while in 
multi it is the higher hassle factor among the measure installed. This because in single 
there are different installer for different measures (with each relative hassle factor 
related), while in multi there is only one installer for all the measures (everything is done at 
the same moment, lowering the hassle) 
reference hassle factor 
per interventions[SC 
type,i] 
reference hassle factor per 
measure[insulation] 
Dmnl 
The hassle factor calculated per intervention and supply chain type. In single supply chain 
the hassle factor is the sum of the hassle factors related to the measure installed, while in 
multi it is the higher hassle factor among the measure installed. This because in single 
there are different installer for different measures (with each relative hassle factor 
related), while in multi there is only one installer for all the measures (everything is done at 
the same moment, lowering the hassle) 
reference hassle factor 
per 
interventions[single,gb] 
reference hassle factor per measure[glazing]+ 
reference hassle factor per measure[boiler] 
Dmnl 
The hassle factor calculated per intervention and supply chain type. In single supply chain 
the hassle factor is the sum of the hassle factors related to the measure installed, while in 
multi it is the higher hassle factor among the measure installed. This because in single 
there are different installer for different measures (with each relative hassle factor 
related), while in multi there is only one installer for all the measures (everything is done at 
the same moment, lowering the hassle) 
reference hassle factor 
per 
interventions[single,gl] 
reference hassle factor per measure[glazing]+ 
reference hassle factor per measure[loft] 
Dmnl 
The hassle factor calculated per intervention and supply chain type. In single supply chain 
the hassle factor is the sum of the hassle factors related to the measure installed, while in 
multi it is the higher hassle factor among the measure installed. This because in single 
there are different installer for different measures (with each relative hassle factor 
related), while in multi there is only one installer for all the measures (everything is done at 
the same moment, lowering the hassle) 
reference hassle factor 
per 
interventions[single,gi] 
reference hassle factor per measure[glazing]+ 
reference hassle factor per 
measure[insulation] 
Dmnl 
The hassle factor calculated per intervention and supply chain type. In single supply chain 
the hassle factor is the sum of the hassle factors related to the measure installed, while in 
multi it is the higher hassle factor among the measure installed. This because in single 
there are different installer for different measures (with each relative hassle factor 
related), while in multi there is only one installer for all the measures (everything is done at 
the same moment, lowering the hassle) 
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reference hassle factor 
per 
interventions[single,bl] 
reference hassle factor per measure[boiler]+ 
reference hassle factor per measure[loft] 
Dmnl 
The hassle factor calculated per intervention and supply chain type. In single supply chain 
the hassle factor is the sum of the hassle factors related to the measure installed, while in 
multi it is the higher hassle factor among the measure installed. This because in single 
there are different installer for different measures (with each relative hassle factor 
related), while in multi there is only one installer for all the measures (everything is done at 
the same moment, lowering the hassle) 
reference hassle factor 
per 
interventions[single,bi] 
reference hassle factor per measure[boiler]+ 
reference hassle factor per 
measure[insulation] 
Dmnl 
The hassle factor calculated per intervention and supply chain type. In single supply chain 
the hassle factor is the sum of the hassle factors related to the measure installed, while in 
multi it is the higher hassle factor among the measure installed. This because in single 
there are different installer for different measures (with each relative hassle factor 
related), while in multi there is only one installer for all the measures (everything is done at 
the same moment, lowering the hassle) 
reference hassle factor 
per 
interventions[single,li] 
reference hassle factor per measure[loft]+ 
reference hassle factor per 
measure[insulation] 
Dmnl 
The hassle factor calculated per intervention and supply chain type. In single supply chain 
the hassle factor is the sum of the hassle factors related to the measure installed, while in 
multi it is the higher hassle factor among the measure installed. This because in single 
there are different installer for different measures (with each relative hassle factor 
related), while in multi there is only one installer for all the measures (everything is done at 
the same moment, lowering the hassle) 




reference hassle factor per measure[glazing]+ 
reference hassle factor per 
measure[boiler]+reference hassle factor per 
measure[loft] 
Dmnl 
The hassle factor calculated per intervention and supply chain type. In single supply chain 
the hassle factor is the sum of the hassle factors related to the measure installed, while in 
multi it is the higher hassle factor among the measure installed. This because in single 
there are different installer for different measures (with each relative hassle factor 
related), while in multi there is only one installer for all the measures (everything is done at 
the same moment, lowering the hassle) 




reference hassle factor per measure[glazing]+ 
reference hassle factor per measure[boiler]+ 
reference hassle factor per 
measure[insulation] 
Dmnl 
The hassle factor calculated per intervention and supply chain type. In single supply chain 
the hassle factor is the sum of the hassle factors related to the measure installed, while in 
multi it is the higher hassle factor among the measure installed. This because in single 
there are different installer for different measures (with each relative hassle factor 
related), while in multi there is only one installer for all the measures (everything is done at 
the same moment, lowering the hassle) 
reference hassle factor 
per 
interventions[single,gli] 
reference hassle factor per measure[glazing]+ 
reference hassle factor per measure[loft]+ 
reference hassle factor per 
measure[insulation] 
Dmnl 
The hassle factor calculated per intervention and supply chain type. In single supply chain 
the hassle factor is the sum of the hassle factors related to the measure installed, while in 
multi it is the higher hassle factor among the measure installed. This because in single 
there are different installer for different measures (with each relative hassle factor 
related), while in multi there is only one installer for all the measures (everything is done at 
the same moment, lowering the hassle) 
reference hassle factor 
per 
interventions[single,bli] 
reference hassle factor per measure[boiler]+ 
reference hassle factor per measure[loft]+ 
reference hassle factor per 
measure[insulation] 
Dmnl 
The hassle factor calculated per intervention and supply chain type. In single supply chain 
the hassle factor is the sum of the hassle factors related to the measure installed, while in 
multi it is the higher hassle factor among the measure installed. This because in single 
there are different installer for different measures (with each relative hassle factor 
related), while in multi there is only one installer for all the measures (everything is done at 
the same moment, lowering the hassle) 
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reference hassle factor per measure[glazing]+ 
reference hassle factor per measure[boiler]+ 
reference hassle factor per measure[loft]+ 
reference hassle factor per 
measure[insulation] 
Dmnl 
The hassle factor calculated per intervention and supply chain type. In single supply chain 
the hassle factor is the sum of the hassle factors related to the measure installed, while in 
multi it is the higher hassle factor among the measure installed. This because in single 
there are different installer for different measures (with each relative hassle factor 
related), while in multi there is only one installer for all the measures (everything is done at 
the same moment, lowering the hassle) 
reference hassle factor 
per 
interventions[multi,gb] 
MAX(reference hassle factor per 
measure[glazing], reference hassle factor per 
measure[boiler]) 
Dmnl 
The hassle factor calculated per intervention and supply chain type. In single supply chain 
the hassle factor is the sum of the hassle factors related to the measure installed, while in 
multi it is the higher hassle factor among the measure installed. This because in single 
there are different installer for different measures (with each relative hassle factor 
related), while in multi there is only one installer for all the measures (everything is done at 
the same moment, lowering the hassle) 
reference hassle factor 
per 
interventions[multi,gl] 
MAX(reference hassle factor per 
measure[glazing],reference hassle factor per 
measure[loft]) 
Dmnl 
The hassle factor calculated per intervention and supply chain type. In single supply chain 
the hassle factor is the sum of the hassle factors related to the measure installed, while in 
multi it is the higher hassle factor among the measure installed. This because in single 
there are different installer for different measures (with each relative hassle factor 
related), while in multi there is only one installer for all the measures (everything is done at 
the same moment, lowering the hassle) 
reference hassle factor 
per 
interventions[multi,gi] 
MAX(reference hassle factor per 
measure[glazing], reference hassle factor per 
measure[insulation]) 
Dmnl 
The hassle factor calculated per intervention and supply chain type. In single supply chain 
the hassle factor is the sum of the hassle factors related to the measure installed, while in 
multi it is the higher hassle factor among the measure installed. This because in single 
there are different installer for different measures (with each relative hassle factor 
related), while in multi there is only one installer for all the measures (everything is done at 
the same moment, lowering the hassle) 
reference hassle factor 
per 
interventions[multi,bl] 
MAX(reference hassle factor per 
measure[boiler], reference hassle factor per 
measure[loft]) 
Dmnl 
The hassle factor calculated per intervention and supply chain type. In single supply chain 
the hassle factor is the sum of the hassle factors related to the measure installed, while in 
multi it is the higher hassle factor among the measure installed. This because in single 
there are different installer for different measures (with each relative hassle factor 
related), while in multi there is only one installer for all the measures (everything is done at 
the same moment, lowering the hassle) 
reference hassle factor 
per 
interventions[multi,bi] 
MAX(reference hassle factor per 
measure[boiler], reference hassle factor per 
measure[insulation]) 
Dmnl 
The hassle factor calculated per intervention and supply chain type. In single supply chain 
the hassle factor is the sum of the hassle factors related to the measure installed, while in 
multi it is the higher hassle factor among the measure installed. This because in single 
there are different installer for different measures (with each relative hassle factor 
related), while in multi there is only one installer for all the measures (everything is done at 
the same moment, lowering the hassle) 
reference hassle factor 
per 
interventions[multi,li] 
MAX(reference hassle factor per measure[loft], 
reference hassle factor per 
measure[insulation]) 
Dmnl 
The hassle factor calculated per intervention and supply chain type. In single supply chain 
the hassle factor is the sum of the hassle factors related to the measure installed, while in 
multi it is the higher hassle factor among the measure installed. This because in single 
there are different installer for different measures (with each relative hassle factor 
related), while in multi there is only one installer for all the measures (everything is done at 
the same moment, lowering the hassle) 
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reference hassle factor 
per 
interventions[multi,gbl] 
MAX(reference hassle factor per 
measure[glazing], MAX(reference hassle factor 
per measure[boiler], reference hassle factor 
per measure[loft])) 
Dmnl 
The hassle factor calculated per intervention and supply chain type. In single supply chain 
the hassle factor is the sum of the hassle factors related to the measure installed, while in 
multi it is the higher hassle factor among the measure installed. This because in single 
there are different installer for different measures (with each relative hassle factor 
related), while in multi there is only one installer for all the measures (everything is done at 
the same moment, lowering the hassle) 
reference hassle factor 
per 
interventions[multi,gbi] 
MAX(reference hassle factor per 
measure[glazing], MAX(reference hassle factor 
per measure[boiler], reference hassle factor 
per measure[insulation])) 
Dmnl 
The hassle factor calculated per intervention and supply chain type. In single supply chain 
the hassle factor is the sum of the hassle factors related to the measure installed, while in 
multi it is the higher hassle factor among the measure installed. This because in single 
there are different installer for different measures (with each relative hassle factor 
related), while in multi there is only one installer for all the measures (everything is done at 
the same moment, lowering the hassle) 
reference hassle factor 
per 
interventions[multi,gli] 
MAX(reference hassle factor per 
measure[glazing], MAX(reference hassle factor 
per measure[boiler], reference hassle factor 
per measure[loft])) 
Dmnl 
The hassle factor calculated per intervention and supply chain type. In single supply chain 
the hassle factor is the sum of the hassle factors related to the measure installed, while in 
multi it is the higher hassle factor among the measure installed. This because in single 
there are different installer for different measures (with each relative hassle factor 
related), while in multi there is only one installer for all the measures (everything is done at 
the same moment, lowering the hassle) 
reference hassle factor 
per 
interventions[multi,bli] 
MAX(reference hassle factor per 
measure[boiler], MAX(reference hassle factor 
per measure[loft], reference hassle factor per 
measure[insulation])) 
Dmnl 
The hassle factor calculated per intervention and supply chain type. In single supply chain 
the hassle factor is the sum of the hassle factors related to the measure installed, while in 
multi it is the higher hassle factor among the measure installed. This because in single 
there are different installer for different measures (with each relative hassle factor 
related), while in multi there is only one installer for all the measures (everything is done at 
the same moment, lowering the hassle) 




MAX(reference hassle factor per 
measure[glazing], MAX(reference hassle factor 
per measure[boiler], MAX(reference hassle 
factor per measure[loft], reference hassle 
factor per measure[insulation]))) 
Dmnl 
The hassle factor calculated per intervention and supply chain type. In single supply chain 
the hassle factor is the sum of the hassle factors related to the measure installed, while in 
multi it is the higher hassle factor among the measure installed. This because in single 
there are different installer for different measures (with each relative hassle factor 
related), while in multi there is only one installer for all the measures (everything is done at 
the same moment, lowering the hassle) 





From a conversation with Mike Gentry: solid wall is the measure that creates way most 
hassle, cavity wall is generally easy to do (except for flats, that might be difficult), double 
glazing has a relative significant amount of hassle (although it is sold as a no hassle 
measure), boilers' low hassle and loft insulation is slightly more than cavity wall 
reference hassle factor 
per measure[boiler] 
0.3 Dmnl 
From a conversation with Mike Gentry: solid wall is the measure that creates way most 
hassle, cavity wall is generally easy to do (except for flats, that might be difficult), double 
glazing has a relative significant amount of hassle (although it is sold as a no hassle 
measure), boilers' low hassle and loft insulation is slightly more than cavity wall 
reference hassle factor 
per measure[insulation] 
5*(1-cavity wall scenario)+ 0.3*cavity wall 
scenario 
Dmnl 
From a conversation with Mike Gentry: solid wall is the measure that creates way most 
hassle, cavity wall is generally easy to do (except for flats, that might be difficult), double 
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glazing has a relative significant amount of hassle (although it is sold as a no hassle 
measure), boilers' low hassle and loft insulation is slightly more than cavity wall 
reference hassle factor 
per measure[loft] 
0.4 Dmnl 
From a conversation with Mike Gentry: solid wall is the measure that creates way most 
hassle, cavity wall is generally easy to do (except for flats, that might be difficult), double 
glazing has a relative significant amount of hassle (although it is sold as a no hassle 
measure), boilers' low hassle and loft insulation is slightly more than cavity wall 
reference indoor 
temperature 
20 ° The average reference temperature in the UK houses. Educated guess made by researchers 
reference max added 
value 
0.03 Dmnl 
The maximum possible added value to a property a measure can have for non-financial 





To each measure a reference non-financial attractiveness has been given. This value 
aggregate aesthetics and thermal comfort. It is a dimensionless value because what is 
important for the model is the relative value compared to other measure. The values are 





To each measure a reference non-financial attractiveness has been given. This value 
aggregate aesthetics and thermal comfort. It is a dimensionless value because what is 
important for the model is the relative value compared to other measure. The values are 




cavity wall scenario+ (1+STEP( step in solid 
non-financial attractiveness ,240))*(1-cavity 
wall scenario) 
 
To each measure a reference non-financial attractiveness has been given. This value 
aggregate aesthetics and thermal comfort. It is a dimensionless value because what is 
important for the model is the relative value compared to other measure. The values are 





To each measure a reference non-financial attractiveness has been given. This value 
aggregate aesthetics and thermal comfort. It is a dimensionless value because what is 
important for the model is the relative value compared to other measure. The values are 
given based on a interview with Mike Gentry from BEIS 
reference prices for 
individual 
measure[insulation] 
IF THEN ELSE(cavity wall scenario>0.5, 500, 
12000) 
GBP/measures 
Reference average prices retrieve from online suppliers. In line with what has been said 
during the workshops 




Reference average prices retrieve from online suppliers. In line with what has been said 
during the workshops 




Reference average prices retrieve from online suppliers. In line with what has been said 
during the workshops 
reference prices for 
individual measure[loft] 
400 GBP/measures 
Reference average prices retrieve from online suppliers. In line with what has been said 
during the workshops 
reference reactiveness 
of house prices 
0.05 1/Month 
This value represents the speed the housing prices adapt to changes in the market. Data 






UK Houzz & Home (2015) says that 75% of houses made renovations between 2014 and 
2015. If we assume this as the normal fraction we have 37.5% per year and 3.125% per 
month. Then we multiply by the share of the stock which is owner occupied (0.69) 
reference skills of new 
workers 
0.4 Dmnl 
This value represents the skills of the new workforce hired. It is lower than the maximum 





The initial and reference thermal comfort is assumed to be high (1) since most 
homeowners are able to afford to warm adequately their house 
reference time for skills 
acquisition 
120 Month 
It has been estimated by researchers that it takes 10 year to a worker to get perfectly 
skilled 
reference workforce in 








relative importance of 
financial benefits 
0.6 Dmnl 
This weight is used to give different to financial and non-financial benefits in homeowners 
decision. This value is based on a conversation with Mike Gentry from BEIS 




How much is evaluated popularity compared to measure benefits when estimating the 
measure desirability (this value is close to the ‘middle’ since there are not many 








This variable calculates the relative desirability of each measure with respect of the total 
desirability. It is a sort of desirability distribution 
reliability of EPC 0.5 Dmnl 
Reliability of Energy Performance Certificate is a factor that can give more confidence on 
the credibility of the retrofit industry to the homeowners 
renovation fraction 
reference renovation fraction* impact of 
economic cycles on renovation fraction* 
impact of tax reductions on renovation fraction 
1/Month 
This variable is the amenity renovation fraction and accounts for all the effects 
 
renovations 
renovations without retrofit+ total retrofit 
interventions per month 




12 Month How much time households need to perceive a tax reduction 
renovations without 
retrofit 
demand from renovation drop out[amenity]+ 
hh initiating amenity only renovations- 
SUM(retrofit measures installed as 
amenity[measures!])/measures per household 
households/Month The number of amenity renovations that take place without being combined retrofit 
renovators investing 
capacity 
reference expenditures for 
renovations[renovation type]*flexibility for 
extra investment+ ease of available credit 
options[renovation type] 
GBP/Interventions 






avg energy consumption per household*CO2 
emissions per kWh*total housing stock 
Kg/Month 
Flow of CO2 emissions from the housing stock obtained multiplying the number of houses 
(housing stock) per its average energy consumption (average energy consumption per 
household) times the CO2 emitted per kWh. It is assumed one household per house 
retirement rate 
Workforce for retrofit[SC type,measures]/avg 
installers working time 
workers/Month 
The ratio between the actual workforce and the time the workers stay at work gives the 
retirement rate 
retrofit affordability for 
buyers 
MIN(1, XIDZ(buyers' investing capacity[SC 
type,interventions,buyers type], upfront cost 
for consumer[SC type,interventions],100))^ 
affordability steepness 
Dmnl 
The affordability function gives the fraction of the households that can afford the specific 
intervention in the specific type of buyers. If the buyers capacity is higher than the upfront 
cost, everybody can afford and the MIN function impose affordability equal to 1. If the 
capacity is lower than the upfront cost, the affordability is lower than one. A high 
affordability steepness means that even a small excess of the cost over the capacity, 
reduces drastically the demand and vice versa. Thanks to the XIDZ function, if the cost is 
zero, like in the intervention 'n', the affordability is 1, so nobody drop out 
retrofit affordability for 
renovations[SC 
type,interventions,reno




(1/2)* (1+TANH(affordability steepness* (1-




This tangent function is inclined by the affordability steepness and represents how much 
the investing capacity for retrofit of the households doing renovation is distributed among 
the population 





This tangent function is inclined by the affordability steepness and represents how much 
the investing capacity for retrofit of  the households doing renovation is distributed 
among the population 
retrofit as amenity 
SUM(retrofit measures installed as 
amenity[measures!])/measures per household 
households/Month Total retrofit measures installed for amenity reasons per households 
retrofit credibility[SC 
type,interventions] 
:EXCEPT: [SC type,n] 
MAX(0, MIN(1, (size effect on 
credibility*interventions 
popularity[interventions]+ effect of market 
fragmentation on credibility[SC 
type]+guarantees on retrofit performances) 
*reliability of EPC)) 
Dmnl 
The credibility of the retrofit industry depends on many  factors: the popularity of the 
intervention, on how many installation the industry has done (size effect on credibility), on 
the market fragmentation (the more fragmented the less credible), on guarantees on 





The credibility of the retrofit industry depends on many  factors: the popularity of the 
intervention, on how many installation the industry has done (size effect on credibility), on 
the market fragmentation (the more fragmented the less credible), on guarantees on 
retrofit performances (insurances) and on the reliability of the Energy Performance 
Certificate (EPC) 
retrofit demand by 
measures[SC 
type,insulation] 
measures per intervention*(demand for 
retrofit by interventions[SC type,i]+ demand 
for retrofit by interventions[SC type,li]+ 
demand for retrofit by interventions[SC 
type,gi]+ demand for retrofit by 
measures/Month 
Total retrofit demand calculated by measure. All the intervention containing that specific 
measure are summed 
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interventions[SC type,bi]+ demand for retrofit 
by interventions[SC type,gbi]+ demand for 
retrofit by interventions[SC type,gli]+ demand 
for retrofit by interventions[SC type,bli]+ 
demand for retrofit by interventions[SC 
type,gbli]) 
retrofit demand by 
measures[SC type,loft] 
measures per intervention*(demand for 
retrofit by interventions[SC type,l]+ demand 
for retrofit by interventions[SC type,li]+ 
demand for retrofit by interventions[SC 
type,gl]+ demand for retrofit by 
interventions[SC type,bl]+ demand for retrofit 
by interventions[SC type,gbl]+ 
 demand for retrofit by 
interventions[SC type,gli]+ demand for retrofit 
by interventions[SC type,bli]+ demand for 
retrofit by interventions[SC type,gbli]) 
measures/Month 
Total retrofit demand calculated by measure. All the intervention containing that specific 
measure are summed 
retrofit demand by 
measures[SC 
type,boiler] 
measures per intervention*(demand for 
retrofit by interventions[SC type,b]+ demand 
for retrofit by interventions[SC type,bl]+ 
demand for retrofit by interventions[SC 
type,gb]+ demand for retrofit by 
interventions[SC type,bi]+ demand for retrofit 
by interventions[SC type,gbl]+ demand for 
retrofit by interventions[SC type,gbi]+ demand 
for retrofit by interventions[SC type,bli]+ 
demand for retrofit by interventions[SC 
type,gbli]) 
measures/Month 
Total retrofit demand calculated by measure. All the intervention containing that specific 
measure are summed 
retrofit demand by 
measures[SC type, 
glazing] 
measures per intervention*(demand for 
retrofit by interventions[SC type,g]+ demand 
for retrofit by interventions[SC type,gb]+ 
demand for retrofit by interventions[SC 
type,gl]+ demand for retrofit by 
interventions[SC type,gi]+ demand for retrofit 
by interventions[SC type,gbl]+ 
 demand for retrofit by 
interventions[SC type,gli]+ demand for retrofit 
by interventions[SC type,gbi]+ demand for 
retrofit by interventions[SC type,gbli]) 
measures/Month 
Total retrofit demand calculated by measure. All the intervention containing that specific 
measure are summed 
retrofit 
desirability[single,interv
MAX(0,  (benefits 
attractiveness[single,interventions]*(1-relative 
importance of popularity on desirability)+ 
Dmnl 
Here all the feature of a retrofit intervention influencing its desirability are aggregated 
(benefits attractiveness, popularity, hassle factors, market fragmentation). The importance 







of popularity on desirability)/ (1+perceived 




desirability of not retrofitting Dmnl 
Here all the feature of a retrofit intervention influencing its desirability are aggregated 
(benefits attractiveness, popularity, hassle factors, market fragmentation). The importance 







importance of popularity on desirability)+ 
interventions 
popularity[interventions]*relative importance 
of popularity on desirability)/ (1+perceived 
hassle factor[multi,interventions])* (1-market 
fragmentation)) 
Dmnl 
Here all the feature of a retrofit intervention influencing its desirability are aggregated 
(benefits attractiveness, popularity, hassle factors, market fragmentation). The importance 
of popularity is weighted. The output is a number between zero and one 




Dmnl Percentage of the defected measures installed and not yet fixed 
retrofit measures 
installed as amenity 
measures per household*fraction of retrofit 
measures installed as amenity[measures]* (hh 
initiating amenity only renovations+ demand 
from renovation drop out[amenity]+ demand 
from renovation drop out[efficiency])* 
potential fraction by measure[measures] 
measures/Month 
Number of measures installed per month for amenity reasons. It is calculated multiplying 
the fraction of retrofit measures installed as amenity by the potential for that measure still 
available in the housing stock and by the sum of all the possible demand for amenity 
renovation (households starting directly amenity renovation, households that consider to 
top up their amenity with retrofit but drop out the retrofit and households starting directly 
to do retrofit for energy efficiency reasons but drop out and therefore may consider to do 
an amenity renovation) 
retrofit rate by 
intervention 




Rate of the total retrofit intervention per month 
retrofit rate by 
measures[SC 
type,insulation] 
(fulfilled interventions[SC type,i]+ fulfilled 
interventions[SC type,li]+ fulfilled 
interventions[SC type,gi]+ fulfilled 
interventions[SC type,bi]+ fulfilled 
interventions[SC type,gbi]+ fulfilled 
interventions[SC type,gli]+ fulfilled 
interventions[SC type,bli]+ fulfilled 
interventions[SC type,gbli])* measures per 
intervention 
measures/Month 
Actual retrofit installation by measure type. All the interventions containing the that 
specific measure are summed 
retrofit rate by 
measures[SC type,loft] 
(fulfilled interventions[SC type,l]+ fulfilled 
interventions[SC type,li]+ fulfilled 
interventions[SC type,gl]+ fulfilled 
interventions[SC type,bl]+ fulfilled 
interventions[SC type,gbl]+ fulfilled 
measures/Month 
Actual retrofit installation by measure type. All the interventions containing the that 




interventions[SC type,bli]+ fulfilled 
interventions[SC type,gbli])* measures per 
intervention 
retrofit rate by 
measures[SC 
type,boiler] 
(fulfilled interventions[SC type,b]+ fulfilled 
interventions[SC type,bl]+ fulfilled 
interventions[SC type,gb]+ fulfilled 
interventions[SC type,bi]+ fulfilled 
interventions[SC type,gbl]+ fulfilled 
interventions[SC type,gbi]+ fulfilled 
interventions[SC type,bli]+ fulfilled 
interventions[SC type,gbli])* measures per 
intervention 
measures/Month 
Actual retrofit installation by measure type. All the interventions containing the that 
specific measure are summed 
retrofit rate by 
measures[SC 
type,glazing] 
(fulfilled interventions[SC type,g]+ fulfilled 
interventions[SC type,gb]+ fulfilled 
interventions[SC type,gl]+ fulfilled 
interventions[SC type,gi]+ fulfilled 
interventions[SC type,gbl]+ fulfilled 
interventions[SC type,gli]+ fulfilled 
interventions[SC type,gbi]+ fulfilled 
interventions[SC type,gbli])* measures per 
intervention 
measures/Month 
Actual retrofit installation by measure type. All the interventions containing the that 
specific measure are summed 
Retrofit technology 
INTEG (technology improvements[measures], 
1) 
Dmnl 
Level of technological development. The stock is initialized with value one (it represents 




After conversation with Mike Gentry (BEIS): glazing and boiler are two very visible and 
popular measure ('that's what people look at when they see a new house [...] because they 
interact with them), then they maybe look for loft insulation while cavity wall and solid wall 
are not even on the people's radar 
retrofit 
visibility[insulation] 
cavity wall scenario*0.2+ (1-cavity wall 
scenario)*0.8 
Dmnl 
After conversation with Mike Gentry (BEIS): glazing and boiler are two very visible and 
popular measure ('that's what people look at when they see a new house [...] because they 
interact with them), then they maybe look for loft insulation while cavity wall and solid wall 
are not even on the people's radar 
retrofit visibility[boiler] 3 Dmnl 
After conversation with Mike Gentry (BEIS): glazing and boiler are two very visible and 
popular measure ('that's what people look at when they see a new house [...] because they 
interact with them), then they maybe look for loft insulation while cavity wall and solid wall 
are not even on the people's radar 
retrofit visibility[loft] 0.5 Dmnl 
After conversation with Mike Gentry (BEIS): glazing and boiler are two very visible and 
popular measure ('that's what people look at when they see a new house [...] because they 
interact with them), then they maybe look for loft insulation while cavity wall and solid wall 
are not even on the people's radar 
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retrofit WF fraction 
SUM(Workforce for retrofit[SC 
type!,measures!])/reference workforce in the 
SC for renovation maintenance and 
improvements 
Dmnl 
Percentage of workforce in the renovation maintenance and improvements sector that 
does retrofit 




Dmnl Stock fraction by measure type installed 
return from not 
investing 
MAX(0, cost of hiring[SC type,measures]* 
(1+(bank interest rate*TIME STEP))^ (desired 
payback time for workforce investments/TIME 
STEP)) 
GBP 
Here the return from not investing an equivalent amount of money to the hiring costs for 
the considered time horizon are calculated 
risk taking attitude by 
economic cycles 
1+ economic cycles switch* fractional 
amplitude of economic cycles* SIN( 
6.28/economic cycles time*Time) 
Dmnl 
The economic cycles are represented as a SIN function, since it is believe that the housing 
market relatively regularly oscillates 
SC capacity for 
interventions[SC type,i] 
SC capacity for measures[SC 
type,insulation]/measures per intervention 
Interventions/ 
Month 
Supply chain capacity calculated per intervention. It is calculated based on the lower 
capacity available among the measures installed in the intervention. For ‘n’, namely doing 
nothing, the number is on purposely very high in order not to have no limitations for 
people that do not want to do anything 
SC capacity for 
interventions[SC type,l] 
SC capacity for measures[SC 
type,loft]/measures per intervention 
Interventions/ 
Month 
Supply chain capacity calculated per intervention. It is calculated based on the lower 
capacity available among the measures installed in the intervention. For ‘n’, namely doing 
nothing, the number is on purposely very high in order not to have no limitations for 
people that do not want to do anything 
SC capacity for 
interventions[SC type,g] 
SC capacity for measures[SC 
type,glazing]/measures per intervention 
Interventions/ 
Month 
Supply chain capacity calculated per intervention. It is calculated based on the lower 
capacity available among the measures installed in the intervention. For ‘n’, namely doing 
nothing, the number is on purposely very high in order not to have no limitations for 
people that do not want to do anything 
SC capacity for 
interventions[SC 
type,b] 
SC capacity for measures[SC 
type,boiler]/measures per intervention 
Interventions/ 
Month 
Supply chain capacity calculated per intervention. It is calculated based on the lower 
capacity available among the measures installed in the intervention. For ‘n’, namely doing 
nothing, the number is on purposely very high in order not to have no limitations for 
people that do not want to do anything 
SC capacity for 
interventions[SC 
type,gb] 
MIN(SC capacity for measures[SC 
type,glazing],SC capacity for measures[SC type, 
boiler])/ measures per intervention 
Interventions/ 
Month 
Supply chain capacity calculated per intervention. It is calculated based on the lower 
capacity available among the measures installed in the intervention. For ‘n’, namely doing 
nothing, the number is on purposely very high in order not to have no limitations for 
people that do not want to do anything 
SC capacity for 
interventions[SC 
type,gl] 
MIN(SC capacity for measures[SC 
type,glazing],SC capacity for measures[SC 
type,loft])/ measures per intervention 
Interventions/ 
Month 
Supply chain capacity calculated per intervention. It is calculated based on the lower 
capacity available among the measures installed in the intervention. For ‘n’, namely doing 
nothing, the number is on purposely very high in order not to have no limitations for 
people that do not want to do anything 
SC capacity for 
interventions[SC 
type,gi] 
MIN(SC capacity for measures[SC 
type,glazing],SC capacity for measures[SC type, 
insulation])/ measures per intervention 
Interventions/ 
Month 
Supply chain capacity calculated per intervention. It is calculated based on the lower 
capacity available among the measures installed in the intervention. For ‘n’, namely doing 
nothing, the number is on purposely very high in order not to have no limitations for 
people that do not want to do anything 
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SC capacity for 
interventions[SC 
type,bl] 
MIN(SC capacity for measures[SC 
type,boiler],SC capacity for measures[SC 
type,loft])/ measures per intervention 
Interventions/ 
Month 
Supply chain capacity calculated per intervention. It is calculated based on the lower 
capacity available among the measures installed in the intervention. For ‘n’, namely doing 
nothing, the number is on purposely very high in order not to have no limitations for 
people that do not want to do anything 
SC capacity for 
interventions[SC 
type,bi] 
MIN(SC capacity for measures[SC 
type,boiler],SC capacity for measures[SC 
type,insulation])/ measures per intervention 
Interventions/ 
Month 
Supply chain capacity calculated per intervention. It is calculated based on the lower 
capacity available among the measures installed in the intervention. For ‘n’, namely doing 
nothing, the number is on purposely very high in order not to have no limitations for 
people that do not want to do anything 
SC capacity for 
interventions[SC type,li] 
MIN(SC capacity for measures[SC type,loft],SC 
capacity for measures[SC type,insulation])/ 
measures per intervention 
Interventions/ 
Month 
Supply chain capacity calculated per intervention. It is calculated based on the lower 
capacity available among the measures installed in the intervention. For ‘n’, namely doing 
nothing, the number is on purposely very high in order not to have no limitations for 
people that do not want to do anything 
SC capacity for 
interventions[SC 
type,gbli] 
MIN(SC capacity for measures[SC 
type,insulation],  MIN(SC capacity for 
measures[SC type,loft], MIN(SC capacity for 
measures[SC type,boiler],SC capacity for 




Supply chain capacity calculated per intervention. It is calculated based on the lower 
capacity available among the measures installed in the intervention. For ‘n’, namely doing 
nothing, the number is on purposely very high in order not to have no limitations for 
people that do not want to do anything 
SC capacity for 
interventions[SC 
type,gbl] 
MIN(SC capacity for measures[SC type,glazing], 
MIN(SC capacity for measures[SC type,loft],SC 
capacity for measures[SC type,boiler]))/ 
measures per intervention 
Interventions/ 
Month 
Supply chain capacity calculated per intervention. It is calculated based on the lower 
capacity available among the measures installed in the intervention. For ‘n’, namely doing 
nothing, the number is on purposely very high in order not to have no limitations for 
people that do not want to do anything 
SC capacity for 
interventions[SC 
type,gbi] 
MIN(SC capacity for measures[SC 
type,insulation], MIN(SC capacity for 
measures[SC type,glazing],SC capacity for 




Supply chain capacity calculated per intervention. It is calculated based on the lower 
capacity available among the measures installed in the intervention. For ‘n’, namely doing 
nothing, the number is on purposely very high in order not to have no limitations for 
people that do not want to do anything 
SC capacity for 
interventions[SC 
type,gli] 
MIN(SC capacity for measures[SC 
type,insulation], MIN(SC capacity for 
measures[SC type,loft],SC capacity for 




Supply chain capacity calculated per intervention. It is calculated based on the lower 
capacity available among the measures installed in the intervention. For ‘n’, namely doing 
nothing, the number is on purposely very high in order not to have no limitations for 
people that do not want to do anything 
SC capacity for 
interventions[SC 
type,bli] 
MIN(SC capacity for measures[SC 
type,insulation], MIN(SC capacity for 
measures[SC type,loft],SC capacity for 




Supply chain capacity calculated per intervention. It is calculated based on the lower 
capacity available among the measures installed in the intervention. For ‘n’, namely doing 
nothing, the number is on purposely very high in order not to have no limitations for 
people that do not want to do anything 
SC capacity for 
interventions[SC 
type,n] 
(SUM(SC capacity for measures[SC 




Supply chain capacity calculated per intervention. It is calculated based on the lower 
capacity available among the measures installed in the intervention. For ‘n’, namely doing 
nothing, the number is on purposely very high in order not to have no limitations for 
people that do not want to do anything 
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SC capacity for 
measures 




The productivity of the two supply chain is obtained multiplying  the workforce by its 
productivity 
sense of opportunity 
1-(ZIDZ(difference in prices[SC 
type,interventions],perceived prices of 
interventions for consumers 
[SC type,interventions])) 
Dmnl 
This variable accounts for homeowners appreciating a measure becoming cheaper because 
a change in the perceived price. This is calculated with the ZIDZ function. This ratio is 
subtracted to one in order to have a value between zero and one representing how this 
sense of opportunity is perceived 




How much an unitary variation in sense of opportunity impact the non-financial 
attractiveness 
 
size effect on credibility 
accumulated measures/reference accumulated 
measures for credibility 
Dmnl 
All the measures installed are confronted with the reference accumulated number of 
retrofit measures installed to see if the a positive size effect on credibility is activated 
skills decay 
MAX( 0, SUM(workforce decay[SC 
type!,measures])*workforce skills[measures]) 
workers/Month 
Here the workers that retires or are fired 'bring' with them their skills. This means that 
there is an outflow of workers equal to the workforce decay and weighted for the skills 




Here the solid wall measures installed are calculated separately and then, when the cavity 
wall scenario is running, exogenously introduced in the model 
solid INIT distribution 0.307 Dmnl 
Fraction of houses with a solid wall. Estimation based on two report released by 
DECC/BEIS: 'United Kingdom housing energy fact file 2013' and 'Households energy 
efficiency national statistics. Detailed report 2016'. Integrated with I. Hamilton (2014) 
'Uptake of energy efficiency interventions in English dwellings' 
solid wall savings 2000/12 
kWh/Month/ 
measures 
Solid wall energy savings per month. Source: DECC/BEIS report: 'NATIONAL ENERGY 
EFFICIENCY DATA-FRAMEWORK Summary of analysis using the National Energy Efficiency 
Data-Framework (NEED)' June 2016 
stamp duty rebate 
maximum fraction 
1 Dmnl This fraction represent how 'strong' the rebate is. In this case it is 100% of the stamp duty 
stamp duty rebates 
switch 
0 Dmnl Switch to turn off and on the stamp duty rebate policy 
stamp rebate starting 
time 
216 Month The time in the simulation in which the stamp duty rebate starts. It is set to start in 2018 
stamp rebates eligible 
and aware fraction 
buyers awareness of stamp duty 
rebates*fraction of buyers eligible for stamp 
duty rebates 
Dmnl 
Percentage of buyers that are eligible for a stamp duty and that are aware of the possibility 
to retrofit their new property with this amount of money coming from the rebate 
stamp rebates eligible 
but not aware fraction 
fraction of buyers eligible for stamp duty 
rebates* (1-buyers awareness of stamp duty 
rebates) 
Dmnl 
This variable represents the buyers that are eligible of a stamp duty but are not aware of 
the policy. It is assumed to be null since everybody is supposed to be aware of the policy 
step in solid non-
financial attractiveness 
0 Dmnl 
This variable is used to test what happen if there are remarkable changes in the measure  
non-financial attractiveness 
stop of subsidies 0 Dmnl This is a switch to activate or stop the subsidies 
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subsidies / consumer 
tax credit 
(ECO subsidies[measures]-EEC and CERT 
subsidies[measures])*STEP(1,ECO start)+ EEC 
and CERT subsidies[measures]*STEP(1,EEC and 
CERT start) 
Dmnl 
This variable aggregates and differentiate in time all the  subsidies discount to upfront 
costs for homeowners 
subsidies stop time 216 Month 
In case the stop of subsidies switch is on, this time represents the moment in which they 
will be stopped 
summed desirability 
SUM(relative intervention desirability[SC 
type!,interventions!]) 
Dmnl Control variable so assess if the sum of all the desirability gives one 
suppliers costs for 
individual measuress[SC 
type,measures] 
(materials contribution to costs[SC 
type,measures]+labour contribution to costs 
[measures])* (1-VAT reductions)*reference 
costs for individual measures[measures] 
GBP/measures 
Here the fractional costs (if there is not effect in place, their sum is equal to one) are 
multiplied by the reference costs for individual measure in order to obtain the suppliers 
actual costs. A VAT reduction option is included 
susceptible for 
renovations stock 
INTEG (new susceptible homeowners' houses+ 
re-getting susceptible -renovations, 
MAX(Potential for retrofit measures to 
install[loft], MAX(Potential for retrofit 
measures to install[insulation], MAX(Potential 
for retrofit measures to install[boiler], 
Potential for retrofit measures to 
install[glazing])))/ measures per household) 
households 
Households that haven't undertake a renovation recently and that are susceptible to do a 
renovation 
tax reduction on 
renovations 
0 Dmnl 
It has been mentioned in a workshop that a possible policy is to allow for a tax reduction 
on general renovation. This variable is here to test this scenario 
tax reduction starting 
time 
216 Month 
This variable represents the time in which an hypothetical tax reduction on renovation 
starts 
tax reduction to 
renovation fraction 
elasticity 
0.5 Dmnl This elasticity represents how much a tax reduction prompt homeowners to renovate more 
tailored advise and 
smart metering[single] 
0 Dmnl 
Tailored installers advice and smart metering can improve the households behaviour and 
impact their behaviour compliance 
tailored advise and 
smart metering[multi] 
1 Dmnl 
Tailored installers advice and smart metering can improve the households behaviour and 
impact their behaviour compliance 
techno to energy 
savings elasticity 
0.1 Dmnl 





1e-008 1/GBP This value is an educated guess made by researchers based on 
technology 
improvements 
(1-market fragmentation)* investments in 
technology[measures]* technological 
improvement per investment unit+ natural 
technological improvement rate 
1/Month 




technology to cost 
elasticity 
0 Dmnl 
How a unitary variation in technology change the material costs of a measure. Now it is 
assumed to be close to zero based on the inputs of Hunter Danskin (BEIS) 
temperature increase 
per extent level 
1 ° 
If there is a rebound effect, this variable reports the value of how much higher households 
will keep their indoor temperature per each additional retrofit extent installed 
temperature to comfort 
elasticity 
0.2 Dmnl How much a unitary variation of temperature can change the comfort households perceive 
temperature to energy 
curve 
(indoor temperature by 
intervention[interventions]/reference indoor 
temperature)^ elasticity for temperature to 
energy curve 
Dmnl 
Here the variation in temperature due to the rebound effect is compared with the 
reference indoor temperature and then it is used to assess how much this variation impact 
the energy consumption 
thermal comfort by 
intervention 
reference thermal comfort* (indoor 
temperature by intervention[interventions]/ 
reference indoor temperature)^ temperature 
to comfort elasticity 
Dmnl 
Here the thermal comfort by intervention is calculated. It is obtained multiplying the 
reference thermal comfort by the ratio between the actual indoor temperature after an 
intervention and the reference indoor temperature. This ratio is elevated to the elasticity 
measuring changes in comfort after a unit variation in temperature 
thermal comfort by 
measure[glazing] 
XIDZ(thermal comfort by 
intervention[g]*estimated retrofitted fraction 
by intervention[g]+ thermal comfort by 
intervention[gb]*estimated retrofitted fraction 
by intervention[gb]+ thermal comfort by 
intervention[gl]*estimated retrofitted fraction 
by intervention[gl]+ thermal comfort by 
intervention[gi]*estimated retrofitted fraction 
by intervention[gi]+ thermal comfort by 
intervention[gbl]*estimated retrofitted 
fraction by intervention[gbl]+ thermal comfort 
by intervention[gbi]*estimated retrofitted 
fraction by intervention[gbi]+thermal comfort 
by intervention[gli]*estimated retrofitted 
fraction by intervention[gli]+ thermal comfort 
by intervention[gbli]*estimated retrofitted 
fraction by intervention[gbli],estimated 
retrofitted fraction by intervention[g]+ 
estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[gb]+estimated retrofitted fraction 
by intervention[gl]+estimated retrofitted 
fraction by intervention[gi]+ estimated 
retrofitted fraction by intervention[gbl]+ 
estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[gbi]+estimated retrofitted 
fraction by intervention[gli]+ estimated 
retrofitted fraction by intervention[gbli], 
reference thermal comfort) 
Dmnl  
Here the thermal comfort is calculated per measure starting from intervention thermal 
comfort, averaging all the comforts for each measure 
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thermal comfort by 
measure[boiler] 
XIDZ(thermal comfort by 
intervention[b]*estimated retrofitted fraction 
by intervention[b]+ thermal comfort by 
intervention[gb]*estimated retrofitted fraction 
by intervention[gb]+ thermal comfort by 
intervention[bl]*estimated retrofitted fraction 
by intervention[bl]+ thermal comfort by 
intervention[bi]*estimated retrofitted fraction 
by intervention[bi]+ thermal comfort by 
intervention[gbl]*estimated retrofitted 
fraction by intervention[gbl]+ thermal comfort 
by intervention[gbi]*estimated retrofitted 
fraction by intervention[gbi]+ thermal comfort 
by intervention[bli]*estimated retrofitted 
fraction by intervention[bli]+ thermal comfort 
by intervention[gbli]*estimated retrofitted 
fraction by intervention[gbli], estimated 
retrofitted fraction by intervention[b]+ 
estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[gb]+ estimated retrofitted 
fraction by intervention[bl]+ estimated 
retrofitted fraction by intervention[bi]+ 
estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[gbl]+ estimated retrofitted 
fraction by intervention[gbi]+ estimated 
retrofitted fraction by intervention[bli]+ 
estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[gbli], reference thermal comfort) 
Dmnl  
Here the thermal comfort is calculated per measure starting from intervention thermal 
comfort, averaging all the comforts for each measure 
thermal comfort by 
measure[insulation] 
XIDZ(thermal comfort by 
intervention[i]*estimated retrofitted fraction 
by intervention[i]+ thermal comfort by 
intervention[bi]*estimated retrofitted fraction 
by intervention[bi]+ thermal comfort by 
intervention[li]*estimated retrofitted fraction 
by intervention[li]+ thermal comfort by 
intervention[gi]*estimated retrofitted fraction 
by intervention[gi]+ thermal comfort by 
intervention[bli]*estimated retrofitted fraction 
by intervention[bli]+ thermal comfort by 
intervention[gbi]*estimated retrofitted 
fraction by intervention[gbi]+ thermal comfort 
by intervention[gli]*estimated retrofitted 
Dmnl  
Here the thermal comfort is calculated per measure starting from intervention thermal 
comfort, averaging all the comforts for each measure 
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fraction by intervention[gli]+ thermal comfort 
by intervention[gbli]*estimated retrofitted 
fraction by intervention[gbli], estimated 
retrofitted fraction by intervention[i]+ 
estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[bi]+ estimated retrofitted fraction 
by intervention[li]+ estimated retrofitted 
fraction by intervention[gi]+ estimated 
retrofitted fraction by intervention[bli]+ 
estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[gbi]+ estimated retrofitted 
fraction by intervention[gli]+ estimated 
retrofitted fraction by intervention[gbli], 
reference thermal comfort) 
thermal comfort by 
measure[loft] 
XIDZ(thermal comfort by 
intervention[l]*estimated retrofitted fraction 
by intervention[l]+ thermal comfort by 
intervention[bl]*estimated retrofitted fraction 
by intervention[bl]+thermal comfort by 
intervention[gl]* estimated retrofitted fraction 
by intervention[gl]+ thermal comfort by 
intervention[li]*estimated retrofitted fraction 
by intervention[li]+ thermal comfort by 
intervention[gbl]*estimated retrofitted 
fraction by intervention[gbl]+ thermal comfort 
by intervention[bli]*estimated retrofitted 
fraction by intervention[bli]+ thermal comfort 
by intervention[gli]*estimated retrofitted 
fraction by intervention[gli]+ thermal comfort 
by intervention[gbli]*estimated retrofitted 
fraction by intervention[gbli], estimated 
retrofitted fraction by intervention[l]+ 
estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[bl]+ estimated retrofitted fraction 
by intervention[gl]+estimated retrofitted 
fraction by intervention[li]+ estimated 
retrofitted fraction by intervention[gbl]+ 
estimated retrofitted fraction by 
intervention[bli]+ estimated retrofitted 
fraction by intervention[gli]+ estimated 
retrofitted fraction by intervention[gbli], 
reference thermal comfort) 
Dmnl  
Here the thermal comfort is calculated per measure starting from intervention thermal 
comfort, averaging all the comforts for each measure 
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TIME STEP   0.5 Month The time step for the simulation 
total demand 
demand from buyers+ demand from 
renovations+ demand from boiler 
replacements+ retrofit as amenity 
households/Month 
Total retrofit demand from households per month (not divided by measure or intervention 
type) 
total housing stock 
susceptible for renovations stock+ non-
susceptible stock 
households 
It counts the total housing stock. In the model, it is static 
 
total measures 




measures Total measure that are installed, possible to installed or failed 
total potential demand 
from renovation 
SUM(potential demand from 
renovations[renovation type!]) 
households/Month 
Total demand arising from the of all the type households willing  to top up their 




(SUM(retrofit rate by intervention[SC 
type!,interventions!])-SUM(retrofit rate by 
intervention[SC type!,n]))*households per 
interventions 
households/Month Total number of retrofit intervention undertaken per month 
total WF 
SUM(Workforce for retrofit[SC 
type!,measures]) 
workers Sum of the multi and single supply chain per measure 
training costs for junior 2000 GBP/workers Educated guess made by researchers on the cost of training new hired workforce 
training time 6 Month Educated guess on how much time is needed to train workforce 
trust of industry 
MAX(0,MIN(1, SMOOTH(Popularity of 
measures[measures],industry trust building 
time)* risk taking attitude by economic 
cycles*policy coherence)) 
Dmnl 
This value between one and zero represents the level of trust the industry have on the 
potential of the sector. This trust depend on the popularity of retrofit and it is perceived as 
an informational delay. However, this potential is dampened by the policy coherence: if 
investors perceive there is no coherence in the policies applied to the retrofit sector, they 
see the sector as unstable (e.g. first there are subsidies and then they are erased). 
Economic cycles can have an impact on investors 
upfront cost for 
consumer 
prices of interventions[SC type,interventions] GBP/Interventions 
These are the actual costs that homeowners face when they have to decide whether 
retrofit or not 
VAT reductions 0 Dmnl 
This is a possible police discussed in the workshop. It consists on decreasing the VAT 
taxation on retrofit measure in order to ultimately decrease the upfront cost for 
homeowners 
weighted energy 
savings from alternative 
insulation 
alternative insulation retrofitted fraction* 
alternative insulation INIT distribution* 
alternative insulation energy savings 
kWh/Month/ 
measures 
If the model simulates the cavity wall scenario, then this variable reports the energy 
savings over time for solid wall in order to include them in the energy savings calculation. 
On the contrary ,if the model simulates the solid wall scenario 
weighted energy 
savings from simulated 
installed measures 
SUM( INIT measures distribution[measures!]* 
expected energy savings by measure[SC 
type!,measures!]* retrofitted fraction by 





Here the energy savings due to the measure installed in the stock are calculated 
270 
 
willingness of mortgage 
borrowers to take a 
conditional mortgage 
1 Dmnl 
Percentage of mortgage borrowers that are willing to accept the lenders offer of a 
conditional mortgage to retrofit the low EPC property they are buying 
willingness of mortgage 
borrowers to take an 
additional mortgage 
1 Dmnl 
Percentage of mortgage borrowers that are willing to accept the lenders offer of additional 
cash on the initial mortgage to retrofit their new property 
workforce adjustment 
for backlog 
MAX(0,Accumulated capacity gap for 
measures[SC type,measures]/workforce 
productivity[SC type,measures]/ adjustment 
time for backlog) 
workers 
The ratio between the accumulated capacity gap and the workforce productivity gives the 
amount of workforce needed to close the capacity gap. This is divided by the time the 




The reference time the supply chain use as horizon to estimate what size the future 
workforce should be. It is equivalent to the time supply chain needs to adjust the 




The time the industry needs to adjust the workforce to the projections and needs of the 
market. The value is an educated guess made by researchers since no data were available. 
It has been estimated to be six months 
workforce decay 
IF THEN ELSE(Workforce for retrofit[SC 
type,measures]>0, retirement rate[SC 
type,measures]+ firing aggressiveness* desired 
lay-offs [SC type,measures]/ workforce 
adjustment horizon, 0) 
workers/Month 
The workforce decay comprehend the retirement rate and the people that are fired 
because in future they seem not to be needed (this firing process depends on the firing 





INTEG ( -from single to multi SC 
flow[measures]+workforce 
growth[single,measures]- workforce 
decay[single,measures], initial market 
fragmentation*INIT installed 
fraction[measures]*initial total WF) 




INTEG ( from single to multi SC 
flow[measures]+workforce 
growth[multi,measures]-workforce 
decay[multi,measures], (1-initial market 
fragmentation)*INIT installed 
fraction[measures]*initial total WF) 
workers Total retrofit workforce by type (single or multi installers) 
workforce growth 
(investment effort in workforce[SC 
type,measures]* desired hiring[SC 
type,measures]/workforce adjustment time+ 
workforce adjustment for backlog[SC 
type,measures]/workforce adjustment time) 
workers/Month 
This flow represents the increase in the retrofit workforce for both single and multi supply 
chain. It depends on the investments done in the supply chain multiplied by the desired 
hiring (this is a workforce expansion due to future projected profits). To this it is summed 
the workforce needed to cover any eventual backlog 
workforce productivity 10 
measures/workers/
Month 
The value is an educated guess made by researchers since no data were available 
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workforce reference for 
economy of scale 
INITIAL( total WF[measures]) workers 
Workforce is a proxy for accounting the supply chain size. This value is a reference value 
after which the economy of scale starts to play a role 
workforce skills 
MIN(1, Workforce weighted by 
skills[measures]/total WF[measures]) 
Dmnl 
Here the workforce weighted by skill is divided by the total workforce available, in order to 
calculate the average total workforce skills 
workforce threshold for 
marketing 
30000 workers 
Once the workforce employed for a specific measure exceed this number, the different 
actors in the supply chain start to compete and to initiate marketing initiatives. Educated 
guess made by researchers based on the inputs of BEIS experts 
workforce training 
MAX(0, effort intensity in 
training[measures]*total WF[measures]* 
perceived gap in quality[measures]/training 
time) 
workers/Month 
This inflow represents the increase workforce skills: this  inflow of workers trained to 
close the quality gap goes into the stock and increases the workforce weighted by skills 
Workforce weighted by 
skills 




reference skills of new 
workers*SUM(Workforce for retrofit[SC 
type!,measures])) 
workers 
Here the total workforce is weighted by the skills they have. If the workforce has maximum 















External .xlsx file 
An external Microsoft Excel (.xlsx format) file named ‘energy’ was used to support with external data the model. Below are reported all the data in the file, 
necessary to replicate the simulations. Important is to remember to place this data in a sheet named ‘Sheet1’ 
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